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Introduction 
In 2015, the American author Dave Eggers was awarded Ghent University’s Amnesty 
International Chair for his work in the field of human rights. This Chair is awarded each 
year to someone who has “made exceptional efforts in the fight for human rights” 
(Furniere). Ghent University’s choice of laureate begs a number of questions that go to 
the heart of this American author-activist’s place in the contemporary American 
cultural field. How can a literary author make an “exceptional” effort in the fight for 
human rights or have a meaningful impact on human rights related issues? There seems 
to be an obvious answer to this question. Dave Eggers is prolifically active, not just as a 
writer, but as a publisher, editor, and activist. In addition, his literary success is 
intricately bound up with collaborative testimonial projects such as What Is the What or 
Zeitoun, which testify to human rights issues in Central Africa and the United States 
respectively. Yet it is not immediately clear why Eggers’s different forms of activism, 
from charitable foundations and organizations to collaborative testimonial works, 
warrant the label of “human rights activism” or how his involvement as an 
intermediary affects that activism. Nor is it obvious how the themes addressed in his 
novels and short stories, such as global inequality (You Shall Know Our Velocity), the 
impact of globalization (A Hologram for the King), or privacy (The Circle), are affected by 
their being focused through the lens of human rights. Moreover, how does his largely 
literary contribution to the “fight” for human rights relate to more formalized legal and 
political human rights projects? The question as to why Eggers was distinguished by 
Amnesty and Ghent University thus ultimately comes down to the following: how do 
Eggers’s various forms of storytelling relate to the multifarious discourse of human 
rights? This dissertation grew out of a need to address these interconnected questions. 
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Questioning the deceptively “obvious,” it traces and maps the interconnections between 
this contemporary American author’s (extra-)textual activism and the prominent 
discourse of human rights. 
The specific reason for Eggers’s selection for the Amnesty International Chair seems 
to lie in two aspects of his prolific activities in the contemporary American cultural 
field. First, he is the founder of a number of charitable foundations and organizations, 
the most important of which centre on education. 826 Valencia and ScholarMatch seek 
to provide educational opportunities for people from disadvantaged backgrounds in the 
United States. In addition to these, there is also the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation 
and the Zeitoun Foundation, which Eggers founded with the victim-collaborators of his 
books What Is the What and Zeitoun respectively, and to which he has donated all 
royalties from these best-selling books. The Valentino Achak Deng Foundation built and 
operates a school in Deng’s home village in South Sudan, while the Zeitoun Foundation 
funded reconstruction projects in New Orleans and promoted interfaith understanding. 
Second, Eggers has sought to translate his success on the literary scene into additional 
activism. In 1998, he founded McSweeney’s, which has since grown into a well-respected 
non-profit publishing house. Based in San Francisco, McSweeney’s produces books 
(including Eggers’s own works), an influential literary journal (Timothy McSweeney’s 
Quarterly Concern), a bi-monthly magazine (The Believer), and Voice of Witness, a non-
profit book series that depicts human rights crises around the world through the stories 
of the men and women who experienced them.  
It is perhaps his authorial persona and output though that comes closest to 
explaining why he was nominated for a contribution to the “fight for human rights.” 
Indeed, Eggers himself seems convinced that storytelling is the central axis around 
which his activism turns. In mine and Stef Craps’s interview with the author regarding 
his being awarded the Amnesty International Chair, Eggers expresses his firm belief in 
providing the means for those whose human rights have been violated to “reclaim their 
narrative” (qtd. in Bex and Craps 559). The traumatic pasts and presents disempowered 
people recount are likely to be perceived by a contemporary audience, especially a 
Western one, as human rights issues. More broadly, his work as an author, editor, and 
publisher, most of which is centred on telling or amplifying the stories of disempowered 
others, highlights the conceptual importance of narrative for the human rights project. 
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In this broader sense, James Dawes has argued that the act of bearing witness through 
stories lies at the heart of the human rights movement as a whole (Dawes, Evil Men 8). 
This helps to refine the scope for this dissertation’s central questions in that narrative 
and storytelling thus become the nexus of the interconnections between Eggers and 
human rights. Similarly, this coalescence of narrative form and human rights forms the 
basis for a partial reconceptualization of human rights that emphasizes its cultural in 
addition to its legal and political roots. In order to bring Eggers’s ties to human rights 
into focus, in other words, my analysis examines the affordances and obstacles his use of 
narrative – and his role in shaping those narratives – faces through its embedding in the 
cultural field of human rights.1 
In doing so, the analyses in this dissertation position themselves at the crossroads of 
a number of prevailing theoretical, methodological, and analytical approaches in the 
recently emerged field of human rights and literature. In terms of theory, the field of 
human rights has swelled beyond its original, legal borders as a result of concerted 
interest on the part of, amongst others, humanities scholars. The humanities have 
sought to bring their expertise with regard to trauma narratives, (trans)cultural 
memory, restitution, and commemorative practices into touch with the world’s 
foremost legal, political, and moral discourse.2 Some of the field’s foundational texts 
include Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith’s Human Rights and Narrated Lives (2004), Daniel 
Levy and Natan Sznaider’s Human Rights and Memory (2010), and Andreas Huyssen’s 
“International Human Rights and the Politics of Memory: Limits and Challenges” (2011). 
 
                                                     
1 The first chapter of this dissertation is devoted to delineating this broader understanding of a “human rights 
culture” within which Eggers’s oeuvre and activism can be embedded. 
2 Pheng Cheah sums up one of the main impetuses for the humanities to study human rights in “Humanity in 
the Field of Instrumentality” when she writes:  
The proliferation of discourses on human rights after the end of the cold war indicates that 
globalization raises the deepest anxieties about the continuing preservation of our humanity. 
Because the humanities does not take the humanity of the human being as a given but sets as 
its basic task the inquiry of how humanity is constituted, it can help us assess whether the 
vicissitudes of globalization compel a radical rethinking of what it means to be human. (1552) 
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The latter’s focus is typical of such studies. Huyssen contends that the abstract, 
legalistic discourse of human rights may be enriched by the “memory of rights 
violations” so as to provide it with a historical grounding that can confront the promise 
of universal rights with less utopian realities (607-608).3 Similarly, scholars working in 
history or law have sought to develop histories of the legal and political development of 
human rights against the backdrop of – mostly Western – history and culture. Samuel 
Moyn’s The Last Utopia (2010) and Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights (2007) can be 
considered emblematic, even if they severally embed the history of human rights in 
respectively a strictly contemporary and broader historical context. I will contextualize 
and engage with these works throughout this dissertation, qualifying some of their 
optimism and expanding their disciplinary purview at times so as to allow for a more 
comprehensive discussion of how literary rights-work takes place. Indeed, my 
positioning of Eggers vis-à-vis human rights provides a case study through which to 
explore some of the core assertions and assumptions upon which the coalescence of the 
humanities and human rights are based. 
What makes Eggers’s oeuvre and activism so apt as a means of contributing to the 
field of human rights and literature is how the theoretical concerns of this field   
manifest themselves on a formal level in his work. Even as his commitment to human 
rights issues makes him recognizable as a “human rights activist,” his adept exploration 
of narrative form in service of those issues ties him to the processes and problems of 
human rights storytelling on a deeper level. In and of itself, Eggers’s projects may seem 
typical with regard to human rights activism by authors. His penchant for collaborative 
testimonial work, contributions to human rights charities at home and abroad, and 
gentle coaxing of the reader’s affective engagement with victim-subjects in, for 
instance, What Is the What or Zeitoun are commonplace in this respect. It has also been 
pointed out that his tendency to explore the insecurities and postnational identities of 
 
                                                     
3 In a special issue of PMLA on The Humanities in Human Rights: Critique, Language, Politics, Domna C. Stanton 
specifies what is meant by this abstraction in relation to human rights as they  were universally proclaimed by 
the United Nation in 1948: “Human rights discourse openly embraces the universal (“the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”), though it is far from clear what the term specifically means in covenants and 
charters and, most especially, in practice” (1519). 
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American protagonists in the world is typical of twenty-first century American fiction.4 
The innovation and peculiarity of Eggers is located on a more formal level, where the 
dynamics of his collaborative storytelling, affective engagement, and cross-cultural 
encounters are laid bare in his use of narrative voice, focalization, structure, dramatic 
tension, and character development. The mechanics of narrative voice as it is complexly 
constructed by the author and distortedly heard by the reader in What Is the What 
mimics the difficulty of engaging the subaltern’s voice in the global public sphere. 
Similarly, the problematization of the relationship between charity, cross-cultural 
encounters, and human rights work in You Shall Know Our Velocity is poignantly played 
out in a series of silent dialogues between the Western protagonists and the 
disempowered subjects in the novel which run counter to the individual isolation of 
those characters as they undergo the narrative’s events. The formal features of Eggers’s 
works, in other words, call into question the basic premises with which his activism – 
and the human rights project more broadly – is engaged. 
A key critical touchstone in this respect is the field of postcolonial studies, which 
provides a sceptical lens through which to survey the use of narrative form in aid of a 
global rights project which, as Moyn’s and Hunt’s studies reinforce, has its origins in the 
West. If the coalescence of the humanities and human rights has turned up some 
productive dynamics between the two, postcolonial theory provides a necessary foil to 
those optimistic conclusions. Edward Said’s landmark study, Orientalism (1978), exposed 
the force of cultural imperialism, showing how a discourse of inequality between 
civilization and savagery paved the way for the colonial mission civilisatrice. A key part of 
the discourse of colonialism, as Homi K. Bhabha argues in The Location of Culture (1995), is 
the exclusion of the subaltern from the hegemony through a fixed “ideological 
construction of otherness“ (66). This is especially relevant in the context of human 
rights and narrative. As long as the concept of universal rights is a promise rather than 
a reality – a last utopia, as Moyn terms it – the relationship between those whose rights 
 
                                                     
4 See Peter Boxall’s Twenty-First Century Fiction (2013), Caren Irr’s Toward the Geopolitical Novel (2013), Timothy 
Gallow’s Understanding Dave Eggers (2014). I will engage at length with all three of these studies in the first 
chapter as a means of positioning Eggers in the contemporary American cultural field. 
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are guaranteed and those who are perpetually at risk of having their rights violated is 
integral to the story of human rights. The issue at hand is that of how proclaimed 
equality and protections can be made real and can be sufficiently entrenched in a social, 
cultural, and political sense. The concept of narrative is key to untangling this issue. 
Joseph Slaughter’s seminal work, Human Rights Inc. (2007), traces the interconnection of 
the Bildungsroman and the rise of human rights, noting in particular how the former 
helps subjects narrate their inclusion into a society of rights-bearers. Slaughter makes a 
valuable connection between the human rights project and the cultural field within 
which it operates, thereby plotting the course for subjects to secure recognition and 
protection of their rights. However, this process can also be tied to the postcolonial 
concern with regard to the hierarchy-reinforcing discourse that emerged from that 
culture in the past and which prevents such a process from ever taking place. The 
narrative route to inclusion must bridge those cross-cultural distinctions that facilitate 
exclusion if it is to be successful. It is this dissertation’s ambition to bring the recent 
interest in human rights and literature into sustained contact with these postcolonial 
concerns so as to pave the way for a formal analysis of the politics of rights as it plays 
out in Eggers’s oeuvre. 
A critical point in this respect has to do with Eggers’s own role in helping 
disempowered subjects reclaim their narrative. It is unclear whether or not his 
mediation facilitates an expansion of the purview of human rights or constitutes a mere 
incorporation of the victim-subject into the existing hegemony without challenging the 
exclusionary limits of that hegemony. The work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak helps 
throw this question into sharp relief, given her focus on the possibilities and salience of 
subaltern speech in the face of hegemonic exclusion in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 
and her influential essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”5 As such, postcolonial theory 
 
                                                     
5 Another key critical voice in this respect will be Judith Butler, who brings the issue of subaltern speech into 
contact with human rights in her afterword to the aforementioned special issue of PMLA on the subject: “The 
claim of human rights is articulated in a speech situation in which someone can speak in a language that is not 
only understood but also engaged, received, responded to. Thus, the conditions of possibility of making a 
claim already raise the problem of address and translation—of communicability; the norms of reasonableness; 
the conditions for utterability, aural registration, and a more generalized response” (1659). 
  7 
serves as a litmus test for the potentially positive impact of Eggers’s personal narratives 
within contemporary human rights culture by measuring the promise of generalized 
rights against the hierarchies and neo-colonial flows of power that preserve inequality. 
It opens up an important and underexplored angle on what constitutes as “human 
rights work” such as Eggers’s. It uncovers, clarifies, and questions the role of literature, 
or literary activism, in staging the encounters in the global public sphere upon which 
the human rights project relies. This helps to position Eggers’s collaborative and other 
literary works in human rights culture within the broader field within which human 
rights operates. The reinsertion of human rights culture into the postcolonial public 
sphere makes up the dissertation’s main theoretical contribution, as it is precisely the 
relationship between the formal characteristics of human rights texts and the political 
work of the human rights project that remain undertheorized.  
These formal characteristics of Eggers’s oeuvre are also central to the contribution 
this dissertation makes to the study of literary texts in conjunction with human rights, 
on the one hand, and the study of this major contemporary American author, on the 
other. In doing so, this dissertation forms the first book-length study of this major 
contemporary American author that brings his work into contact with the discourse of 
human rights through a sustained analysis of narrative form. With regard to his 
collaborative testimonial works, the key formal features to be considered are the 
construction of narrative voice in his collaborative texts, the role and impact of the 
author as mediator, and the soliciting of readerly identification through focalization and 
dramatic tension. When it comes to the remainder of his oeuvre, the thematic 
representation of the global public sphere and the nature of the cross-cultural 
relationships within it are of paramount importance, given that they confront the 
transnational human rights project with the spectres of imperialism. My discussion of 
narrative form across Eggers’s oeuvre unsettles the optimistic view put forward by Hunt 
or Schaffer and Smith with regard to human rights storytelling by exposing the 
ambiguity of literary activism in a human rights context. In Eggers’s oeuvre, the 
intricacy of narrative form throws the complexity of the politics of rights into sharp 
relief. In the case of his collaborative testimonial work, it sharpens the perception of 
these projects as double-edged swords that both help and hinder those he hopes to 
serve. Similarly, his novels and short stories consistently thematize the insecurities and 
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distrust that mark the global public sphere within which the human rights project 
operates in their exploration of stunted Western protagonists in search of meaningful 
cross-cultural encounters. 
Exploratory Case Study: J.M.W Turner’s The Slave Ship 
The cover of this dissertation provides a brief case study for how the theoretical 
concerns outlined above are taken up in a methodological and analytical sense. Given its 
contemporary focus, it may be considered strange at first for this dissertation to be 
framed by Joseph Mallard William Turner’s The Slave Ship, Slavers Throwing Overboard the 
Dead and Dying, Typhoon Coming On (1840), a mid-nineteenth-century painting dedicated 
to the abolition of chattel slavery and the slave trade.6 Nevertheless, this iconic 
painting, through its back story, production, and impact forms a microcosm of those 
questions that drive this dissertation’s study. In fact, Turner’s painting brings into focus 
precisely how the broad lines of enquiry set out above can be pursued in relation to 
cultural activism such as Eggers’s. Thematically and diachronically, the two cultural 
actors, Eggers and Turner, are linked by their artistic representations of suffering in 
service of the politics of rights. The Slave Ship can be seen as a decision on the part of one 
of Britain’s most celebrated artists, Turner, to depict the plight of disempowered 
subjects whose protest against the inhumanity they were being forced to endure he felt 
was worth amplifying. As such, it constitutes an aestheticization of human suffering 
designed to galvanize a British audience in support of the abolition of the slave trade. 
John Ruskin, the influential Victorian art critic, helped Turner achieve this aim by 
writing up an extensive review of the painting in the first volume of his monumental 
work Modern Painters, where he praised its “daring conception” and dedication “to the 
most sublime of subjects and impressions” (572, 573). Commenting on the chilling scene, 
Ruskin notes how the dramatic depiction of the sea makes it seem as though “the lurid 
 
                                                     
6 Henceforth referred to by its common abbreviated title The Slave Ship. 
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shadows of the hollow breakers are cast upon the mist of night, which gathers cold and 
low, advancing like the shadow of death upon the guilty ship as it labours amidst the 
lightening of the sea” (572, my emphasis).7 Ruskin’s description, as if to echo the nature 
of the sublime, marries the awe-inspiring beauty of the painting to the overwhelming, 
disturbing inhumanity of the scene, its aesthetically pleasing façade thereby masking its 
ethically unsettling reality.  
Compositionally, The Slave Ship uses vivid red and blue colours to depict a harrowing 
oceanic scene in which a slave ship is in the process of perishing in a ferocious storm. 
The scene is split into two spatial sections. In the background, the eye is initially held by 
a ship being engulfed by waves, its crew waiting to be swallowed by the ocean. At the 
front, far less obvious at first glance, limbs pleadingly rise from the water even as chains 
weigh them down towards a watery grave. In case the title of the piece left anyone in 
doubt as to what exactly the scene was depicting, Turner wrote seven lines of verse to 
accompany it for the Royal Academy exhibition in 1840: 
Aloft all hands, strike the top-masts and belay; 
Yon angry setting sun and fierce-edged clouds 
Declare the Typhon's coming. 
Before it sweeps your decks, throw overboard 
The dead and dying – ne'er heed their chains 
Hope, Hope, fallacious Hope! 
Where is thy market now? (qtd. in Shanes 222) 
The poor souls drowning in the foreground are thus identified as slaves who have been 
thrown overboard by the captain. The storm serves as a sublime symbol for nature 
cleansing the seas of the slave trade. It makes no distinction between slaver and slave, 
reducing man to his essential humanity in the face of such an awe-inspiring display of 
nature’s indiscriminate force. The “market” referred to in the final line, in addition to 
being a reference to the slave trade more generally, specifically clarifies the reasoning 
behind casting the slaves overboard. This practice ensured that insurance payments 
 
                                                     
7 He famously concludes this section by writing that if he were “reduced to rest Turner’s immortality upon any 
single work, I should choose this” (572).  
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could be claimed for lost slaves. If they were to have died at the hands of those 
transporting them or of disease, for instance, no such payment would have been 
forthcoming. Turner’s condemnation of this horrible practice on canvas poignantly 
raised awareness of this inhuman treatment, bringing it to life in dramatic fashion for 
all to see.  
The Slave Ship has clear ties to the abolitionist movement, both in its inspiration and 
provenance. Two possible explanations have been given as to what inspired Turner to 
commit this tragic scene to canvas. The first relates to a particular historical incident 
said to have occurred in 1781, when the captain of the slave ship Zong threw overboard 
the sick and dying slaves so he could claim recompense for cargo lost at sea. As Leo 
Costello writes in “Turner’s The Slave Ship (1840): Towards a Dialectical History 
Painting,” The Slave Ship is noteworthy for how it brings the past into the present, 
thereby bringing the issue of slavery and abolition into focus in a nation, Great Britain, 
that had legally dealt with that issue through the 1807 Abolition of the Slave Trade Act 
(210). As such, the painting forced its audience to consider the past in light of the 
present and shocked them into action by connecting the on-going struggle for 
abolitionism to the horrific practices that had accrued sufficient political currency to 
force action in the past. 
The second, alternative prompt for the painting’s production is solely the broader 
and more contemporary issue, namely of the continuing suffering caused by the slave 
trade even after Great Britain had withdrawn from it earlier that century.8 In “Turner’s 
Slave Ship: Abolition, Ruskin, Reception,” John McCoubrey places the painting squarely 
in this mid-nineteenth-century period and sees it as part of the campaign against the 
continuing international slave trade, thereby severing its connection to the particular 
history of the slave ship Zong (320-329). In this case, the painting is a direct 
 
                                                     
8 In fact, the slave trade persisted in the British colonies until it was abolished there in 1838. Other nations, 
such as Spain, Portugal, and France, also continued with the practice, which imbued the fight against the 
international slave trade with additional ferocity in the 1830s and beyond. McCoubrey suggests as much when 
he points out that the blue and white flag in the centre of the painting most likely belongs to that of a 
Portuguese or Spanish slaver (324). As such, Turner’s unveiling of The Slave Ship in 1840 is a timely reminder to 
his British audience that the problem of the trading of slaves had not by any means been rooted out.  
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representation of the continuing inhumanity on the high seas that was happening right 
under the nose of the nation that had sought to abolish the slave trade and whose navy 
was said to rule the waves. In this reading, the painting serves as a disruption to the 
narrative that the slave trade had been dealt with and required no further attention.  
The Slave Ship continued to serve the struggle for black rights across the Atlantic 
when, in 1876, it was sold to Alice Sturgis Hooper, who shared it with the then newly 
founded Museum of Fine Arts in Boston which, she insisted, should “display pictures 
with an elevating message” (qtd. in May 183). In the final half of the nineteenth century, 
however, its affective force as a call to activism seems to have fallen short of its mark. 
The Atlantic Monthly’s 1877 review of the piece provides a glimpse into American popular 
and critical impressions of the painting’s heart-wrenching scene, blaming Turner for 
ruining a vivid seascape with the ugliness of human suffering: “It is difficult to imagine 
why the artist should have disfigured his picture by this story of ‘man’s inhumanity to 
man,’ – marring one of the most glorious aspects of nature by the introduction of one of 
the most hideous of crimes” (“Art” 510). What Turner, Ruskin, and Hooper clearly 
shared was the belief that The Slave Ship, by depicting the scene so vividly, could 
contribute significantly to the moral fight against slavery and the slave trade. However, 
The Slave Ship’s transatlantic reception, illustrated by the representative review in The 
Atlantic Monthly, shows how art’s call to arms can also fall on deaf ears. 
The brief case study of Turner’s The Slave Ship underscores four intriguing aspects of 
how artistic depictions of suffering intersect with the process of claiming rights. First, it 
shows that the act of securing recognition for one’s humanity by disrupting the 
discourse that marginalizes certain subjects resonates beyond the legal and political 
sphere and into the cultural, with which it seems to be engaged in a mutually 
reinforcing dynamic. If the political movement and act of parliament that triggered the 
abolition of the slave trade in the early nineteenth century prompted Turner to get 
involved in the issue, his painting imbued the cause with additional cultural capital so as 
to allow it to continue to effect social and political change. Second, even a concise 
overview of the inspiration and provenance of The Slave Ship reveals how the power of a 
compelling and emotively charged narrative can be appropriated and reappropriated 
diachronically to serve the politics of rights. Third, in a more synchronic sense, it points 
towards the ways in which shocking images and stories can broach rights issues not 
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only through fact, but also through affect. Finally, The Slave Ship’s own transatlantic 
journey and mixed reception questions the premise of the sentimental thesis upon 
which this form of cultural activism relies as it begs the question as to why certain 
audiences are seemingly immune to being shocked or affectively impacted. 
The chapters of this dissertation will bring precisely these four considerations to bear 
on Eggers’s texts through a complementary mix of close and distant readings. These 
readings will be framed by the theoretical debates and questions that come out of the 
intersecting fields of human rights, literary studies, and postcolonial theory. Chapter 
one sets out to define the concept of human rights in a broad sense, paying particular 
attention to its cultural dimension(s). It goes on to trace Eggers’s relationship to human 
rights culture so as to ascertain on what terms his activism engages with the influential 
discourse of human rights as well as how he is helped and hindered by it. His 
collaborative testimonial works and fictional stories, I argue, broadly adhere to the basic 
principles and practices of human rights culture within the discursive spaces of the 
narrative worlds they create. The ideal of cross-cultural encounters as a means of 
expanding the circle of rights-bearers prevails, both thematically and in terms of 
focalization and narrative voice. As I go on to show in subsequent chapters, however, he 
sometimes goes against the grain of that culture when those same principles and 
practices seem to prevent or impede egalitarian cross-cultural engagement. 
Chapter two seeks to unpack Eggers’s use of the personal narrative by understanding 
the way in which the form has been used historically as a rights-space creating tool. It 
starts from the observation that disempowered subjects have made use of narrative 
forms to claim rights in the face of discrimination for centuries. The power of the story 
is that it allows these subjects to speak directly to an audience they found it hard to 
reach out to politically. As such, a discussion of the narrative route to salience as well as 
why their pleas were variously (re-)silenced or went unheard sheds further light on the 
required effort on the part of disempowered subjects and rights-bearing readers alike 
for rights to be claimed successfully. This study of the personal narrative in history 
brings the dissertation back to the issue of slavery, focusing this time on how slave 
narratives sought to disrupt the hegemonic discourse of racial inequality so as to make 
room for black rights. A discussion of the fraught relationship between the abolitionist 
movement, (former) slaves, and United States culture around the time of Emancipation 
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provides a useful perspective from which to survey Eggers’s own collaborative 
testimonial efforts to secure the recognition of rights for disempowered others. 
Moreover, a more extensive corpus of personal narratives across distinctive historical 
periods begins to map out the particular formal features that mark the personal 
narrative’s diachronic use in the context of rights. I show that, despite their widely 
different contexts, slave narratives and Eggers’s contemporary narratives display a 
marked formal similarity in how they seek to affect and move the reader towards 
recognizing rights and social action more broadly.  
Chapter three delves more deeply into the affective aspect of personal narratives as 
they are variously explored in trauma studies (Caruth; LaCapra) and postcolonial studies 
(Spivak; Attridge). The close readings of the author’s collaborative testimonies in this 
chapter allow Eggers’s texts to be reconceived of as fully-fledged discursive spaces that 
comprise but are not limited to the rights claim contained within disempowered 
subjects’ recollections of past trauma. Even if that is the primary function of the text in 
approaching the reader, the use of narrative techniques and devices that facilitate these 
acts of collaborative witnessing and the staging of rights violations resonates beyond 
that primary function. Indeed, simply by approaching the reader with the request for 
them to engage with someone else’s traumatic experiences and recognize their right to 
rights, questions are raised as to the terms on which that engagement takes place, what 
the reader’s relationship is to the disempowered subject’s trauma, and to what extent 
the reader is able to grant the victim rights. In this chapter, I argue that Eggers’s texts 
work hard to destabilize the straightforward identificatory reading practices that 
underlie human rights culture’s premise of putting rights-bearers in touch with the 
suffering of disempowered others as a means of generating socio-political change. Form 
is key to unpacking this process. For instance, What Is the What makes use of its 
collaborative authorship to generate an ambiguous narrative voice that guards against 
the reader’s ability to appropriate the victim’s voice through straightforward 
identification. This destabilizing process is significant because it seeks to provide 
interpretative cues for the reader that lead away from appropriative or patronizing 
engagements with the disempowered subject’s narrative. 
The final chapter further scrutinizes the effectiveness of human rights culture by 
investigating the competition to its efforts it faces in the global public sphere. This 
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competition comes in the form of countervailing discourses, practices, and mindsets 
that are perpetuated culturally in the form of neo-colonial stereotypes that fix the 
subaltern as a passive and helpless collective that exists in the lawless borderlands of 
the global rights-community. What makes these modes of thinking so pernicious is how 
they effectively counteract some of the core aims of human rights by stressing 
fundamental differences between human beings and by entrenching racialized 
hierarchies of Enlightened and primitive cultures. Whereas Eggers’s collaborative 
testimonial work aims to overcome these countervailing discourses, his fictional work 
often exposes how cross-cultural relationships and engagements struggle not to be 
inflected by neo-colonialism. This chapter takes this discrepancy as a cue to instigate a 
dialogue between the various narrative forms that mark Eggers’s oeuvre. It deploys the 
author’s novels and short stories as caveats and qualifications to his collaborative 
testimonial work, thus weighing up the value of the latter’s efforts to salvage its rights-
work from the issues raised in those novels and short stories. 
The issues thrown up by this final chapter neatly converge with the poignant 
postcolonial interrogation of the human rights project. This interrogation is helped by 
the dissertation’s broad geographical and historical range, which inserts Eggers’s 
literary activism into the global aspect of the human rights project and relates his 
literary output to previous such rights-work in literary history. A discussion of the 
difficulties and possibilities in facilitating empathy and understanding for human rights 
crises through narrative as staged by Eggers’s texts emerges from the diachronic and 
synchronic studies in chapters two and three respectively. At the same time, Eggers’s 
use of the personal narrative is also marked by its embedding in a specific 
contemporary iteration of the discourse of rights, which poses specific challenges to the 
subaltern’s ability to speak. Earlier sections of chapters three and four were published as 
journal articles in respectively Cultural Critique and The Journal of Human Rights and were 
concerned precisely with postcolonial analyses of Eggers’s embedding in the 
contemporary American cultural field and human rights culture. Having thus staked out 
Eggers’s position within human rights culture both in a contemporary and a historical 
sense, I further tease out the implications of such postcolonial scrutiny for Eggers’s 
work within that culture. As I will show, these implications reach beyond the particular 
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cases, practices, and narratives as they are tied to Eggers and provide a window onto 
how literature and human rights interact with the global public sphere. 
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 1 Dave Eggers and the Cultural Space of Human 
Rights 
This chapter traces the intersections of the contemporary American author Dave 
Eggers’s various literary and non-literary works and the influential discourse of human 
rights. Eggers has both directly and indirectly engaged with human rights issues 
throughout his varied career as an author, publisher, editor, and activist. His 
collaborative testimonial works, What Is the What and Zeitoun, have garnered significant 
interest for how a successful white, male, American author and a disadvantaged person 
of colour have joined forces in bearing witness to the latter’s traumatic past, often 
pushing the boundaries of style and genre-conventions in the process. The Voice of 
Witness series, which Eggers co-founded and which publishes edited volumes in which 
victims of a wide range of rights abuses testify to their experiences, is similarly 
committed to the power of the personal narrative in furthering the reach and 
recognition of human rights. In addition to this, his works of narrative fiction such as 
You Shall Know Our Velocity, A Hologram for the King, or the short story “Up the Mountain 
Coming Down Slowly” show Eggers’s broader preoccupation with the concept of global 
citizenship, postnational identity, and cross-cultural encounters.  
In this chapter’s preliminary exploration of the author’s works, I show how his 
fictional and non-fictional works can be read productively within the context of the 
cultural dimension of human rights. It does so in order to set up a further analysis of 
how the author’s oeuvre is embedded in a culture of human rights that is 
simultaneously related to, interconnected with, and yet distinctive from legal-political 
iterations of human rights. Both his collaborative testimonial work and his fictional 
stories graft the central tenets of that human rights culture onto the discursive spaces 
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of the narrative worlds they create. Within these discursive spaces though, the basic 
principles and modern applications of human rights are subsequently engaged and 
interrogated by confronting its abstract and legalistic precepts with the (partially) 
fictionalized representations of the diffuse experiences of disempowered others whose 
rights have been abused, or the trials and tribulations of rights-bearing citizens 
exploring the boundaries and limitations of the global rights project. 1  
As such, Eggers’s relationship with human rights culture turns out to be mutually 
inflectional. Even if his narratives betray the extent to which they have internalized the 
principles and practices of human rights culture in the rights-work they perform, they 
also go against the grain of that culture when those same principles and practices seem 
to prevent or hinder egalitarian cross-cultural engagement. Eggers’s commitment to 
amplifying the lesser heard voices of victims of rights abuses is reflected in the 
narrative culture surrounding human rights. Much of his work is indebted to the belief, 
central to human rights culture, that personal narratives told by disempowered subjects 
have a sufficiently impactful affective charge to convince readers to recognize the 
rights of victims and join them in advocating for the safeguarding of rights in future. 
When these encounters between disempowered subjects and readers are staged across 
his oeuvre, however, they come up against many of the issues that have plagued and 
continue to plague human rights as a global moral code and framework. These issues 
include the accusation that human rights is simply the latest incarnation of imperialist 
discourses or that it is so abstract and legalistic that it is rendered inaccessible to the 
vast majority of victims in need of a means of articulating their grievances and claiming 
recognition of their rights.  
 
                                                     
1 Throughout this dissertation, I will refer to human rights in conjunction with the singular form of verbs so as 
to make the distinction between human rights as a conceptual entity and as a series of specific rights. As a 
result, when I am referring to a set of particular rights, the plural form will be used. This is important because, 
even though Eggers’s works tend to focus on a certain subset of basic civil and political rights set out in the 
Universal Declaration, his works are often concerned on a more fundamental level with negotiating access for 
disempowered subjects to the discourse of human rights in general and, more conceptually, for those subjects 
to be considered first and foremost as qualifying as the “human” covered by human rights. 
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Often, Eggers’s texts actively seek to expose such issues and provide narrative cues 
that lead away from cross-cultural engagements grounded in neo-colonial stereotypes. 
Similarly, as a novelist and writer, Eggers also puts his talent for compelling narration in 
service of the subaltern by turning disempowered subjects’ experiences into easily 
accessible and thought-provoking stories. Overall, his oeuvre seems to want to help 
disempowered subjects tell their stories or engage with rights-related issues in other 
ways in his fictional works in such a way that his publications benefit from the socio-
political capital attached to the discourse of human rights while mitigating the 
detrimental impact of the continued influence of global hierarchies and power 
dynamics that undermine such rights-work at every turn. 
In this, Eggers is only partially successful. At their best, Eggers’s narratives manage to 
nestle into human rights culture and deploy the discursive force of imaginative writing 
to secure recognition for disempowered subjects, to challenge neo-colonial reading and 
interpretative practices, and to navigate successfully the treacherous waters of human 
rights work in a global context. In subsequent chapters, I bring into focus some of the 
ways in which these successes are achieved. I explore how works such as What Is the 
What or Zeitoun make use of the genre characteristics of the personal narrative as a 
rights-space creating tool in order to secure a place for the testimonial subject within 
the hegemony of human rights. Simultaneously, the form of the personal narrative is 
used to push the boundaries of that discourse and to question whose lives fall outside of 
that hegemony. Part of this happens through the intricate use of textual cues that 
guides the identificatory process at the heart of human rights culture towards a more 
egalitarian, affective interaction between the disempowered subject and the privileged 
reader. The carefully crafted structure of both the texts and paratexts are similarly 
instrumental in maximizing the potential rights-work that his narratives can achieve.  
At their worst, however, Eggers’s narratives remain marred by a Western bias and 
pernicious neo-colonialism that continues negatively to inflect the ever-fraught 
relationship between privileged readers or activists and disenfranchised others. Despite 
his best intentions, Eggers’s collaborative testimonial endeavours remain bound by the 
strictures of a book market, and – as I go on to show – rights culture more broadly, that 
is more attuned to the artistic machinations of a white author than the plight and plea 
of his subaltern collaborators. This unhelpful dynamic is underscored by the realities of 
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co-publication, in which the rhetorical force of the rights-claiming protagonist in the 
narrative competes for socio-cultural capital with the purchase the successful author 
has on the Western literary marketplace and readership.  
Interestingly, the exploration of precisely these failings of cross-cultural dynamics is 
at the centre of many of Eggers’s fictional works, such as You Shall Know Our Velocity, A 
Hologram for the King, or the short story “Up the Mounting Coming Down Slowly.” In 
these narratives, insecure Western protagonists venture out into the world seeking to 
engage disempowered others. These engagements take the form of charity, silent 
sympathy, and stunted conversations, through which the protagonists continually 
struggle to step out from the shadow of the negative connotations of the (neo-)colonial 
cultures and structures from which they hail. The mutually reinforcing logic behind this 
lies in how the Western characters cannot think beyond the familiar hierarchical global 
power dynamics that govern their interpretation of disempowered others, and how 
those disempowered others remain wary of Western humanitarian impulses and 
interventions that solidify rather than tear down the hegemonic boundaries that render 
some lives more valuable than others.2 Accordingly, the postnational identities 
imagined for these protagonists are often less reflective of a freeing transnational 
aspiration towards global citizenship than they are of a strenuous and anxiety-ridden 
search for what lies beyond the unequal divisions of rights amongst the varying degrees 
of incorporated citizenship available across the globe.3 What makes the analysis of these 
 
                                                     
2 This solidification is usually the result of a hierarchy-reinforcing logic whereby those being helped are 
characterized as being less developed, weaker, and perpetually in need of assistance. The slave narratives in 
the next chapter provide a good example of this, as black subjects in nineteenth-century America suffered not 
only from slavery but also from the race theories that determined their inferiority and, therefore, need for 
structural direction and management. In the case of Eggers’s What Is the What or You Shall Know Our Velocity, 
this issue manifests itself on the level of African subjects. These narratives problematize the notion that 
African subjects exist in a pre-civilizational state that simultaneously makes them dependent on the charity of 
Westerners and underscores their fundamental exclusion from the Enlightened hegemony, from which 
human rights emerged in an intellectual sense. 
3 The concept of the rights-bearing human as an incorporated citizen whose rights are guaranteed within the 
context of the nation state is taken from Joseph Slaughter’s seminal work Human Rights Inc. In this study, 
Slaughter traces what he calls the mutually enabling fictions of the Bildungsroman and human rights in 
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fictional works in the context of global citizenship and human rights culture 
particularly relevant is how they inflect the rights-work Eggers sets out to do with his 
collaborative testimonial projects. 
In order to bring together these various analyses in the context of human rights, it is 
useful to find some clarity with regard to how one defines and distinguishes between 
broad, related concepts such as “human rights” and “human rights culture,” as well as 
what Eggers’s relationship is to both. In what follows, I deal with each of these in turn. 
The first section provides a broad discussion of contemporary human rights discourses, 
its attendant strengths and weaknesses, and the recent surge in studies of human rights 
in conjunction with cultural studies and literary studies in particular. On the basis of 
this, it becomes clear that human rights has an important cultural dimension that 
cannot simply be equated with or seen as an extension of its more abstract, legalistic 
one. As a result, this chapter goes on to investigate the particular cultural manifestation 
of human rights in order to introduce an expanded, fluid, and more experiential socio-
cultural understanding of rights discourses. This tentative definition of “human rights 
culture” will then be used to frame the chapter’s final section, in which Eggers’s work as 
an editor, author, publisher, and activist is broadly introduced. As such, the aim is not to 
provide a holistic picture of Eggers’s various entanglements in the literary field, but to 
uncover the degree to which his work can be read in conjunction with a broader 
conception of human rights as a cultural discourse that creates certain opportunities 
and raises certain obstacles to the type of activism in which Eggers engages. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Western culture. Both are fundamentally tied up with incorporating the individual into the nation state, 
which then becomes the ultimate arbiter of whose rights are recognized, granted, and protected. The finer 
points of Slaughter’s work will feature prominently in the next chapter, and will be further elaborated on and 
contextualized at that stage. 
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1.1 What Is Human Rights? 
Over the course of the past few decades, human rights has become the global moral and 
legal discourse for victims of atrocity to claim recompense for violations of what are 
seen as their innate rights as human beings. As such, it has become an aspirational set of 
ideas that, as Andrew Clapham writes in his popularizing Human Rights: A Very Short 
Introduction, “provide the vocabulary for arguing about which interests should prevail 
and how best to achieve the ends we have chosen” (“Preface”). The extent to which 
human rights has permeated the global consciousness in this respect is illustrated by 
David Rieff’s assertion in A Bed for the Night that the “claim that most humanitarian 
emergencies have their origins in human rights abuses is almost always correct and 
demonstrable” (323).4 Regardless of where or how specific human rights are (ab)used, 
the human rights movement is driven at its core – even if sometimes only rhetorically – 
by the appealingly decisive and clear basic principles outlined in the United Nations’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the UN in 1948. 
Further legal developments of the Declaration – which, arguably, has no legal clout in 
and of itself – consistently maintain ties to the articles set forth in the original 
declarative document.  
Accordingly, modern activists and humanitarians couch their efforts and protests in 
the language of human rights so as to allow their claims to resonate with the 
international conception of those rights. Some of the most prominent international 
NGO’s have risen to prominence in recent decades carrying the banner of human rights, 
such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. Often, these NGO’s are in the 
business of trying to effect international human rights agreements that cannot be 
enforced by law without the consent of nation states, many of whom are guilty of 
rights-abuses themselves or who see international human rights law as infringing upon 
 
                                                     
4 In Human Rights and Memory, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider give the example of how past and on-going 
ethnic and national conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East “are being interpreted by a 
global audience as human rights problems rather than as existential and ethnic divisions” (3). 
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their sovereignty.5 They are thus both made necessary by the weakness of human rights 
as a legal-political framework nation states choose to enforce and given weight by the 
rhetorical and cultural force of the principles and agreements to which nations across 
the globe have signed up. 
Despite the wide-reaching resonance of the Universal Declaration, both in activism 
and in law, human rights remains weak in a (geo-)political sense as a result of its 
continually seeking a balance between the varying interpretations of human rights put 
forward by normative international organizations, such as the United Nations, and 
regional institutions’, or, more often, nation states’ concerns over sovereignty. 
Ultimately, this delicate balance is laid bare in the extent to which universal principles 
and agreements on human rights are often perceived to be at odds with regional or 
national commitments and interests, even if national and regional institutions remain 
instrumental in guaranteeing and enforcing human rights law so long as international 
organizations operate on an inter-state consensual basis.6 In effect, this raises the 
 
                                                     
5 A recent example of the tension between efforts, both global and regional, to establish an international 
human rights framework that can be enforced, on the one hand, and the perceived safeguarding of national 
sovereignty on the other, has risen to prominence in the United Kingdom. Before the 2015 election, its then 
prime minister, David Cameron, promised to scrap the Human Rights Act, which integrates UK law with the 
European charter on human rights, and replace it with a British Bill of Rights, answerable only to the British 
parliament. Cameron’s motivation for the move highlights the extent to which interpretations of human 
rights vary between countries and regions. At the 2014 Conservative Party conference, he stated the European 
Court of Human Rights’ “interpretations of that charter [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union] have led to a whole lot of things that are frankly wrong” (Cameron). The two examples he gave were of 
prisoners’ having the right to vote and human rights law applying to war zones. This suggests that while 
supporters of the Universal Declaration may share its broad and universal ambitions, they may still wish to 
maintain control over how those ambitions are translated into individual countries and cultures. It should also 
be noted that the European Court of Human Rights, a dependency of the Council of Europe, is by no means the 
same as the European Union, a distinction often unhelpfully blurred in the UK’s relationship with both. 
6 Regional interests can clash with the transnational human rights project’s institutions, such as the ICC, in the 
case of, for instance, the African Union. Whereas the AU has committed itself to defending human rights – and 
has even set up an African Court of Justice and Human Rights to that effect – it is increasingly reluctant to 
accept any intrusion into African affairs by the ICC. This led to Human Rights Watch reasserting the necessity 
for the human rights project to maintain its global outlook in favour of regionalism in an open letter to the AU 
in July 2012: “To preserve the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court and its ability to deliver justice, 
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question of how human rights are to be meaningfully distinguished from civil rights, 
since the former’s universality is dependent on the individual guarantees provided to 
citizens by nation states. At the same time, Levy and Sznaider rightly point out that 
“[h]uman rights declarations are formulated as a set of rules, regulations, and norms 
challenging sovereignty” (2). Human rights and civil rights, intricately tied to national 
sovereignty, thus coexist uncomfortably, as Huyssen notes, because the nation state’s 
position in a globalizing world as the sole “guarantor of rights” is challenged by 
transnational rights institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights or the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) (610).7 The tenuousness of this relationship is 
exemplified by the ICC, an international tribunal able to prosecute individuals on 
charges for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This intergovernmental 
institution has continually come under fire from African nations and regional 
institutions such as the African Union (AU) for its perceived bias in prosecuting African 
warlords and dictators. The chairman of the AU, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, has 
called the ICC’s efforts “condescending,” defining the institution as “a political 
instrument targeting Africa and Africans” (Ghebreyesus). This serves as a useful 
illustration of the extent to which the global public sphere within which human rights 
operates at a geo-political level is highly contested, despite the more prolific 
penetration of human rights into the public sphere as a weighty discourse. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
there must be cooperation with the ICC and respect for the court’s decisions” (“Letter to Foreign Ministers in 
Advance of the 19th African Union Summit”). Even if this transnational focus coalesces with the universalist 
aspirations of the human rights movement, the risk in these cases is that such a rebuke helps to maintain 
(perceived) colonial distinctions between the West as a civilized haven of Enlightenment and Africa as a 
barbaric place of violations on the borderlands of the global rights project. 
7 It could be suggested that in framing his activities as an author and activist through human rights rather 
than civil rights, Eggers is challenging the primacy of the nation state as the guarantor of rights in a 
contemporary context. Then again, it is also clear that the issues he deals with in Zeitoun are explicitly issues 
of civil rights pertaining to the protagonist’s position and citizenship within the United States in addition to 
those human rights that are violated upon his imprisonment. In this sense, Zeitoun’s engagement with the 
politics of rights goes to the heart of this issue. This will be explored further in the final chapter, which deals 
with the implications for human rights culture caused by the tensions between the national and global 
contexts as explored by Eggers in his fictional works. 
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1.2 Literature, Human Rights, and Human Rights Culture 
The discrepancy between the weakness of the legal incarnation of human rights and the 
less tangible cultural impact of it forms the stepping stone for a further investigation of 
how human rights operates at a cultural level and what impact its non-legal conception 
has on the discourse more broadly. The scholarly interest to this effect followed once 
human rights had established itself as a firmly entrenched global political and moral 
discourse. Indeed, there has recently been an explosion in research from various fields 
and disciplines tracing its history, politics, and culture as well as some of the issues 
touched on above. Scholars with backgrounds as diverse as literary studies, social 
sciences, history, law, and philosophy have all refocused their research through the lens 
of human rights. Newer fields such as literature and human rights, transcultural 
memory studies, and histories of human rights have begun to question, expand, and 
criticize the foundations of what is now the world’s principal social, legal, and political 
framework. In The Last Utopia and Inventing Human Rights, Samuel Moyn and Lynn Hunt 
respectively provide diverging accounts of the contemporary human rights moment 
and its history. Moyn studies how human rights crystallized as a social and political 
movement in the late 1960s as an internationalist alternative to other “failed” utopian 
systems such as communism or nationalism. In her book, in turn, Hunt attempts to find 
earlier traces of the human rights movement in a survey of developments from late-
eighteenth-century philosophy, literature, and politics to the modern age. Literary 
scholars such as Joseph Slaughter, meanwhile, have taken a similarly historical 
approach in order to show how human rights latched onto evolving socio-cultural 
attitudes and ideas as they are expressed in popular narrative practices. In Human Rights 
Inc., he makes the case for reading the development of the Bildungsroman and the 
evolution of rights discourses in Western culture as mutually enabling fictions that 
fundamentally seek to incorporate the individual into existing social structures. Finally, 
Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider take their cue from memory studies in Human Rights and 
Memory to investigate how human rights impacts upon the way in which narratives of 
suffering circulate within global memory cultures. 
At the same time, human rights has thrown existing concerns and questions into 
relief. The continuous use of victims of rights abuses testifying to their suffering in the 
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global public sphere reinvigorates questions concerning the possibility and salience of 
subaltern speech as articulated by postcolonial theorists, most famously Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak. In her aptly titled essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” she asks 
whether Western desires to represent the subaltern, who are periodically silenced 
within or excluded from the global public sphere, risk perpetuating their invisibility by 
speaking for subaltern subjects rather than allowing them to speak for themselves and 
thereby overcome their exclusion (“Can the Subaltern Speak”). This exclusion, Spivak 
notes in her essay, is part of what she calls a “heterogeneous project to constitute the 
colonial subject as Other” and thereby erase its already “precarious Subjectivity” (“Can 
the Subaltern Speak” 24; 25). Edward Said similarly remarks on this problem in 
Orientalism, where he writes that subaltern subjects are always thus constructed in 
colonial discourse that they cannot speak or represent themselves, thereby opening the 
door to their continued distorted representation by the West (21). Jacques Rancière 
essentially rephrases Said’s and Spivak’s concerns in terms of human rights when he 
notes rather critically that less sophisticated understandings of the human rights 
movement lead proponents to think that “if those who suffer inhuman repression are 
unable to enact the Human Rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has 
to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place” (308). Traditionally, such 
problems feature within postcolonial studies’ wider concern that the exclusionary 
discourses of the West, such as colonialist or imperialist ones, rely on what Homi K. 
Bhaba describes in The Location of Culture as a “‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of 
otherness” that firmly secures the subaltern subject as fundamentally different from 
Western subjects (66). This clearly gains significance with regard to human rights’ 
foundational principle of universal equality, but it also addresses the equally important 
issue of how that principle can be promoted without reinforcing existing hierarchies 
that counteract it.  
Notably, however, this issue has also inspired arguments that qualify the postcolonial 
arguments of Spivak and Said. Kwame Anthony Apiah has argued in Cosmopolitanism, for 
instance, that theories of cultural imperialism are based on the flawed and 
condescending assumption that the “other” is a tabula rasa being inscribed by global 
capitalism (111). His point, in other words, is that critiques that accuse the human rights 
project of neo-imperialism take for granted that there is no local culture with which 
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that project can engage and that could potentially reconceive of that project in a more 
local context. The tension surrounding this crucial point will guide the further 
discussion of Eggers’s collaborative testimonial work in its exploration of whether or 
not human rights culture exacerbates or ameliorates these issues. 
The terminology used to describe the relevant sections of Eggers’s oeuvre has a 
significant part to play here. After all, it must be sufficiently open or broad in order to 
accommodate this wider outlook and treat these important concerns. As such, the 
descriptive term needs to reflect the conscious effort to avoid “othering” the 
testimonial subject by framing their narrative in such a way that their subjectivity is 
only reductively represented. Accordingly, I will refer to Eggers’s collaborative 
testimonial work and other similar texts as “personal narratives” throughout this 
dissertation, even though the term “testimony” is widely used in research to describe 
the practice of storytelling in human rights culture. For this, I partly take my cue from 
Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith’s seminal work Human Rights and Narrated Lives, in which 
they explain their choice for yet another term, “life narrative,” as “an umbrella term 
that encompasses the extensive array and diverse modes of personal storytelling that 
takes experiential history as its starting point” (7). What makes this choice of 
terminology appealing is the reductive nature of other terms that solely emphasize the 
testimonial aspect of personal narratives in human rights culture. The term “life 
narrative” has its own problems, to which I will return shortly. 
First, though, the risk of a reductive categorization is twofold. First, one may reduce 
the complexity of the testifying subject to the mere act of speaking. Second, one risks 
restricting the discursive force of the narrative to the abuses to which it speaks by 
framing it solely as an act of testimony, with all its attendant implications of a single 
subject testifying to a very specific set of lived experiences. Even though both of these 
things may be the primary function of a testimonial text, other aspects of it may have a 
great impact on the rights-work a personal narrative does within human rights culture.8 
 
                                                     
8 The precise nature of the term rights-work as well as how Eggers’s texts conduct it will be the subject of the 
next chapter. For now, it can be taken to mean the way in which a text contributes to the victim-subject’s 
ability to have their rights recognized and protected. 
 28 
What Is the What provides a useful example in this respect. It is an autobiographical novel 
that deals with the life of a victim of the Second Sudanese Civil War – Valentino Achak 
Deng – collaboratively told by Eggers and Deng. It is notably framed by a multitude of 
factors of which testimony is only one. In terms of genre, it is a novel, biography, 
autobiography, and testimony. Its contents also cover far more than the protagonist’s 
experiences of rights abuses during the Second Sudanese Civil War as a child, most 
overtly by its inclusion of an extensive frame narrative set during the protagonist’s 
adult years following his resettlement in the United States. As a text, it is collaborative 
both in terms of its production, because Eggers authored the written version of Deng’s 
verbal testimony, and in terms of its narration, with the narrator’s voice not reflecting 
directly the testifying subject’s voice. The term “testimony,” even when collocated with 
the term “collaborative,” needlessly limits our initial understanding of the complexity 
of this text, even if, as I will argue in subsequent chapters, its intricacies lie at the heart 
of the rights-work it sets out to do as well as the problems it encounters in doing so.  
This is not to suggest that the issues with derivations of the term testimony 
necessarily find their way into the works of other studies of the genre. In Can Literature 
Promote Justice?, for instance, Kimberley Nance defines her object of study, the Latin-
American genre of “testimonio” writing, in a non-restrictive way. Her choice to maintain 
the term testimonio has the advantage of linking her study explicitly to the Latin-
American context of such writings as well as the broader use of testimony as a tool for 
social justice. She defines her corpus as a  
body of works in which speaking subjects who present themselves as somehow 
‘ordinary’ represent a personal experience of injustice, whether directly to the 
reader or through the offices of a collaborating writer, with the goal of inducing 
readers to participate in a project of social justice. (7) 
Indeed, Nance’s further discussion of her corpus – which is often similar to Eggers’s 
testimonial work in that it is collaborative in nature – shows her awareness of the 
attendant complexities of published personal narratives in a social justice context that I 
alluded to in relation to What Is the What and to which I will return throughout this 
dissertation. She is aware that the texts’ appeals “neither end with the production of the 
text nor even with its enthusiastic reception” (14) and that they are both didactic and 
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persuasive in tone in their efforts to educate readers and convince them to act (19). In 
fact, it is this intricate attention to the various aspects of testimonio works that allows 
her to think through the question posed by her book’s title with regard to the possibility 
of literature promoting justice.  
The reason I nevertheless insist on avoiding a similar use of the term “testimony,” 
which could take on an equally open and comprehensive meaning as Nance’s, is that 
testimony takes on additional connotations when used in the context of human rights. 
One of the major interests that unites the diverging interdisciplinary perspectives on 
human rights is the centrality of witnessing and testimony. As Dawes puts it in Evil Men: 
“Atrocity both requires and resists representation. The argument that we must bear 
witness to atrocity, that we must tell the stories, is the core of the catechism of the 
human rights movement” (8). Testimonial narratives, in their various cultural and legal 
incarnations, have become pervasive as the main tool for making people aware of rights 
abuses in the era of human rights. Testimonies activate rights discourses; they make 
them real. Culturally, this dovetails with the philosopher Richard Rorty’s famous 
assertion in “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” that “sad and sentimental 
stories” have the power to wake us up and make us take note of humanitarian crises 
(185). Perhaps even more saliently, testimony is also an intricate part of legal rights 
discourses, as a witness’ or survivor’s account in court, as a narrative constructed by 
victims to acquire certain legal statuses – one could think of displaced people applying 
for refugee status – or more broadly as a means to claim the subjectivity to which 
human rights entitle all human beings by reaffirming the uniqueness and 
irreplaceability of the speaker.9 As this example already suggests, uses such as these 
have a profound impact on the form of these narratives. As Schaffer and Smith point 
out, there is a real pressure for personal narratives to conform “to the protocols for 
codification of human rights abuse” in order for them to complete the rights-work they 
are intended to do (37). Because of these specific legal and cultural connotations and 
restraints of what “testimony” is and can be in a human rights context, the broader 
 
                                                     
9 The relationship between testimony and subjectivity is also discussed by Jacques Derrida in Demeure, where 
he writes that in the act of testifying, the subject is “unique and irreplaceable” (40). 
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awareness shown by Nance is difficult to maintain in a study such as mine, even though 
Eggers’s narratives seem to be similar to Nance’s testimonios.10 
The reason I prefer the term “personal narrative” over “life narrative,” moreover, is 
that the latter has an overly holistic connotation that seems to suggest that narratives 
such as What Is the What provide a direct account of an entire person. This may seem less 
problematic overall than the reductive nature of the term “testimony,” but it becomes 
so when human rights are considered from a postcolonial perspective concerned with 
ways in which the subaltern can be re-marginalized, homogenized, and deprived of its 
subjectivity. The issue with the term “life narrative” is that it sets up an impossible task 
for a text to fulfil, namely that of providing an account of a particular, unique, and 
culturally embedded human life. Tales of human rights abuse, while they can speak to 
more than simply the testifying subject’s experience of victimhood as they often do in 
Eggers’s works, seldom capture in their entirety the context-specific particularity of a 
life. Dawes identifies a central problem with human rights discourses in The Language of 
War as being their innate tendency to frame unique individuals in terms of generalized 
persons entitled to rights but “devoid of personhood, and of cultural and linguistic 
thickness” (213). Furthermore, human rights “institutes an empty formalism that 
obliterates the space of difference, of the individual, the unique, and the context-
dependent” (The Language of War 213). The risk, in other words, is that the specific 
 
                                                     
10 The alternative would be to impose a confusing distinction on what the term “testimony” can or cannot 
mean that is dependent on the context within which such narratives are used. Brian Yost suggests such a 
distinction in “The Voices of Others: Dave Eggers and New Directions for Testimony Narrative and 
Cosmopolitan Literary Collaboration,” when he writes: “Unlike legal testimony, which derives authority from 
an assumed exact correspondence with a single testifying individual’s experience, testimonial narratives gain 
meaning and authority to the extent that they create a flexible portrait of an entire community or culture” 
(152). There are two issues with such a use of the term “testimonial narrative.” First, it is unclear why 
testimonies in a legal context such as those in a Truth and Reconciliation context do not fall under his 
understanding of the term “testimonial narrative.” Second, the premise that a testimonial narrative used in a 
non-legal context should seek to be representative of an entire community through what Yost later calls a 
“metonymic” (153) form of representation risks effacing the particularity of the disempowered victim-
narrator, an issue to which I will return at length in the next chapter. 
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experiences to which a narrative testifies are embedded in a broad conception of the 
“human” in human rights, and thereby taken out of their specific social, cultural, and 
historical context. This would then be considered a sufficient representation of the 
subaltern subject to consider their narratives as “life narratives,” with further enquiry 
into their specificity becoming optional. The term “personal narrative” finds a middle 
ground between “testimony” and “life narrative” by allowing the discursive space of a 
text and its paratext to be more than a strict testimonial account of experienced 
suffering without burdening it with the need to provide a holistic account of the human 
person at its core.  
The affective force of literature and how it is understood has also taken on new 
meaning in light of the rise of human rights. The term personal narrative draws 
attention to the textual quality of personal narratives spotted by Schaffer and Smith, 
namely that of an individual’s words affecting, inter-personally, readers in such a way 
that they take the first step towards creating social change (226). As Huyssen argues in 
“International Human Rights and the Politics of Memory: Limits and Challenges,” the 
task for scholars in the fields of memory and trauma studies is to bring their insights 
about the ways in which literature engages with traumatic memories and engenders 
various forms of commemorative practices into contact with the broader cross-
disciplinary interest in human rights. This exercise would be mutually beneficial, he 
points out, in that it would prevent memory studies from “becoming a vacuous exercise 
feeding parasitically and narrowly on itself” while also grounding the “abstract 
universalism of human rights” in specific memories and histories (608). In Human Rights 
and Memory, memory scholars Levy and Sznaider begin to address this issue, arguing 
that the “language of human rights provides us with a framework to begin to 
understand why pictures of strangers being beaten and tortured by other strangers 
concern us” (2). The issue at stake is essentially how human rights discourse allows one 
to adopt a vocabulary through which the suffering of others can be articulated in terms 
other than those of trauma and memory, a vocabulary that focuses on recognition, 
reparation, and rights. The ultimate aim is the extension of the protective mantel of 
human rights as facilitated by raising awareness for those who suffer outside of the 
hegemony. This also explains in part why the use of personal narratives in human rights 
discourses has reinvigorated theories of “cosmopolitanism” that see cross-cultural 
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encounters, facilitated by the culture of human rights, as a means of generating social 
change.11 
However, the concern more broadly that human rights is the latest incarnation of 
Western imperial discourses that created the conditions for the atrocities of the colonial 
era adds a bitter inflection to this hopeful cosmopolitan belief that is meant to facilitate 
the ambitions of the human rights movement. Gilroy notes in Postcolonial Melancholia 
that the discourse of human rights makes the concept of a shared humanity “accessible 
to political debate and legal rationality,” but in doing so belies the extent to which the 
universal values and principles of human rights lack neutrality because of the 
“foundational investment that the West has made in the idea of rights” (59). Gilroy 
comments on this phenomenon in the context of the practical geopolitical shift by 
which “initiatives that derive directly from American strategic objectives” are coming 
to replace rather than augment what he calls “the waning authority of bodies like the 
United Nations” (59). In many cases, therefore, the transnational rights project can just 
as easily justify a far less productive cross-cultural engagement that underpins the 
Global North’s continued invasions and interventions in the Global South, thus 
reinstating a negative inter-national global dynamic rather than replacing it with a 
progressive transnational one. What makes this particularly pernicious, he adds, is that 
these initiatives cloak themselves in a universalist rhetoric that maintains the “benign 
and seductive language of humanitarianism” even when it takes on a more belligerent 
character (59). In a similar vein, Slaughter begins his discussion in Human Rights Inc. by 
referencing the myriad ways in which the discourse of human rights is often used in 
service of “the palliative rhetoric of humanitarian intervention” to invade countries, 
open markets, ensure “equal consumerist opportunity,” and promote democracy (2).  
However, in The Postcolonial Constellation, Jürgen Habermas urges human rights 
scholars not to mistake criticism of the human rights regime and its Western bias for an 
 
                                                     
11 The final chapter of this dissertation will provide a more detailed discussion of the term “cosmopolitanism” 
in relation to personal narratives in human rights culture. For now, it is simply important to note that it 
provides a certain level of philosophical underpinning to the affective drive within and premise of that 
culture. 
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absolute rejection of the human rights project as a whole. Even non-Western critics who 
accuse human rights of remaining “imprisoned, despite everything, in the original 
European context” would not “reject human rights lock, stock, and barrel” (121). 
Habermas explicitly tries to overcome this issue by placing the notion of Western bias in 
a global context. His approach is one that seeks to figure the universal standards of 
human rights, which Gilroy sees as inherently tied up with Western ethnocentrism, as 
part of a global response to the “specific challenges posed by social modernity” (The 
Postcolonial Constellation 121). Regardless of whether one sees human rights as a vehicle 
for the negative developments outlined by Gilroy and Slaughter or simply as a discourse 
seeking to overcome its own Western bias in the face of an already biased global public 
sphere as Habermas suggests, it is important at least to consider these biases and the 
project together in order to grasp the global dynamic of which the human rights project 
has become a part. 
Pheng Cheah makes the further point in Inhuman Conditions that the continuing socio-
economic inequality between the Global North and the Global South means human 
rights operate differently in different areas. This has a significant impact on the extent 
to which the cosmopolitan project of universal citizenship and equality can be rolled 
out across the globe. She argues that human rights are enforced through their “link to 
the civil rights provisions of individual nation-states,” which differ widely (Inhuman 
Conditions 5). She goes on to say that their positive impact is further regulated by “the 
shifting material linkages and interconnections created by global capitalism at a 
particular historical conjuncture” (Inhuman Conditions 30). One of these, for example, is 
that “new cosmopolitan subjects of Northern multiculturalism can already rely on an 
existing organizational framework for the regulation of social and political conflict and 
economic redistribution that is lacking for the world as a whole” (Inhuman Conditions 63). 
In other words, while the Global North has an established framework human rights can 
latch onto, the Global South has no such organizational security. As such, it is left solely 
as a place where rights can be violated and their violation can subsequently be 
condemned by the makeshift transnational rights frameworks set up by the North. The 
cosmopolitan drive’s first task, in Cheah’s thinking, would be to unmoor human rights 
from this “historical bondage to the instrumentality of sovereign nation states” that 
causes many of the problems she outlines (Inhuman Conditions 5). It is therefore crucial 
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for Eggers’s use of the personal narrative to achieve such a denationalization and 
protest this setup, where the guardians of rights in the North gaze at violations in the 
South. If not, his efforts risk merely reinforcing a negative and hierarchical global 
dynamic. 
The accusation levelled at the ICC that it is a white man’s tool used to castigate Africa 
becomes especially relevant in this respect. This risks creating a perception, at least 
politically, that human rights works through the sovereignty of nation states in the 
Global North, but works around or against them in some areas of the Global South.12 This 
adds a disturbingly neo-colonial dimension to Jean L. Cohen’s point in Globalization and 
Sovereignty that the radical idea behind human rights is that “the international 
community may articulate and enforce moral principles and legal rules regulating the 
conduct of governments towards their citizens (when their human rights are at stake)” 
(2). The neo-colonial risk, in other words, is that the promotion of human rights may 
come to resemble the colonial mission civilisatrice in an unhelpful way. Partly as a result 
of this issue, human rights activism is often explicitly apolitical so as to divest itself of 
this accusation levelled at the ICC and other rights institutions that they are a 
continuation of the colonial dominance of the Global South by the Global North. Wendy 
Brown describes this in “‘The Most We Can Hope For…’: Human Rights and the Politics 
of Fatalism,” when she writes that human rights activism has become 
something of an antipolitics – a pure defense of the innocent and powerless 
against power, a pure defense of the individual against immense and potentially 
cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, 
 
                                                     
12 The case of the AU is a relevant example in this respect, given that the global push for human rights comes 
to coincide with an intrusion into regional affairs by Western powers whose transnational institutions 
“outrank” local ones. A more fundamental example would be the perceived incongruity between “Western” 
individual rights as they are put forward by supranational bodies and so-called “Asian values,” which – though 
not necessarily as widely accepted – emphasize collectivism and assert a specifically regional set of values. In 
this case, the human rights project is ideologically at odds with nation states who are said to hold different 
values, making the assertion of human rights a political rather than a moral act. While these examples are not 
by any means representative of a broad rejection of human rights by the Global South, they do point to 
continued tensions between parts of the globe on the point of a universal rights project. 
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patriarchy, and other mobilizations of instantiations of collective power against 
individuals. (453) 
The focus on the defence of individual rights both sidesteps the muddle of 
intergovernmental geopolitics, with its attendant remnants of its colonial past, and 
conveniently reiterates the strong individualism of the movement’s foundational 
document.  
Even though these individual rights are intricately bound up with the nation states 
that grant or violate them, human rights themselves, like the philosophical notions of 
natural rights to which I will return shortly, are an articulation of the universal rights of 
individuals regardless of where they are born or live. This contributes to the non-legal, 
wider understanding of human rights as an inspirational set of universal values as well 
as a broad tool that allows the world to pursue those values outside of the quagmire of 
geopolitical turmoil. It is also at the heart of one of the central criticisms of the human 
rights regime, as explained by Schaffer and Smith: “Critics of the human rights regime 
have pointed to the ways in which human rights discourse is a globalizing project, part 
of a Western and particularly American-oriented imperial project that emphasizes 
individual freedoms and civil and political rights” (227). As such, even the apolitical 
values of the UDHR itself become embroiled in the politics of the rights project, which 
further underlines the need to conceptualize human rights more holistically in order to 
consider its various intersecting dynamics.13 
As part of my argument for a broader understanding of the cultural dimension of 
human rights, it is worth considering for a moment the relationship between the two 
versions of human rights that have already emerged from this brief discussion. That is, 
 
                                                     
13 Judith Butler makes a related in point in the preface to Precarious Life when she writes that the hegemonic 
understanding of whose lives are ultimately considered to be worthy of attention and consideration in the 
public sphere is at the heart of public policy (xx). As such, I would add, human rights activism is always 
embedded in political reality, even if its aspirations and principles claim to be apolitical. Butler goes on to 
argue that “[t]he articulation of this hegemony takes place in part through producing a consensus on what 
certain terms will mean, how they can be used, and what lines of solidarity are implicitly drawn through this 
use” (4). The struggle for visibility within such a regulated public sphere by victims of rights will return as a 
core concern in my discussions of personal narratives throughout this dissertation. 
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the one in which a weak international legal framework seeks to secure the 
generalization of supposedly already universal rights, and the one used by an apolitical 
activism actively seeking to dissociate itself from a problematic rights-dynamic in which 
universal rights become caught up in the global hierarchies that still govern and haunt 
international relations. The tension between the political act of declaring universal 
rights in a legally binding way by nation states and the apolitical argument for those 
rights as predating society itself has an illuminating history that can partially help 
frame the contemporary rights moment. Before the salience of the term “human 
rights,” the notion of universal rights was usually framed in terms of “natural rights.” A 
typical example of this older, natural rights tradition is provided by John Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Government, which he opens with a chapter “Of the State of Nature” in which 
he elaborates on the states of “perfect freedom” and “equality” into which all are born 
and which are only curtailed by “the law of nature” (116). The nineteenth century 
proponent of utilitarianism and social reformer Jeremy Bentham famously described 
the concept of “natural rights,” seen by many as the precursor to contemporary human 
rights in a philosophical sense, as “nonsense upon stilts” in his “A Critical Examination 
of the Declaration of Rights” (501).14 It is worth considering the context of this oft-used 
quote in a little more detail. In his essay, Bentham explains that  
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense – nonsense upon stilts. But this rhetorical nonsense ends in the usual 
 
                                                     
14 While it is true that many see in the concept of natural rights, as put forward by Locke for instance, the 
natural foundation for contemporary understandings of human rights, others have argued against such an 
interpretation. As early as 1982, the period in which Moyn argues human rights rose to prominence, an article 
by Jack Donnely appeared in Human Rights Quarterly titled “Human Rights as Natural Rights.” Donnelly’s 
argument is that those seeking alternative philosophical groundings for human rights, specifically Charles 
Beitz’s “Human Rights and Social Justice,” need to accept or take into account at least the link between human 
rights and natural rights. The article is an illustrative example of the need felt by some to defend natural 
rights interpretations against those who sought a different philosophical grounding for the concept, thereby 
showing that either interpretation is contested. Nevertheless, the natural rights argument tends to prevail, as 
is borne out by Andrew Clapham’s Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction. There, he writes that the seeds of the 
human rights movement lie in the “sense of injustice when governments resort to measures which invade the 
perceived natural rights of the individual” (9). 
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mischievous nonsense: for immediately a list of these pretended natural rights is 
given, and those are so expressed as to present to view legal rights. And of these 
rights, whatever they are, there is not, it seems, any one of which any government 
can, upon any occasion whatever, abrogate the smallest particle. (501) 
Bentham thus insists that basic innate rights – such as those covered by the UDHR – 
cannot logically be secured in a legal sense outside the context of nation states or inter-
governmental accords. These rights are, in effect, part of the foundational principals of 
a society and the social contract, not a precursor to that society. Bentham’s point is 
valuable here because it points out that the fight for natural rights, or human rights, 
cannot be grounded solely outside of socio-political reality.  
Rights, even innate ones, can only be guaranteed when they become part of the social 
contract citizens settle on with the institutions that govern them. In that respect, it is 
important to note at this stage that social contracts are not necessarily consensual or 
peaceful. In his criticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract and Locke’s 
explanations of the social contract, “Of the Social Contract,” David Hume notes that 
such contracts are often messily enforced or violently imposed rather than mutually 
agreed upon: 
The face of the earth is continually changing, by the increase of small kingdoms 
into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into smaller kingdoms, by 
the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing discoverable 
in all these events but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or 
voluntary association so much talked of? (216) 
As I have argued, the contemporary rights regime, with all its various incarnations, is 
engaged in a complex struggle to make global citizens part of its global legal-political 
project, sometimes through mutual agreement (the United Nations or rights activism) 
and sometimes through less peaceful means (humanitarian interventions). The latter 
explains some of the mistrust for globalizing projects and ideologies in sections of the 
world that suffered under colonial rule, as well as the unwillingness of nation states to 
allow a transnational system to intervene in its sovereignty to impose supposedly 
universal values.  
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The basic premise of Slaughter’s Human Rights Inc. can help further to disentangle this 
complex process, with its positive and negative sides, of building the socio-cultural 
consensus for human rights. He uses the term “incorporated citizenship” – hence the 
“Inc.” in the title – in his study to show how the literary genre of the Bildungsroman and 
human rights align the individual with society. The Bildungsroman, he points out, is a 
narrative in which the individual’s pre-social desires are eventually brought in line with 
the place of citizens within society, making such novels “a particularly dependable ally 
in human rights law’s globalizing designs . . . that disseminates its norms” (25). The fact 
that the two are inextricably linked in terms of rights, securing “natural” or “human” 
rights within the context of the nation state, is significant to his argument. He writes 
that, broadly, “literature and law take on the character of an international and 
intertextual system” (25) and that, specifically, the “complicity of human rights and the 
novel means that the field of literature is itself implicated in the discursive regime of 
human rights” (43). In order to make this point, he shows that the human rights project 
of teaching individuals to recognize that which they already are – human beings 
endowed with certain inalienable rights – is figured in a narrative way.15 He writes that 
the culture of human rights revolves around generating a “self-saying, self-
incorporating citizen-subject” able to narrate their entitlement to rights as a result of 
their having integrated into the society that guarantees those rights (249).  
To restate this in the terms set out above, it pays to understand the cultural 
dimension and the culture surrounding human rights for two separate reasons. First, it 
sheds light on the ways in which cultural artefacts work in tandem with legal-political 
aspects of rights movements and are indeed often a critical part of those movements.16 
 
                                                     
15 I deliberately use the well-known turn of phrase from the American Declaration of Independence here to 
underscore the extent to which the politics of rights is always caught in the limbo between the universal 
promise of its foundational declarations and the inequalities that pervade the realities those documents seek 
to govern. This tension lies at the heart of the next chapter’s exploration of how narratives are used by 
disempowered subjects to confront declarative practices and promises with their own suffering. 
16 Huyssen calls for a similar type of understanding when he writes that “the active prosecution of human 
rights violations in the court also depends on the strength of memory discourses in the public sphere – 
journalism, films, media, literature, the arts, education, and even urban graffiti” (612). 
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Second, whereas the legal-political or activist framing of human rights often seeks to 
avoid confrontation with the colonial spectres that haunt international relations, a 
cultural perspective comprises the fluidity of the dynamic and complex public sphere in 
which human rights and other discourses compete, coexist, and coalesce. Moreover, it 
takes into account the point raised by Robert Meister in After Evil that a restrictive legal 
focus on individual perpetrators of rights abuses has drawn the focus away from the 
political demons that plague the rights project, even if that politics informs many of the 
problems that project encounters in its engagement with the global public sphere more 
broadly (315). Gilroy makes a related point in Postcolonial Melancholia when he writes 
that the human rights project needs to confront histories of inequality more explicitly if 
it is to extend and consolidate its reach (xvi). In what follows, I want to lay the 
groundwork for a cultural perspective that addresses these issues. In order to do so, it is 
important to come to grips with how human rights culture itself currently operates and 
what the attendant assumptions are of that culture. 
1.3 Short Case Study: Amnesty International 
Amnesty UK’s programme of human rights education through books forms a valuable 
case in point at this stage, in that it draws on personal narratives to ground abstract 
human rights. As such, it also begins to lift the veil on important aspects of the cultural 
dimension of human rights more broadly in which Eggers can be grounded. It is useful 
to consider three aspects of the language used by Amnesty in explaining its thinking 
around literary texts in relation to human rights-work. These are the affective and 
theoretical aspects of those texts as well as the bridging towards Amnesty’s activism. 
Amnesty UK explains its decision to endorse certain books as part of an effort “to help 
readers take that next step into activism – to empower them to consider what comes 
next” (“Fiction for Human Rights Change,” bold in original). The general principle that 
governs this faith in literature is described as follows: “Reading fiction develops our 
empathy and social understanding. Empathy helps us stand up to prejudice and 
discrimination” (“Literature and Human Rights”). On its practical page on how to teach 
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human rights fiction, it then goes on to provide short summaries of endorsed novels 
with explicit references to abstract human rights made tangible through the texts or, to 
use their words, stories that “personalise human rights that may otherwise seem 
abstract” (“Fiction and Human Rights”). It is evident from these descriptions that 
Amnesty UK believes that literary works, and personal narratives in particular, have a 
key function in their rights-work. 
The clear linear thinking process behind the endorsed fiction campaign provides a 
first articulation of the central tenets of human rights culture. The core idea is that 
stories of suffering can ground the abstract language of human rights in such a way that 
non-specialist readers are moved to action. Any of the summaries on the “Resources” 
page underscores this principle. For instance, the blurb for Jane Mitchell’s Chalkline 
reads as follows: 
Soldiers of the Kashmir Freedom Fighters are in search of new recruits at nine-
year-old Rafiq’s school in rural Kashmir. Rafiq becomes the first boy in his class to 
be forced into a life of brutality and terrorism. So begins Rafiq’s transformation 
from child to boy soldier, indoctrinated into a cause of fanatical belief. Chalkline 
explores the themes of slavery, child soldiers, freedom of belief, and the right to 
an education. (“Fiction and Human Rights,” bold in original) 
What is particularly noteworthy about these descriptions is the way they explicitly 
point to rights, emphasized in bold, to which the narrative is meant to draw attention. 
The selected texts are also clearly marketed towards a Western audience, who are 
meant to become aware of the universality of rights as a result of reading about 
individualized and specific rights abuses. The victim-protagonists in these stories thus 
become vessels, propelled by the affective charge of their suffering, that bring readers 
an acute awareness of human rights in general and the need to protect them in specific 
contexts. In this sense, these personal narratives are emblematic of what Robert 
Eaglestone describes as “forms of engaged literature that seek to influence, explain, and 
educate” readers about acute human rights issues (84). These narratives are 
fundamentally individualistic, which has led them to be criticized. However, Eaglestone 
goes on to say that those critics who suggest this individualistic focus misses the point 
in terms of addressing the broader “political and global issues,” further miss the point 
that these narrative forms constitute a productive means of making legible the 
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complexities of these broader crises (84). Eggers would seem to share this view when, in 
discussing his involvement in the publication of oral history collections, he says that 
“you almost always have a better understanding of a situation through a first-person 
narrative—seeing what one person says and then seeing a broader view of it” (562). 
Amnesty UK’s endorsed fiction initiative thus illustrates a key dynamic that drives 
human rights’s cultural dimension. There is an interplay between abstract rights, 
particular victim-narratives, and the affective engagement of the reader, and this 
interplay forms the central premise of human rights culture’s efforts to mitigate the 
weakness of its legal-political dimension. In order to discuss Eggers’s works in relation 
to that culture, it will be crucial to unpack precisely how his works position themselves 
vis-à-vis that premise and how his narratives play out the dynamic between its various 
actors. This requires an in-depth discussion of his engagement with that human rights 
culture, the prerequisite for which is a working definition of the concept that will serve 
to frame the further investigation of Eggers’s oeuvre. 
1.4 Mapping Out Human Rights Culture 
In many ways, conceiving of human rights as a culture in addition to recognizing its 
status as a legal concept lays bare that which the vast majority of studies into human 
rights have taken for granted. That is, that human rights have their basis in the dynamic 
social, cultural, and historical roots of the countries and cultures to which its rigid, 
universal claims apply. The influential histories of human rights by Hunt and Moyn 
form a useful case in point here. Regardless of their differing conclusions, both base 
their explorations of the rise of human rights on a tumultuous public sphere that covers 
the literary, political, and social in addition to the legal-historical developments of 
various periods of history. It is important to make this more fluid cultural definition 
explicit, however, if one is subsequently to analyse just how an author such as Eggers 
participates in and plays with the conventions of human rights culture. Peter Burke’s 
discussion in What Is Cultural History with regard to the implications of what it means to 
take a cultural historical approach is useful in this respect. He notes that the concept of 
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culture “implies the idea of tradition, of certain kinds of knowledge and skills handed 
down from one generation to the next” (26). This, he goes on to argue, allows cultural 
historians to do away with the presumed “homogeneity of an ‘age’” (26). If one takes 
this type of approach to cultural history, it is possible to discern from the conflicting 
aspects of human rights outlined above a broad, working definition of human rights 
culture. 
Therefore, by human rights culture I mean the multifarious field within which 
personal narratives circulate in service of the human rights movement, as well as the 
opportunities and restrictions placed upon those narratives by the tenets of that 
movement and the global public sphere within which it operates. This means that this 
dissertation’s conception and study of human rights culture is inevitably skewed by how 
Eggers engages with it, the types of activism he undertakes, and the mode of 
storytelling he prefers. It does not deal with the many other media or means found by 
others to operate within that culture. In this sense, the conclusions are telling only as 
case studies of how personal narratives fare within the diverse and complex global 
public sphere of which human rights culture is a part, but should not be mistaken for 
generalizations about the nature of that culture more broadly. They do, however, 
provide a useful means of measuring the basic premises of human rights culture against 
the impact of personal narratives that make use of it. In this sense, my analysis of Eggers 
is not strictly focused on the discursive space created by the text and paratext of his 
personal narratives, but is also concerned with what that discursive space’s relationship 
is to the extra-textual field within which it is solicited, produced, marketed, and read.  
By exploring human rights culture in this way, I aim to take into account the warning 
put out by Sophie McClennen and Joseph Slaughter in “Introducing Human Rights and 
Literary Forms; or, The Vehicles and Vocabularies of Human Rights,” that “humanities-
based human rights scholarship has a tendency to ignore, devalue, or discredit the law” 
(6). In fact, my working definition takes their incentive one step further by including 
not only the legal dimension of human rights, but the various other concerns outlined 
above that intersect with the human rights project at the social, national, cultural, and 
geopolitical levels. Art and culture more broadly are an integral part of that project. In 
“Human Rights and Literary Studies,” Dawes even finds grounds for this in the UDHR 
itself when he notes that art is protected in its 27th article (399). What makes this 
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concept of a “cultural dimension” so important is precisely that it can bring into focus 
the multifarious nature of the field within which the human rights movement operates. 
As Michael Galchinsky writes in “The Problem with Human Rights Culture,” the civic 
and ethical functions of the cultural and legal aspects of human rights may be shared, 
but their concerns differ in terms of scope: “while the orientation of the law is vertical, 
reaching down from government bodies to individuals, the orientation of rights culture 
tends to be horizontal, the artist appealing as a human being directly to his or her 
fellows” (5). He argues that this, linking back to my point, puts human rights in touch 
with the broader public sphere in the way it is conceived by Habermas more broadly, 
and by Slaughter specifically in relation to human rights (5). As such, the cultural 
dimension of human rights can help to conceptualize how the rights project goes about 
convincing global citizens to claim, respect, and defend universal rights. 
Given the focus on Eggers as a case study, this dissertation looks mainly at a specific 
type of cultural artefact, the personal narrative, and its place within the global public 
sphere as a human rights tool. Personal narratives, in a basic sense, provide 
disempowered subjects with the chance to engage a wide, often Western, audience 
through a compelling narrative in which they put forward their experiences of rights 
abuses, enter into an affective dialogue with their readerships and, on that basis, 
demand recognition for their basic humanity and rights. In terms of the readership, 
personal narratives play a double role in human rights culture according to Sidonie 
Smith and Julia Watson. In “Witness or False Witness: Metrics of Authenticity, Collective 
I-Formations, and the Ethic of Verification in First-Person Testimony,” they write that 
such narratives convince readers that the suffering experienced by the victim matters 
and is real, as well as positioning readers as ethical subjects whose engagement with the 
human rights project can make a difference to this or similar victims (590). In this sense, 
as well as in terms of the postcolonial critique outlined above, the personal narrative is 
a particularly fruitful point of entry into studying human rights culture and how it 
operates.  
There are at least three major areas of interest that the personal narrative helps 
illuminate based on the discussion thus far. First, the tendency towards collaboration 
between privileged Western authors and disempowered subjects in the context of 
human rights culture provides a means of addressing postcolonial critics’ concerns 
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about neo-colonial appropriation and the position and salience of the subaltern in the 
global public sphere. Eggers’s often necessary role in providing his disempowered 
collaborators with a platform from which to address a Western audience as well as his 
interventions in how that address is structured and phrased are of particular interest in 
this respect. Second, the reliance on cross-cultural affective engagement to effect 
change is often taken for granted, especially by cosmopolitan theorists, but remains 
under-theorized at a textual level in the specific case of narratives seeking to contribute 
to social change in a human rights context. One example of this lack of textual 
theorization is Brian Yost’s discussion of Eggers’s What Is the What, in which he loosely 
reconfigures literature “as an ethically motivated cosmopolitan engagement” that 
allows its contents to become relevant “beyond the constraints of any specific territorial 
or national boundary” (150). According to Yost, this means that cosmopolitan literature 
has the power to cultivate notions of a shared humanity by “continually exposing one 
national readership to the literary consciousness or voices of other nationalities” (166). 
Part of what human rights culture contributes to the human rights project as a whole, 
Galchinsky argues, is the means to “craft a universal structure of feeling for a global 
audience” that puts universal values in touch with the distinctive experiences of 
individuals across national and cultural boundaries (15). The promotion of universal 
values on the basis of particular experiences as well as the preservation of particularity 
in the light of human rights’ universalizing tendency are respectively at the heart of 
Eggers’s collaborative testimonial works and his fictional works. 
Third, both the struggle for salience undertaken by disempowered subjects and the 
affective dimension of personal narratives as relied on by human rights culture bring 
into focus those questions relating to human rights’ role in the global public sphere. To 
ask why the voices of victims go unnoticed – why their lives are less grievable, to use 
Butler’s terms in Frames of War – or whether empathic engagement is enough to remedy 
that or indeed prevent future abuses, is to enquire why human rights struggles to assert 
its universal values in a more binding, global, and egalitarian way. The core premise for 
the question at the heart of Butler’s study into the lack of visibility for certain lives 
revolves around the ways in which certain types of victimhood are obscured or 
excluded from the global public sphere: “Forms of racism instituted and active at the 
level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently 
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grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable” (24). 
Disempowered subjects who write personal narratives seek to break through these 
forms of exclusion and have often seen, or been made to see, the opportunities afforded 
by human rights culture as a means of doing so. I will introduce these particular aspects 
of human rights culture as they come to the fore through a study of the personal 
narrative in subsequent chapters, each of which will tackle one of the three issues 
outlined above head on.  
The finer points of how human rights culture operates will be further uncovered 
through a close reading of Eggers’s works. The mutually beneficial reasoning behind 
taking a cultural perspective on human rights and then considering Eggers within that 
framework is twofold. First, it allows the analysis of Eggers’s works to take into 
consideration the fluidity of the global public sphere, of which human rights is only one 
part, into which the rights-work performed by his texts enters. Furthermore, it thereby 
becomes possible to consider how his personal narratives aim to contribute to making 
real the universal promise of human rights, as well as why or how such efforts struggle 
or fail. In his fictional works, Eggers is often the first to raise the potential risks and 
problems cross-cultural rights-work runs into, thus underscoring once more the need 
for a definition of human rights culture to include an understanding of its weaknesses as 
well as its strengths. Second, the role of Eggers in human rights culture can be 
juxtaposed with narratives that circulated in different historical contexts so as to gain a 
better understanding of how human rights culture has changed as well as how Eggers’s 
engagement with it in the present is either typical or innovative. This is useful in that 
the continuity of practice in deploying cultural means, such as testimonial narratives, in 
the context of rights-work highlights the development of this socio-political tool in 
relation to the contemporary human rights moment. In this way, an argument begins to 
form for considering Eggers’s texts as discursive spaces in themselves that not only 
convey the rights-claim of victims but also reimagine and push the boundaries of 
human rights culture itself even as they take up that culture’s extra-textual impetus to 
rights activism. In addition to this, a comparison of Eggers’s collaborative rights-work to 
other such collaborations in the past provides a valuable means of gauging the 
consequences of the author’s involvement in retelling the stories of others in human 
rights culture. 
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1.5 Dave Eggers in Human Rights Culture 
In an abstract way, Eggers’s oeuvre mimics the narrative path of the protagonists in 
Bildungsromane that Slaughter sees as forming one half of the mutually reinforcing 
dynamic between human rights and literature. In this case, the story of an individual 
who discovers their subjectivity and comes to define that subjectivity in terms of how 
their individuality meshes with the social order through which their rights are granted 
is echoed by Eggers’s literary output. As an author, he has gradually developed a study 
of the individual’s place in and relationship with the globalizing society in which they 
live, focusing specifically on the North-American context. Eggers’s study evolves in 
scope from his highly personal breakthrough memoir A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering 
Genius, published in 2000, to a broader concern for the individual’s place in a new, 
globalized world order in works such as A Hologram for the King or The Circle, published in 
2012 and 2013 respectively. A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius can be seen as an 
exercise in self-discovery in which the author constitutes his subjectivity through an 
account of the tragic loss of his parents to cancer and his subsequent struggle to find his 
way in life with his younger brother Christopher. To cast this in terms of human rights 
culture, one could see this memoir as the author’s construction of a fictional version of 
himself as a fully-fledged human being as demarcated by his traumatic childhood. This 
is not to suggest that A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius should be read purely 
biographically or indeed be analysed so as to uncover the traces of the intentional 
process behind the way the protagonist relates to the real author. In fact, the distorted 
link between Eggers and the protagonist of his memoir, who is more clearly and more 
exclusively shaped by his traumatic past, lays bare one of the central problems with 
human rights culture’s assumption that personal narratives can attest sufficiently to the 
particular lived experiences of complex human beings marked but not defined by 
trauma. Indeed, it is precisely the discrepancies between the biographical subject and 
the protagonist that forms the basis for much of the analysis of Eggers’s collaborative 
testimonial projects in the context of human rights culture in later chapters.  
A Hologram for the King and The Circle are both emblematic of what Timothy W. Galow, 
in Understanding Dave Eggers, calls the author’s increasing focus on “the interaction of 
individual voices and larger social structures” (98). The emphasis in these novels is not 
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so much on the subjectivity of its protagonists as on their engagement with others and 
their engagement with society at large. In doing so, they often explore some of the basic 
tendencies with which human rights culture intersects, such as the consequences of 
globalization for the individual as well as the tension between that globalization and 
notions of sovereignty.A Hologram for the King is an allegorical novel about the decline of 
America in a globalized world. It tracks the story of a washed-out businessman, Alan 
Clay, as he engages in a last ditch effort to rekindle his fortunes in the global economic 
arena by selling a holographic communications system to the king of Saudi Arabia. The 
decline of America and the character of Alan are tied up with one another, Galow 
argues, in that the protagonist’s “displacement in this new culture allows him to 
consider the implications of globalization in a new context” (102).17 The novel, largely 
told from the perspective of the perpetually insecure and increasingly obsolete Alan, 
explores its protagonist’s bumbling efforts to establish meaningful connections with a 
multitude of different characters he encounters.  
The Circle concerns itself with the topical issue of privacy in the age of social media. 
This dystopian novel warns against the erosion of privacy by large multinational tech 
companies which, in their adherence to the mantra of openness and transparency, may 
in fact be reshaping the world in a less benign way than its enthusiastic users, such as 
the novel’s naïve protagonist Mae Holland, are willing to admit. In a review of the book 
for The New York Review of Books, Margaret Atwood praised it as a “novel of ideas” in 
which Eggers “holds up the mirror of art” to a society in danger of embracing 
uncritically the social media revolution (“When Privacy is Theft”). Eggers himself 
explicitly describes the issue with which his novel is concerned in terms of rights in a 
2016 interview for Contemporary Literature with Sean Bex and Stef Craps. The right at 
stake here is not only the novel’s discussion of the right to privacy, but the way it 
intricately connects that right to the fundamental freedom of the individual in society. 
Eggers suggests that his aim was to create through The Circle a feeling of horror around  
 
                                                     
17 Galow also points out that this is a recurring theme in many of Eggers’s short stories, in which American 
protagonists wrestle with the anxieties and fears spawned by globalization (82). I will discuss one such short 
story in particular, “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly,” in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
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the conglomeration of power and wealth into a very few hands and the 
temptation toward submitting to this central funnel of all information where, in 
exchange for having all of your banking, your voting, and your social life in one 
place, you give up access to some third party, some capitalist company that uses it 
for means beyond your control and knowledge. That is where we are at right now. 
In exchange for “freedom,” in exchange for “free things,” we allow ourselves to be 
spied on. (qtd. in Bex and Craps 554) 
Put together, A Hologram for the King and The Circle investigate both the decline in 
traditional means of framing the individual’s relationship to society, such as clout in a 
cultural, economic, and technical sense derived from the nation state, and the dangers 
of newer frames, such as rootless cosmopolitanism and the rise of social media with its 
attendant monetization of personal data. 
In his other works, as well as in his work as an editor and activist, Eggers has often 
considered the relationship between the individual and society more explicitly in terms 
of human rights. He followed up the success of A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius 
with You Shall Know Our Velocity (2002), a novel in which two young Americans, Will and 
Hand, seek to overcome personal tragedy by travelling around the world and, along the 
way, distributing money to those in need. The novel poignantly balances descriptions of 
abject poverty with ludicrous schemes devised by the stunted protagonists to donate 
money to the poor. It ingeniously brings together the highly individual plot of personal 
development through its main protagonist, Will, even as it inserts that plot into a 
broader story of cross-cultural engagement and charity. Galow describes the plot as one 
in which Will, blinded by his own background and traumatic past, struggles “to 
overcome his privilege and find a new language for encountering the ‘other’” (39). As 
such, the novel forms the starting point for an exploration of the dynamics of global 
charity as it is personified in the charity quest plot of its two stunted protagonists.18 As I 
 
                                                     
18 Charity and human rights activism often coexist uncomfortably in Eggers’s works, as the former is mostly 
shown up as running counter to the impact sought after by Eggers’s narrative efforts in the context of the 
latter. This is closely connected to my discussion in chapter three of the distinction between sympathy, 
empathy, and identification that governs much of the affective engagement pursued by narratives in human 
rights culture. 
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go on to discuss in the final chapter of this dissertation, the subsequent failure of the 
protagonists to achieve anything meaningful either in terms of working through their 
own trauma or in terms of helping disempowered others becomes a powerful critique of 
the cosmopolitan faith in cross-cultural encounters in human rights culture.  
This critique provides a valuable lens through which to study Eggers’s own activism, 
which is often also grounded in the possibilities and opportunities afforded by cross-
cultural engagement. Consider in this respect the similarity between Hand’s call to 
action in You Shall Know Our Velocity with regard to activism and Eggers’s own reflections 
on the subject. In a chapter narrated from the perspective of Hand in the novel, the 
character says: 
There’s nothing to be gained from passive observance, the simple documenting of 
conditions, because, at its core, it sets a bad example. Every time something is 
observed and not fixed, or when one has a chance to give in some way and does 
not, there is a lie being told, the same lie we all know by heart but which needn’t 
be reiterated. (134) 
In this plea, Eggers’s character is clearly expounding the view that it is better to engage 
with the issues at hand – in You Shall Know Our Velocity’s case that would be the poverty 
in the Global South – rather than simply look on as a bystander. In his interview with 
Stef Craps and myself, Eggers makes a similar appeal: 
Don’t allow yourself to become cynical, especially before you’ve tried. The 
cynicism that I felt in my twenties, that nothing would have an impact—that was a 
terrible mistake. . . . The cynics usually are not directly engaged in anything. . . . 
You can have a profound impact, but it’s about where and how and when. It’s 
about being serious and putting in the time, staying, and being courageous and 
fierce and true about it. (567) 
As such, the author clearly shares the view of his character in You Shall Know Our Velocity 
that it is better to try to do good and accept whatever positive impact you may have as a 
small victory than refrain from action for fear of failure. It is noteworthy, however, that 
by aligning his views on activism with one of two protagonists in his novel, Eggers offers 
his readers a critical window onto this type of activism. The characters in You Shall Know 
Our Velocity end up wasting a large sum of money in fruitless charity throughout their 
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adventures in the Global South, yet achieve neither personal nor cross-cultural success 
in alleviating suffering. This is not to suggest that Eggers must therefore be equally 
unsuccessful in his efforts, but it does raise significant questions with regard to his 
attitude to activism that demand answers.19 
The place one could look for these answers is in the competitive global public sphere 
of which human rights culture is a part, with its neo-colonial resonances and 
geopolitical complications. Much of Eggers’s most salient activism, which centres on 
finding the means to narrate individual trauma, is bound up with this global human 
rights culture.20 The two key examples of this are What Is the What and Zeitoun, for which 
Eggers collaborated with victims of human rights abuses in Sudan and the U.S., 
respectively, in order to give a voice to their suffering, to allow them to articulate a 
claim to rights, and to recruit a Western audience for their cause. What Is the What tells 
the story of Valentino Achak Deng, one of the so-called “Lost Boys” of Sudan, who 
survived the Second Sudanese Civil War and was subsequently airlifted to the United 
States as part of a resettlement programme. Eggers and Deng’s collaboration was 
extensive both on and off the pages of the book. Most noteworthy in this respect is the 
way Eggers chose to narrate Deng’s story through a fictional narrator whose speaking 
voice does not entirely reflect either of the partners, but nevertheless claims to provide 
an accurate representation of Deng’s particular experiences. The reason this narrator 
cannot simply be equated to Deng is because there is extensive involvement on Eggers’s 
part in the story’s structuring, and because the disempowered other, Deng, explicitly 
states in the preface that parts of the story were made up by Eggers so as to streamline 
 
                                                     
19 In “Paratextuality and Economic Disavowal in Eggers’ You Shall Know Our Velocity,” Sarah Brouillette reads 
the novel as “a text about Eggers' career” designed “to police the reception of future works and control the 
way we read Eggers' position in the literary marketplace” (Brouillette). The central tension she describes 
centres on him trying to avoid being perceived as either a hack working for profit or an author who is part of a 
cultural elite. This gains further importance for Eggers, I would add, because neither position is conducive to 
his work as an author-activist inviting readers to join him in agonizing over how to engage productively with 
those to whom rights are not yet extended or whose rights have been violated. 
20 Indeed, Galow identifies as some of the unifying characteristics of Eggers’s literary output the continued 
interest in traumatized protagonists as well as a broader preoccupation with the role of Americans on the 
global stage (98). 
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the narrative and make up for those events of which Deng himself had little recollection 
(What Is the What 2008 xiv).21  
Despite these narratological oddities, which move the book away from the more 
straightforward testimonial strategy of having a victim simply tell their story, critics 
have read and received the book as a clear piece of activism in addition to its being a 
well-crafted story. Galow sees it as evidence for “Deng’s gradual transformation from 
scared child into a highly visible representative of the Lost Boys” (51). Yost even focuses 
on the formal features of the book as part of his argument that it forms “a positive 
model for the testimony narrative as a form of cosmopolitan humanitarian 
collaboration” (150). He also makes the case for extrapolating from Deng’s experiences 
in some respect as part of the reading process. Yost focuses not so much on how the 
protagonist comes to represent the Lost Boys more broadly, as Galow does, but argues 
instead that the premise of the book is that readers can “extract” universal values from 
the “specific, local, and unique experiences” described in the story (159). Bringing these 
two points together, in “Humanitarian Narrative and Posthumanist Critique: Dave 
Eggers’s What Is the What” Michelle Peek argues that the novel constitutes a rewriting of 
the “terms of testimonial writing” in which the unique and particular is retained in 
terms of Deng’s story, but the resonance of the narrative extends to the “universalizing 
genre of ‘Lost Boys’ testimonial’” (115).22 As a result, proponents of the book tend to 
praise Eggers’s skills as a writer for making legible and compelling the rights-claims of 
the narrative’s disempowered subject as well as for educating readers about a broader 
rights crisis. 
 
                                                     
21 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all citations are taken from the 2008 Penguin edition of What Is the What, 
which contains a revised preface in which Deng explains in more detail how his relationship with Eggers 
developed. In order to counter criticism their collaboration received following the book’s initial publication, 
he also makes clear that all the proceeds from the book go directly to the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation 
(What Is the What 2008 xiii-xv). 
22 Peek explicitly notes Eggers’s engagement with the universalizing humanism of the human rights 
movement and reads What Is the What as an effort on the part of the author to think beyond some of the 
“value-laden frames of humanitarian witnessing” even as it embeds itself within the culture of life writing as 
it functions within the discourse of human rights (116). This point is taken up in chapter three of this 
dissertation. 
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Less favourable reviews are similarly concerned with how the book is more than just 
a story and is also part of a campaign for social justice. In a review for The New Republic, 
for instance, Lee Siegel accuses Eggers of “post-colonial arrogance” and the 
“expropriation of another man’s identity” (53). Siegel claims that, in What Is the What, 
Deng has his identity “erased” (50), that Eggers’s interventions create a discord between 
“whimsical . . . artistic license” and “a genocidal historical event” (51), and that the 
narrative thereby weakens and confuses the reader’s engagement by making it 
impossible to tell whether Deng’s emotional appeals are “his own or not” (53). In many 
ways, the specific criticisms laid out by Siegel can be brought back to the criticisms of 
human rights culture. After all, the faith in providing salience for rights abuses through 
personal narratives – which is exactly what Eggers tends to do in some form or other in 
his activism – reframes but does not rebut postcolonial concerns about subaltern 
speech. Both the positive and negative reviews thus slot What Is the What into the 
dynamics of human rights culture. They cover the metonymical requirements of 
personal narratives – the extent to which Deng’s experiences are “representative” – as 
well as the imperial spectres that haunt the West’s cross-cultural engagement with non-
Western subjects in the pursuit of the universalization of rights.  
Zeitoun similarly embeds itself within these tenets of human rights culture. It tells the 
story of Abdulrahman Zeitoun, a Syrian-American migrant who survives Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans only to be arrested, detained, and abused without due process 
under the guise of counter-terror measures in the chaotic aftermath of the storm. While 
this collaborative narrative is less experimental in terms of form – everything is 
narrated by a journalistic third person narrator – it nevertheless works hard through its 
structure and style to cajole readers into taking part in its rights project. The novel 
blends the perspectives of Zeitoun and his wife Kathy, who struggles to find out what 
has happened to her husband following his arrest, in such a way as to humanize the 
dehumanizing stereotypes and treatment to which the protagonist is consistently 
subjected. As such, it attempts to guide the reader into engaging Zeitoun affectively and 
recognizing his humanity in his being stripped of that humanity. In this sense, as 
Valerie Thomas points out in “‘Dust to Cleanse Themselves,’ A Survivor's Ethos: 
Diasporic Disidentifications in Zeitoun,” the narrative seeks to provide a foil to the 
stereotyping and repression of the particular experiences of people such as Zeitoun in 
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the storm’s aftermath, which rendered their suffering invisible whilst simultaneously 
using them as scapegoats for the ills in U.S. society (284). Its scope is, just like What Is the 
What’s, both individual and universal in terms of the rights-work it is trying to do. It 
asks for the recognition of its protagonist’s humanity and attendant rights, but also asks 
that readers understand the reasons behind the rights abuses Zeitoun suffered so as to 
make a wider point about the need to amend the unequal treatment of people by the 
state based on their ethnicity, religion, or race and reinforced by a counter-terrorism 
discourse that emphasizes rather than bridges those divisions.23 
In this case, the extra-textual reality surrounding the book’s protagonist provided 
the main bone of contention for critics debating the effectiveness of Zeitoun as a rights 
project. Following the publication of Eggers’s account of Zeitoun’s story, which gives an 
altogether positive account of the protagonist as an honest, hard-working man 
wrongfully accused and abused, real-world revelations caught up with the 
representation of the character in Zeitoun. Kathy was forced to take out a restraining 
order against her husband after he allegedly tried to beat her to death with a tire iron 
and subsequently ordered a hit on her from prison, though Zeitoun himself contests 
these allegations (“Zeitoun Lawyer: restraining order ‘flawed’”). The charges and 
allegations against Zeitoun reveal a darker side of the character Eggers chose to create 
in his narrative and leaves Zeitoun open to the accusation that the text whitewashed the 
character in order to smooth the path for the rights-work the text sets out to do. 
Indeed, some critics leapt on the revelations as discrediting entirely the book’s 
endeavours. Robbie Brown wrote in the New York Times that the events marked a “series 
of dark turns” that call into question the relationship between Kathy and Zeitoun as 
described in the book (“Katrina Hero Facing Charges in New Orleans”), while Victoria 
Patterson’s article published on Salon.com asked more bluntly “Did Eggers get Zeitoun 
Wrong?” (“Did Dave Eggers get Zeitoun Wrong?”). Other critics, such as Galow, have 
 
                                                     
23 The specific context for the story of Zeitoun is the so-called PATRIOT act, which effectively places counter-
terror investigations beyond the normal legal restraints and thereby allows the types of abuse in the narrative 
to take place. The particular implications of this for Zeitoun will be introduced as they become relevant to the 
analysis of that narrative in subsequent chapters. 
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chosen to separate the extra-textual events from the narrative proper in order to 
analyse the text’s depiction of the story without muddling the analysis with events 
outside of it (64-81). However, the revelations following Zeitoun’s publication cannot 
form the basis for a simple dismissal of Eggers and Zeitoun’s collaborative project nor 
can they simply be ignored in order to simplify the analysis of what they set out to 
achieve.  
The revelations are a key part of the discussion about how Eggers engages human 
rights culture and how that culture in turn affects and shapes his activism. They reveal 
the extent to which these collaborative efforts make it so that author and 
disempowered subject are mutually invested in each other’s success. As far as Eggers is 
concerned, as Liesbeth Korthals Altes writes in Ethos and Narrative Interpretation, the 
author’s “writing programs with underprivileged people arguably provide a strong 
backing to his posture of sincerely committed writer” (54). This posture of the sincere 
writer, in turn, helps soften the audience for the projects to which books such as What Is 
the What or Zeitoun are linked. In part, this is achieved by the way in which these texts, 
especially What Is the What, echo the playful and self-deprecating style of Eggers’s 
popular breakthrough narrative A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, which also 
blends stylistic play with serious subject matter to form a compelling narrative. In this 
way, his work with Deng and Zeitoun is a continuation of previous artistic projects. 
Altes, describing A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, notes how the formal play at 
work in the book acts as a means of drawing the reader into the sincere communicative 
effort at the heart of the book. In this sense, the style may be particularly suited to the 
type of work literature can perform in human rights culture in making 
incomprehensible and complex suffering of victims sufficiently legible so as to activate 
readers in an affective sense and, beyond that, to engage them for social change.  
As far as Deng and Zeitoun are concerned, the affectively engaging articulation of 
their suffering as facilitated by Eggers makes their appeal stronger. Kevin Brooks makes 
this point in “Dave Eggers’s What Is the What as World Literature” when he writes that 
after Eggers rewrote Deng’s story, “the story gained significantly as a work of art” (36) 
to the extent that it tells the story of the Lost Boys more “fully” and “vividly” than the 
first-hand accounts he has heard (37). Through Eggers and the clout he has on the 
Western, especially North-American, book market, Zeitoun and What Is the What reach a 
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far larger audience and can make use of the reading public’s desire to consume the 
latest text by a likeable author. In her analysis of A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering 
Genius, Altes notes how Eggers’s authorial posturing is characterized by an appealing 
oscilation between irony and sincerity that captivates the reader and challenges them 
to discern the author’s true voice and persona amidst the narrative’s many formal 
gimmicks and experiments (62). Moreover, she argues, the cover for the memoir, a red 
curtain crossing a sunset, shows the extent to which the author is aware of the 
marketing conventions in the U.S. book market in its parodying of that marketing style 
(232). It is this acute knowledge of the book market that makes Eggers so successful in 
helping the disempowered subjects with which he collaborates augment the salience of 
their appeals and rights claims. When this dynamic is successful, as it was for What Is the 
What, artist and disempowered victim lift each other’s efforts to new heights. But when 
either side is shown to be faulty in some respect, as was the case for Zeitoun, the entire 
endeavour collapses.24 Indeed, in Zeitoun’s case the revelations eventually caused the 
Zeitoun Foundation, set up as a recipient charity for all the book’s proceeds, to close 
down. 
Zeitoun and What Is the What provide intriguing examples of the drive, taken up by 
Eggers, towards personal narratives in human rights culture, both in their successes and 
failures. What Is the What is part of a compelling effort to make legible an extraordinarily 
complex conflict in and around South Sudan through the story of a single Sudanese 
man’s experience. This conflict, which has its origins in the tensions between the deeply 
held ethnic and religious identities of groups of people across what was then still a 
single country, Sudan. Deng, for instance, is part of the Dinka people, an ethnic group in 
what is now South Sudan, whose faith and lifestyle, mostly made up of cattle-herding, 
differ markedly from that of the Islamic North. They further differ from the Nuer, a 
different ethnic group that makes up a significant part of South Sudan’s demographic, 
 
                                                     
24 Another well-known example would be Rigoberta Menchú, whose life story appeared as I, Rigobert Menchú 
under the editorial guidance of Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. Even though the book, considered a classic in the 
Latin-American testimonio genre, received the Nobel Peace Prize, Menchú and Burgos-Debray’s account was 
heavily criticized by David Stoll in Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans, in which he finds fault 
with the accuracy of Menchú’s account and the way it was sensationalized for maximum publicity. 
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with whom relations remain difficult. Even if the novel devotes attention to these 
particularities as a means of providing context through exposition for the events in 
which Deng gets caught up, the character himself is less bound by these ethnic or 
religious strictures in his functioning within the narrative. In the section set in the 
United States in particular, Deng seems to be stripped of much of his local rootedness in 
South Sudan so as to facilitate the process of his becoming a representative character 
through which the reader, as he himself notes in the preface, can “learn” about his 
country (What Is the What 2008 xiii). This raises questions as to whether personal 
narratives in human rights culture provide access to or erase and supplant the local 
context of human rights crises. One could argue the point that such narratives distort 
the reader’s image of the conflict and of the parties involved in it. In terms of human 
rights activism, however, one could also suggest that this process reframes the conflict 
and its victims in more abstract terms, with local divisions being relinquished in favour 
of a more universalistic conception of suffering human beings entitled to rights and the 
protection thereof.  
The case of Zeitoun can help further disentangle this issue, as it came to be deployed 
on either side of this argument. The story of Zeitoun was taken up elsewhere before it 
was transformed into a stand-alone story by Eggers, in Voices from the Storm, a volume in 
the Voice of Witness series co-founded by Eggers that publishes oral history collections 
relating to various human rights crises across the globe. I will return to the specifics of 
how the series, which focuses on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, engages with 
human rights culture in chapter three, where I investigate the affective dimension of 
personal narratives as a critical part of the human rights-work they seek to perform. For 
now, however, it is useful to consider how this different embedding of Zeitoun’s story 
engages with the issue surrounding the local and the global as it exists within human 
rights culture. In Voices From the Storm, Zeitoun’s experiences are a smaller part in an 
extensive collection of narratives covering a wide range of disempowered subjects’ 
experiences of Hurricane Katrina. The volume has a total of thirteen diverse narrators, 
including a Vietnamese pastor (Father Vien The Nguyen), a wrongfully convicted father 
of four (Dan Bright), a local activist (Jackie Harris), a Cuban immigrant (Sonya 
Hernandez), and an African-American New Orleans native trumpeter (Kermit Ruffins). 
In addition to his Syrian-American perspective, therefore, the reader is also confronted 
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with those of other New Orleans residents of different ages and genders with different 
racial, cultural, and religious backgrounds. As a cross-section of representatives, the 
volume is able to speak to the overall experience of Hurricane Katrina by its inhabitants, 
with its attendant complications for the poorer sections of the community that were 
unable to flee the city in time or whose houses were built on natural flood plains. In this 
sense, Zeitoun’s experiences, whilst extraordinary as an impactful example of human 
rights abuse in a broad sense, are put in touch with the particularities of the local 
context that made such abuses possible through the use of extensive appendices. 
In Zeitoun, the stand-alone version of this personal narrative, the embedding is vastly 
different. In this case, the character is largely unmoored from his specific ties to New 
Orleans rather than connected to them through the mosaic of narratives in Voices from 
the Storm. In his second engagement with Zeitoun’s experiences, Eggers chose to explore 
the multinational and multicultural background of the character in order to address 
more specifically the racial profiling that underlies his arrest and abuse in the storm’s 
aftermath. While I will deal with this issue in more detail in chapter three, it is worth 
noting the extent to which Zeitoun becomes a multi-rooted yet rootless individual in 
Eggers’s more focused non-fiction adaptation. It draws more extensively on his Syrian 
background, which features in lengthy flashbacks and perpetually resurfaces, as certain 
motifs in the narrative remind him of his complex roots. For instance, photographs play 
an important role in Zeitoun as a prompt for the protagonist to recall his past life as a 
sailor and his childhood in Syria. These photographic memory-prompts are intricately 
connected to his experiences of being a New Orleans resident in that the storm, and his 
subsequent efforts to secure his possessions from the flood, quite literally bring these 
forgotten photographs to the surface (139-146). Syria and his past life at sea thus 
function as an escape for the character in Zeitoun. It is also an integral part of his 
identity, explained at length in the narrative’s exposition which explores the 
character’s experiences of being a Syrian-American Muslim in New Orleans that will 
later link to the narrative’s major event, his arrest and detention on the basis of racial 
profiling.  
In Voices from the Storm, Zeitoun’s Syrian background is never more than one of the 
many diverse background stories that all the narrators seem to have. It seemingly does 
not affect the character in any significant way other than as an anecdotal part of his 
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experiences of the storm, such as when it helps him understand the flooding in the 
storm’s aftermath: “There is a Syrian island close to Tripoli named Arwad Island. My 
grandmother lived there and that is where I grew up. So I know that when the sea level 
high in the ocean, we got one foot above the sea level from the wave pushing the water 
inside the city [sic]” (131). The focus on the character’s hyphenated identity as a Syrian-
American in Zeitoun suggests that the narrative attempts to think beyond the 
categorizations and stereotypes that govern the way he is perceived in the context of 
the American nation state. Indeed, Thomas argues as much when she suggests that in 
telling of the protagonist’s “immigrant experience,” the narrative “democratizes routes 
to inclusion and agency by expanding public knowledge and dialogue” (272). 
Furthermore, as I go on to show in my analysis in chapter three, the entire narrative 
works hard to find means of framing the protagonist as a human being, stripped of 
nationality and particularity, in its efforts to open him up to affective engagement on 
the part of the audience. The key issue at work here is, to use Butler’s terms, that of 
overcoming the hegemonic boundaries that render certain lives and peoples less 
recognizable and grievable. The crucial point being that Zeitoun’s status as both a 
Syrian and a Muslim, in addition to his status as a New Orleans inhabitant, make his 
suffering less visible. Indeed, Eggers’s drive towards the personal narrative is informed 
by a belief that the hegemony excludes the voices of certain people, such as Zeitoun, 
and the need he feels to redress that injustice (Bex and Craps 565-566). In a broader 
sense, therefore, the act of distancing the character from his local ties unshackles the 
human rights-work of the narrative from the chains of the nation state, with all its 
attendant hegemonic divisions along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines. In doing so, it 
similarly seeks to address the way those divisions are replicated in the neo-colonial 
relationships and hierarchies between nation states that render the rights violations 
described in Zeitoun invisible by placing his suffering beyond the scope of the 
incorporated citizen-subject of the global human rights regime. 
Yet the abandonment of local specificity and context can also work against this very 
process when that specificity and context contradict the champion of human rights put 
forward by the personal narrative. This was most strongly the case for Zeitoun, where 
the extra-textual revelations concerning the protagonist’s conduct stood in stark 
contrast to the character sketched by Eggers in his narrative. In the aftermath of the 
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book’s release, these new facts clashed with the emerging news story of domestic 
violence and court charges surrounding Zeitoun. Once the man was shown to be more 
complex than the character portrayed in the book, a process that essentially reinserted 
the transnational abstracted character into a specific local situation and series of events, 
the personal narrative lost its ability to use him as a conduit for human rights-work. In 
other words, once Zeitoun was no longer open to affective engagement as the idealized 
“human” of human rights, his claim to inclusion in that hegemony evaporated. In some 
way, the criminal allegations laid at the feet of Zeitoun became linked to his human 
rights claim and the abuse he suffered. As Patterson’s article suggests by its title, “Did 
Dave Eggers Get Zeitoun Wrong?,” the implication of these revelations prompted 
questions about whether or not Eggers had misled his audience or simply misread the 
issue himself. This is not to suggest that these revelations unfairly sullied Eggers’s 
portrayal of Zeitoun. The allegations provide important additional information for the 
reader to judge Zeitoun’s particular case, even if they do not diminish, as the narrative 
seeks to show, his right to be free from discrimination on the basis of his religion or 
nationality, as well as his right not to be unlawfully detained or tortured. Rather, the 
question must be why Eggers’s personal narrative, in its appeal to human rights culture, 
constructs its subject in such a way and why the text’s audience seems so willing to 
dismiss the rights-claim within once that narrative construct falls apart. What this lays 
bare, in other words, is the fickle status of the disempowered subject in human rights 
culture, measured against an idealized standard but always at risk of being re-grounded 
and subsequently dismissed on the basis of any complexities and particularities that 
form the context of their testimonies.  
The same issue applies to What Is the What, which carefully navigates the ambiguous 
figure of the child soldier – who is both victim and perpetrator – in the discourse of 
human rights. Accordingly, the work of claiming rights by or on behalf of victims 
through the narrative requires a certain amount of re-grounding or abstraction so as to 
make the narrative and its incorporated rights-claim legible and amenable to a Western 
audience. Even though the protagonist is explicitly spared the need to contend with this 
problem by distinguishing Deng from other characters who do become child soldiers, 
the need to salvage their claim to absolute victimhood is, even for these peripheral 
characters, paramount. They are constructed solely as children: the agency in the tale of 
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their coercion into becoming soldiers is laid entirely at the feet of the rebel leaders 
recruiting them, and any potential atrocities committed following their induction are 
omitted from the narrative. This is not to say that the use of child soldiers is 
whitewashed in the novel, but rather to suggest that becoming a child soldier must be 
slotted into the overall victim-centred focus of a narrative that will not accept any 
ambiguity.  
Despite this meticulous navigation though, the reader is reassured that Deng’s 
victimhood need not be recovered in this way. The novel provides no evidence to 
suggest that Deng himself was a child soldier. Indeed, as I go on to show in the final 
chapter of this dissertation, the protagonist consistently stresses his not being part of 
the rebel army that recruits many of the other refugee children. In fact, this is one of 
the reasons he is eligible to be relocated to the United States. He sees himself as an 
exemplary candidate for resettlement because, as he writes, “I had not been a soldier” 
(490). Deng’s victim-narrative is subsequently interlaced with one in which he struggles 
to be accepted in the United States. This creates a mutually reinforcing dynamic in the 
novel whereby the child-protagonist’s suffering in Africa becomes a claim for having his 
human rights recognized, and the rejection the adult-protagonist contends with in the 
United States brings that claim into a recognizable setting and situation. His Sudanese 
experiences give readers a compelling reason to care for the plight of the character and 
also reassure them that he is worthy of their affective engagement, whereas the 
American ones make the character recognizable and accessible. The fact that Eggers 
steers Deng’s narrative clear of any association with child soldiers further ensures that 
the rights-work performed by the novel cannot so easily subsequently be undermined. 
Thus, Deng can take up the role of the ideal human rights victim and the story becomes 
safe for consumption in human rights culture. As a result, the protagonist can be 
inserted into the process of claiming rights on behalf of himself and similar victims. 
Human rights culture offers a blueprint for that process to take place, but seems to 
require a certain amount of mediation for it to be successful. In Zeitoun’s case, the 
vulnerability of this process was shown up when criminal allegations seemed to 
disqualify the narrative from claiming rights on behalf of its protagonist, thus calling 
into question the nature of Eggers’s mediation. Part of this mediation comes back to the 
tension between the generalization of the victim’s testimony and the particularities of 
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their experiences which, in What Is the What’s case, involve engaging or circumventing 
the complex issue of child soldiers.  
Another part of the necessary mediation is Eggers’s own intervention in the writing, 
editing, production, and marketing of these personal narratives. As a popular American 
author with a guaranteed access to the North-American marketplace, his involvement is 
invaluable in terms of providing people such as Deng or Zeitoun with the necessary 
salience and reach for the rights-work of their narratives to be impactful. As Deng 
writes in the preface to What Is the What, he called on Eggers to help him reach a bigger 
audience and transform his many experiences into a coherent and intriguing story 
(What Is the What 2008 xiii). This bigger audience is largely located in the United States 
and the West more broadly. This can be further gleaned from the preface, which 
stresses the wish to educate readers about African issues (What Is the What 2008 xiii) and 
includes a helpful map of Sudan and its neighbouring countries for readers unfamiliar 
with African geography (What Is the What 2008 xi). Eggers’s ability to craft compelling 
stories and market them to this audience makes him invaluable to the rights-work these 
narratives set out to achieve. In this sense, Eggers’s mediation also relates to the issue of 
engaging the local in a cross-cultural dialogue, or of reframing the violations of 
particular human beings in specific contexts in terms of universal values and their 
global application. This raises two questions. First, to what extent does Eggers’s 
involvement in writing these personal narratives constitute an erosion of the particular 
voice or context of the victim or, conversely, help to accentuate it? Second, and 
relatedly, to what extent does the framing of these personal narratives as collaborative 
affect the rights-work they perform and the terms on which the audience is engaged? A 
comparison to similar such collaborations in the past in different rights-contexts can 
help address these questions. The slave narratives introduced in the following chapter 
provide a useful point of comparison as a means of gauging four aspects of collaborative 
personal narratives. How are these cultural artefacts engaged in rights-causes? How are 
they shaped by existing rights discourses and cultures? How do they contribute to the 
further shaping of those discourses and cultures? Finally, what role does the 
collaboration between a privileged author or editor and a disempowered subject play in 
the three previous questions? An answer to these questions sheds light on the function 
of personal narratives and their collaborative dimension in developing rights cultures 
 62 
and provides the tools with which to approach such collaborations and narratives in 
contemporary human rights culture.  
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I began by exploring the various incarnations of contemporary human 
rights discourses and their application in order to sketch some of the most important 
ideas that underpin them, functions they (seek to) fulfil, and agents that make use of 
them. Both in its grounding in the philosophical roots of natural rights and the 
foundational document of the UDHR, the discourse of human rights has come to 
represent a universal standard by which fundamental issues relating to human equality, 
justice, and peace are judged. Yet the application and strength of that standard in 
(geo)political, legal, activist, and cultural contexts has been markedly distinctive. 
Whereas human rights law and the institutions that support it, such as the UN or the 
ICC, struggle to apply the legal articulation of the UDHR to individual nation states in 
the shifting shoals of the geopolitical landscape, activists have found the common 
language and understanding provided by human rights a useful means of articulating 
their concerns and recruiting people for their cause. Cultural engagement with human 
rights has similarly relied on a broad understanding of basic rights so as to present the 
suffering of individual victims as a violation of an agreed upon standard. This 
discrepancy between a strong socio-cultural understanding of human rights and a 
notoriously weak legal iteration of it gives rise to a need for a separate conception of 
human rights culture. This culture covers the multifarious field within which personal 
narratives circulate in service of the human rights movement as well as the 
opportunities and restrictions placed upon those narratives by the tenets of that 
movement. Indeed, Eggers’s efforts to amplify the voices of victims of rights abuses 
already reflects one of the central tenets of human rights culture, that of using the 
testimonies of disempowered subjects to affectively engage readers and recruit them in 
the push to effect change on their behalf. As such, it is less concerned with the strict 
legal interpretation of human rights or the legal-institutional context within which that 
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interpretation operates. Rather, it gives shape to the set of assumptions and possibilities 
that undergird the many other applications of human rights that fall beyond the scope 
of legal definitions, but which nevertheless provide it with its socio-cultural base and 
grounding. 
By gauging Eggers’s position within this human rights culture, this chapter has 
subsequently brought into focus some of the criticisms and concerns levelled at human 
rights more broadly, especially from a postcolonial angle. In his exploration of the 
function of the personal narrative as a rights-space creating tool, Eggers runs into many 
of the issues with regard to subaltern speech, othering, and neo-colonialism that are 
brought into play by postcolonial critics to express concern about some of the central 
ideas and practices that underlie the human rights project. The focus on the textual 
analysis of Eggers’s works in subsequent chapters brings these concerns down to a 
specifically textual level and seeks to put them in touch with the field of human rights 
culture. An analysis of the textual practices and narrative structures in works such as 
What Is the What or Zeitoun helps uncover how the affective relationship is cultivated by 
personal narratives and navigates the problems of voice appropriation. Similarly, a 
study of You Shall Know Our Velocity or “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” brings 
the neo-colonial dimension of cross-cultural engagements into focus by playing out 
various interpersonal encounters and thereby questions the cosmopolitan faith in such 
engagements that pervades human rights culture.25 Beyond the text, the relationship 
between the discursive space created by the text and the extra-textual circulation and 
reception of that text sheds further light on the global dynamics of human rights 
culture as well as the extent to which personal narratives can engage, are shaped by, or 
help (re)form the discourse of human rights itself beyond the cultural sphere. In this 
 
                                                     
25 “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” is part of the short story collection How We Are Hungry. This 
collection also contains a short story sequel to the novel You Shall Know Our Velocity titled “The Only Meaning 
of the Oil-Wet Water” in which the protagonist, Hand, and one of his friends, Pillar, meet up in Costa Rica. The 
story retains the motifs of self-absorption and emotive encounters, focusing this time on the anticipation and 
resolution of the sexual tension between the two Western protagonists rather than their meeting of others. 
For the analytical purposes of this dissertation, however, they do not offer any further textual material to add 
substantially to the analysis of You Shall Know Our Velocity. 
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respect, the way in which such narratives have undertaken these various actions in the 
past provides a fruitful place to start. 
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 2 Forging Rights-Spaces: Form, Intertextuality, 
and Cultural Politics 
This chapter takes a diachronic approach to understanding how Eggers’s use of the 
collaborative testimonial form in What Is the What and Zeitoun intersects with the 
function of personal narratives in the historical development of human rights. It does so 
by tracing the intertextual links between Eggers’s narratives and the genre of the 
nineteenth-century slave narrative and the historical debate surrounding the abolition 
of slavery more generally. I take my cue for such a genre-genealogical approach from 
Wai Chee Dimock’s concept of “deep time,” which she sets out in her alternate history of 
American literature in Through Other Continents: American Literature Across Deep Time 
(2006).1 She introduces “deep time” as a means of pushing literary history beyond the 
confines of the nation state, thereby opening up the possibility for a genre-based history 
of world literature which includes, but is not restricted to, cultural output in the United 
States context.2 This affects her definition of “American Literature” quite drastically: 
 
                                                     
1 By genre, I do not mean a rigid definition of textual characteristics that leaves no room for the type of 
textual and paratextual maneouvering that I show is key to the rights-work performed by personal narratives. 
Instead, I follow Dimock’s assertion that genre is not the just an act of classification, but a probabilistic and 
distributional gauging of the interconnectedness and affinities of related texts along temporal and spatial axes 
(74). 
2 The guiding question or line of enquiry, she notes at the beginning of a chapter titled “Genre as a World 
System,” is: “What would literary history look like if the field were divided, not into discrete periods, and not 
into discrete bodies of national literatures? What other organizing principles might come into play?” (73). It is 
my assertion in this chapter that an understanding of the personal narrative as a rights-space creating tool 
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“Rather than being a discrete entity, it is better seen as a crisscrossing set of pathways, 
open-ended and ever multiplying, weaving in and out of other geographies, other 
languages and cultures” (3). As such, it is a useful means of gauging the evolution of the 
personal narrative as a rights-space creating tool against the backdrop of rights 
discourses that have oscillated between the national and the global, and between the 
Global South and the West and back again. The geographical fluidity of Dimock’s 
conception of American literature serves a significant purpose. In terms of rights, there 
is a sense in which Eggers’s collaborative testimonies constitute a writing back by 
forcing Western readers to look at abuses in the Global South, whereas slave narratives 
focus attention on the effects of the transatlantic slave trade on the United States. Even 
though both Eggers’s works and the slave narratives were published in North America 
with an American audience in mind, a discussion of their rights-space creating efforts 
would be hampered by a strictly national demarcation and consideration. As an 
alternative, a generic-genealogical reading of the personal narrative provides a means 
of tracing the tension between the local and the global, the universal and the particular, 
that marks the cultural history of rights.3 
Furthermore, my analytical and methodological approach is a formal one, because it 
focuses attention on the mechanics of the way in which a text performs its socio-
political function. As Franco Moretti asserts in the preface to his study of the 
Bildungsroman in European culture, The Way of the World (2000), the analysis of formal 
patterns and genres, as a conveyor of ideological charge, is key to understanding the 
way in which narratives perform their political work (xiii).4 In reflecting on the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
could be one such organizing principle, one that would, furthermore, greatly contribute to the 
conceptualization of the development of human rights culture.  
3 Dimock stipulates that “deep time” allows her analysis to be attentive to how the “subnational and the 
transnational” thus become “intertwined in a way that speaks as much to local circumstances as it does to 
global circuits” (23).  
4 In her recent survey study of twenty-first century fiction, including Eggers, Toward the Geopolitical Novel, 
Caren Irr also specifically insists upon genre analysis as a necessary complement to the individualizing and 
particularizing tendencies of close reading to uncover what she sees as the resurgence of the American 
political novel in the twenty-first century (14).  
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coalescence of studies of literature and human rights, Slaughter and Mcclennen point 
out that the imaginative and social work of literary texts is “done through the forms of 
stories that enable forms of thought, forms of commitment, forms of being, and forms of 
justice” (11). This point is especially important here, given the broader socio-political 
impact these personal narratives aspire to and which my analysis seeks to uncover. 
Dimock’s approach is thus further valuable in the context of this chapter because it 
opens up the possibility of considering rights-space creating efforts through the uses of 
personal narratives across distinctive historical periods, while at the same time allowing 
for those efforts to be inflected by the particular contexts within which they circulated.5 
A comparison between the two iterations of the personal narrative in this chapter 
reveals a continuity of practice when it comes to the performative tie between form and 
rights-work. In other words, the ways in which a personal narrative is told by a 
disempowered narrator, through the act of narrating their suffering, sets out to 
influence the perceptions and positions that govern the socio-political negotiation of 
rights. Subsequently however, the chapter demonstrates how the use of personal 
narratives has been adapted to the historical specificity of the rights contexts in which 
they function.  
By reading the political through the formal, I am able to pinpoint how personal 
narratives are used to open up cross-cultural and cross-racial spaces within which 
rights can be imagined, claimed, and granted. This effort goes some way to 
acknowledging the “special traditions of artistic expression that emerge from slave 
culture” that can deepen what Gilroy terms the existing “primal history of ‘modernity’” 
(56). In order to do so, one must focus on the form through which rights have 
historically been claimed (personal narratives) rather than scrutinizing the places 
where they have been proclaimed (declarations). This is not to suggest that rights 
cannot be “claimed” politically. Historically, political rights-claiming movements have 
 
                                                     
5 Dimock herself summarizes and draws on Moretti’s concept of “distant reading” to undergird her genre-
based approach to world literature in deep time: “He [Moretti] calls for a ‘comparative morphology,’ one that 
takes as its starting point a distributive map, reflecting the circulation and evolution of literary forms, and 
operating on the same scale as the planet. Only such a map can capture the full range of environmental input, 
the difference that each locale makes” (79). 
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been a successful means of securing rights. Even as far back as Ancient Rome, the 
plebeian class claimed social and political rights by withdrawing from the city during 
the so-called secessio plebis, which led to plebiscite access to the political decision-
making process in the form of tribunes. Nevertheless, the politics of form as it is 
produced by my analyses marries this political sphere to its cultural context. In the 
context of slave narratives, for instance, my analysis of Douglass and Jacobs shows that 
there is a fascinating interplay between the abolitionist movement and the use of 
personal narratives as part of a broad push for (former) slaves to be granted rights. 
Furthermore, it introduces a level of agency to the position of the disempowered 
otherwise lost in historical representations of oppression in which the agency is solely 
conferred upon the oppressor or the saviour, rarely upon the oppressed. Close readings 
of the narrative performance and political role of rights-claiming personal narratives 
are thereby able to shed new light on the developmental history of human rights. As far 
as agency is concerned, Dimock’s “deep time” literary history is once again a useful 
point of reference. She notes that even though postcolonial theorists such as Said have 
been successful in unpacking the history of Orientalism, they have done so in a way that 
places the West at its centre and thereby reproduces the very dynamic they aim to 
scrutinize (29). The issue of challenging the distribution of agency plays a central role in 
both slave narratives and Eggers’s collaborative works, thereby underscoring once more 
the value of considering their interconnection as rights-space creating tools in “deep 
time.”  
In terms of human rights, diachronic considerations have recently become a bone of 
contention for scholars, who broadly fall into opposing historicist and presentist camps. 
In Human Rights and the Uses of History (2014), legal-historian Samuel Moyn forcibly 
argues that human rights scholars should avoid projecting contemporary conceptions 
and uses of human rights discourse onto the past in order to provide it with a 
legitimizing history: “human rights history should turn away from ransacking the past 
as if it provided good support for the astonishingly specific international movement of 
the last few decades” (xiii). Much like the central argument in The Last Utopia (2010), 
Moyn’s point is not so much that human rights were invented recently, but that their 
current conception is specific to the contemporary moment and not part of a cascading 
logic of progress that can be traced back to the eighteenth century. His plea for 
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historical specificity partly runs counter to Lynn Hunt’s landmark study Inventing 
Human Rights (2007), which argues for essential historical continuity running from the 
United States Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) to the United Nations’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). This history, she writes, provides the means of understanding 
“what human rights mean to us today” (19).6 These opposing views on the history of 
rights have proven difficult to reconcile: one is seemingly either forced to ignore the 
history of human rights in order to deal with the specificity of the present, or allowed to 
include the evolution of human rights at the expense of glossing over glaring legal-
historical differences. 
However, this critical impasse need not be crippling. In fact, this opposition can be 
put to productive use by studying the literary history of human rights-work in deep 
time alongside its legal-historical development. The key role of literature in the 
development of human rights has become increasingly clear as interdisciplinary 
research has uncovered historical coalescences between the two. As Slaughter makes 
clear in his seminal work in this area, Human Rights Inc., cultural forms like the novel 
have helped to shape and entrench the idea of human rights (25). The central place of 
personal narratives in the contemporary iteration of human rights now seems equally 
certain. In their study of contemporary uses of personal narratives in the context of 
human rights, Human Rights and Narrated Lives (2004), Schaffer and Smith start from the 
observation that they “have become one of the most potent vehicles for advancing 
human rights claims” (1). As a result, the goal of their study is to show the extent to 
which this narrative form is tied up with human rights discourses (2-8) and how they 
ultimately “trouble established interpretations of rights violations, shift definitions and 
 
                                                     
6 Acknowledging his debt to the work of Hunt, Marcello Flores similarly argues in The Story of Human Rights 
that the “history of human rights is the itinerary through which moral principles and values have 
transformed into political objectives and into laws and juridical institutions, as well as into common sense and 
shared opinions” (11). His perspective affirms Hunt’s premise that the historical trend towards human rights 
is indicative of how “complex, articulated, yet fundamentally unitary history’s progress is” (45). 
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framings of human rights, and test modes of advocacy” (229).7 The role of personal 
narratives now, it is suggested, is to engage with human rights discourses by pointing to 
those areas where it fails to live up to its universal promise.  
While illuminating the dynamic between the two, this chapter also questions the 
stability of the relationship between personal narratives and rights activism by focusing 
on its volatile history. The similarities and differences between the circulation of 
personal narratives in distinctive legal-historical and literary contexts can reveal how 
the texts where rights are claimed consistently imagine a space both within and beyond 
the social contract and rights framework of a society. These narratives thereby seek 
redress within that framework for their disempowered subjects and advocate 
fundamental reform of it. In order to achieve this, narratives often make use of 
established cultural forms in order to articulate rights claims. As such, this chapter’s 
generic-genealogical study of personal narratives sets out to uncover how different 
cultural forms were adapted in the struggle for rights in different contexts. Eggers’s 
collaborative testimonies, for instance, make use of an establish human rights form, the 
personal narrative, to convince the reader to expand the epistemological frames of 
human rights to create a space for those currently excluded from them. This drive to 
engage but also reform the framework of human rights through the circulation of 
personal narratives is summed up more broadly in Frames of War when Butler writes: 
“When those frames that govern the relative and differential recognisability of lives 
come apart – as part of the very mechanism of their circulation – it becomes possible to 
apprehend something about what or who is living but has not been generally 
 
                                                     
7 Their study seeks to address the following questions, all of which pertain to contemporary circulations of 
personal narratives within the established and dominant framework of human rights: 
All stories emerge in de midst of complex and uneven relationships of power, prompting 
certain questions about production: Who tells the stories and who doesn’t? Why, when, how, 
and where do narratives become intelligible as stories of human rights? What historical, 
cultural, and institutional conditions affect the shapes stories take? What are the personal, 
social, political, and ethical effects of stories and their venues of production for both tellers 
and listeners? (5) 
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‘recognized’ as a life (12).” Even though they share this ultimate goal of rewriting the 
definition of who has the right to rights, nineteenth-century slave narratives function 
differently in that they operate within an entirely different legal and literary context. 
The personal narrative, as adopted by black authors, was at this time still defining itself 
as a rights-claiming genre in the midst of a revolutionary legal-historical moment.  
Furthermore, it is important that the literary historical contribution to the history of 
rights should trace the adaptation of the personal narrative form without entering it 
into the same type of cascading narrative of progress for which Moyn seeks to provide 
an antidote. Even though my analysis centres on Eggers, it thus also points towards a 
diverse and diffuse literary tradition in which form is used to contest or disrupt colonial 
modes of thinking as a means of claiming recognition and rights. This further suggests 
that there is a postcolonial history of literary form in deep time that can inform the 
history of human rights culture. In this dissertation, the discussion of slave narratives in 
this chapter as well as the in-depth discussion of neo-colonialism in relation to 
contemporary human rights culture in chapter four gestures towards two moments in 
such a history. Even a brief overview of these two moments, focused through Eggers, 
reveals an intriguing dynamic in world literature whereby personal narratives are used 
first to claim rights in the Western world and then evolve towards forcing the purview 
of rights to extend beyond the West in the contemporary context. It is particularly 
noteworthy too, for instance, how many of the tensions between the textual, 
paratextual, and extra-textual struggle for rights echo through the ages. 
Much as Eggers’s works and slave narratives share these features, however, their 
different literary and legal circumstances separate them. The protagonists of Eggers’s 
collaborative testimonies, Valentino Achak Deng and Abdulrahman Zeitoun, are 
embedded within an existing human rights framework. What Is the What focuses on 
getting the reader to inhabit a transnational space of human rights that transcends the 
restrictive national contexts within which Deng is denied a place throughout the 
narrative. Zeitoun’s narrative plot focuses precisely on the split between human being 
and United States citizenship as the protagonist is forcibly redefined as belonging to an 
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extra-legal space “exempt” from civil and human rights.8 By stressing the distinctive 
nature of both the slave narratives’ and Eggers’s context, I am able to pinpoint the exact 
nature of the rights-work these respective narratives perform. As I go on to show, 
however, many of the distinctive aims of Eggers’s personal narratives in the 
contemporary context conceal a marked similarity in terms of form and genre. By 
uncovering these similarities, one begins to understand just how personal narratives 
negotiate the relationship between text, paratext, and extra-textual circulation so as to 
engage in rights-space creation for disempowered subjects. In other words, while the 
context within which Eggers’s narratives are embedded may differ distinctly from that 
of the slave narratives, the continuity of such formal concerns provides a useful inroad 
into mapping out the rights-work Eggers and his collaborators are engaged in. 
This is not to suggest that the historical context within which personal narratives are 
produced has no impact on form. There is a definite distinctiveness to legal and literary 
adaptations of the genre across time that is worth bearing in mind: contemporary 
personal narratives have taken on increasingly standardized forms in narrating the 
difficulties faced by disenfranchised subjects in signing up to the existing global human 
rights regime. Moreover, human rights is now so dominant as a legal-political narrative 
that it is shaping the way in which rights claims are narrated.9 Slave narrators and black 
activists made use of other established literary forms (rather than legal-political ones) 
to articulate rights claims which, if granted, would contest the recently “declared” 
terms of the nineteenth-century social contract in order to include the possibility for 
black citizenship and rights. This point underscores Moyn’s doubts about seeing the 
 
                                                     
8 This split between subject and citizenship, as Slaughter notes in Human Rights Inc., is emblematic of non-
Western applications of the integrational Bildungs-plot that has been normalized as the central means of 
narrating the individual’s integration into the rights-bearing hegemony (123-124). 
9 This point has been reiterated time and again in studies of modern testimonial narratives. In That the World 
May Know, Dawes, discerns an emerging global subgenre of human rights narratives with distinctive formal 
characteristics (190). These formal characteristics are so culturally embedded, argues Anthony Rowland in The 
Future of Memory, that they can now be mimicked by other victim narrators (114). Schaffer and Smith put this 
down to “the pressure to conform the ‘messiness’ of personal testimony to the protocols for codification of a 
human rights abuse” as derived from the UNDHR or the UN (36-37).  
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abolitionist movement as the precursor to contemporary struggles for human rights 
(Human Rights and the Uses of History 58). Given the clearly distinctive legal, historical, 
and literary context, it becomes difficult to acquiesce to Hunt’s call to see a continuous 
line from the declarations of the eighteenth century emerging from societies that were 
“built on slavery, subordination, and seemingly natural subservience” (19) to the 
present day. Peter de Bolla pinpoints the problem with a history of inspirational and 
seemingly definitive declarations when he concludes his conceptual history of human 
rights, The Architecture of Concepts, with the point that declarations ought to be 
understood as “ongoing, even continuous action, endlessly recaptured and reformulated 
in each successive performance” (287). The development of personal narratives as an 
effective means of claiming rights – even when they are denied in the most extreme 
sense – marks an underlying continuity of practice that runs through these disparate 
historical rights movements, declarations, and developments. Conceiving of that 
development in deep time allows for the type of flexibility and dynamism suggested by 
de Bolla, which finds common ground between Moyn’s and Hunt’s theorizations. As 
Spivak notes in her A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, personal narratives are able to 
establish a “line of communication” between the subaltern and “the circuits of 
citizenship or institutionality” that insert their disempowered narrators “into the long 
road to hegemony” (310). The comparative analysis in this chapter goes one step further 
by also demonstrating how personal narratives engage with their respective legal-
historical and literary context in order to contribute to the negotiation and formation of 
successive rights frameworks, rather than simply gaining access to them. 
First, I flesh out the idea of how personal narratives can forge discursive spaces that 
establish disempowered narrators as ethical subjects and leave room for the further 
development or adjustment of rights discourses. The case of abolitionist texts, slave 
narratives, and post-emancipation black activism is key to developing this point. 
Subsequently, I discuss a number of key nineteenth-century personal narratives that 
can be seen as emblematic in terms of their formal structure and narrative features, and 
which illustrate this exchange between politics and culture. Frederick Douglass’s 
autobiographies, particularly his first autobiography Narrative in the Life of Frederick 
Douglass (1845), and Harriet Ann Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861) will be 
used to describe the “typical” form of the pre-emancipation slave narrative. The 
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relationship with white mediators as well as the standardization of the slave narrative 
form lays the groundwork for my analysis of the collaborative dimension of Eggers’s 
work with disempowered subjects as well as how he thwarts or flaunts the conventions 
of human rights culture. Booker T. Washington’s Up From Slavery and the writings of 
William Edward Burghardt Du Bois’s provide contrasting outlooks on the type of 
discursive space pursued following Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. The formal-
political analysis of the place of personal narratives in the context of rights for slaves 
and former slaves will subsequently serve as a point of comparison to how Eggers’s 
collaborative testimonies, What Is the What and Zeitoun, seek to engage with the now 
dominant discourse of human rights. Much like Du Bois and Washington, Eggers’s works 
betray a concern for the extent to which rights are recognized and seek to move beyond 
a simple recognition of the protagonist’s humanity. Finally, the nature of the 
relationship between privileged authors and disenfranchised subjects will be considered 
by juxtaposing Eggers’s role in amplifying the voices of Deng and Zeitoun with the role 
of prominent abolitionists in engaging slave narrators to promote the abolitionist cause. 
This last point is paramount, I will show, as it is critical to mapping the dynamic 
between authorship, publication, and readership through which the necessary cultural 
capital to effect political change is earned and distributed.  
2.1 Human Rights Culture in History: Slavery and 
Abolitionism 
There is a restrictive tendency to portray the history of abolitionism and the acquisition 
of rights by former slaves according to the proclamations produced by the dominant 
social group.10 Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights serves as a useful case in point here, in that 
 
                                                     
10 Edward A. Pearson makes a similar observation in A Countryside Full of Flames, his study of a slave uprising in 
1739 in South Carolina called the “Stone Rebellion:” “Problems clearly abound when using materials written 
by dominant groups to explain the world view of the dominated. The authorities do not view events from the 
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it makes copious use of the abolitionist movement as part of its survey of the history of 
human rights, yet makes no mention of prominent black writers such as Harriet Ann 
Jacobs, W.E.B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington or even Frederick Douglass. Symptomatic 
is the section on “Free Blacks, Slavery, and Race,” which references a plethora of acts 
and declarations ranging from the acts of 1792 and 1794 in France granting black people 
freedom and abolishing slavery, the British Parliament’s act of 1807 ending participation 
in the slave trade and its eventual abolition of slavery in 1833, to the gradual 
constitutional process by which the United States eventually recognized black 
citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 (160-161). One could also consider in 
this respect Michael Barnett’s recent Empire of Humanity (2013), which summarizes the 
period with a focus on a series of drastic developments that propelled the development 
of rights: “For many students of humanitarianism and human rights, it all began with 
the antislavery movement. . . . There was no single cause of this moral awakening. 
Instead, various world-turning developments combined to produce an outcome that 
only a few decades before few had reason to believe would ever exist” (57). The 
widespread use of personal narratives (published slave narratives, speeches by former 
slaves, or their contributions to the publication of abolitionist texts by people of colour), 
so crucial to laying the grounds for these developments, is frequently only considered as 
an aside to certain critical moments.  
This is curious given that these black voices have been and still are the object of 
continued study by humanities scholars analysing how former slaves and black activists’ 
writings construct black humanity and subjectivity, though many do so without 
reference to the specific legal-historical context set out by scholars like Hunt. It would 
seem, therefore, that the history of rights and the literary study of black subjects 
claiming rights have to a certain extent eluded one another.11 This chapter aims to open 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
perspective of the rebels; they impose their own narrative structure on events and infuse the text with their 
own ideological inclinations, ‘authorizing’ it for their own ends” (571). 
11 The point is not so much that there has been no analysis of minority literature that deals with rights issues, 
but that these analyses rarely insert their findings into the history of human rights that is being constructed 
by scholars in the field of human rights and literature. Doris Sommer’s Proceed with Caution, When Engaged by 
Minority Writing in the Americas is a foundational study of the history of minority literature as a bridge between 
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a dialogue between these two approaches. This section provides a concise account of 
historical events as constructed through proclamations alone, as it provides a useful 
point of departure for considering how traditional histories of rights can be complicated 
by including the personal narratives of those seeking to claim them. This is significant, 
because tracking slave narratives’ relationship to this context lays the groundwork for 
doing the same for Eggers’s texts with regard to the contemporary context set out in the 
previous chapter.  
The transatlantic slave trade saw a total of twelve million human beings from Africa 
forced into slavery, ten and a half of which eventually survived the journey to the New 
World (Heuman and Walvin 4). Several of the authors of the United States Declaration of 
Independence, most notably Thomas Jefferson, were slave owners themselves. 
Nevertheless, Hunt defends the view in her history that the document deserves praise 
for declaring at least the imagined equality of all human beings and thus formed a 
starting point for further refinement (18-19). This process of refinement, the gradual 
decline of the institution of slavery, and its eventual abolition in the United States is 
well-known. As Andrew Porter concisely writes in the Oxford History of the British Empire, 
the intellectual argument against slavery had been won by the late eighteenth century 
(201). An increasingly vocal abolitionist movement at home and abroad, led at its height 
by famous white activists such as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Philips, began 
pushing for this intellectual victory to effect real social and political change. 
Nevertheless, chattel slavery endured in the New World until Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation in 1863 declared that “all persons held as slaves . . . shall be then, 
thenceforward, and forever free” (Lincoln 424). Citizenship for people of colour became 
available following the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution in 
1868.  
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the process by which social 
attitudes towards slaves and former slaves evolved in order for the ideas in these acts 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the privileged and the disempowered. I will take up the central issue she raises in her survey, of how minority 
literature carefully negotiates its engagement with privileged readers, in the next chapter as a means of 
studying the identificatory paradigm that governs human rights culture. 
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and declarations to gain political currency.12 These documents themselves, moreover, 
only offer one window onto the past, given that they tend to reflect society in a 
theoretical sense rather than showing the ways in which rights and norms were 
debated, challenged, and transgressed. Without taking the latter into consideration, one 
glosses over how attitudes evolved, how ideas were negotiated, and how both were 
reflected in the specific cultural sphere of the time. As such, it risks skewing our 
interpretation of this historical moment by focusing on the interplay between the 
strongly principled abolitionist movement and visionary legislators. One is left to 
wonder about where it is this sudden conviction sprang from and how it gained traction 
in a society built on slavery. 
What is missing, in other words, is an account of how slaves came to be understood as 
human beings whose rights were worth contemplating. There was indeed an intellectual 
movement which condemned slavery that held sway in the United States in this period 
which emphasized the inalienability of rights that would be foregrounded in the 
declaration of independence. de Bolla confirms as much in The Architecture of Concepts 
when he writes that even though American interpretations of liberal thought differed 
from British ones, what he calls “Whig ideology” came to dominate “interpretations of 
the nature of government and society” (134). This ideology was largely underpinned by 
the influential British liberal philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
established by the likes of John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, all of whom 
condemned slavery in some form or other.13 The congruity between their condemnation 
 
                                                     
12 In The Last Utopia, Moyn formulates a related critique of Hunt’s idea that contemporary notions of universal 
rights grew out of secular humanitarianism when he points out that, for one, humanitarianism was initially 
largely grounded in religion, did not point in the direction of individual rights, and was entirely compatible 
with the imperialist projects that operated on the assumption of racial inequality (243-244). It is not, Moyn 
goes on to argue in Human Rights and the Uses of History, till the 1960s and 70s, long after the UDHR was adopted, 
that the universal project of human rights was deployed in support of decolonization (93). 
13 In the second of his Two Treatises of Government, which first appeared in 1689, Locke discusses the issue in a 
section titled “On Slavery” and argues against it on the grounds that human beings cannot become the 
property of other human beings (125-127). A century later, the liberal thinker and economist Adam Smith 
published his The Wealth of Nations in 1776, denouncing slavery as economically unsound: “It appears, 
accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes 
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of human bondage, on the one hand, and the fundamental equality of all human beings 
and the specific prohibition of slavery in the fourth article of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights that underlies our contemporary rights discourse in this area on the 
other is, however, less obvious. This becomes apparent when one considers the complex 
and precarious position of black subjectivity within the liberal philosophical discourse 
that dominated this particular rights moment instead of listing the rigid and explicit 
political and legal documents that are indebted to these philosophical advancements 
and which seems to echo straightforwardly modern rights discourses in their 
proclamation of equality. Take, for instance, the influential writings of Hume, who 
broadly condemned slavery as a practice in his Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary 
published in 1741, but also defended fundamental racial inequality in an infamous 
footnote that reads:  
I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all the other species of men (for 
there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There 
never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any 
individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures 
amongst them, no arts, no sciences. (Hume,  “Of National Characters” 252)14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New-York, and 
Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so very high” (184). Hume, in turn, specifically 
denounces domestic slavery in the United States in his essay “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations”: 
The remains which are found of domestic slavery, in the AMERICAN colonies, and among some 
EUROPEAN nations, would never surely create a desire of rendering it more universal. The 
little humanity, commonly observed in persons, accustomed, from their infancy, to exercise so 
great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were 
sufficient alone to disgust us with that unbounded dominion. (Hume 386) 
14 In David Hume and Eighteenth-Century American, Mark G. Spencer seeks to redress the notion that Hume was 
somehow ignored by the North-American readership throughout this period. In fact, he argues, there is a vast 
array of evidence that shows that his works were widely read, and influenced American socio-political 
attitudes and thought accordingly. He traces the broad availability of Hume’s works before the revolution and 
subsequently argues that, in the years leading up to and following independence, Americans “increasingly 
read and defined Hume’s works in their own terms” (52). Regardless of the extent to which Hume’s ideas in 
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Even though some scholars have argued that this footnote should be read as an almost 
throwaway remark that was not an integral part of Hume’s philosophical writings, John 
Immerwahr makes a case in his article “Hume’s Revised Racism” that, based on Hume’s 
further editing of the footnote for later editions, one could read the note as responding 
to the considerable criticism of his idea by contemporaries such as James Beattie (481-
485). This, Immerwahr argues, “proves that Hume’s racism was deliberate rather than 
casual” (486). Regardless of this debate, the remark shows that it was perfectly 
reasonable at the time to make a progressive argument in favour of the abolition of 
slavery and still defend the notion of racial inequality.  
Thus, while the intellectual argument against slavery may have already been won, 
the intellectual argument for racial equality was quite clearly still raging. There is good 
reason for distinguishing these two issues in order to understand the development of 
black rights throughout this period. As Winthrop D. Jordan explains in “Modern 
Tensions and the Origins of American Slavery,” slavery and prejudice were mutually 
enabling when it came to degrading and subsequently fixing the position of black 
people (118). Even if the former were to lose its discursive force, however, the 
persistence of the latter – which went far less challenged – was clearly enough to 
maintain a hierarchical relationship between white citizens and former slaves aspiring 
to citizenship. A strictly legal history of rights focusing on abolition can be considered 
similarly misleading or restrictive. As David Brion Davis argues in Slavery and Human 
Progress (1984), legislative changes were often more of a “cosmetic change in legal status 
that failed to improve the blacks’ basic conditions and quality of life” (108). Freedom 
cannot, therefore, be equated with equality, and there is little evidence to suggest that 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
particular impacted upon American political thought, it is important to note how it contributes in a broader 
sense to the point that the dominant intellectual tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment, with its conflicting 
attitude towards slavery and race questions, permeated the socio-political debate of the newly founded 
nation. In The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and Their Publishers in Eigteenth-Century Britain, Ireland, 
and America, Richard B. Sher provides further material evidence of this by tracing the culture of reprinting 
that made the ideas of thinkers like Hume freely available in North America by the end of the eighteenth 
century (503-540). Importantly, Sher notes how the proliferation of reprints in the American context should 
be regarded as “acts of appropriation, with enormous significance for understanding American culture” (506). 
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the former led to the latter in any direct way. This matters because it calls into question 
the theory of cascading progress that pervades conceptions of human rights in the 
contemporary context and thereby forestall an in-depth analysis of the rights-work in 
which Eggers’s works engage. If their goal is defined as simply claiming Deng’s or 
Zeitoun’s human rights, which are fixed and agreed upon, then that goal elides the 
multi-layered work being done by the text and paratext, as well as the complex extra-
textual reality within which they circulate. 
All of this is not to say that legal-philosophical advancements are irrelevant or 
unimportant. As Maurice S. Lee explains in Slavery, Philosophy, and American Literature, 
the liberal philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment permeated American political 
thought throughout the century.15 As such, the influence and popularity of certain 
philosophical ideas were instrumental in educating and generalizing anti-slavery 
sentiments (Blackburn 47). Similarly, the generalized and vivid understanding of one’s 
own rights as non-black citizens is a prerequisite to allowing one to “empathize with the 
deprivation of the rights of others” (Brown and Wilson 12). The above qualifications 
matter, however, because they show that defining this as a seminal and seemingly 
definitive legal-philosophical “moment” in the history of human rights covers over the 
tensions that reveal which rights were (not) up for debate, how they were contested and 
negotiated, and to what extent they were compatible with or contradictory to 
contemporary conceptions of human rights. 
An analysis of personal narratives that appeared during this time can go some way 
towards answering these questions and offers a glimpse into how socio-cultural rights-
spaces were contested and negotiated over a period of time. First, it is important to 
establish broadly how personal narratives were involved in the campaign for slave 
 
                                                     
15 In his study, Lee homes in on the works of Poe, Melville, Emerson, Stowe, and Douglass against the backdrop 
of the philosophical debates of the day and the anti-slavery struggle. He notes of the latter, for instance, that 
by performing the act of self-reflection, a hotly debated issue at the time, throughout his autobiographies, 
Douglass was able to refute those who claimed Africans were incapable of higher forms of thought (109-114). 
In doing so, his autobiographies brought theoretical issues of perception and self-perception into contact with 
the very real experience of slavery. This leads Lee to conclude that the slavery controversy helped to 
challenge and shape American thinking throughout the century (210-216).  
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rights throughout eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Michael Bennett observes in 
Democratic Discourses (2005) that slave narrators were instrumental in creating the socio-
cultural platform from which influential abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison 
spoke: “Not only were African Americans responsible for building the discursive 
foundations of the so-called Garrisonian abolitionist movement . . ., they also authored 
one of the chief vehicles for promoting abolitionist sentiment and one of the most 
popular and distinctive U.S. genres – the slave narrative” (10). The genre of the slave 
narrative took up and adapted the conventions of a number of existing literary genres 
such as the picaresque, the sentimental novel, and the Bildungsroman. The key difference 
being that slave narratives inflected these “high art” forms with a political charge 
usually shunned by the European belles lettres (Bennett 13). In turn, the abolitionist 
movement that these narratives helped to support, which consisted of both sympathetic 
white activists and former slaves, succeeded in constructing a national lexicon for 
radical change that could be taken up by anyone wishing to end human bondage 
(Bennett 22). The abolitionist movement and the genre of the slave narrative should 
thus be considered as being mutually enabling, with the former providing the – initially 
highly important –framing for the latter.  
This reveals a first way in which slave narratives made use of existing literary 
conventions to open up socio-cultural rights-spaces. In her critical edition of Douglass’s 
Narrative, Deborah E. McDowell notes that the abolitionist cause allowed slave narratives 
to be read as rights claims rather than another incarnation of the ever popular first-
person adventure stories that dominated the antebellum American book market (xi). 
The fact that the reading public may initially not have been receptive to the radical 
message the first slave narrators told – and would probably even have rejected them if it 
were more explicit – is cleverly bypassed by this adherence to accepted literary forms. 
They were thus initially accepted into the public sphere only as adventure narratives, 
only to be reframed as subversive narratives once they were entered into the 
abolitionist discourse they helped to create. This role played by slave narratives gains 
further importance as a significant qualification of the now common view that 
testimonies fail if the discursive threshold for the rights issue to which they testify has 
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not yet been reached.16 It shows that there are intricate means by which they broke into 
the hegemony which governs whose lives are recognized and whose voice is admitted 
into the public sphere. Similarly, I show, Eggers makes use of the marketability of 
sentimental stories as a means of coaxing readers into engaging with the stories of Deng 
and Zeitoun. 
A key reason slave narratives made use of popular literary forms is that they seek to 
cultivate an emotional connection with the reader. This belief in the affective power of 
literature is the main contribution of culture to the history of rights, according to Hunt. 
Referring to popular eighteenth-century novels such as Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and 
Clarissa or Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, she makes the point that reading literature 
taught the reading public how to identify and empathize with human beings across 
existing social boundaries (38-50). As Thomas W. Laqueur observes in “Mourning, Pity, 
and the Work of Narrative in the Making of ‘Humanity,’” this interpretation of the so-
called “sentimental thesis” is highly contested, but the core fact remains that during 
this period “the ethical subject was democratized” and readers “came to believe it was 
their obligation to ameliorate and prevent wrongdoing to others” (37-38). The concepts 
of identification and empathy will be complicated accordingly in the next chapter. For 
now, it is important to note that personal narratives could tap into the possibility 
opened up by literary texts for engaging readers on affective as well as intellectual 
terms. 
The critical point is that personal narratives were both reflective of and instrumental 
in effecting the socio-cultural shift required for various black rights to develop 
throughout the course of this historical period. Slave narratives simultaneously helped 
to create, shape, and challenge the dominant rights discourse of their time. As I will 
discuss later in this chapter, this multi-layered relationship between personal narratives 
and historical rights discourses can be shown to persist to the present day, even if 
 
                                                     
16 See, for example, Dawes’s discussion of why representations of suffering can “misfire” in That the World May 
Know (2007), in which he includes the idea that “they can fail because they are too unfamiliar, because their 
content has not yet reached the necessary ‘discursive threshold’ required to make it through the filters of 
information-overloaded news consumers” (65). 
  83 
historical and contemporary rights discourses themselves are no longer wholly 
reconcilable. My discussion of these earlier uses of personal narratives will be 
particularly relevant for my reading of Eggers’s collaborative testimonies in that the 
more subversive engagement between personal narratives and rights frameworks is 
today often downplayed in favour of more synergetic readings in which they amend 
rather than rewrite the terms of the existing legal-political system of rights. This more 
radical politics of rights conducted by Eggers’s use of personal narratives can be 
uncovered by scrutinizing their formal features, much as the formal features of the 
slave narrative betray the most subversive rights-work they engaged in. 
2.2 “Black” Narratives: Form and Genre  
Many of the formal and generic characteristics of the slave narratives lie at the heart of 
the further development of the personal narrative genre adopted by Eggers in the 
contemporary context. The genre and form of the slave narrative go back to the earliest 
published autobiographies of freed slaves in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
two prominent examples of which are A Narrative of the Most Remarkable Particulars in the 
Life of James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, an African Prince, as Related by Himself (1772) and 
The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written 
by Himself (1789). By the end of the American Civil War in 1865, sixty-five slave 
narratives pertaining to the American institution of slavery had been published in 
autobiography or pamphlet form (Andrews, “The Representation of Slavery” 63). The 
genre was initially successful in that it managed to combine the thrill of a good story 
with autobiographical realism. The rousing titles of these narratives, such as the ones by 
James Albert and Olaudah Equiano, hint at the “adventurous” aspect of these stories 
that was their major selling point. The addition of a by-line stressing the 
autobiographical nature of the text is also typical and feeds the timeless voyeuristic 
pleasure a reading public derives from reading “a true story.” As Paul John Eakin 
explains in Fictions in Autobiography (1985), the dominant symbolic systems in a culture, 
such as its narrative forms, are often instrumental in shaping personal narratives (132). 
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However, as Shari Goldberg remarks in Quiet Testimony, it is precisely when personal 
narratives start displaying similarities with literary genres that they are able to move 
beyond simple first-person accounts of the past and seek to drive its audience into 
accepted wider truths (11). In effect, my analyses show that literary genre conventions 
were progressively and shrewdly manipulated by black narrators in order to further 
their social and political aims. It is worth considering these genre links more explicitly 
and describing some typical formal features of slave narratives in general. The ties to 
the genres of autobiography, the Bildungsroman, and the sentimental novel are 
important in the further analysis of Douglass, Jacob, Washington, and Du Bois’s personal 
narratives. Furthermore, What Is the What and Zeitoun are genealogically tied to these 
genres both through some of their key formal characteristics and the political aims that 
underlie the slave narratives’ adaptations of the personal narrative form. 
First, slave narratives are explicitly linked to the genre of autobiography in that they 
are true stories told by slaves who have suffered under the yoke of slavery. 
Autobiography itself rose to prominence as a genre around this time as an outlet for 
Romantic authors who rejected the radical severance of fact from feeling promulgated 
by the Enlightenment and who wished to write about their personal experiences and 
vivid sentiments (“Autobiography” 53).17 The genre then quickly caught on because of 
its ability to allow readers to understand the lives of individuals through a narrative 
account that mixes factual details and psychological reflections. As Eakin explains, 
autobiography is not a passive and transparent recording of an individual’s life, but a 
decisive act of self-definition on the part of the author (Fictions in Autobiography 226). In 
the United States in particular, the autobiography of Benjamin Franklin – first published 
in England in 1793 and later in the United States in 1818 – was much admired.18 The fact 
 
                                                     
17 Typical in this respect is the Romantic poet William Wordsworth’s The Prelude, which was first published in 
1805 and then heavily revised until its final posthumous publication in 1850. In this autobiographical poem in 
blank verse, the poet reflects on himself “as a chosen being, with an overriding duty to his poetic vocation” 
and offers an affective overview of his life from his infancy to adulthood (“Prelude” 812-3). As such, it is a clear 
act of self-definition in writing. 
18 An illustration of the extent to which Franklin’s autobiography came to define the genre in the United 
States would be William Dean Howell’s comment on it in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine in April 1888: “One 
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then that slave narrators’ self-reflexive and self-constituting texts were tied in terms of 
genre to these highly “civilized” authors and thinkers was in and of itself an argument 
against Hume’s claim that civilization and culture belonged purely to those with white 
skin. This also underscores once again the extent to which the performative aspect of 
literary form, in the case of these personal narratives, becomes intricately bound up 
with the political claiming of recognition and rights. As Andrews suggests, literacy came 
to be considered as a tremendously powerful tool by slave narrators because it 
forcefully asserted their humanity and authority in the face of an omnipresent white 
bigotry that refused to see slaves as anything other than property (Andrews, “The 
Representation of Slavery” 65). Moreover, the way in which they used that literacy to 
engage with established genres goes to the very heart of what it meant to be a slave. 
Orlando Paterson explains in Slavery and Social Death (1982) that slaves are constituted by 
the enslaving culture as socially dead and, therefore, alienated from the symbolic 
instruments from which the dominant culture derives its authority (5).19 By making 
clear the subject’s personal involvement in its writing and subsequently deftly playing 
with established literary genres, slave narrators were able to gain access to the literary 
and cultural life of the nation from which they were explicitly excluded.  
Slave narratives also echoed the then immensely popular genre of the Bildungsroman 
in that both tended to be exciting, bittersweet accounts of hardships suffered and 
overcome. There are clear similarities between the titles, narrative structures, themes, 
and narration of slave narratives and this novelistic form. Take, for example, Daniel 
Defoe’s canonical The Life and Strange and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719), a 
typical story of development in which a young inexperienced man is shipwrecked and 
overcomes hardships on an exotic island where he encounters and slaughters 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
cannot very well mention autobiography without mentioning Franklin, whose fragment in that sort remains 
the chief literary work of his life, and the perpetual pleasure of whoever likes to meet a man face to face in 
literature” (804). 
19 This point is made differently by Eduardo Cadava in “The Monstrosity of Human Rights,” where he sums up 
the position of slaves in the United States in relation to that nation having proclaimed all men to be equal:  
“Refused their minimal human right—the right to life—slaves become subject to a state-organized violence 
that operates, and monstrously so, under the sanction of human rights themselves” (1559). 
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indigenous natives before being rescued by a passing English ship once he has matured 
and become self-sufficient. Apart from the similar title structure, the transition from 
prelapsarian innocence through hardship to salvation and social integration is partially 
mirrored by the typical slave narrative’s description of a state of freedom followed by a 
period of brutality under the institution of slavery and an eventual escape to freedom in 
the more progressive North. As I will show, Douglass’s Narrative provides a strong 
example of this plot structure. The key difference, however, is that the social 
integration that usually comes at the end of the typical Bildungsroman is forestalled in 
the slave narrative because escaped slaves were not granted citizenship and were 
always at risk of being sent back to their owners in accordance with the Fugitive Slave 
Act.20 The systematic denial of American rights and identity to former slaves above the 
Mason-Dixon line made it increasingly difficult for black autobiographers to close their 
narratives with hopeful endings of imagined demarginalization in the North (Andrews, 
To Tell a Free Story 176).  
Slaughter’s Human Rights Inc. is highly relevant in this respect, because it throws the 
central incorporative capacity of the Bildungsroman into sharp relief. In his study, he 
convincingly shows that the genre lies at the heart of the development of a human 
rights discourse. If the slave narrative were to perform this incorporative premise, it 
would thereby render illegible the claim to rights within by making it seem superfluous. 
As Slaughter indicates, the capacity for discourse creation through the narrative form of 
the Bildungsroman therefore also comes with a risk: “If the Bildungsroman has the 
historical capacity to render legible a human rights vision of the world, it also has the 
capacity to falsify that vision and to obscure actually existing uneven social relations” 
(267). This is because, even though the Bildungsroman offered opportunities for slaves to 
construct individual autonomy for themselves as human beings entitled to rights, the 
 
                                                     
20 Even though the Fugitive Slave Act is now associated with its reaffirmation in 1850 as part of a compromise 
between the North and the South, the act itself dates back to a 1793 act that enforced article IV of the U.S. 
constitution, which reads: “No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, 
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due” (qtd. in Finseth 42). 
The acts were repealed in 1864.  
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genre itself, as Slaughter notes, is “only superficially” interested in its protagonist and 
actually more interested in legitimizing existing social institutions (116). The slave 
narratives of Douglass and Jacobs show a continued awareness of this risk and one can 
detect in their resistance of narrative closure a marked effort to prevent the potential 
obfuscation of racial inequality even as they make use of the conventional plot structure 
of this popular genre. Furthermore, the refusal to perform the incorporative ending of 
the Bildungsroman by adapting its form is a political act on the part of the (former) slave-
narrator. The fact that this pattern for slave narratives became commonplace gains 
further significance in light of the fact that Eggers’s collaborative testimonies thwart or 
subvert the expectations they create as part of their rights-space creating efforts, just 
like the slave narratives do for the literary genres they adapt and echo. 
Slave narratives also show strong affinity with the sentimental novel, a genre that 
illustrates the preservation of virtue and honour in the face of moral corruption 
through characters marked by copious feeling and a sympathetic heart (“Sentiment” 
916). A canonical example is Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, or the History of a Young Lady 
(1749), in which the eponymous protagonist attempts to retain her virtue as she is 
harassed, misled, and ultimately raped by a rake named Lovelace. The genre is known 
for the cultivation of affective ties between its fictitious protagonists and its readership, 
which, Hunt argues, allowed readers to expand their ethical awareness to include others 
whom they had never met (35-69). The best-known example of a sentimental novel that 
focuses its affective energy on the abolitionist cause is Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin (1852), which took the book market by storm with its melodramatic 
descriptions of the horrors of slavery.21 Though the political potential of this affect-
 
                                                     
21 Despite its status as a canonical abolitionist text, the title character has since become a byword for racial 
stereotyping and passivity in the face of abuse. In “Uncle Tom and the Anglo-Saxons: Romantic Racialism in 
the North,” George M. Fredrickson argues that it is likely that Stowe’s title character was inspired by the 
romantic race theory of Alexander Kinmont, who believed black people were naturally servile and kind-
hearted (435-438). Some contemporary readers believed Stowe’s portrayal of black people was so sympathetic 
that it risked alienating people from the abolitionist cause. The British novelist Charles Dickens wrote a letter 
to this effect on 17 July 1852, in which he expressed his doubts about “there being any warrant for making out 
the African race to be a great race” (33). This supposedly kind portrayal of black people has been reframed by 
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based genre to slave narrators is quite clear, the convention of virtue preserved and 
rewarded was strained to its limits through descriptions of the moral void within which 
life under slavery was lived. As the next chapter shows, Eggers’s understanding of the 
sentimental charge of literature marks a similar complication of the reader’s affective 
engagement with his disempowered collaborators. In the case of slave narratives, one 
sees this most strongly in the double bind central to Jacobs’s Incidents, in which 
narrating the sexual exploitation of slaves clashes with the need to preserve her virtue 
as the protagonist of her narrative.  
What this general comparison of genres shows is that the slave narrative is 
embedded within popular contemporary literary genres, but problematizes their more 
uplifting aspects and thereby shifts attention to the (former) slave’s socio-political 
struggle. Generally speaking, slave narrators thus sought to claim humanity and 
subjectivity through their narratives and did so by deploying literary forms that were 
deeply ingrained in the culture that dehumanized them in the first place.22 They did so 
in a way that echoed another symbolic instrument – political this time – of the 
dominant culture’s authority, the Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitution. In 
his preface to Douglass’s Narrative, the prominent lawyer turned abolitionist Wendell 
Phillips explicitly compares the two: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contemporary critics such as Arthur Riss to conclude that Stowe’s portrayal of Uncle Tom is fed by racial 
essentialism to the extent that her support for the abolitionist cause itself, by stressing the inherent goodness 
and peacefulness of black people, is grounded in biological racialism (“Racial Essentialism and Family Values 
in Uncle Tom’s Cabin” 63-65). It is noteworthy that the protagonists in the slave narratives discussed later on in 
this chapter seek to avoid precisely the type of erasure of their agency that was promoted by nineteenth-
century race theory. 
22 In his preface to Frantz Fanon’s forceful denunciation of the effects of colonialism, The Wretched of the Earth, 
Jean-Paul Sartre comments that when the disenfranchised speak back to those who repressed them, they are 
able to deploy the colonizers’ own weighty humanist vocabulary to denounce them: “[t]here was no doubt in 
our minds they accepted our ideal, since they were accusing us of not respecting it” (xliv). Given the 
instrumental role played by literary genres such as the Bildungsroman in helping societies figure the human as 
rights bearing citizens, as determined by Slaughter, one could expand Sartre’s remark to say that, in the case 
of former slaves, the disenfranchised made copious use of Western literary culture to denounce the failure of 
Western philosophical humanism. 
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They say the fathers, in 1776, signed the Declaration of Independence with the 
halter about their necks. You, too, publish your declaration of freedom with 
danger compassing you around. In all the broad lands which the Constitution of 
the United States overshadows, there is no single spot, -- however narrow or 
desolate, -- where a fugitive slave can plant himself and say, “I am safe.” (13)23 
Thus, as slave narrators made use of genre conventions to make sure the reader would 
recognize their authority, autonomy, and humanity, abolitionists were quick to relate 
the struggle for slaves’ freedom to the fervour in the fight for national independence 
that had such strong social and political capital. Even if, as Douglass’s Narrative will 
show, the relationship between slave narrator, abolitionist, and rights declarations was 
complicated, this shows once again that the history of these personal narratives and 
their uses is deeply implicated in the legal-political development of rights during this 
period. 
A last characteristic of slave narratives is the addition of one or more prefaces by 
sympathetic white editors testifying to the credibility of the black narrator and 
denouncing the institution of slavery. White involvement in soliciting, editing, and 
publishing the personal narratives of black authors was instrumental in facilitating the 
dissemination of slave narratives amongst a broad readership.24 The fact that these 
types of prefaces were necessary in the first place, however, also highlights the extent 
to which these collaborative texts were always a partnership of unequals. The white 
voices that enveloped the personal narratives of freed slaves were there because, as 
opposed to the autobiographical subject, they were recognized in the nineteenth-
 
                                                     
23 Literary critics have since fleshed out in more detail the congruity of these legal-political documents and the 
personal narratives of slaves in the context of the United States. See, for example, “The Founding Fathers: 
Frederick Douglass and Booker T. Washington,” in which James Olney supports an analogous reading of the 
Declaration of Independence and slave narratives as similarly self-assertive documents that establish freedom 
and independence (4). 
24 It was also necessary in the sense that the book market remained, to a large extent, closed to people of 
colour long after it began publishing books written by black authors. Lydia Maria Child’s letters to Jacobs 
provide a good illustration of this. On 13 August 1860 she writes to Jacobs to tell her that she has “signed and 
sealed the contract with Thayer & Eldridge [a Boston-based publishing firm], in my name and told them to 
take out the copyright in my name. Under the circumstances your name could not be used, you know” (194). 
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century public sphere, had the resources to publish periodicals and books, and had 
access to the book market. Their privileged position allowed them to build a powerful 
abolitionist movement, partially thanks to the work performed by the slave narratives 
they edited and published.25 The reality of slavery was thus forced to undergo additional 
mediation within the accepted racial hierarchy through this unequal partnership, which 
was reproduced in the textual structure of validating preface and narrative proper.  
However, as Gilroy notes, the personal tone and genre characteristics of slaves’ 
personal narratives became inextricably linked to the freed slave’s insistence on 
authority and autonomy, and thereby contributed to the formation of a discursive space 
that refused to “subordinate the particularity of the slave experience to the totalising 
power of universal reason held exclusively by white hands, pens, or publishing houses” 
(69). My analysis of Douglass’s autobiographies in particular shows how slave narrators 
struggled to resist this reaffirmation of their inferior social and political position by 
deploying certain narrative devices, such as genre conventions, that challenged their 
largely illustrative function within the broader intellectual debate on the institution of 
slavery from which they were excluded. This makes the overall effect of the text even 
more ambivalent and complex. Just as literary genres are both evoked and challenged 
on the level of the narrative, the narrative itself is both authorised and undercut by the 
preface, on the level of the paratext. Both were conducive to helping former slaves gain 
access to a public discourse on rights that excluded people of colour. They also made a 
broad readership amenable to their personal narratives of suffering under the 
institution of slavery. Yet simultaneously, they were also part of a complex mediating 
process that risked obscuring wider problems of racial inequality, such as the question 
of black rights and citizenship. It is crucial to understand the various complexities of 
this process because it is precisely where the rights-spaces these narratives seek to 
create are contested and defined. Furthermore, the discussion of this mediatory 
 
                                                     
25 The narrativized autobiographies of slaves were seen as an innovative means of addressing the problem of 
slavery and racism outside of the established non-fictional grounds occupied by pro- and antislavery polemics 
(Andrews, To Tell a Free Story 5). 
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relationship provides valuable tools that allow Eggers’s collaborations with Deng or 
Zeitoun for What Is the What and Zeitoun to be suitably scrutinized. 
2.3 Imagining Rights-Spaces Before Emancipation: Frederick 
Douglass and Harriet Ann Jacobs 
2.3.1 Frederick Douglass 
Douglass is arguably the most canonical of the slave narrators in the antebellum period. 
Douglass, an escaped slave who became the most powerful black voice in the abolitionist 
movement, wrote three personal narratives over the course of his lifetime. All three 
provide an account moving from his escape from a plantation in Maryland to his 
progressively more active role as an abolitionist. Two were published before the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave 
(1845)26 and My Bondage and My Freedom (1855); a third, Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, 
appeared in 1893. For the publication of his first autobiography, Douglass worked with 
two white abolitionists. The first was William Lloyd Garrison, the prominent anti-
slavery activist and editor of the abolitionist newspaper The Liberator that ran the 
Narrative, and the second was Wendell Phillips, the previously quoted lawyer turned 
abolitionist. Prior to its publication, Douglass had participated in the anti-slavery cause 
as a particularly gifted orator testifying to the horrors of chattel slave life at public 
rallies. This oral experience honed his natural eloquence and made him acutely aware of 
the need to tailor his message to an audience that was not necessarily overly 
sympathetic to his plea (Andrews, To Tell a Free Story 100). It also, at least in part, 
prompted his writing of an autobiography. Audiences became suspicious of a freed slave 
who could match the rhetorical force of highly educated white abolitionists. My analysis 
focuses on this first autobiography in particular, given that it is most typical of pre-
 
                                                     
26 Henceforth referred to as Narrative. 
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emancipation slave narratives but also contests the position delegated to its contents by 
the white abolitionists who framed it.27 
Typically, former slaves were meant to function as support for the abolitionist cause 
by illustrating in an experiential sense what was being condemned on social, religious, 
and philosophical grounds by white abolitionists. In this sense, they are not so different 
from the Amnesty Endorsed Fiction project, which aims to make real and tangible the 
rights for which the organization fights, or Eggers’s faith in testimonies as powerful 
rights-space creating tools. The reason slave narratives were necessary, as Phillips 
writes in his preface to the Narrative, was because the public had “been left long enough 
to gather the character of slavery from the involuntary evidence of the masters” (12). 
Accordingly, Douglass was brought along to rallies and meetings strictly as a witness 
revealing the truth about slavery to a white readership ill-informed about the realities 
of life under slavery. This reduced the individuality of slaves’ experiences to 
generalizable examples of lives and bodies brutally violated. This restrictive role given 
to slaves was common. As J. Ring explains in “Painting by Numbers,” slave narratives 
were simply meant to narrate wrongs, not denounce them (125). Indeed, to some extent, 
Douglass’s Narrative was published to perpetuate this mechanism. After all, his first 
autobiography was meant to strengthen the veracity of his story against those who 
doubted that a former slave could possess such eloquence and who thus undermined his 
position as a primary witness to the institution of slavery. This aim fit the abolitionist 
cause’s use for Douglass’s testimony, as the prefaces show. Garrison assures readers 
from the start that Douglass’s story is “sustained by a cloud of witnesses, whose veracity 
is unimpeachable” (10) and Phillips confirms that the hardships described are “the 
essential ingredients, not the occasional results, of the system” (13).  
It is important to note, however, that the autobiography is underpinned by a second 
agenda that diverges from those set out in the prefaces. Douglass was clearly unhappy 
about being excluded from the public debate in an intellectual sense. He greatly 
 
                                                     
27 Robert S. Levine explains in “Identity in the Autobiographies” that the Narrative draws the most consistently 
on the conventions of the slave narrative (31). Andrews goes so far as to describe it as “the great enabling text 
of the first century of Afro-American autobiography” (Andrews, To Tell a Free Story 138). 
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objected to serving merely as a prop to be wheeled out to illustrate the horrors of 
slavery. He later sarcastically writes in My Bondage and My Freedom: “I was generally 
introduced as a ‘chattel’ – a ‘thing’ – a piece of southern ‘property’ – the chairman 
assuring the audience that it could speak” (366). As his sarcastic remark indicates, 
however, Douglass was unwilling to accept this unequal partnership and reappropriated 
the role of narrator in his autobiographies to exploit its potential to reimagine the 
specific position of black people in the United States in his own voice.28 This struggle on 
the part of the disempowered subject to serve as more than an illustration and to 
combat the inequalities that seek to remarginalize their voices are key to understanding 
these slave narratives as rights-space creating tools. They also constitute the two 
critical links across “deep time” to collaborative testimonies in a contemporary context, 
as my discussion of What Is the What and Zeitoun goes on to show. 
Douglass’s Narrative consistently resists categorization as a simple testimony to his 
past life as a slave by exploring the full narrative potential of his text. He defies the 
restrictive role dealt to him by the abolitionists, Delombard argues, by splitting the 
narrating subject into a witnessing body during his time as a slave in the South and a 
powerful voice denouncing slavery once he reaches the North (245-275). Similarly, 
Levine notes that the Narrative is marked precisely by the narrator’s ability to provide 
an astute analysis of the events he describes with regard to the institution of slavery 
more generally (32). I argue that Douglass utilizes the narrative account of his real-life 
experiences as a basis for unmasking slavery as a repressive socio-cultural force that 
dehumanizes slaves and denies them rights. Concertedly, he deploys and manipulates 
the genre conventions of the Bildungsroman and sentimental novel to guide the reader – 
sometimes rather forcefully – into imagining precisely the humanity and rights he was 
denied as a slave in the South and is still partially denied as a former slave in the North. 
Douglass asserts his humanity in a complex narrative, a high cultural mode of speech 
 
                                                     
28 As a result of this, Golberg argues that “the four iterations of his autobiography may be read . . . as signalling 
an unwillingness to stop testifying, to stop imagining that a better way to say the self might still arrive” (85). 
Similarly, Ring explains that Douglass never saw his text as a simple closed record of past events, but as part of 
a project that reached far beyond the text and ultimately sought to write his name into history (119). 
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that was meant to be impossible for him to master, that shows how slavery is 
incongruous with the civilized society the United States claims to be.  
Central to Douglass’s assertive move is his mastery of language as a tool of resistance. 
Mullen argues that the text figures his literacy as a “radical discontinuity” with his slave 
past that stresses Douglass’s “emerging subjectivity” (261). The Narrative quotes his 
owner, Mr Auld, as warning against his education as “unlawful” and “unsafe” before 
reflecting at length on the empowering sensation of literacy as a means of penetrating 
the society from which Douglass is excluded (38-44). However, slavery not only deprives 
slaves from participating in society by denying them, amongst other things, literacy, it 
also dulls the “masters” by forcing them to resort to primitive violence so as to enforce 
racial inequality.29 At one stage, Douglass portrays Mrs Auld as a benighted fool who 
requires “training in the exercise of irresponsible power, to make her equal to the task 
of treating me as though I were a brute” (42). Douglass suggests that slavery denies 
slaves the opportunity to develop their individuality in society, but also diminishes the 
dominant culture by forcing it to participate in the primitive institution of slavery. This 
powerfully blurs the radical severance of black people from Enlightened and civilized 
society, aligning Douglass with civilization and slave masters with primitive brutality. 
By showing that he can master the language of the dominant discourse that 
marginalizes him, he shows that slaves can participate in U.S. culture when given the 
opportunity and thus makes a powerful case for being the social and cultural equal of 
the citizens he is addressing.  
As Pearson observes, the anti-slavery movement’s drive to humanize slaves on the 
basis of a shared humanity sparked the rise of ideas concerning race and colour that 
served as an argument for maintaining racial inequality (640). Hume’s aforementioned 
footnote shows how this might be maintained by supposedly progressive thinkers even 
in a post-slavery society, in that he recognizes black humanity yet insists on radical 
 
                                                     
29 See also Kelly Oliver’s analysis of slave-society in Witnessing:  “The world of slavery is not a world of 
humanity or of subjective articulation, but a world beyond description. It is a world where both slaves and 
masters are inhumane; masters because of their cruelty and inhumanity, slaves because they have been 
rendered less than human objects” (103). 
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difference in terms of civilization and culture. Hunt makes a similar point when she 
explains that Jefferson recognized the “rights of slaves as human beings,” but “did not 
envision a polity in which they or women of any color took an active part” (69). 
Goldberg confirms this when she observes that abolition, once achieved, simply 
“initiated a social and cultural climate of segregation that aimed to preserve the white 
polity” through scientific racism (81). However, she goes on to argue that Douglass’s 
“mistake” was to focus solely on abolitionism and believe that this would allow him to 
articulate a “positive and perfect, and entirely accurate and legitimate, identity for 
himself” (80-81). This ignores Douglass’s attempts at reframing his personal narrative to 
include a push for national rights and citizenship in addition to its function as a tool in 
the international abolitionist movement.  
This gains further importance because it complicates his relationship to the 
abolitionist movement, which is traditionally seen as the first transnational 
humanitarian movement and which denounced slavery on the universalist grounds of a 
shared humanity. A representative illustration of the movement’s universalist rhetoric 
are the popular jasperware medallions made by Josiah Wedgewood in the late 
eighteenth century that depict a kneeling black man and read “Am I not a Man and a 
Brother.” Douglass’s narrative, in contrast, addresses a primarily American readership 
and his accusation towards them centres on the United States not living up to its liberal 
and Christian principles as a nation rather than on plainly denouncing the nation’s 
foundational texts from a universalist perspective. John Stauffer explains in “Douglass’s 
Self-Making and Abolitionism” that while Garrisonian abolitionists believed, for 
example, that the Constitution was inherently proslavery and corrupt, Douglass later 
openly changed his mind and saw the potential for its language to be read anarchically 
as being anti-slavery (Stauffer 22-23). This has led critics such as Paul Giles to consider 
his later work as seeking “to rotate the axis of its [the United States] master narratives 
so as to bring patriotic narratives into alignment with African American interests” 
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(139).30 Douglass’s Narrative, I argue, constitutes a first attempt at aligning his own 
interests with those of the nation that enslaved him precisely because he understood 
the need for abolition to be followed by a push for black citizenship. 
The tension between the transnational focus of the abolitionist movement and the 
national focus of Douglass’s narrative with regard to the creation of rights-spaces is 
born out in the Narrative’s appeal to socio-cultural values and discourses that were 
closely tied to an emerging U.S. national identity. The ability for Douglass to appeal to a 
well-known, in this case national, framework as a means of resistance is intriguing, 
especially given that the legally weak but culturally deeply entrenched discourse of 
human rights will form a similar frame of resistance for Deng’s appeal in What Is the 
What. In terms of the slave narrative’s appeal, Levine makes the further point that 
Douglass’s autobiography mimics Benjamin Franklin’s in his stressing of the hard work, 
energy, and creativity required to overcome hardship, in his case from slavery to 
freedom (32). It also employs the language of the declaration Franklin signed asserting 
the United Sates’ independence when it juxtaposes the image of a free and rational man 
with the dehumanizing life of a slave. Douglass’s past of being considered subhuman – 
property in fact – and present as a relatively “free” man writing and testifying are yoked 
together with extraordinary force in the following image:  
I was kept almost naked - no shoes, no stockings, no jacket, no trousers, nothing 
on but a coarse tow linen shirt, reaching only to my knees. I had no bed. I used to 
steal a bag which was used for carrying corn to the mill. I would crawl into this 
bag, and there sleep on the cold, damp, clay floor, with my head in and feet out. 
My feet have been so cracked with the frost, that the pen with which I am writing 
might be laid in the gashes. (34) 
The shocking brutality of slavery in North America is brought together with the image 
of a free rational man and former slave writing for an American audience. The cognitive 
dissonance of a rational man being forced into slavery is crucial to Douglass’ rhetorical 
 
                                                     
30 See also Crane, who argues that “Douglass powerfully recasts the national narrative as a continuing 
confrontation of the challenge to read justice into the terms of the national charter despite our history of 
injustice” (100) 
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strategy and is reinforced by the subtitle, “An American Slave,” which uncomfortably 
forces the two words together.  
Echoing the language of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, Douglass insists on the 
fundamental freedom of man set out therein to show the irrationality of men being 
coerced into slavery. His narrative, as he himself says, shows both how “a man was 
made slave” and “a slave was made man” (63). Douglass explains what is required to 
deny someone’s humanity in order to make them a slave. In order to do so, he says, one 
must “annihilate the power of reason” until the slaves “detect no inconsistences in 
slavery” (87). A point that is only reached once that person “ceases to be a man” (87). 
Two seemingly contradictory conclusions can be drawn from his use of language here. 
The first is that Douglass presents his story not as one from slave to man, but as one 
from man to slave to man. It is the United States that made him a slave and his escape 
would suggest that he is now free in spite of his being in the United States. He writes of 
how he came to detest his “enslavers” as “successful robbers” who had “stolen” him 
away and made him a slave in a “strange land” (44). The target of Douglass’s text is, as 
he writes in the preface, “the American slave system” in particular and he attacks the 
Christian foundations of the country precisely by denouncing the “corrupt, 
slaveholding, women-whipping, cradle-plundering, partial and hypocritical Christianity 
of this land” (101). The second point, however, is that his outrage and plea are heavily 
couched in the language and spirit of the newly independent nation that he is 
addressing. The claiming of humanity, reason, and freedom in an act of writing using 
that specific language both grounds this testimony in and addresses it to the American 
nation.  
This ambiguous relationship with the nation that he is addressing – as both villain 
and potential saviour – is illuminated by the general principle that governs the 
Bildungsroman. That is, a narrative in which personal development allows the 
protagonist to overcome hardship, mature, and – most importantly – claim citizenship 
within society. Douglass takes up this literary master narrative, but twists its 
incorporative ending. As Andrews points out, the ending of the Narrative is atypical in 
that it refuses the “stock-in-trade” climax where the slave finds freedom in the North 
(Andrews, To Tell a Free Story 128). There is no safe haven at the end of Douglass’s story, 
but a sense of continued struggle. Those things which are emphasized in Douglass’s 
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Narrative, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness granted to U.S. citizens, 
are precisely those things which are denied to black people under slavery, but also 
remain unavailable to them as long as they are denied the rights of citizenship. His 
narrative is thus not one of an arduous road towards testifying to the past and present 
brutality in the South, as the abolitionists would frame it, but a continuing story, that is 
necessarily open-ended, of racial discrimination and hardship across an entire nation 
corrupted by slavery. This manipulation of the closure afforded by a typical 
Bildungsroman upsets the uplifting ending expected by readers and allows it to achieve 
more than a simple plea for the abolition of slavery. Douglass’s analysis of his 
experiences as a slave and continued struggle as a free man unable to become part of 
society is mirrored by an incomplete plot structure that invites readers to imagine a 
society in which the incorporative narrative ending now refused could be fulfilled. As 
such, the rights-space opened up by this personal narrative comprises both the 
recognition of slaves’ humanity and, more ambitiously, a rewriting of the national 
narrative to consider extending the citizenship rights set out in the Declaration of 
Independence to former slaves. This rhetorical-formal strategy of the open-ended 
narrative, which deliberately leaves spaces for the reader to contemplate, is critical to 
understanding how Eggers’s What Is the What and Zeitoun function in the contemporary 
rights context. The key difference thus becomes a political one. The dissonance and 
open-endedness in Eggers’s texts is not focused on exposing the incongruity of the 
nation state’s principles and practices, but on laying bare the tensions between 
universally acknowledge and unequally distributed rights in global society. 
2.3.2 Harriet Ann Jacobs 
Jacobs, the most prominent female American slave narrator, is the author of Incidents in 
the Life of a Slave Girl, Written By Herself (1861)31, which details her life as a slave in North 
Carolina and her subsequent years as a fugitive in the North. The narrative ends with 
her freedom being purchased by a friend in the North, Cornelia Willis. Incidents is 
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simultaneously typical and atypical of the slave narrative genre. The publication of 
Jacobs’s Incidents was facilitated by Lydia Maria Child, an abolitionist and women’s rights 
activist who also edited her narrative. As is typical, Child frames the narrative with a 
preface in which she assures the reader of its veracity: “The author of the following 
autobiography is personally known to me, and her conversation and manners inspire 
me with confidence” (5). Interestingly though, Jacobs also writes a preface for her 
narrative, in which she grants authority to her own narrative: “Reader, be assured this 
narrative is no fiction. I am aware that some of my adventures may seem incredible; but 
they are, nevertheless, strictly true” (5). The overall tone is less assertive and more self-
deprecating than Child’s preface, particularly when she writes: “I wish I were more 
competent to the task I have undertaken. But I trust my readers will excuse deficiencies 
in consideration of circumstances” (5). Much like Douglass’s Narrative, Jacobs’s 
autobiographical account displays the author’s deft employment of rhetorical modes 
that were thought to be exclusive to white culture (Ring 124). The self-deprecatory tone, 
while usually a sign of authorial modesty in nineteenth-century writing, thus serves as a 
self-assertive move for Jacobs, who is able to underscore her subjectivity in a 
conventional manner. 
Incidents is also unique, however, because it offered the first full-length American 
narrative detailing the experiences of a woman living under slavery. The uniqueness of 
this perspective was not without risk. Even at the time of its publication almost a 
century after the first slave narratives were published and read, its narrative of sexual 
exploitation was likely to be seen, as Child writes in her preface, as dealing with 
“indelicate” subjects (6). She goes on to say that Northern readers had thus far remained 
“veiled” from this “monstrous” aspect of slavery (6). The fact that this type of subject, 
usually suppressed or deemed improper in the patriarchal society of the nineteenth 
century, was able to be treated in a slave narrative demonstrates once again the 
subversive ability of the genre to assert that which was usually repressed. What 
warranted broaching this subject in such an explicit sense, according to Child, is 
precisely the overriding importance of the anti-slavery crusade (6). For Jacobs, however, 
the ability to broach sexual exploitation within the context of a hierarchical master-
slave relationship afforded her the opportunity of manipulating the genre conventions 
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of the sentimental novel to put her narrative to work in creating a space for black 
rights. 
Like Douglass’s Narrative, Jacobs’s complex narrative refuses to function simply as an 
illustrative example of slavery’s ills and once again the resistance to this can be found at 
the formal level of the text and paratext. The narrative proper may be illustrative, but a 
number of narrative strategies ensure that the narrator is not reduced to the illustrative 
function of her narrative. Overtly, the goal of Jacobs’s Incidents is precisely to move her 
readers to take up the American anti-slavery cause by narrating the ills that befell her 
as a slave living in the South. As opposed to Douglass, who resented his personal 
experiences being used as a representative piece of evidence to be wheeled out by 
abolitionists, Jacobs thus seemingly embraces in full her role as an exemplar for life 
under slavery. Her preface even goes so far as to state that she does not aim to “excite 
sympathy for my own sufferings,” but wishes to “arouse the women of the North to a 
realizing sense of the condition of two millions of women at the South, still in bondage, 
suffering what I suffered, and most of them far worse” (5). This stands in stark contrast 
to the self-assertiveness in Douglass’s Narrative that, according to Andrews, 
characterizes North-American slave narrators writing in the mid-nineteenth century 
(Andrews, To Tell a Free Story 100). In the narrative proper, she bemoans the weakness of 
her own authorship as a slave narrator when she exclaims: “But my heart is so full, and 
my pen is so weak” (28). Her sole aim, Jacobs concludes, is to add her testimony “to that 
of abler pens to convince the people of the Free States what Slavery really is” (5). 
Authorial recognition and individuality seem not to matter to Jacobs, especially given 
that Incidents was published under the pseudonym “Linda Brent.”  
This extensive self-effacement and self-deprecation is so complete, however, that the 
modest rhetoric of such weak authorship, typical at the time, belies a more powerful 
assertion on the part of Jacobs. In Witnessing, Kelly Oliver argues that Jacobs’s use of the 
pseudonym “Linda Brent” should be read as a “refusal to be defined by her experience 
of slavery” (103). If this is taken to be accurate, then the weakness of the slave’s position 
and testimony as it is admitted into a social and cultural sphere guarded by white 
citizens is delegated to the authorial function of the pseudonym “Linda Brent,” leaving 
Jacobs to pursue an identity beyond slavery now that she is free. This is crucial, because 
it allows Jacobs to launch a two-pronged attack on the position of black people in 
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society that, just like Douglass’s, both incorporates and transcends the slavery question. 
First, and in accordance with the typical reading of slave narratives, Elizabeth Spelman 
points out in “The Heady Political Life of Compassion” that Jacobs uses her personal 
narrative to disrupt the legal and cultural discourses that render slaves speechless by 
asserting her voice from a slave’s position (365-371). As opposed to Douglass’s Narrative, 
Brent’s story has the clear narrative closure so appreciated by readers. As The Anti-
Slavery Bugle, an abolitionist newspaper, noted on 9 February 1861: “It is a veritable 
history of the trials and suffering to which a slave girl was subjected, but who finally 
triumphed over all discouragements, and obtained freedom for herself and her two 
children” (162). This is the merit of the self-contained narrative cordoned off under the 
authorship of Linda Brent. Second, as a result, the figure of Jacobs is left open as a newly 
independent woman in the North able to explore different terms for recognition and 
identification.  
This drive to escape reductive categorization as a former slave is also what 
characterizes Jacobs’s use of the sentimental tradition. As is the case for her authorial 
presence, the deployment of genre conventions both serves and transcends the 
abolitionist discourse within which it circulated. In a straightforward sense, the literary 
genre of the sentimental novel is taken up here as an ideal means of “moving” readers, 
both emotionally and politically, in service of the anti-slavery movement. As Michelle 
Burnham maintains in “Loopholes of Resistance,” Jacobs’s use of the sentimental novel’s 
ability to affect readers emotionally is part of a strategy by which she means to 
“translate that emotional response into moral behavior” (290). The narrative is filled 
with pathos in its descriptions of what it feels like to be a slave. For instance, when she 
is “inherited” upon the death of her first master, her new master tells her that she is 
“his property” and that she is now “subject to his will” (26). At this point, she exclaims: 
“My soul revolted against the mean tyranny. But where could I turn for protection” (26). 
Shortly afterwards, she almost pleadingly informs the reader that this was the time 
when most she “longed for some one to confide in” (27). In Self-discovery and Authority in 
Afro-American Literature, Valerie Smith notes of the further plot how “Jacobs’s resistance 
of the male aggressor echoes Richardson’s Pamela” (41). Jacob’s struggle to maintain 
virtue in the face of sexual harassment by “Dr. Flint” (a pseudonym for her master, Dr. 
James Norcom) would thus resonate with readers used to consuming popular 
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sentimental fiction with similar plot lines (Smith 37). The heart-wrenching narrative of 
a woman’s virtue threatened by a vile master, brought with sufficient pathos to move 
even the most hard-boiled reader is thus effectively keyed towards rousing the reader, 
as Child puts it, to “the exertion of moral influence on the question of Slavery” (6).32 
This affective strategy, however, was predicated on the fact that readers would 
understand that, in the case of a slave, maintaining moral virtue within a social 
structure that made slaves bend to the will of their masters faced Jacobs with impossible 
choices. This is reflected in her agonizing over the decision to take a white lover in 
order to shield herself from Flint’s aggression and her realization that white readers 
may refuse to sympathize with a protagonist who voluntarily gives up the female purity 
that characterizes women in sentimental fiction (Riss, “Sentimental Douglass” 107).33 In 
being recognized as property rather than human by her masters, the agency of women 
in sentimental novels to resist moral corruption – already rather limited within the 
patriarchal societies in which they are set – is unavailable to Jacobs. As a result, she 
must ask readers not to judge her “by the same standards as one would a free woman” 
(Oliver 101). As an illustration of this, take Jacobs’s direct address of the reader in the 
final chapter: “Reader, my story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with 
marriage” (156). The protagonist, having been established as worthy of the typically 
incorporative ending, merely claims freedom from cruelty at the end instead of 
completing the typical sentimental plot reconciling the protagonist with society 
through the institution of marriage. This provides closure for the reader as a story of 
adventures had and hardships overcome, while simultaneously leaving the “usual” 
ending of the sentimental story unfulfilled. Once again, testifying to life under slavery 
only comprises part of this narrative’s rights-work. Additional room is left at the end of 
 
                                                     
32 Child’s revisions of the narrative, though she writes that they are “trifling exceptions” (6), did contribute in 
one explicit sense to this affective aim. In a letter to Jacobs on 13 August 1860, she writes that she has brought 
the story “into continuous order” so as to render it “much more clear and entertaining” (193). Her concern 
with order and entertainment value no doubt aimed at improving the immersive experience for the readers. 
33 See also Oliver, who remarks that Incidents “often reads as juridical testimony” in which Jacobs puts up a 
defence of her actions “as if she were literally on trial and being judged by her reader” (103). 
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the narrative for the reader to imagine a recognized rights-space in society that Jacobs 
could inhabit now that she is no longer a slave. 
Incidents also deploys the sentimental genre in a broader sense to restructure the 
master-slave hierarchy by redistributing moral currency within the story world. 
Typically, a sentimental novel details the protagonist’s struggle to maintain their virtue 
in the face of a villainous antagonist whose rapacious conduct transgresses society’s 
moral boundaries. The virtuous protagonist in the narrative subsequently comes to be 
seen as the moral centre and, therefore, the “superior” character more aligned with the 
ideals of a moral society. The quintessential example of this would be Richardson’s 
Pamela, whose extreme piety reflects the Christian virtue to which the nation aspires. In 
Incidents, the institution of slavery – as an accepted part of the nation – counteracts the 
protagonist’s virtue being recognized and rewarded, precisely because her status as a 
slave condones the immoral conduct of those threatening her “female purity.” This 
impossible position is articulated by Jacobs when she notes that resistance was futile in 
the face of an attacker who was free to do with her as he pleased: “That which 
commands admiration in the white woman only hastens the degradation of the female 
slave” (26). This phrase is doubly significant, because it appeals to the ideal conduct that 
white readers found admirable and exemplary before pointing out that such conduct on 
the part of slaves hastens the decline rather than the preservation of virtue.  
The shocking unavailability of virtue rewarded to Jacobs is subsequently brought 
home in the text through the familiarly self-deprecating rhetoric of the author. The 
narrative turns away from describing the brutality of Flint to a pathos-laden exploration 
of the humiliation she feels as a result of his aggression. Oliver reads passages such as 
these as part of Jacobs’s effort to “reinscribe dignity and self-respect into the experience 
of slavery” (100). This, I would argue, fails to take into account the extent to which 
Jacobs separates herself from her slave experiences, making such a recovery 
unnecessary. Indeed, Jacobs says as much herself when she redirects the affective 
reader response away from herself in the present and towards her representative slave-
past, which is cordoned off within the narrative of Linda Brent:  
O, what days and nights of fear and sorrow that man caused me. Reader, it is not 
to awaken sympathy for myself that I am telling you truthfully what I suffered in 
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slavery. I do it to kindle a flame of compassion in your hearts for my sisters who 
are still in bondage, suffering as I once suffered (27). 
Even though there is a strong emphasis on the immorality of slavery that is part of the 
sentimental appeal for its abolition and black freedom, Jacobs herself is thus presented 
as already having exchanged the moral void of slavery for freedom in the North.  
The narrative suggests that the type of virtue she could not protect in the South 
should now be available to her. After all, she is now living in a social and cultural 
environment that is comprised of precisely those readers who consume sentimental 
fiction and whom she aims to shock by describing the iniquity of the South. However, 
the latter half of the narrative, dealing with Jacobs’s constant fear of being sent back as 
a result of the Fugitive Slave Act, points to the precarious position of former slaves 
living in the North. As she writes, the danger was that slaves would be “given up by the 
bloodhounds of the north to the bloodhounds of the south” (147). Even freedom within 
a society that accepts the institution of slavery does little more than reaffirm her 
precarious position as property. She wryly describes the moment she finds out that she 
has been sold to a sympathetic white woman, Mrs Bruce (a pseudonym for Cornelia 
Willis):  
So I was sold at last! A human being sold in the free city of New York! The bill of 
sale is on record, and future generations will learn from it that women were 
articles of traffic in New York, late nineteenth century of the Christian religion. I 
well know the value of that bit of paper; but much as I love freedom, I do not like 
to look upon it. (155) 
Having denounced both the moral state of society in the North and the South, the space 
within which the virtue of a black character such as Jacobs’s would be available in the 
novel is shifted from the Free States in the North to an imagined space that can, as of 
yet, only exist in the minds of the readers. Jon Hauss makes the related point in 
“Perilous Passages in Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl” that Incidents 
conjures up a dream of “a finally unbounded circle of human community free of 
exploitation” that contrasts with the “profound systemic dangers of American racial, 
economic, and sexual hierarchies” (162). This imaginative process is fed by the open-
ended plot, which leaves precisely this type of fictional space and encourages readers to 
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connect with Jacobs as an equal instead of acknowledging her humanity but 
maintaining socio-cultural structures that reinforce racial inequality.34 The goal of this 
personal narrative thus comes to exceed mere freedom from slavery and begins to 
imagine a societal structure in which exploitative racial hierarchies would be effaced as 
a result of former slaves being recognized not simply as human beings, but as citizens in 
an egalitarian nation. Like Douglass’s Narrative, it can thus be said to stake Jacob’s claim 
to citizenship in a reformed post-slavery nation as much as it denounces the nation’s 
current immorality as a result of its maintaining of this morally void institution and 
racialized mode of thinking. The significant link in “deep time” to Eggers’s 
contemporary work comes in the form of this resistance to remarginalization through 
stereotypes and hierarchies, a perpetual concern for the disempowered collaborators in 
What Is the What and Zeitoun. 
2.4 Imagining Rights-Spaces After Emancipation: Booker T. 
Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois 
2.4.1 Booker T. Washington 
With Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, the stakes shifted for former slaves and black 
people born in the Free States alike. Across the United States, slaves became – at least by 
law – free, and escaped slaves who made it to the North were legally safe from being 
returned to their masters, even if the Civil War was still to rage for a further two years 
and the freedom of slaves was still hotly contested. With the primary goal for 
abolitionists thus achieved, subsequent personal narratives by black authors debated 
the future of African-Americans in American society as well as how best to pursue the 
acquisition of rights in a post-slavery society. Two towering figures in this debate were 
 
                                                     
34 See also Sandra Gunning in “Reading and Redemption in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl,” where she argues 
that this narrative pursues an affective response that stimulates activism which connects black and white 
readers rather than stimulating top-down charity (352). 
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Booker T. Washington and William Edward Burghardt Du Bois. Both published 
influential narratives around the same time that took up the slave narrative genre and 
adapted it to the issues facing African-Americans in the U.S. following Emancipation. 
Washington’s Up From Slavery, An Autobiography (1901) presents him as a self-reliant 
American hero as it briefly touches on his early life as a slave on a plantation in Virginia 
before going on to detail his success in founding and running the Tuskegee Normal and 
Industrial Institute, a school in Alabama dedicated to teaching practical skills to young 
African-Americans. 
Du Bois was a prolific author. He began his writing career as a researcher at Harvard 
University, where he wrote a doctoral dissertation titled The Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade to the United States of America (1896). He is also known for his autobiography 
titled Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept (1940). His seminal 
work, however, is The Souls of Black Folk (1903), in which Du Bois explored the concept of 
race in American society through the now well-known concepts of “double 
consciousness” and “the veil,” to which I will return later. Du Bois and – especially – 
Washinton’s engagement with the slave narrative genre reflect a shift in the use of 
personal narratives that took place in the post-Emancipation period. These narratives 
moved away from the paratextually framed texts working in conjunction with, or 
resisting, the abolitionist movement towards an even clearer adoption of the 
Bildungsroman. This was particularly the case now that the latter’s incorporative premise 
coalesced with the central issue of how black rights should develop in a post-slavery 
society. This is a final, significant evolution in the personal narrative genre that is worth 
exploring in relation to Eggers, given that his collaborative testimonial work negotiates 
the treacherous balance between recognizing disempowered subjects as the “human” in 
human rights and pushing beyond that to have those subjects be granted full rights 
within global society. 
Up From Slavery and The Souls of Black Folk typify the polemical relationship between 
their respective authors on how black rights should be developed further following 
Emancipation. The disagreement between both authors was played out in the public 
sphere, as their books were widely disseminated and published by mainstream presses. 
Up From Slavery was first published in 1901 by Doubleday, Page, and Co. in New York, one 
of the largest publishing houses in the United States, following serialization in the 
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periodical The Outlook between November 1900 and February 1901. As opposed to the 
radical abolitionist presses and newspapers that published Douglass’s and Jacobs’s 
narratives, The Outlook was a popular periodical with a mainstream readership. 
Theodore Peterson explains in Magazines in the Twentieth Century that the period when 
Washington’s Up from Slavery was serialized coincided with a golden age for the 
magazine as a mainstream “journal of opinion” with a circulation of between 100,000 
and 125,000 copies that attracted important editors and contributors, including 
Theodore Roosevelt (144-146). By way of comparison, Douglass’s Narrative ran in The 
Liberator, which only had 3,000 paying subscribers, many of whom were African-
American.35 Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk was partly serialized in The Atlantic Monthly, a 
similarly mainstream cultural and literary magazine, and published as a whole by A. C. 
McClurg, the same publisher who revived the magazine The Dial that would later become 
a major outlet for influential modernist authors such as T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and 
Marianne Moore. These publishing outlets provide some indication that black 
authorship and subjectivity itself had gained mainstream social and cultural capital in 
the decades following Emancipation. 
Washington’s autobiography is characterized by its stressing of economic rights over 
social and political ones, a focus that formed the basis for Du Bois’s profound 
disagreement with him. Up From Slavery largely provides an almost benign account of 
slavery and goes on to extoll the virtues of his life as a self-made man as an example for 
his race, emphasizing all the way that economic rights are now both available to and to 
be preferred by former slaves.36 In order for this narrative to make sense, Washington 
disentangles the ills of slavery from the nation state and appeals to the latter’s 
foundational meritocratic principles of self-reliance to offer hope to African-
 
                                                     
35 As Ellery Sedgwick notes though, the abolitionist newspaper’s influence cannot be measured by its 
subscriptions alone, as it was “disproportionate to its circulation” (27). This is largely a result of the extent to 
which single copies were copiously shared amongst a wide audience. 
36 This benign description of slavery and its impact upon the black community contrasts heavily with the 
brutality so central to many preceding slave narratives. At one point, he writes that former slaves and their 
descendants “are in a stronger and more hopeful condition, materially, intellectually, morally, and religiously, 
than is true of an equal number of black people in any other portion of the globe” (16).  
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Americans.37 His intended audience is thus clearly both white and black. To white 
citizens of post-Emancipation society he offers reassurance that he bears them no ill 
will for the brutality of slavery with which they had become acquainted through 
previous slave narratives. To recently freed black men and women, he shows a path of 
hard work and economic progress that will secure them a place in the American nation. 
His initial description of slavery is a suitable illustration of his reconciliatory gesture to 
the American nation, especially the South: 
I pity from the bottom of my heart any nation or body of people that is so 
unfortunate as to get entangled in the net of slavery. I have long since ceased to 
cherish any spirit of bitterness against the Southern white people on account of 
the enslavement of my race. . . . Having once got its tentacles fastened on to the 
economic and social life of the Republic, it was no easy matter for the country to 
relieve itself of the institution. (16) 
In this passage, slavery is externalized as an evil that befell the American nation rather 
than an integral part of it. As such, Washington suggests, white citizens – even former 
 
                                                     
37 Self-reliance was also central to the thinking of the influential transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson. In 
an essay titled “Self-Reliance,” Emerson bestows upon the individual in a democratic society of free and equal 
men the great agency to shape the world around him and to resist the temptation to always conform to 
existing customs and traditions. As James H. Read explains in “The Limits of Self-Reliance,” Emerson soon 
realized the incompatibility of slavery and self-reliance, and subsequently found in the resistance to the 
Fugitive Slave Act a prime example of the type of individual non-conformist thinking that any self-reliant 
individual should undertake (152-155). Superficially, Emerson’s intellectualist concept of self-reliance seems 
opposed to the anti-intellectualist self-reliance of which Washington was a proponent. However, Emerson 
interestingly reframes his notion of self-reliance when confronted with his opposition to slavery. In 
denouncing slavery in a speech in 1856, Emerson aligned the same virtues of education and hard work 
stressed by Washington with the democratic values of the free states in the North that were a prerequisite for 
the type of self-reliance he advocated: “I do not see how a barbarous community and a civilized community 
can constitute one State. I think we must get rid of slavery, or we must get rid of freedom. Life has not parity 
of value in the free state and in the slave state. In one, it is adorned with education, with skilful labor, . . . . In 
the other, life is a fever; man is an animal, given to pleasure, frivolous, irritable . . .” (“The Assault upon Mr. 
Sumner”). 
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slave owners – cannot be blamed for its cruelty, as they are as much victims of it as the 
slaves themselves. 
This most forgiving attitude to the U.S.’s slaving past may seem odd to readers now, 
but it did serve an important purpose in Washington’s attempt at securing a place for 
black people in American society. Slaves may have been considered socially and 
culturally dead for centuries as a result of their enslaved status, but they had not been 
economically dead. Consider the way in which freedom in the present day is 
suggestively juxtaposed with past slave labour in Washington’s summary of black 
people’s place in the history of the United States: “The central government gave them 
freedom, and the whole Nation had been enriched for more than two centuries by the 
labour of the Negro” (83). On the one hand, slavery provides African-Americans with 
economic roots in the nation that just granted them freedom and, on the other hand, so 
he points out, had contributed to the nation’s economy. Even as the ills of slavery as an 
institution are thus disentangled from the nation, the slaves themselves are shown to be 
an integral part of it. The establishment of roots, Gilroy clarifies, became increasingly 
important in this period as African-Americans sought to articulate claims to citizenship 
as a means of constructing a cultural sense of belonging that made sense of disparate 
histories of diaspora, exile, and dispersal (112). Nevertheless, Washington is also at pains 
to make sure his readers understand that he does not wish the nation to return to 
slavery: “I have never met one [African-American] who did not want to be free, or on 
who would return to slavery” (15). As Washington repeats throughout the book, the 
benefit of the former slave’s present freedom is that, through hard work and merit, they 
are able to make something of themselves in a society that no longer fixes black people 
in inferior positions. All that is required, he argues, is for others to follow his example of 
self-reliance and industriousness, which will eventually and inevitably be “recognized 
and rewarded” (40-41). By proving their economic worth and relying on this law of 
meritocracy, he says elsewhere, black people can also serve the larger purpose of 
“softening prejudices” (154). Constructing his narrative in this way allows Washington 
to denounce slavery as a past evil and look towards a more inclusive future society in 
which both former slaves and slave-owners have a place, even if it is not yet an equal 
one. 
 110 
This opposition between past ills and present opportunities, which is so critical to the 
rights-space Washington imagines, can be foregrounded even further by looking at how 
he engages with the genre conventions of the slave narrative, Bildungsroman, and the 
tremendously popular nineteenth-century travel narrative. Up From Slavery has the 
typical self-deprecating preface written by Washington in which he regrets that what he 
has tried to narrate was “done so imperfectly,” and in which he takes the opportunity to 
thank Max Bennett Thrasher, a white publicist, for his “painstaking and generous 
assistance” in helping him tell his story (“Preface”). In “Slavery and the Literary 
Imagination,” Arnold Rampersad aptly summarizes his further use of the slave narrative 
genre. He points out that it uses “the skeleton of the slave narrative form” in order to 
urge self-reliance, reconciliation with the white South, and a relinquishing of social and 
political rights in favour of economic rights (105). The reconciliatory aspect of his 
narrative, grounded in its willingness to accept only a partial granting of rights, did not 
go unnoticed by reviewers at the time such as William Dean Howells, who reviewed Up 
From Slavery for The North American Review: “Social equality he does not ask for or 
apparently care for; but industrial and economic equality his energies are bent upon 
achieving, in the common interest of both races” (283).38 Indeed, Washington’s narrative 
stresses this fact repeatedly, making it central to the rights-work it sets out to do. In the 
penultimate chapter of Up From Slavery, he forcibly asserts how economic rights granted 
by whites and hard work on the part of blacks can cement the latter’s freedom and place 
in the United States. African-Americans must seek to make themselves “of such 
indispensable value that the people in the town and the state where we reside will feel 
that our presence is necessary to the happiness and well-being of the community” (281). 
What is noteworthy here is that even as Du Bois would condemn Washington later on 
for selling out on racial equality, the latter leapt on the opportunity of making real the 
incorporative promise and premise of the Bildungs-plot that was unavailable to previous 
 
                                                     
38 Howells goes so far as to praise Washington in his conclusion by comparing his reconciliatory attitude to the 
fighting spirit of Douglass, suggesting that the latter would not have been so constructive following 
Emancipation: “Without affirming his intellectual equality with Douglass, we may doubt whether Douglass 
would have been able to cope so successfully with the actual conditions, and we may safely recognize in 
Booker T. Washington an Afro-American of unsurpassed usefulness, and an exemplary citizen” (288). 
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slave narrators such as Douglass or Jacobs and that now emerged in the wake of 
Emancipation. He is at pains to perform the incorporative ending of the plot, 
particularly in the pathos-laden closing scenes in which he receives a letter inviting him 
to attend a ceremony at Harvard University where he will be awarded an honorary 
degree. This scene explicitly summarizes the Bildungs-plot as part of the narrative’s 
conclusion in which he is accepted into society by one of its foremost institutions:  
[I]t was hard for me to realize that I was to be honoured by a degree from the 
oldest and most renowned university in America. As I sat upon my veranda, with 
this letter in my hand, tears came into my eyes. My whole former life – my life as a 
slave on the plantation, my work in the coal-mine, . . . my struggles for an 
education, the trying days I had had at Tuskegee . . . – all this passed before me 
and nearly overcame me. (296) 
Up From Slavery is eager to narrate the case for economic rights in the aftermath of 
Emancipation before renewed racial segregation has the chance to close down whatever 
rights-space he realized was available to him and is now available to other African-
Americans. Crucial to this is Washington’s stressing of the real and immediate benefits 
for the United States’s economic future from allowing black people to claim these rights 
as well as his deferral of claims for social and political rights as a means of placating the 
white section of his audience. 
Despite his acceptance of inequality, Washington managed to gain recognition for 
U.S. citizenship as a result of his autobiography, something Douglass and Jacobs were 
only able to conjure up through rhetorical twists and narrative devices. Howells’s 
review, for instance, was tellingly titled “An Exemplary Citizen” and claims that “the 
story of Booker T. Washington does not differ so very widely from that of many another 
eminent American” (281). Up From Slavery is not devoid of narrative devices, however, 
when it comes to reinforcing the claim to and recognition of its author’s citizenship, 
which often extends beyond the purely economic level that he purports to claim. A 
particularly poignant example of this is how he makes use of the conventions of the 
popular travel narrative genre that boomed throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century when he describes his visit to Britain in 1899. The genre had the 
ability to captivate American audiences, even if typical examples such as Frances 
Trollope’s Domestic Manners of the Americans (1832) and Charles Dickens’s American Notes 
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(1842), infamous for its negative portrayal of Americans, were not always well received. 
As the nineteenth century went on, American authors gained in confidence and decided 
to “write back” by visiting Britain and commenting on what they found. Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s Our Old Home (1863) can serve as an example here, with its rather scathing 
comment that “an English lady of fifty is apt to become a creature less refined and 
delicate, so far as her physique goes, than anything that we Western people class under 
the name of woman” (48). This aside may seem trivial, were it not that Washington also 
takes the same perspective of the observing, witty American abroad, and thus strongly 
aligns himself with his readership at home and includes himself in a shared perception 
of being American. Washington implicitly also rejects the voyeuristic gaze of 
eighteenth-century travel books that were strongly focused on exotic explorations of 
what were seen as “primitives” in the ancestral homelands of slaves, Africa, by aligning 
himself with the “civilized” observer instead of the observed.39 Consider, for example, 
this comment on the English stiff upper lip: “The average Englishman is so serious, and 
is so tremendously in earnest about everything, that when I told a story that would have 
made an American audience roar with laughter, the Englishmen simply looked me 
straight in the face without even cracking a smile” (287). By way of humour, these types 
of witty observations spoon-feed his claiming of American citizenship to his reader and 
transform him from an African body of exotic interest into an autonomous and 
observant African-American subject. In spite of these narrative moves, critics have 
largely concluded from Washington’s emphasis on economic self-assertiveness over 
rhetorical moralizing that he disavows the performative power of personal narratives. 
Andrews asserts that, as opposed to earlier slave narrators, Washington claims “a 
radical distinction between action and speech” to the extent that he “denies the 
performative dimension of representation” (Andrews, “The Representation of Slavery” 
 
                                                     
39 Frank J. Klingberg notes the following in The Anti-Slavery Movement in England: “During the middle years of 
the eighteenth century interest in primitive man was revived largely by a great increase of travel and the 
publication of travel books” (29). One can read into this sort of cultural interest in Africans a form of 
Orientalism that reinforced the image of black peoples as brutish, uncivilized and uncultured. As Said notes in 
Orientalism of similar textual constructions of the “Orient,” such an existing body of texts has the ability to 
create a discourse that rationalizes racial and cultural inequality and hierarchy (39). 
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72-73). However, his deft rewriting of the slave narrative genre, explicit performance of 
the incorporative aspect of the Bildungs-plot, and adroit adopting of the travel narrative 
genre show that the narrative devices at work in Up From Slavery were key to its 
mapping out of a rights-space for the recently freed African-American community. 
Even Washington, therefore, who downplayed the ills of slavery and who saw the 
moment of Emancipation as a golden opportunity for his race, narrates a story of the 
gradual negotiation of rights in the wake of newly declared freedom. In Up From Slavery, 
Washington blazes a trail for his African-American brethren in terms of claiming 
economic rights in order to grind down prejudice, while simultaneously reassuring 
white readers that he is not advocating for a social or political awakening that would 
upset the existing racial segregation. This is not because African-Americans are 
incapable of participating in political life, as he makes clear in his description of the 
run-up to Emancipation in Up From Slavery. There, he writes that while Lincoln was 
running for the presidency, the slaves were keenly aware of “the issues involved” (8). As 
my analysis showed though, Washington’s focus was on displaying the worth of African-
Americans as self-reliant human beings now that they were no longer mere property as 
a means of grinding down prejudice and laying claim to the citizenship the nation 
accorded to men who displayed precisely those virtues. Racial prejudice could not keep 
down the African-American who shows his merit in a country that Washington believed 
had always been fundamentally meritocratic and that had now finally been freed of 
slavery. 
2.4.2 W. E. B. Du Bois 
Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk, published two years after Up From Slavery, constitutes a 
concerted rebuttal of Washington’s proposal for the incremental acquisition of rights by 
African-Americans in the post-Emancipation United States. It does not subscribe to the 
slave narrative genre, which Du Bois saw as an obsolete means of describing African-
American experience in a post-slavery nation. Instead, Du Bois’s narrative is the 
beginning of what Rampersad calls a ‘”reflexive paradigm” that is “allied to the slave 
narrative” but more aptly suited to the modern world (106). The subsequent influence 
exerted by The Souls of Black Folk suggests the success of this new paradigm. Seemingly 
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keenly aware of his breaking with tradition, Du Bois provides a nod to the 
conventionally self-deprecating style of slave narrative prefaces when he addresses the 
“Gentle Reader” in his own: “I pray you, then, receive my little book in all charity, 
studying my words with me, forgiving mistake and foible for sake of the faith and 
passion that is in me, and seeking the grain of truth hidden there” (359). This humble 
tone disguises, however, the serious intellectual work already being done by this 
opening section that undergirds his further analysis of the race issue in the United 
States.  
In the preface, Du Bois introduces the concept of the “colour line.” This concept is 
central to Du Bois’s thinking that slavery was not, as Washington would have it, a thing 
of the past, but the expression of the deep-seated problem of persistent racial inequality 
and prejudice in the United States. The colour line is precisely what the book seeks to 
traverse as it aims to reveal to its readers “the meaning of being black here in the 
dawning of the Twentieth Century” (359). Before Du Bois’s use of it, the term “colour 
line” was most prominently used by Frederick Douglass in an article for The North 
American Review in 1881 with the same title. In the article, Douglass similarly uses it as a 
means of exposing racial inequality and hierarchy as a result of prejudice. He writes that 
prejudice “is a moral disorder, which creates the conditions necessary to its own 
existence, and fortifies itself by refusing all contradiction” (567). In describing the 
deeply ingrained prejudice that reinforces racial equality in such hefty terms, the 
concept of the colour line stands in stark contrast to Washington’s assertion that hard 
work and the universal law of merit would eventually grind down any remaining 
prejudice following Emancipation. Douglass’s description of the colour line runs even 
further contrary to Washington’s later faith in economic rights, when he shows how 
prejudice affects “every department of American life,” meeting black people even “at 
the work shop and factory, when they apply for work” (568). Prejudice conspires to 
perpetuate slavery, he concludes, in that the black person “has ceased to be the slave of 
an individual, but has in some sense become the slave of society” (568). Du Bois’s 
appropriation of the concept of the colour line reflects this less optimistic view of post-
Emancipation African-American life and explains why the thrust of his argument lies in 
combatting racial inequality and prejudice as a precursor to the acquisition of social, 
cultural, political, and economic rights. 
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Even if The Souls of Black Folk does not engage with existing literary genres as 
extensively as the slave narratives, its discussion of racial inequality does centre on the 
conceptual metaphor of the “colour line.” It is therefore a markedly different text to 
Washington’s Up From Slavery, which, despite its copious use of narrative strategies to 
push its message, explicitly prides itself on being a “simple, straightforward story, with 
no attempt at embellishment” (n.p.). Du Bois has no such scruples about employing 
language in his thinking to its full colourful, imaginative, and complex effect. As the 
notion of the colour line suggests, Du Bois is not afraid of using metaphors. Another 
important metaphor is the “veil.” He introduces the metaphor of a veil to explain his 
influential idea of double consciousness:  
. . . the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-
sight in this American world, – a world which yields him no true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other 
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels this 
two-ness, – an American, a Negro. (364) 
The metaphorical veil symbolizes that which continues to separate the white from the 
black in post-slavery America, clouding their mutual perception of one another. As 
Gilroy explains, the complex term “double consciousness” pertains to African-
Americans being determined first by their race, their fluid intermediate status of former 
slave but not-yet-citizen, and their perceived rootlessness (127). The problem of the 
colour line thus lies in the fact that African-Americans are shrouded within a discourse 
that sees the first half of that collocation, that is the “African” in “African-American,” as 
a restrictive qualification of the second. As Du Bois notes, he noticed at an early age how 
he was “shut out from their [white] world by a vast veil” which meant that opportunity 
in life was “theirs, not mine” (364). As a result, the ambition for his race should be to 
“make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed 
and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in 
his face” (365). Du Bois understood that the colour line, the various incarnations of 
hierarchical racial thinking symbolized by the veil, lay at the heart of the rights issue 
facing African-Americans. Therefore, he had no interest in seeking out a space within a 
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discourse that had already designated him an inferior position. Washington’s answer 
had been to start from that unequal basis, to insist on establishing the inherent worth of 
black people through economic achievement as a means of gradually wearing down the 
effects of prejudice and inequality. Du Bois’s was to suggest something altogether more 
radical. 
The Souls of Black Folk seeks to disrupt the discourse of racial inequality by arguing for 
the simultaneous recognition of social, cultural, political, and economic parity between 
black and white as a means of fulfilling the promise of the American nation. This is 
spelled out in the very first chapter of the book, when he writes: “Work, culture, liberty, 
– all these we need, not singly but together, not successively but together . . .” (370). 
This striving is then forcefully rearticulated in the terms of American nationhood, when 
he says later on:  
By every civilized and peaceful method we must strive for the rights which the 
world accords to men, clinging unwaveringly to those great words which the sons 
of the Fathers would fain forget: We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all 
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
(404) 
To demand anything less than total equality and equal rights, as Washington suggested, 
would be to accept an unacceptable lesser human status deprived of those rights 
granted to all Americans. In case anyone should doubt the implied addressee of this 
poignant rallying cry, the title of this chapter, “Of Booker T. Washington and Others,” 
makes it abundantly clear to the reader. Du Bois thus insists on equality where 
Washington was willing to accept marginally less inequality as a stepping stone to 
improving the position of African-Americans in the long term.  
This is echoed in the performative dimension of both narrators in their respective 
narratives. In Up From Slavery, Washington assumes the position of the slave narrator 
and uses the potential of the Bildungs-plot contained within the slave narrative genre to 
show how his hard work in educational and economic terms culminates in his being 
recognized in socio-cultural terms by Harvard University’s awarding him an honorary 
degree. Du Bois, in contrast, no longer wishes to perform this – erstwhile unavailable – 
incorporative aspect of the slave narrative’s Bildungs-plot if it means accepting life 
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under the veil as Washington proposes. He published The Souls of Black Folk after having 
completed his doctoral dissertation at the same university and adopts a different, less 
narrative, and more argumentative textual genre.40 It is rational argument in favour of 
racial equality, as his after-thought to the reader suggests, that will eventually erase the 
colour line: “Thus in Thy good time may infinite reason turn the tangle straight, and 
these crooked marks on a fragile leaf be not indeed THE END” (547). Similarly, even his 
autobiography Dusk of Dawn subordinates his own personal experiences as a black man 
to the broader intellectual consideration of the colour line in the nation at large: “My 
life had its significance and its only deep significance because it was part of a Problem . . 
. I seem to see a way of elucidating the inner meaning and significance of that race 
problem by explaining it in terms of the one human life that I know best” (551). His 
performance as a narrator is thus less that of an amenable former slave seeking 
reconciliation, as was Washington’s, and more that of a radical thinker addressing 
intellectual equals and thereby confirming his claim to socio-cultural equality.  
However, regardless of the fundamental intellectual disagreement between 
Washington and Du Bois over the development of black rights, they both provide a 
further illustration of how the now commonplace steady and progressive history of 
declarations belies the complex contestation of rights between and amongst the various 
races yoked together in the United States as a result of the slave trade. In his doctoral 
dissertation, Du Bois lays bare the tension between sweeping proclamations, on the one 
hand, and the slow-paced change in reality, on the other, when he wryly notes of the 
foundational moment of independence that “[i]t was the plain duty of a Revolution 
based upon ‘Liberty’ to take steps toward the abolition of slavery: it preferred promises 
to straightforward action” (196).41 Dealing with the history of slavery and the slave trade 
 
                                                     
40 See, for example, the structure of his preface, which sets out the different steps of his argument chapter by 
chapter: “First, in two chapters . . . Then, in two other chapters . . . Venturing now into deeper detail, I have in 
two chapters studied . . .” (359). 
41 He also damningly writes that “It was the plain duty of the colonies to crush the trade and the system in its 
infancy: they preferred to enrich themselves on its profits” (196). Elsewhere in his dissertation, Du Bois shows 
himself to be particularly suspicious of the bias that a history of the abolition of slavery and the slave trade 
based on successive legal changes would inevitably incur. While he admits that a study of progressive laws 
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was important to Du Bois’s thinking in The Souls of Black Folk, as Rampersad explains, 
because understanding its history and its temporality would lead to a greater 
understanding of Afro-American culture and allow that culture to transcend the legacy 
of slavery (123). In this respect, it is no coincidence that Du Bois’s doctoral dissertation 
dealt precisely with the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. His analysis of the 
decline of the slave trade and slavery qualifies the moral energy of the nation’s 
foundational moments. In the concluding paragraphs of his text, for instance, he notes 
that slavery was a system that never “had a slighter economic, political, and moral 
justification than in 1787” (197). His study also lays the groundwork for his later study of 
the continued problem of the colour line in The Souls of Black Folk. He tellingly expresses 
his hope in the preface to his dissertation that his study of the trade that landed 
millions of Africans in the United States should contribute to the “scientific study of 
slavery and the American Negro” (3). The inclusion of the latter in particular, the study 
of the African-cum-American, suggests that in studying the history of the slave trade, he 
hopes to address in some part the roots and identity of a people uprooted from their 
homes, shipped half way across the world as slaves, and denied their full identity as 
human beings in the process of being turned into commodities.42 Bridging towards his 
later ideas in The Souls of Black Folk, he goes on to describe the complex economic and 
political shifts that led to the abolition of the slave trade and slavery itself, thus 
undermining the idea that moral suasion by abolitionists alone had restored humanity 
to slaves and allowed them to be set free. As he poignantly writes:  
There is always a certain glamour about the idea of a nation rising up to crush an 
evil simply because it is wrong. Unfortunately, this can seldom be realized in real 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
could be interpreted as a “moral awakening,” he suggests instead that they “showed a fear of servile 
insurrection” and reflected a desire to be seen by the rest of the world to be addressing the paradox of slavery 
in the land of the free (194). 
42 His own roots, as he describes them in his autobiography Dusk of Dawn, were distinctly bound up with his 
country of birth: “In the folds of this European civilization I was born and shall die, imprisoned, conditioned, 
depressed, exalted and inspired. Integrally a part of it and yet, much more significant, one of its rejected 
parts” (555).  
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life; for the very existence of the evil usually argues a moral weakness in the very 
place where extraordinary moral strength is called for. (194) 
Instead of a history of moral enlightenment, Du Bois stresses the absence of sufficient 
moral growth and strength to overcome the racial thinking that sustained the 
commodification of human beings before Emancipation and allowed the veil to descend 
over black people after it. His attempt at creating a rights-space for black people could 
be considered one in which he fights against the racial prejudice that had been 
preserved despite the pithy declarations that are now so eagerly taken up by human 
rights histories as foundational moments.  
Both Washington’s and Du Bois’s narratives fundamentally centre on the issue of 
racial inequality, even if their approaches differ extensively. In narrating a gradual 
expansion of rights to challenge the prejudice that had justified the oppression of his 
race, starting with economic rights and fundamental freedom from slavery, Up From 
Slavery is as much engaged with the continuing problem of racial inequality and 
prejudice as Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk. They both seek to create a space for black 
rights beyond the boundaries placed upon them by a society that had paradoxically 
established itself through various enlightened declarations affirming the fundamental 
freedom and equality of man. Their narratives do so by pushing this paradox to its 
limits, each in their own way, and making a case for allowing the existing discourse of 
rights to be extended and thereby overcome the discourse of racial inequality with 
which it had coexisted for so long.  
2.5 Imagining Rights-Spaces in the Era of Human Rights: 
Eggers’s Collaborative Testimonies 
2.5.1 Valentino Achak Deng and What Is the What 
Slave narratives, as my analysis shows, mostly resulted from collaborations with white 
abolitionists and sought to claim rights by disrupting the status quo of a culture in 
which proclaimed human equality and racial inequality coexisted. Today, personal 
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narratives are still solicited and sanctioned by actors operating within a largely Western 
rights framework. The distinct difference lies in that framework’s now more universal 
and global reach, as well as its explicit affirmation of racial equality and fundamental 
basic rights. How do these slave narratives relate to contemporary uses of the personal 
narrative as a means of narrating wrongs in the modern era of human rights? Moyn 
suggests that studies of rights should refrain from dealing with such questions in a 
linear way that seeks to establish overly optimistic ties with the past. Instead, one 
should stress the particularity of the rights-context of nineteenth-century North 
America, how it differs dramatically from the current globalized rights discourse, and 
how the imagined “equality” proclaimed at the level of the nation state should not be 
entered into a cascading logical of improvement that culminates in a transnational 
rights order that is meant to supersede the nation state as the arbiter of rights. Yet the 
temptation to see continuity is not wholly unjustified and a narrative of difference 
belies the gradual transition from one rights-context to the next. I believe that this 
knotty issue can, at least in part, be disentangled by means of a comparison of the 
manifold ways in which personal narratives help to produce and are produced by the 
rights-contexts in which they operate. The black authors of the previous section 
provide part of the illustration for this hypothesis. They show rights “in action” in that 
they reflect on both the theory and practice of declarative practices and lived violations 
respectively. In addition to this illustrative dimension, they also show how rights are 
contested and imagined. Even though Douglass, Jacobs, Washington, and Du Bois may 
have shifted their rights-space creating efforts to respond to constant social, cultural, 
political, and legal changes, their narratives are all equally marked by a shared goal of 
imagining black rights in a way that far transcended the established rights-discourse of 
their time.  
The narrative means may thus be a product of a historical rights context and, 
therefore, variable, even if the end to which that narrative is put to use invariably seeks 
to reshape that discourse so as to achieve the same goal. The proposed means of 
conceptualizing this relates to Dimock’s concept of “deep time.” It is a generic-
genealogical map across which the mutual production of personal narratives and rights 
discourses can be studied at a narrative level by attending to two aspects of their 
development. On the one hand, it is important to ascertain how personal narratives 
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have been adapted in the modern age in order to engage with the entirely different 
contemporary rights culture. On the other hand, it is equally important to determine 
how the genre has built on and echoed previous uses of the personal narrative form as a 
means of preserving their rights-space creating characteristics. In other words, these 
echoes would constitute a continuity of practice with those black authors writing in the 
age when contemporary human rights culture is said to have emerged. As such, the 
category of personal narratives is a dynamic and fluid one that is united across different 
rights contexts and literary periods by its deployment of formal features to claim rights, 
but distinctive for each of those contexts and periods. Even if this dissertation cannot 
conclusively or exhaustively prove this point, it can offer a comparative case study with 
contemporary collaborative testimonies to support it. Indeed, Eggers’s What Is the What 
provides a first fruitful testing ground for this hypothesis, especially given its 
intertextual affiliation with the slave narrative genre. 
There is a clear similarity between the way the early slave narrative genre was 
framed and authorized and What Is the What, which sees an established Western author, 
Eggers, compose the story of a disempowered African, Valentino Achak Deng, one of the 
so-called “Lost Boys of Sudan” who survived the Second Sudanese Civil War and was 
relocated to the United States.43 Following his relocation to Atlanta, Deng’s apartment 
was robbed by two African-Americans, a further tragedy that Eggers used as part of a 
frame narrative for his retelling of this story. Deng himself was originally part of 
 
                                                     
43 See also Travel and Dislocation in Contemporary American Fiction, in which Aliki Varvogli comes to the same 
conclusion that “By telling a black African’s story of suffering and eventual triumph against the odds, Eggers is 
reviving the old slave narrative mode” (xxiii). As Yost notes in “The Voices of Others: Dave Eggers and New 
Directions for Testimony Narrative and Cosmopolitan Literary Collaboration,” the collaboration between 
Eggers and Deng also suggests a link between What Is the What and the tradition of the testimonio genre (149). 
Testimonio narratives, as written in the tradition of texts testifying to humanitarian issues in Central America, 
are the product of a collaborative process in which a privileged outsider helps to write the account of a 
victim’s life in order to make it accessible to a wider audience. The humanitarian potential of testimonio 
literature forms the central hypothesis of Kimberley Nance’s Can Literature Promote Justice?, which explores the 
interconnectedness of the form, humanitarian intent, and ideological background of collaborative testimonial 
narratives. Important to note here is how in the testimonio genre the victim’s narrative is facilitated and 
implicitly corroborated by the Western author. 
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fundraisers organized by an organization called “The Lost Boy Foundation” during 
which he would testify to his experiences of the Second Sudanese Civil War in order to 
inform U.S. audiences of its horrors and spur them to act. Like Douglass and 
Washington, therefore, Deng’s narrative address to a privileged Western audience is 
thus a companion to his extensive work as a public speaker and activist in the United 
States. In terms of the paratext, a preface was added for the 2006 edition that echoes 
those found in many slaves narratives in which the veracity, didactic mission, and 
humanitarian aims of the text are explicitly set out. The need to provide justification for 
What Is the What’s narrative and charitable projects in such a preface is more than a little 
reminiscent of Garrison and Douglass’s struggle to convince white readers that the 
latter’s experiences were real, that his narrative was true, and that their cause was 
worthwhile. A further similarity in terms of collaboration is Eggers’s explicit role in 
ordering and shaping the narrative, much like Child restructured Jacobs’s text to make 
it flow better and to make it more entertaining.44  
What Is the What deviates from the slave narrative genre in important ways too, 
however. For instance, in this narrative Deng testifies to the competence and 
trustworthiness of Eggers rather than vice-versa. The preface sees Deng initially 
granting What Is the What his blessing by stating that it is “the soulful account of [his] 
life” (xiii), before drawing the reader’s attention to the pedagogical purpose of the text: 
“As you read this book, you will learn about me and my beloved people of Sudan” (xiii). 
The preface also further explicates that Eggers and Deng always agreed that all proceeds 
from the publication would go to Deng (xiv). In this way, the preface addresses those 
 
                                                     
44 As Varvogli notes, Eggers’s reordering and reframing of events in What Is the What revolves around 
employing “strategies” that “are best suited to the telling of a traumatic and dramatic narrative” (11). Eggers 
himself noted how he felt the need to “balance” Deng’s calamitous journey with “other aspects of life” so as to 
establish the protagonist as representing “a full human life” (qtd. in Dawes 209). This provides further 
evidence of the way in which an appropriate and standard format for appeals through incorporative personal 
narratives has developed, as uncovered by Slaughter, in an age of rights to which testimony has become 
central. In Contemporary American Trauma Narratives, Alan Gibbs makes a similar point concerning the 
incestuous relationship between trauma theory and trauma narratives, in which the former – once established 
– became a blueprint for the production of the latter. 
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critics who accused Eggers of appropriating Deng’s voice and story in order to turn a 
profit. Like a slave narrative in service of the abolitionist cause, this testimonial account 
also serves the dual purpose of disseminating the victim’s testimony and gathering 
funds for a humanitarian effort, in this case to support educational projects in what is 
now South Sudan.45  
What Is the What not only invokes but also inverts the hierarchical conventions of the 
slave narrative, however, by having Deng write the preface and thereby testify to the 
veracity of Eggers’s narrativization of his story in the preface. Importantly, therefore, 
this is a testimonial narrative where the privileged author has ceded control to the 
disenfranchised, both financially – as noted before – and narratologically.46 As such, it 
seeks to forestall the type of relationship generated by slave narrators and white 
abolitionists in which the former’s agency is reduced to being an illustrative assistant in 
the latter’s campaign. The role reversal in What Is the What’s preface is a testament to 
the extent to which Eggers and Deng are aware of recreating this type of hierarchical 
and neo-colonial relationship, in which a white middle-class American author commits 
to serving a higher humanitarian purpose by helping a disempowered Sudanese man 
articulate his particular traumatic experiences.  
A second important aspect of the text to note in this respect is the narrative voice 
with which the reader engages in What Is the What. Eggers and Deng’s self-proclaimed 
novel and autobiography is the former’s narrativization of the latter’s life story, with 
the preface being the only section of the text written solely by Deng. Elizabeth Twitchell 
points out that the narrative proper is narrated in the first person by a fictional “third 
voice” which coincides neither with Deng’s nor with Eggers’s voice, and which she calls 
“Valentino.” This third voice resembles the actual “Deng’s speaking voice but does not 
reproduce or transcribe it” (Twitchell 638). I will maintain this valuable distinction 
 
                                                     
45 In 2006, Deng decided to set up the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, a non-profit organization which, 
according to its website, seeks to “increase access to education in post-conflict South Sudan by building 
schools, libraries, teacher-training institutes, and community centers” (“Home”). 
46 See also Michelle Peek’s “Humanitarian Narrative and Posthumanist Critique: Dave Eggers’s What Is the 
What,” in which she notes that this inversion solidifies the collaborative text’s claims to autobiographical 
truth (119). 
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between “Valentino” and “Deng” in my further analysis. Smith and Watson note how 
this ambiguous narrator helps to avoid the fixation on veracity that haunts many 
personal narrative. They point out that the “negotiable ‘I’ of What Is the What disrupts 
reading habits by requiring us to rethink the formation and location of a narrating ‘I’” in 
a way that leaves the novel less open to “charges of fabrication than first person 
testimony because it turns on a paradox of fictive truth that unsettles the metrics of 
authenticity” (619). Even as it undertakes similar work to the slave narrative genre in 
establishing the humanity of its protagonist, therefore, the narrative also actively seeks 
to address and remedy the problem of the disenfranchised subject’s ambiguous 
relationship with a privileged collaborator hindering their rights-claiming efforts as 
much as it helps them. 
What Is the What differs most distinctly from the slave narrative genre in terms of 
where it seeks to create rights-space, moving its focus away from – indeed explicitly 
rejecting – the nation state level in favour of the transnational level at which human 
rights now operate. The novel undermines any reading that would allow – as the slave 
narratives did – rights-space to be simply created at the level of national citizenship. 
This is most clearly reflected in the narrative’s anti-teleological structure. The story is 
structured around a frame narrative spanning two consecutive days in which the 
protagonist becomes the victim of a violent robbery by two African-Americans in his 
apartment in Atlanta. Afterwards, he fruitlessly seeks assistance from the police and 
medical attention from a local hospital. Throughout this account of present-day 
suffering, however, the reader is informed of Valentino’s childhood experiences of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War, which began after racial and religious tensions between the 
oil-rich non-Islamic south of the country and the Arab-dominated north reached 
breaking point.47 This circular narrative structure strongly denies the possibility of 
narrative redemption at the level of the nation state. Deng’s experience of rejection and 
 
                                                     
47 The Khartoum government’s imposition of Shari’a law on the country’s entire population triggered a 
conflict between the government and a rebel movement in the south of the country, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), and its military arm, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). This conflict, 
which lasted until 2005, claimed two and a half million lives and displaced another four million people. 
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abuse in U.S. society from the very start of the text shatters any notions of the West as 
an uncomplicated safe haven into which the protagonist can integrate at the end of his 
story.48 As a result, the West – and the United States in particular – is also disqualified 
from reforming to become the rights society into which the protagonist would 
integrate, given that it is inextricably bound up with his suffering. This differs greatly 
from the slave narrative’s imagined incorporation into a reformed nation state in two 
ways. First, the proclaimed basis for rights is located at a different, transnational level in 
this contemporary novel. Second, the incurred suffering can no longer be comfortingly 
displaced, as it could be for slaves suffering in the South and finding freedom in the 
North. 
Yet there is also a strong similarity in the way the postponed narrative closure of 
What Is the What echoes Douglass’s Narrative, which forestalled the incorporative ending 
of the typical Bildungsroman as a means of pushing the reader to imagine a more radical 
type of rights-space for the narrator to inhabit. As Dawes notes in That the World May 
Know, Deng’s story is characterized by a lack of satisfactory closure in which the 
protagonist finds happiness and safety even as it consistently “lures the reader into a 
feeling of hope that has already been crushed” (202). In this sense, it is typical of what 
Slaughter calls “postcolonial Bildungsromane” in which the concluding incorporative 
ending is “perpetually postponed” and the protagonist never fully becomes the 
“sovereign, undivided human personality” imagined by contemporary understandings 
of human rights (215). The unavailability of full human personhood lies, once again, in 
the juxtaposed frame narrative that influences the story of rights abuse in Sudan so 
greatly. In being robbed by African-Americans, Martyn Bone notes in “Narrative of 
African Immigration to the U.S. South,” the narrative foregrounds the extent to which 
Deng is doubly dislocated, being neither African nor American (68-70). The dream of 
equal African-American citizenship put forward by Du Bois, Douglass, or Jacobs does not 
cover the new generations of Africans moving to the United States. As a result, 
 
                                                     
48 See also Peek, who writes that What Is the What’s narrator “questions the universal humanist assumptions 
upon which a rhetoric of rescue is based, and particularly its positioning of the US as benevolent and 
hospitable” (115).  
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Valentino’s incomplete narrative strives for a different ideal. As Peter Boxall writes in 
Twenty-First Century Fiction, What Is the What examines the “capacity of global culture to 
provide new forms in which to express postnational identity, after African 
decolonisation” (174). One could add to this that it thereby also seeks to move beyond 
the strictly North-American context in which the slave narratives’ rights-space creating 
efforts were engaged. In terms of rights, it explores a global society across which human 
beings migrate for various reasons, but across which human rights only exist in 
rudimentary transnational form. It thus similarly plays with the concept of an open 
ending in order to push the reader to engage with its attempts at rights-space creation 
to recognize Valentino as a fully-fledged human being unable to find that recognition 
within the confines of the nation state and not yet able to receive them from a relatively 
weak global human rights framework.  
A further parallel with the slave narrative is the way in which the narrative sets 
Valentino up as a strong and fully-developed human being to whom rights should be 
extended. In Travel and Dislocation in Contemporary American Fiction, Varvogli argues that 
one finds in What Is the What the same kind of self-assertion and self-reliance that 
typifies the United States’ national mythology that one finds in the works of, for 
instance, Douglass (21-25). Contradictorily, Varvogli concludes from this that What Is the 
What is fundamentally about “becoming an American” (11), even as she admits that the 
novel’s juxtaposed stories of American and Sudanese suffering “serve to unsettle the 
categories of home, safety, and adventure” (22). The anti-teleological thrust of the 
narrative’s structure cannot so easily be reconciled with the nation state, especially 
given the rights-space creating work it seeks to perform. Valentino’s narrative asserts 
the testimonial subject’s humanity and autonomy in a way that immediately 
undermines the uncomplicated world view in which the United States functions as an 
unblemished beacon for human rights where anyone can find safety and security. What 
Is the What instead explores ways of promoting international justice by appealing to a 
more egalitarian transnational empathy between the reader, the author, and the 
testimonial subject. It uses this to push the existing social, cultural, and political 
boundaries restricting the distribution of rights into the more universal transnational 
sphere where universal human rights have been proclaimed. The nature of this 
empathic connection will be explored in the next chapter in greater detail. However, 
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suffice to say for now that, with deprivation hitting in Sudan as well as the United 
States, and the traditional remedy of a saviour Western state guaranteeing rights to 
victims at home and abroad being undermined, the rights-space opened up by 
Valentino’s testimony is firmly grounded in a transnational sphere that is more aligned 
with a global approach to guaranteeing rights. This matches a broader trend, as noted 
by Slaughter, in which contemporary human rights law is also seeking to transcend the 
nation state by internationalizing “the human person by literalizing it, making it real” 
(Human Rights Inc. 22). Both this broader trend and Deng’s personal narrative thus seek 
to strengthen what is now a human rights regime that is “notoriously feeble” and is 
largely still subordinated to nation states (Human Rights Inc. 24). Critical in this respect is 
how Eggers and Deng’s collaboration, which is overall more careful and productive, is 
able to foreground much of the rights-work of establishing Deng’s humanity and 
pushing the boundaries of existing social, cultural, legal, and political boundaries that 
was implicit in the work of black authors during the long nineteenth century. 
However, despite their truly collaborative narrative effort in establishing Deng as a 
rights-bearing subject within a transnational human rights culture, there is still an 
extent to which the relationship between Deng and Eggers disproportionately and 
problematically favours the latter. What Is the What cannot escape the fact that it is, first 
and foremost, “fashioned for the white market” (Varvogli 26). Like Child and Garrison 
before him, it is the white mediator – in this case Eggers – who knows how to make the 
disempowered subject’s story amenable to a white readership. Worryingly, the issue 
runs even deeper than this. With Eggers’s name appearing as the sole author on the 
cover, the various narrative strategies deployed by What Is the What inevitably become 
selling points that make the novel easily marketable to consumers already familiar with 
the author. The novel is, as Boxall notes, clearly “preoccupied” with this authorial 
mediation of the disenfranchised subject and the “circumstances of its own production” 
(175). For instance, the narrative strategy of a collaborative authorial voice so crucial to 
the rights-work performed by the novel in deconstructing the West-Rest binary is, 
simultaneously, part of a typical self-reflective and entertaining style reminiscent of 
Eggers’s popular debut memoir A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius. The two aspects 
of this narrative strategy in some ways even come to contradict one another in the 
novel as it becomes fascinated by “its own narrative mechanisms, and with the nature of 
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the hybrid voice that it creates” to such an extent that it “continually thwarts any 
efforts at producing a fully embodied autobiographical voice” (Boxall 181). This points 
towards the fact that Deng’s self-assertion and autonomy through What Is the What may 
not be able to survive its entrance into the commercial world of the literary 
marketplace. 
This sheds new light on Smith and Watson’s assertion that Deng and Eggers carefully 
“come together across asymmetries of location and access to power” to the extent that 
neither can claim “exclusive ownership of the story” (613). Even if ownership is 
deferred indefinitely in a narrative sense through the fictionalized voice of “Valentino” 
and financial gain is explicitly granted to Deng through a charitable foundation, cultural 
ownership is claimed on the title page by Eggers and Eggers alone. This contradicts the 
primary aim of What Is the What which is, as Boxall contends and as my earlier analysis 
shows, to think beyond “communal modes of being” that are not available to Deng in 
“the current global networks for the distribution of wealth and cultural power” (178). 
The troubling result is that in order for Deng’s personal narrative to contest and 
negotiate rights-space, it relies to a large extent on the cultural capital for which he is 
forced to compete with the author whose name alone is mentioned on the cover. The 
odds are thus stacked heavily in the privileged white author’s favour as being the likely 
long-term beneficiary in terms of cultural capital and reputation, with the success of 
What Is the What fuelling future philanthropy. Deng’s personal narrative, in turn, risks 
being demoted to an illustrative function not unlike the one from which Douglass’s and 
Jacobs’s slave narratives sought to escape. Taking a longer view, one can therefore note 
that personal narratives across differing rights-contexts are caught, first and foremost, 
in a struggle to become sufficiently salient for them to engage in their rights-space 
creating endeavours. Salience, in this respect, is governed by the privileged group that 
is intimately bound up with repressing the disenfranchised voice in the first place. 
Access to the public forum in which that status quo can be contested is equally 
restricted, moreover, through mediation by sympathetic members of the dominant 
group. It is perhaps to What Is the What’s credit, however, that it so clearly foregrounds 
this fundamental problem through Eggers’s typically self-reflexive style and Deng’s 
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reappropriation of the hierarchical slave narrative genre in the preface so as to confront 
the reader with the level of mediation required for them to gain access to this story.49 In 
this way, the open scramble for salience is incorporated into its broader rights-space 
creating efforts and questions the restricted access to what is meant to be a universally 
accessible and established global rights discourse.  
2.5.2 Abdulrahman Zeitoun and Zeitoun 
Zeitoun provides a second interesting case study for the way in which personal 
narratives address specific contemporary rights discourses, are produced by them, and 
seek to reconceive them. This collaborative non-fiction project between Eggers and 
Zeitoun revolves around the latter’s survival of Hurricane Katrina and subsequent 
brutal detention for unfounded suspicions of terrorism under powers granted to 
authorities under the PATRIOT Act.50 Despite its non-fiction label, the text itself once 
again constitutes a rewriting and reimagining of the disempowered subject’s 
experiences by a privileged author who moulded those experiences into a provocative 
and compelling story of rights abuse in the United States. Zeitoun was well-received at 
first by critics, winning the Dayton Literary Peace Prize in 2010 and being praised 
overall for its ability to broach so many aspects of a complex issue such as Katrina and 
its aftermath through the approachable lens of a single man’s experiences. Since its 
initial reception, however, the novel has been embroiled in controversy following 
revelations that its protagonist is, in fact, not the idealized man the narrative makes 
him out to be. Following his release for suspected terrorist activities, Zeitoun was 
 
                                                     
49 See also Boxall’s point that the relationship between Eggers and Deng itself is the at the heart of the novel’s 
“critique of the political forces that govern Deng’s access to a public voice” (183). 
50 The PATRIOT Act was introduced in 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, by George W. Bush as a means of 
bolstering the U.S.’s ability to deal with terror threats. It was later extended by Barack Obama in 2011. Critics 
of the act have accused it of providing law enforcement agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and Federal Bureau of Inspection (FBI) with a carte blanche to pursue their enquiries, even if that means 
violating an individual’s rights. Particularly contentious – and relevant to Zeitoun’s story – is the provision 
that immigrants can be detained indefinitely.   
 130 
convicted for domestic violence and his wife, Kathy, took out a restraining order against 
him. The impact of these revelations on the reception of this personal narrative is 
strongly connected to the rights-space creating efforts of the text and the ideal of the 
unimpeachable witness testimony central to contemporary rights discourses.  
To understand these extra-textual implications fully, however, it is crucial to 
examine just how Zeitoun seeks to push for rights at a textual level. One crucial textual 
aspect of the text is its invocation through intertextual references of the longer history 
of the oppression of minorities in the United States, particularly the history of slavery. 
The development of the protagonist from ideal citizen to subhuman ‘terrorist’ – the 
guards alternatingly refer to him as “al Qaeda” (212) or “Taliban” (213) – is stressed in 
the narrative through its invocation of racial segregation and tensions in the deep 
South, where the events of the text take place. Chris Lloyd argues in “Dave Eggers’ 
Zeitoun and Katrina’s Southern Biopolitics” that the history of black oppression is 
regularly invoked in the second half of the story in connection with Zeitoun’s 
incarceration, forcing the reader to consider contemporary violations in relation to 
those that preceded them (163-164). For example, the temporary holding area where 
Zeitoun is held, a Greyhound bus stop, was built by inmates of the Lousiana State 
Penitentiary (Angola prison), which was itself built on a former slave plantation: 
“Angola, the country’s largest prison, was built on an eighteen-thousand-acre former 
plantation once used for the breeding of slaves” (310). Upon his incarceration, Zeitoun 
also notices a large 120 feet long mural depicting the history of Louisiana: 
The colors were nightmarish, the lines jagged, the images disturbing. He saw Ku 
Klux Klan hoods, skeletons, harlequins in garish colours, painted faces. Just above 
him there was a lion being attacked by a giant eagle made of gold. . . . There were 
many depictions of the suppression or elimination of peoples – Native Americans, 
slaves, immigrants – and always, nearby, was the artist’s idea of the instigators: 
wealthy aristocrats, . . . generals, . . . businessmen. (214) 
The powerful setting of this detention area thus yokes together images of minority 
rights being violated throughout United States history. In doing so, it creates a parallel 
between its protagonist and (former) slaves for readers to consider. The marked 
difference one notices is the reversal of the slave narrative’s pattern of slavery towards 
freedom. In a sense, the resonance and thwarted expectations created by the echoes of 
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slavery may signal a different politics of rights being pursued by Eggers, in which the 
push for civil rights in accordance with the precepts of the nation state are substituted 
for a push for human rights to protect against the nation state. At the same time, this 
resonance also embeds Zeitoun’s incarceration into a more fundamental problem faced 
by a nation continually failing to live up in reality to its theoretically proclaimed 
tolerance and equality. 
In this specific historical moment, Zeitoun’s fate in the text is typical of what Stephen 
Morton describes in States of Emergency as the general attitude towards Muslims in the 
post-9/11 context that allows their rights to be suspended on vague grounds relating to 
terrorism as a result of the creation of extra-legal categories such as that of the ‘enemy 
combatant’ (212). Zeitoun’s incarceration without proper procedures in a makeshift 
prison clearly exists outside of the regular legal system. Nevertheless, this 
contemporary categorization of Muslims as not-quite-human and therefore existing 
outside the remit of otherwise universal human rights strongly echoes the radical 
segregations of slaves as “property” whose lives were governed by rules pertaining to 
property rather than humanity. Morton further notes how there is a “mutually 
reinforcing relationship between cultural representations of Muslims” and the systemic 
violation of their rights (216). This type of neo-colonial cultural reinforcement of those 
whose rights are being denied or violated resonates strongly with the type of cultural 
justification of colonialism described by Said in Orientalism or indeed in the nineteenth-
century race theories and prejudices for which black authors such as Douglass, Jacobs or 
Du Bois sought to provide an antidote.51 
However, like What Is the What and unlike Douglass’s and Jacobs’s slave narratives, 
Zeitoun follows a transnational line when it comes to creating rights-space. It explicitly 
 
                                                     
51 By this, I mean theories of scientific racism such as those put forward in a North-American context by 
Samuel A. Cartwright, George Gliddon, Samuel George Morton, or Josiah C. Nott. Cartwright came up with the 
supposed mental illness of “drapetomania,” an illness that causes slaves to disobey their masters and run 
away. Gliddon and Morton variously defended theories that claimed to prove that white and black human 
beings were part of distinctive races, with the latter being inferior because, for instance, they had smaller 
skulls and were thus said to be intellectually weaker. Nott, another physical anthropologist, used these 
craniological theories to defend the black man’s status as a slave. 
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rejects the view that nation states can reliably function as the guarantors of rights. In 
this testimony, it is not so much that the nation state fails to grant rights as much as it is 
the nation state that violates them or fails to protect them. This is given particular 
rhetorical force in the narrative through its representation of Zeitoun as having already 
fulfilled all the criteria for U.S. citizenship. Before the storm, the narrative describes the 
protagonist and his wife, Kathy, as quintessential business-owning, self-reliant, family-
oriented, religious Americans. The narrator, focalising through Kathy, sums this up 
while contemplating the success of their construction company and family life:  
Kathy was one of nine children, and had grown up with very little . . . To see the 
two of them now, to stand back and assess what they’d built – a sprawling family, 
a business of distinct success, and to be woven so thoroughly into the fabric of 
their adopted city . . . – these were all blessings from God. (14) 
However, the narrative subsequently incorporates references to Zeitoun’s Islamic faith 
and his environment’s tendency to see his faith as disqualifying him from full 
acceptance into U.S. society. An early scene before the storm brings together the 
complex relationship between his faith, his place in U.S. society, and the post-9/11 
context that resonates throughout the book. Referring to clients who had refused their 
services in the past because they were Muslims, the narrator expresses Zeitoun’s 
thoughts as follows: “His frustration with some Americans was like that of a 
disappointed parent. He was so content in this country, so impressed with and loving of 
its opportunities, but then why, sometimes, did Americans fall short of their best selves” 
(37). The problem, as the narrator goes on to explain, lies in the fact that following the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11, Muslims became a persecuted minority in the United States 
(37). Zeitoun finds peace once he recites a passage from the Qur’an that praises the 
virtue of “equity” between all people (38). As A. G. Keeble writes in “Katrina Time: An 
Aggregation of Political Rhetoric in Zeitoun,” the narrative’s intertextual references to 
unobjectionable and peaceful sections of the Qur’an are central to Zeitoun’s heroic 
response to Hurricane Katrina. As a result, his arrest becomes part of a political critique 
of the society that arrests him and is presented as “emblematic” of the country’s 
“failure to live up to its melting pot national identity” (177-178). Like the slave 
narratives critiquing the United States for not living up to their promise of human 
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equality, Zeitoun similarly points to the nation’s failings in relation to its own mythology 
of multicultural tolerance.  
While the disempowered black authors of the nineteenth century still endorsed a 
readjustment at the national level, however, Zeitoun no longer places any faith in the 
nation state. In this narrative, the state participates in a systemic way in the violation of 
the protagonist’s rights following his arrest. This abandonment of the national rights-
context is possible as a result of there being, in this particular contemporary moment, a 
transnational rights framework with legal, political, and socio-cultural currency that, 
however weak, can be implicitly invoked to condemn his suffering at the hands of the 
state in the eyes of the reader. This rejection of the national level in favour of an 
engagement with the transnational discourse of human rights can be found, firstly, on a 
textual level. The way in which this personal narrative seeks to negotiate and contest 
rights-space for its protagonist can be derived from the use of various narrative 
strategies, the most important amongst which are its engaging with the genre of the 
Bildungsroman and its manipulation of narratological “time.” Both of these narrative 
strategies hinge on the interplay between the two different sections of the narrative in 
Zeitoun and have their greatest impact through their interference with the reader’s 
ability to identify with the protagonist.  
The link to the ever popular Bildungs-plot is acknowledged, for instance, in one of the 
more ecstatic literary critics quoted in the extensive paratext of reviews in the 2010 
Vintage edition, which originally appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times: “Zeitoun offers a 
transformative experience to anyone open to it . . . it is not heavy-handed propaganda, . 
. . but an adventure story, a tale of suffering and redemption” (n.p.). Incidentally, the 
ten pages of rave reviews in the paratext offer a contemporary example of the extent to 
which a disempowered other’s suffering needs to be primed for privileged readers, 
much like the prefaces that accompanied so many slave narratives. The enticingly 
adventurous part of the plot that echoes the traditional Bildungs-plot and that is 
referred to in this particular review lies primarily in the first half of the narrative. Here, 
the story elaborates quite extensively on Zeitoun’s experiences before and during the 
storm (before his arrest). In this pre-arrest section of the narrative, he is portrayed as a 
typically active hero within a quest-narrative that grants him immense agency. It is 
typical of the picaresque aspect of the Bildungs-genre in that it sets up a hero-
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protagonist, Zeitoun, who valiantly battles against Hurricane Katrina, rescues many 
people, and survives with his humanity intact. As the protagonist in this hero-section of 
the narrative, Zeitoun becomes a witness to the suffering of others. For example, before 
helping an old lady who is struggling in the aftermath of the storm, he muses: “It was 
not right to watch a woman of her age suffer like this. The situation had stolen her 
dignity, and it pained him to bear witness” (103). Drawing in the 9/11-context quite 
explicitly, Keeble goes so far as to note the similarity between the emergency services 
universally praised for their heroic response to the attacks on New York and Zeitoun’s 
makeshift efforts to rescue as many people from the greatest natural disaster to hit a 
major American city in recent memory (183). As such, the protagonist becomes aligned 
with exemplary citizenship.  
The second half radically breaks with the first and sees the previously heroic 
protagonist being robbed of his agency and human rights by U.S. officials acting under 
powers granted by the PATRIOT Act. What could not be denied to him by a natural 
disaster in the first half (he finds ways to eat, find safety, contact his family, move 
around freely), is thus cruelly taken from him by U.S. officials in the second. This break 
in narrative flow is marked by a radical shift from the heroic narrative to a Kafkaesque 
story in which the protagonist’s rights are systematically violated. His agency in the 
first part contrasts sharply with his being at the mercy of state-actors in the second. 
When he is arrested, he observes:  
He had not been processed in a traditional way . . . Therefore he was not 
technically a Hunt prisoner, and so was not bound by the institution’s standard 
operating procedure. . . . The . . . Center was renting space to warehouse these 
men, but otherwise made no claims to their welfare or rights. (234) 
The narrative transition is thus characterized by an extreme shift in agency, in which 
Zeitoun’s agency is entirely transferred to the bureaucratic machine which traps him 
after his ethnically motivated arrest and detention without charge. The inhuman 
conditions of the maximum security prison where he is kept lead him to compare 
himself to a caged animal: “He felt like an exotic beast, a hunter’s prize” (213) being “fed 
like animals, with balls of bread being thrown in for the strongest to grab” (251). The 
experience, he concludes, “diminished the humanity of them all” (236). As this 
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transition takes place, the reader’s identificatory relationship with the hero-protagonist 
is converted into shock and, because the U.S. government is the culprit, the reader is led 
to bemoan the violation of human rights differently. The interplay between the two 
halves of the narrative breaks the identificatory trend of the narrative in order to stress 
the discrepancy between incorporated citizens and disempowered subjects. In this 
personal narrative, the question is no longer one of the nation state needing to live up 
to its promise of protecting citizens such as Zeitoun, especially given that the United 
States in Zeitoun is presented as having systematically violated minority rights 
throughout its history. Instead, an open space is left for a more universal and 
transnational discourse of rights to be recognized that can guarantee universal rights in 
the face of discrimination and inequality.  
This guidance of the reader towards a transnational level is reinforced at the level of 
narrative time in the text. The first half ends with soldiers appearing at Zeitoun’s fall-
out base in New Orleans, leaving the reader with a cliff-hanger. The narrative then 
continues chronologically from the perspective of Zeitoun’s wife Kathy who desperately 
– but to no avail – tries to find out what happened to her husband. The narrative thus 
temporarily and noticeably silences the title character, keeping the reader in the dark. 
Finally, on 19 September (twelve days after Zeitoun’s narrative is left hanging), Kathy 
hears that he has been arrested and is being detained at a maximum security prison. At 
this stage, the narrative jumps back to 6 September and continues the story of Zeitoun. 
This temporal strategy has three major effects. First, it creates dramatic tension, 
because the reader already knows what is about to happen to the protagonist. Second, it 
focuses our attention on the “why” and “how” of the events rather than immersing the 
reader in the “what” of the protagonist’s life story. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, this narrative strategy has an impact on the level of the (implied) reader’s 
identification with the protagonist. The first part of the narrative encourages the reader 
to think of Zeitoun as a “model citizen,” and creates certain expectations about his 
future life; the second part encourages readers to take the perspective of his loving wife, 
Kathy, both inviting them to specify their expectations about Zeitoun’s fate and to 
deepen their emotional investment in his character; the final part then creates a jarring 
effect, where the expectations that were created by the previous parts are radically 
contradicted. This narrative strategy is critical to pushing the reader beyond the 
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national level in terms of rights-space creation. In other words, the first half sets 
Zeitoun up to become a hero of the nation such as the emergency servicemen and 
women who dealt with the aftermath of 9/11. The second half, by providing radical 
discontinuity in a narrative sense, shatters both the hero and the nation state he would 
serve. Instead, his story champions the values of universal human rights, recognized 
and set out at a transnational level, in the face of their violation by the nation state.  
The extra-textual fact that the protagonist was later revealed to be far less of the 
“perfect victim” that the book made him out to be speaks against this powerful 
condemnation of injustice and racial profiling at a textual level. An analysis of the 
rights-work performed by Zeitoun must take into account these damning revelations 
concerning its protagonist that shook the initial universal praise for the book. When 
Zeitoun was convicted for domestic violence, various media reflected the general shock 
felt by an audience that both trusted and admired Dave Eggers as an author and felt 
misled by his portrayal of Zeitoun in the narrative. On 9 December 2012, Salon.com 
published an article by Victoria Patterson titled “Did Eggers get ‘Zeitoun’ wrong?” 
which detailed the various domestic violence charges for which the protagonist had 
been convicted since Zeitoun was released and reflected on the impact this had on the 
reception of this personal narrative. It concludes by charging the narrative with 
oversimplifying its protagonist to serve the author’s activist purposes: 
Eggers’s Zeitoun serves Eggers’s story . . . Eggers’s Zeitoun is a heroic and selfless 
creation, kind and gentle, and his detainment by the authorities makes for a 
beautiful tale of injustice. But now a far more complex Zeitoun has walked off the 
page, without a political and moral agenda, borderless and uncontainable 
(Patterson). 
In the eyes of this commentator and the many readers whose outrage she is voicing, 
Zeitoun’s personal narrative of the gross injustice inflicted upon him in the wake of 
Katrina is disqualified from performing any substantial rights-work. This is largely 
because readers require a victim to display an unimpeachable innocence, to live up to 
the idea of the ideal citizen portrayed in the first half of the book. Anything more 
complicated challenges what Schaffer and Smith see as one of the mantras of the 
contemporary human rights discourse, that “storytellers in the context of rights 
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campaigns are expected to take up the subject position of ‘innocent’ victims; they are 
expected to be able to occupy that position unambiguously” (163). Slaughter makes a 
related point in this respect with regard to the relationship between the reader, the 
ideal reader, and the disempowered subject of what he calls “postcolonial 
Bildungsromane.” He writes that they make demands on the reader to recognize 
themselves in the implicated reader of these novels, “whose intentions may be 
humanitarian but whose reading practices make certain consumerist demands for 
generic conformity that influence the terms and conventions in which the world can be 
imagined and the observation and enjoyment of human rights realized” (Human Rights 
Inc. 326). The fate of Zeitoun following the real life downfall of its protagonist illustrates 
this problem quite clearly. Even if personal narratives have become a central tool of 
contemporary rights-work, the global rights discourse within which they circulate now 
places demands on them that restricts their complexity. 
This mutually enabling and disabling dynamic between rights frameworks, 
sympathetic readerships, and disempowered narrators constitutes another continuity in 
the history of the rights-work performed by personal narratives. Eggers’s Zeitoun is not 
the only collaborative work to suffer from the demands placed upon personal narratives 
by contemporary rights frameworks. What Is the What is similarly constricted, but avoids 
the compromising of its protagonist by complicating other characters while preserving 
the one-dimensional innocence of Valentino. The clearest example of this comes when 
Valentino’s flight across Central Africa leads him to spend time with the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army, which recruits children into its ranks. In “Human Rights, Child-Soldier 
Narratives, and the Problem of Form,” Maureen Moynagh makes an important point 
concerning the ambiguity of child soldier narratives, the protagonists of which cannot 
live up to the required level of innocence as a result of their being simultaneously 
victims and perpetrators of human rights violations. She concludes:  
There is, consequently, a marked tension between the human rights discourse 
that both frames the reception of child-soldier memoirs and memoir-style novels 
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and is invoked by them, and the necessarily compromised status of the child 
soldier that the narratives foreground. (42)52 
However, even if other characters in What Is the What become compromised in this way, 
Valentino is careful never to suggest that he was one of the child soldiers who served in 
the SPLA: “Of those boys with whom I walked, about half became soldiers eventually. 
And were they all willing? Only a few. . . . We were all used, in different ways. We were 
used for war, we were used to garner food and the sympathy of humanitarian-aid 
organizations” (47). The novel makes it clear to the reader that Valentino’s narrative 
was used for the latter and is not an example of the former. It is thereby saved from 
suffering the same fate as Zeitoun, but only by eliding the complexity of its protagonist 
so as to serve the strong demand for generic conformity and unimpeachable innocence 
placed upon the personal narrative in the contemporary rights context.  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, it is clear that there are numerous similarities in “deep time” between 
the ways in which personal narratives are used by disempowered subjects such as 
Douglass, Jacobs, Washington, Du Bois, Deng, and Zeitoun in wildly different rights-
contexts. Continuities of practice include the careful use of genre conventions and 
narrative strategies to push the reader into imagining rights-spaces for the protagonist 
 
                                                     
52 Though it falls outside the scope of this dissertation,  it is worth noting more broadly that the child occupies 
an ambiguous position with regard to human rights. As Jacqueline Bhabha notes in “The Child – What Sort of 
Human?,” children “are included in the broad scope of protection but peripheral to the framing conception of 
agency” (1526). She illustrates this by scrutinizing the wording of the UDHR, which, in its first article, suggests 
that all human beings are endowed with reason and conscience, thereby suggesting a level of maturity that 
cannot be expected of a child (1526). Her argument centres on the point that “[t]here is a tension between 
recognizing the child’s distinctiveness as an agent and according him or her the same rights as adults” (1526). 
It is precisely this notion of agency that is given an additional layer of complication when it comes to the issue 
of child soldiers. 
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to inhabit that push the socio-cultural, political, and legal boundaries of existing rights 
frameworks. In Jacobs’s case, this meant pushing the limits of propriety to show the 
particular suffering endured by female slaves as well as pointing out the flaws of seeing 
the North as a safe haven for former slaves. Similarly, What Is the What breaks down the 
idea of a rights-violating global South versus a rights-protecting United States by 
testifying to his suffering in both places. As I argued, this pushes the novel’s rights-
claim into the transnational sphere of human rights, even as it simultaneously testifies 
to the weakness of that framework. In undertaking such meticulous narrative work, 
these disempowered subjects often lay bare and contest the demands placed upon them 
by existing rights discourses to articulate their rights-claims in a certain way. For 
Douglass, this manifests itself in his rejection of the illustrative role carved out for his 
Narrative by abolitionists, choosing instead to assert his humanity and authority in a 
way that not only made a claim for freedom, but also made a claim for U.S. citizenship. 
By inverting the hierarchical conventions of the slave narrative in its preface, What Is 
the What similarly tries to transfer control of the personal narrative to Deng in a 
narrative and financial sense. Finally, throughout this historical comparison, it is clear 
that the narrator’s efforts are continually marred by the way in which their testimony 
has to be mediated through a privileged author who is able to sell their stories 
effectively on the white marketplace. 
These personal narratives are further characterized by their engagement with the 
interconnection of citizenship and rights, the incorporative premise of which is 
illustrated by Slaughter’s study of the Bildungsroman in relation to the rise of human 
rights. Washington’s Up From Slavery places great faith in the ability of his narrative to 
narrate incorporation into the nation state. It is a plea to its white readership to grant 
black people limited economic integration and an appeal to his race to take up this 
diminished offer of partial citizenship. In Zeitoun’s case, the protagonist disentangles 
citizenship from rights by illustrating the way in which racial profiling and prejudice 
can cause even the most ideal citizen’s rights to be suspended. The perpetuation of such 
racialized thinking was the core of Du Bois’s rights-space creating efforts in that he saw 
the challenging of such thinking as a prerequisite to the acquisition of rights by 
disempowered subjects in a society that shut them out as a result of racial bias. The 
necessity of breaking down racial prejudice was also central to Douglass’s later thinking, 
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who realized post-Emancipation that if his race was denied a voice in shaping the public 
discourse on rights, it would continue to be determined by it. Indeed, What Is the What 
shows a marked awareness of the restrictions placed on disempowered narrators in the 
present day in its negotiation of the child soldier issue. Zeitoun, on the other hand, 
illustrates the way in which complexity can re-silence those who narrate wrongs. 
The historical specificity of the current rights-moment perhaps also provides the 
greatest difference between the rights-work performed by these various narratives. 
Douglass, Jacobs, Washington, and Du Bois exploited the narrative freedom of their 
personal narratives to re-write the terms of American citizenship and rights, but were 
also led to craft those narratives according to the demands placed upon them by the 
shifting legal, political, and socio-cultural status and voice available to them in 
nineteenth-century America. For Douglass and Jacobs, this meant dealing with an 
abolitionist discourse that focused on their freedom more than their achieving of racial 
equality. In the case Washington and Du Bois, the issue at hand was how to achieve the 
latter in the face of continued racial segregation. Zeitoun and What Is the What are equally 
bound by certain constraints as to how humanity and rights violations can be 
articulated and heard, perhaps even more strongly so as they circulate their stories in a 
global public sphere within which transnational human rights discourses have risen to 
prominence. As a result, the narrative strategies at work in Eggers’s collaborative 
narratives typically work less towards fixing the national rights context. Instead, they 
lay bare the tension between nation states unwilling to guarantee rights or even 
actively participating in rights violations, on the one hand, and transnational rights 
frameworks unable to defend in practice the universal rights they theorize on the other.  
In this sense, they too accuse the dominant rights framework of their time of not 
living up to its promise of fundamental equality and freedom, even if that framework is 
no longer – as it was in the nineteenth century – a national one. However, even as 
Eggers’s narrative partners are freer to appeal to a more elaborate and more established 
transnational rights framework that transcends their suffering at the hands of the 
nation state, they are now even more strongly produced by certain preconceptions that 
govern the construction of the “human” that is entitled to human rights. Perhaps even 
more so than Douglass or Jacobs, Deng’s and Zeitoun’s position as narrator is 
tremendously precarious as any challenge to their status as representative 
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disempowered subject can disqualify their personal narratives from completing the 
careful rights-space creating work they perform. It is noteworthy, for example, that 
Jacobs was able to narrate fundamental wrongs from her position as a morally flawed 
narrator, whereas Zeitoun can no longer take up such a complex subject position 
without his rights-space creating efforts being fundamentally undermined in the eyes of 
his privileged audience. In conclusion, it is clear that the ongoing contestation and 
negotiation of rights, as revealed through the intertextual links between these personal 
narratives across historical periods, adds crucial complexity to progressive histories of 
rights centred on declarations. To this extent, it is equally important to bear the 
historical development of rights-claiming practices in mind if one is to understand the 
various ways in which Eggers’s narratives are produced by existing rights discourses 
even as they try to redraw them so as to make space for their disempowered subjects. 
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 3 Filling Rights-Spaces: Beyond Identification in 
Human Rights Culture 
I have argued that Eggers’s collaborative testimonial works are emblematic of the ways 
in which personal narratives have engaged and shaped as well as reflected and 
challenged the rights discourses of their particular historical context. In this respect, 
Eggers’s narratives have the same function, if not the same objective and effect, as the 
texts by disempowered black authors such as Douglass, Jacobs, Washington, and Du Bois. 
The use of this diverse and malleable narrative form as a means of creating rights-space 
for disempowered subjects connects these texts across disparate moments in the history 
of rights, including the modern human rights moment. In this chapter, I take a closer 
look at those personal narratives written or published with the help of Eggers, and 
investigate how they seek to fill the rights-spaces they create in the contemporary 
rights context. Specifically, this chapter deals with two separate testimonies written by 
Eggers in conjunction with two disempowered subjects, What Is the What: The 
Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng and Zeitoun, as well as two edited oral history 
collections published as part of the Voice of Witness series that Eggers helped to found, 
namely Voices from the Storm: The People of New Orleans on Hurricane Katrina and Its 
Aftermath and Out of Exile: Narratives from the Abducted and Displaced People of Sudan. As is 
the case with many human rights narratives, the explicit goal of these texts is to 
educate readers about human rights crises, narrate the humanity and suffering of their 
protagonists, and, by extension, convince readers to include them in the circle of people 
whose rights deserve recognition and protection. This distinguishes these texts from 
the donor-victim dynamic that pervades humanitarian encounters between privileged 
audiences and disempowered subjects. As Brown and Wilson explain in Humanitarianism 
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and Suffering, human rights culture relies on the assertiveness of victims of abuse to 
claim rights as well as the privileged’s commitment to acting in support of their cause 
(8). As such, it differs from humanitarian assistance, where those being helped “are 
more likely to appear as passive recipients” disconnected from the political reasons for 
their victimization (8). The process in this aspect of human rights culture, in theory at 
least, is an active one.  
In each of these personal narratives, the protagonist’s humanity and suffering are 
shown from the perspective of a victim-protagonist, and it is this act of collaborative 
witnessing that offers victims the opportunity to claim rights. As Eakin writes in 
“Breaking Rules: The Consequences of Self-Narration,” the autobiographical act in 
North-American culture is seen as a “natural extension of the right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness” (113). In the case of personal narratives, this autobiographical 
act channels its rights claim through its efforts to educate and persuade the reader. In 
other words, the disempowered subject presents him- or herself as a human subject 
demanding recognition, and that demand is first and foremost made on the reader. 
Witness narratives in particular, as Smith and Watson explain in “Witness or False 
Witness?: Metrics of Authenticity, Collective I-Formations, and the Ethic of Verification 
in First-Person Testimony,” “educate and bind readers” in that they convince readers 
that “a narrative is joined to an embodied person” and “that the reading experience 
constitutes a cross-cultural encounter through which readers are positioned as ethical 
subjects within the global imaginary of human rights advocacy” (590). Identification, I 
show, is one of the accepted understandings of how readers engage with protagonists in 
such texts as a means of achieving those goals, a practice that is further encouraged by a 
rights discourse that emphasizes universal human equality and, therefore, in a textual 
context, relatability. This chapter aims to complicate this understanding of the reader’s 
interpretative framework as being too reliant on straightforward identificatory 
practices. 
The first half of this chapter considers why the four texts under discussion are both 
typical and peculiar when it comes to personal narratives testifying to rights abuses. In 
doing so, it deconstructs the “progressive” genre of the personal narrative, submitting it 
to a trial by analysis to determine its effectiveness as well as to weigh its productive 
against its counterproductive features. Mark Antaki has observed that interdisciplinary 
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studies into law and literature such as Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights tend to overstate 
the efficacy of testimony. In its adherence to “the romantic fantasy” of literature as a 
morally transformative force, he points out, Hunt’s work tends to promote “so-called 
progressive genres that allow for criticism of existing social structures—but without 
subjecting these progressive genres themselves to critique” (976). On the one hand, 
Eggers’s testimonial work is typical of a human rights culture that expects victims to 
narrate their traumatic experiences in a way that aligns their subjectivity with the 
“human” in human rights. They are also characterized by a tendency to solicit their 
readers for empathy through identification so that those readers may recognize the 
injustice that befell the narrator and become advocates on the testifying subject’s 
behalf. On the other hand, they are atypical as trauma narratives because of a formal 
style that does not, as classical trauma theory posits, reflect the victim’s crippling 
trauma through narrative distortion, but instead leads the reader toward 
comprehending the victim’s experiences through a coherent narrative. They are 
additionally unconventional in that they only partially adhere to the dominant 
identificatory paradigm, offering variations on it that, I argue, address the risk of 
obfuscating global inequality within a universalist discourse based on fundamental 
sameness. This risk, which results from overidentification on the part of the reader fed 
by a feeling of universal sameness, is defined by Nance in Can Literature Promote Justice? 
as “fusion,” a process by which the reader moves “out of the addressee role to share the 
subject position” and thereby sheds the ethical commitment to recognize injustice and 
to take action against it (53).1 How Eggers’s narratives engage with this risk, finally, will 
be considered critical to the way in which they seek to steer the reader’s cross-cultural 
 
                                                     
1 Fusion is part of a series of unproductive reader engagements with a text, according to Nance, all of which 
shut down the narrative’s ability to move the reader to action. The others are the process by which the reader 
passes responsibility to act on to someone else (“Forwarding”), the evasion of responsibility (“Abjection”), and 
passive engagement with the text so as to remain beyond its “field of address” (53). Fusion is especially 
relevant here as it deals with the commonplace notion that readers engage with literature, particularly 
personal narratives, through identification. The issue at hand, as Nance points out, is that this unhelpful type 
of identification “is accomplished through a multiplicity of uncritical identifications” (54, my emphasis). 
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conceptualization of human rights culture as well as the reader’s engagement with the 
victim-subject within that culture. 
With this in mind, the second half of this chapter uses the chosen case studies to 
consider how these narratives cultivate differing forms of engagement between their 
disenfranchised subjects and their (mostly Western) readership. What Is the What 
carefully guides the reader into a form of guarded empathy that allows them to inhabit 
the trauma of its protagonist without appropriating it. Abandoning similarity altogether 
as it progresses, Zeitoun radically emphasizes disidentification between its subject and 
its readers, thus explicitly breaking the simplistic identification that it cultivates at the 
start in order to create a narrative shock effect. The Voice of Witness oral history 
collections, finally, find a middle ground by stimulating a diffuse identification with 
different victims of a single rights abuse or crisis, rendering the crisis itself accessible to 
readers without universalizing the multifarious experiences of it for the reader. In 
addition to this, these works also betray an explicit attempt to call into question the 
privileged position of the West as a stable and uncomplicated guardian and proponent 
of rights. This destabilizing move is important in so far as it breaks down existing 
hierarchies between privileged readers and disenfranchised others and thereby affects 
the reader’s position within the rights conversation in which the narratives ask them to 
participate. Overall, the chapter shows how Eggers’s testimonial work is both shaped by 
the narrative directives of human rights culture and reshapes its discourse of universal 
sameness as a means of engaging the disempowered other on fairer and more equal 
terms.  
Finally, however, I also examine whether Eggers’s role in the ventriloquism of the 
subaltern disconnects the testimonial subject’s narrative from its socio-historical 
context by reframing it for a Western audience. This examination asks whether these 
narratives, in their specific attempts at addressing a Western audience in a more 
productive way, actually relocate the victim’s voice and experiences within the 
boundaries of a Western human rights culture. Part of the reason for this lies in the fact 
that the narratives take the important step of carefully managing the reader’s 
engagement with the discursive space within it, but struggle to address fundamentally 
the rights culture within which they circulate. Even though they ask for more than 
simplistic identification—and, in doing so, address and productively reshape part of the 
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existing rights culture in which they are embedded and which the reader brings to bear 
on the text—these narratives also reinforce the idea that the socio-cultural environment 
in which abuses occur still exists beyond the purview of the narrative’s rights culture. 
Optimistically speaking, they thus aspire to reform the reading culture directly in the 
hopes of also affecting the broader rights culture, a process to which I will return in the 
next chapter. The danger is, however, that for all their narrative efforts in forcing a 
Western audience to engage their victim-subjects on more equal terms, these texts fail 
to embed those subjects and the different cultures from which they emerged into an 
expanded rights discourse. First, however, it is crucial to unpick the first part of that 
process, that of structuring the reader’s engagement with the text. 
3.1 Trauma Narratives as Human Rights Narratives 
Before I set out a methodology for analysing the type of dynamic Eggers’s testimonial 
work cultivates between disempowered subject-narrators, editor-authors, and reader-
activists, it is worth briefly examining how Eggers understands the function of these 
texts himself. This not only provides a window into the relationship between Eggers and 
the people whose story he wishes to present, but it also helps one understand how and 
why those stories were crafted so as to meet and adjust audience expectations.2 Overall, 
the author seems acutely aware of the careful balance that he must strike between the 
demands of a Western literary marketplace and audience for respectively saleable and 
entertaining books, and the need for the text to be a faithful representation of the 
testifying subject’s voice, person, and experiences. In What Is the What, Eggers grants 
Deng space in the preface to explain to readers why the former’s intervention was 
 
                                                     
2 By this, I do not mean to subject the four texts under discussion to an analysis that seeks to ascertain the 
author’s intention through textual analysis, thereby falling prey to the so-called “intentional fallacy” 
disavowed by literary criticism. Instead, I want to suggest that it is important to understand Eggers’s explicit 
role as an activist in addition to his role as an author in shaping these texts. This is additionally relevant 
because it impacts on the way the text is framed for the reader. 
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required as a means of streamlining the narrative. Deng also explains that they should 
not feel uncomfortable about Eggers having fictionalized part of his experiences to such 
an extent so as to require the entire book to be classed as fiction (What Is the What 2008 
xiv). This intervention by Deng before the narrative proper even begins assuages fears 
on the part of the reader that the novel’s entertaining pace and plot, hallmarks of 
fictional narratives, take away from its capacity to provide an accurate window into the 
real lived experiences of its disempowered subject. By putting his heart-wrenching 
story in the hands of a skilful storyteller with considerable clout in the Western book 
market, the disempowered subject is thus able to go about deploying their personal 
experience as a rights-claiming tool.  
The author is clearly aware of his role in this respect, quite happy to be a facilitator if 
it helps obtain recognition for those whose suffering exists beyond the purview of 
Western audiences. Eggers’s involvement in founding the oral history project Voice of 
Witness provides additional illustration of this point. In an interview with Stef Craps 
and myself on the occasion of Eggers being awarded the 2015 Amnesty International 
Chair at Ghent University, the author commented on what he sees as the power of 
personal narratives to illuminate rights issues and violations. Speaking directly to Voice 
of Witness’s aim of amplifying unheard voices so as to foster “empathy-based 
understanding of contemporary human rights crises” (“About”), he explained his belief 
that “you almost always have a better understanding of a situation through a first-
person narrative—seeing what one person says and then seeing a broader view of it” 
(qtd. in Bex and Craps 562). In order for a testimony to achieve this, he goes on to say, it 
needs to be transformed into a legible and engaging story that maintains the illusion of 
direct contact between the reader and the disempowered subject by replicating as 
faithfully as possible the latter’s speech (562). He notes that readers of the series rely on 
editors turning oral testimonies into “a compelling linear narrative with the narrator’s 
original words and phrasings and idiosyncrasies of speech” because they “will not read a 
seventy-page transcript” unless it is edited (qtd. in Bex and Craps 563). Part of the 
reason for this mimicking of the victim’s speech is no doubt that it stimulates the 
illusion of direct contact between the reader and the testimonial subject, which is of 
paramount importance for an author who sees identification and vicarious experience 
as one of the unique characteristics of a narrative text. In an unpublished section of the 
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interview, Eggers elaborates on this particular aspect of literature, noting that 
compelling and well-crafted stories “allow you to live a different life, another life, and 
have an immersive experience that opens up a world that otherwise we would not have 
access to” (“An Afternoon with Dave Eggers”). The latter part of this observation 
expresses Eggers’s faith in the ability for personal narratives to bridge the cross-cultural 
gap between privileged readers and unacknowledged or obfuscated experiences of 
human rights abuses across the globe.  
This chapter focuses specifically on the way texts construct that cross-cultural 
relationship between the disempowered victim-narrator and the privileged Western 
reader. In doing so, it draws attention to a methodological rift between the way in 
which the narrativization of traumatic experiences is considered by humanities scholars 
working in the fields of trauma studies, postcolonial studies, and human rights. Trauma 
studies tends to examine the relationship between victim and reader only in so far as it 
is expressed in a body of trauma narratives whose style and structure are inflected by 
the multidimensional psychological trauma of its rights-bearing narrator. Postcolonial 
studies and research into human rights, in contrast, typically consider how the 
compelling and coherent personal narratives of disempowered subjects are codified 
according to the precepts of human rights discourses, and the way they are bound by 
the strictures of simplifying neo-colonial conceptions of the postcolonial Other’s 
subjectivity. Each of these modes of study offers valuable insights into the opportunities 
and problems posed to readers by personal narratives testifying to the mental and 
physical violence endured by their narrators or testimonial subjects. Trauma studies is 
useful in that it pays particular attention to the ways in which individual memories of 
past violence transition into narrative and are received by an audience. This body of 
research is complemented by the work of postcolonial studies and human rights 
scholars, who study how these articulations of past experiences relate to existing legal-
political frameworks of individual rights and how the reception of these testimonies 
relates to global flows of power in the aftermath of decolonization. This does not mean, 
however, that these three fields are perfectly compatible. In order for these approaches 
to be brought to bear on Eggers’s collaborative works with concomitant productivity, it 
is important to disentangle their respective strengths from their incongruous basis. 
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Broadly speaking, trauma studies has sought to understand the way in which trauma 
is experienced and articulated by individuals as well as how it is received by others. The 
field’s understanding of trauma was largely shaped by the work of theorists such as 
Cathy Caruth, whose foundational study Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and 
History (1996) constructed the dominant conception of the trauma narrative, and 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, whose Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History (1992) provided the field’s primary conceptualization of the 
relationship between traumatic testimony and the reader.3 In her work, Caruth saw the 
initial shock of traumatic events as making them almost unspeakable, except through 
those distorted narrative modes of fiction that allow victims in effect to mimic their 
psychological suffering by stylistically disfiguring the text. As a reflection of the 
experienced trauma, Laub and Felman sought to understand the relationship between 
the testimonial subject and the addressee as one in which the initial trauma is recreated 
second hand for the latter through narrative. The primary function of a trauma 
narrative, therefore, is its ability to confer the traumatic experience onto the reader. 
Avishai Margalit says as much in The Ethics of Memory (2004) when he explains that the 
“paradigmatic case of a moral witness is one who experiences the suffering – one who is 
not just an observer but also a sufferer” (150). Focusing on the implications of this 
necessarily transferential nature of the speaker-addressee dynamic in trauma 
narratives, Dominick LaCapra theorized a productive way in which this relationship 
 
                                                     
3 The main impetus for studying testimonial narratives was the Holocaust testimony movement. Felman and 
Laub’s work takes a psychoanalytical perspective in studying the process of witnessing in reading and writing 
Holocaust testimony. Lawrence Langer’s Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory focuses on how testimonies 
mediate the way in which history remembers and understands the Holocaust. LaCapra’s seminal work on 
empathic unsettlement, upon which this analysis draws, largely grew out of this sustained attention to 
Holocaust testimony begun in the 1980s. Additionally, in The Holocaust and the Postmodern, Robert Eaglestone 
points out that postmodern literature’s tendency to stress the “limits and processes of rationality” (3) through 
formal and stylistic experiments interweaves with the ethical impossibility of straightforwardly representing 
the horror of the Holocaust and disrupts the “process of identification” (43). While the – by his own admission 
non-exhaustive – taxonomy of postmodern tropes he analyses convincingly makes that point, the particular 
narrative devices I discuss here in Eggers’s oeuvre are neither specifically postmodern nor do they fall into the 
categories set out by Eaglestone. 
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should unfold. In Writing History, Writing Trauma (2001), he defines this ideal relationship, 
characterized by what he calls “empathic unsettlement,” as one in which the reader is 
able to identify with the victim’s trauma without appropriating it (78).4 When 
testimonial narratives are read in this way, as cultivating a form of guarded empathy, 
they contribute to the reader’s understanding by associating the lived experience of 
victims with more abstracted notions of human suffering (xiv). The basic tenets of 
trauma theory thus emphasize the disruptive experience of trauma, its similarly 
distorted narrativization, and the ways one can engage with it (un)productively as a 
secondary witness. 
Trauma scholars have since come under fire for their strong focus on literature that 
adheres to a more modernist, experimental, or distorted aesthetic, which forms an ideal 
textual playground in which the victim’s trauma and scholars’ theories could be played 
out in all their complexity.5 LaCapra writes that “many commentators would agree with 
Caruth in thinking that the literary (or even art in general) is a prime, if not privileged, 
place for giving voice to trauma as well as symbolically exploring the role of excess” 
 
                                                     
4 LaCapra operates under many of the same assumptions as Caruth or Laub and Felman in his study of trauma. 
Like the former, he believes that the unsettled experience of the victim’s testimony in a text should be 
reflected by “stylistic effects” that defy codification (41). In accordance with the latter, he acknowledges the 
“implication of the observer in the observed” (36). Indeed, this mirroring effect forms one of the starting 
points for his definition of a productive form of empathy that eschews “unproblematic identification” while 
still allowing for a deeper engagement with testimony that transcends the merely factual (38). This is not to 
conflate the positions of LaCapra and Caruth, the former criticizes the latter in History and Memory after 
Auschwitz for her emphasis on “acting out” rather than a productive working-through of trauma. 
5 By this, I mean those things Anne Whitehead puts forward as the object of study in her book Trauma Fiction, 
where she explores how the rise of trauma theory has provided novelists with the incentive to turn their 
attention away from “what is remembered” to “how and why it is remembered” (3). Novelists, she writes, 
further inspired by insights from trauma theory, “have found that the impact of trauma can only adequately 
be represented by mimicking its forms and symptoms, so that temporality and chronology collapse, and 
narratives are characterized by repetition and indirection” (3). In order to study this phenomenon further she 
looks at novels by, for instance, Toni Morrison (Jazz), Pat Barker (Another World), W. G. Sebald (The Emigrants), 
and Caryl Phillips (The Nature of Blood). These novels are exemplary of the typical trauma canon, being marked 
by one or more disorienting stylistic and thematic features such as multiple intersecting plots, muddled 
chronologies, or non-linear narrative progressions. 
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(190). This has led to a self-perpetuating dynamic between trauma scholars asserting the 
inability for victims to articulate trauma and authors of trauma narratives seeking to 
replicate this theory in their writing through the use of stylistic distortion and 
experimental modes of writing. Alan Gibbs puts forward this critique in Contemporary 
American Trauma Narratives, adding that this prevents victims from verbalizing the 
details of their experiences in favour of creating texts that simply reflect the fact that 
they are traumatized: “A broad injunction exists in cultural trauma theory, discouraging 
writers from attempting to represent trauma. Instead, the approved ethical-aesthetic 
approach is to aim to transmit the trauma to the reader” (27). In an important diversion 
from the dominant approach, Roger Luckhurst’s The Trauma Question (2008) seeks to 
address this problem by broadening the scope of trauma research to incorporate 
examples from popular culture that are not necessarily reflective of the trauma 
aesthetic defined by canonical trauma theory. Another important pushback against the 
typical trauma aesthetic comes from Stef Craps, who argues in Postcolonial Witnessing 
(2013) that the narrow corpus of experimental texts prescribed by traditional trauma 
theorists risks blinding researchers to the multifarious ways in which the subaltern 
voices their experiences of trauma, violence, and abuse (38-41). The solution, according 
to Craps, is for trauma theory to “take account of the specific social and historical 
contexts in which trauma narratives are produced and received, and be open and 
attentive to the diverse strategies of representation and resistance which these contexts 
invite or necessitate” (43). This suggests that the issue may not be that trauma can only 
find an outlet in literary texts able to deploy stylistic features that reflect the 
experience of trauma, but simply that Caruthian trauma theory has maintained too 
narrow a definition and is, therefore, focusing on a restricted set of texts that confirm 
that definition.  
Richard J. McNally suggests as much in Remembering Trauma (2003) when, going 
against Caruth’s assertion that trauma is repressed and therefore cannot be articulated 
coherently, he writes that “emotional stress does not prevent encoding and memory for 
the central, important aspects of experience” (50). In “Speak, Trauma,” Joshua Pederson 
takes this to mean that when a victim does not speak about their traumatic experiences, 
it may be because they are unwilling rather than unable to do so(338). As such, he 
suggests, trauma theory should study how texts “warp” trauma, rather than focus on 
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the lacunae in texts where a supposedly unspeakable trauma is manifest (340). This not 
only refutes one of the central ideas in classical trauma theory, but also contradicts the 
understanding, expressed by James Dawes in The Language of War, that extreme violence 
is anathema to language and “imposes silence upon groups and, through trauma and 
injury, disables the capacity of the individual to speak effectively” (2). If that were 
indeed the case, how is it that organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International manage to fill thousands of pages with disempowered people’s testimonies 
of their experiences of all manner of human rights violations, however gruesome and 
traumatic, that are perpetrated in the world today? McNally’s correction of the 
assumption that victims are unable to articulate their suffering thus raises an intriguing 
epistemological question. If (traumatized) victims of human rights violations articulate 
their experiences so prodigiously, why then do their voices not find their way into the 
works of trauma scholars? This question gains particular importance when one 
considers trauma theory’s contribution to understanding the myriad ways in which the 
testimonial subject seeks to narrate wrongs and how audiences engage with that speech. 
Indeed, trauma scholars such as LaCapra provide a useful theoretical basis for thinking 
through the ethics of the transferential relationship between victim-narrators and 
readers, a pre-requisite for engaging the disempowered subject on egalitarian terms 
that would allow them equal access to the discourse of human rights.  
Not only do victims of abuse make use of various new channels that are available to 
them in the era of human rights, they also codify their experiences according to the 
human rights culture within which their testimonies will circulate and be read. Schaffer 
and Smith specifically argue that collections of personal narratives tend to format the 
particular experiences of rights violations according to “standardized structures and 
thematics of presentation” (47). These standardized and thematized texts are severely 
different from the stylistically distorted narratives solicited and studied by classical 
trauma theorists. They are characterized by self-assertiveness and narrative clarity on 
the part of the narrator as a means of claiming recognition for rights violations and 
articulating membership of a global rights community. The problem with narrative 
requests for access to such a global rights community, as Schaffer and Smith go on to 
explain, is that “empathetic identification” between rights-bearers and disempowered 
subjects may come with “the potential cost of reducing difference to sameness” (47). 
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The key difficulty that arises from a discourse based on universal sameness such as 
human rights is that it may end up covering over the glaring inequalities that derive 
from hierarchical power relations between the West and others instead of illuminating 
and eroding them. The storytelling imperative of human rights culture, as Jennifer 
Rickel explains, is for individuals to narrate themselves as “fully developed human 
persons” who can lay claim to membership of a narrative of universal humanism (160). 
In other words, the aim is for the testimonial subject to be constituted as a complex and 
particular human being, not a carbon copy of the reader’s abstract humanity. The 
central problem for these non-conventional trauma texts, that is straightforward linear 
narratives, is thus not their inability to articulate trauma, but the capacity of such 
narratives to capture the attention and empathy of rights-bearers as well as unsettle the 
dynamics of power that silence those oppressed by those dynamics.  
An additional complication is that once a rights-bearing audience is found, it is often 
allowed to assuage its newfound cross-cultural empathy through simple charity rather 
than forced to question the reason abuses are perpetrated, perpetuated, and obfuscated. 
In States of Denial (2001), Stanley Cohen clearly distinguishes three forms of engagement 
with the subject of suffering in a text: sympathy, empathy, and identification. He 
explains that “sympathy means feeling sorry for victims; empathy means feeling what 
their suffering must be like to them; identification means imagining yourself in their 
position” (216). The danger, on the basis of these definitions, is that empathic and 
identificatory engagement with an individual’s particular experiences is all too easily 
transformed into hierarchy-reinforcing sympathy for a disempowered collective that 
readily confirms rather than challenges existing neo-colonial power relations. The next 
chapter will deal with the particular countervailing discourses that feed this unhelpful 
dynamic and close down the rights-spaces that personal narratives seek to create. At 
this point, however, it is already worth noting the potential danger involved in human-
rights advocates representing others in a way that shows them as a deprived collective 
whose suffering and humanity is universalized so as to make them deserving of charity, 
but whose individual experiences are thereby rendered irrelevant. As I already noted, 
the resulting sympathy reinforces a charitable hierarchy between the privileged West 
and a reductively blurred group of impoverished others rather than promoting 
horizontal cross-cultural connections based on the human-rights-related idea of human 
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equality. It is critical to maintain an awareness of how easily these different forms of 
engagement, clearly distinguished by Cohen, slip into each other. As this chapter shows, 
there is a significant slippage between all of these terms, both textually and historically. 
The complex history of terms such as empathy, sympathy, and identification goes 
some way to illuminating why they are so easily confused. Sympathy, as defined by 
Adam Smith in his eighteenth-century The Theory of Moral Sentiments, closely resembles 
Cohen’s contemporary understanding of empathy and takes place, Smith posits, 
according to a process of identification. Smith’s discussion of how we engage with the 
pain of others at the start of his eighteenth-century text is emblematic of the extent to 
which the three terms defined by Cohen are conceptually more muddled than his 
definitions suggest. In a section titled “Of Sympathy,” Smith writes that “we often 
derive sorrow from the sorrow of others” and that, “[a]s we have no immediate 
experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are 
affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (13). 
Using the example of a man being tortured on the rack, Smith admits that our empirical 
senses alone cannot “inform us of what he suffers” (13). However, the use of our 
imagination allows us to “place ourselves in his situation” (13) and thereby feel in some 
weaker sense “some degree of the same emotion” (14). In effect, Smith’s discussion of 
sympathy explains that, to render it in Cohen’s definitions, sympathy causes empathy 
through identification. To make matters worse, Smith goes on to define sympathy as 
denoting “our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever,” a type of engagement Cohen 
reserves for empathy. In “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth Century 
Sympathy and Humanitarianism,” Norman S. Fiering explains that the imaginative 
switching of positions in Smith’s discussion of sympathy guarantees its altruism in that 
it leads to one understanding the pain of another rather than simply projecting that 
pain onto oneself (210-11). In this sense, the historical notion of sympathy and modern 
understandings of empathy espoused by, for instance, LaCapra, become even more 
blurred. This is not to suggest that these concepts are to be abandoned altogether. 
Instead, I propose to use Cohen’s clear definitions as a starting point to examine those 
parts of a text’s interpretation where they are problematized and blurred. 
LaCapra’s empathic unsettlement is meant precisely to safeguard against 
straightforward overidentification to the extent where one becomes a surrogate victim, 
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proposing instead that one should empathize in such a way that understanding takes 
place without a blurring of the subject positions of victim and witness. LaCapra himself 
becomes entangled in the conceptual chaos I propose to investigate as he insists that his 
notion of empathic unsettlement is to be kept separate from “unproblematic 
identification” and “patronizing sympathy” (38). Even though I agree with LaCapra that 
these are to be avoided, precisely because of the unproductive engagement with the 
disempowered subject they cultivate, my analysis of Eggers’s testimonial works shows 
that various forms of identification, empathy, and sympathy can and do coexist within 
the same text. I believe, therefore, that the answer to this conceptual conundrum is not 
to make the analytical case for an empathically unsettled reading, but to apply the type 
of interpersonal awareness displayed by LaCapra to the discursive space of the text as a 
whole in order to uncover the different dynamics of recognition that it conjures up. The 
answer to this conceptual confusion is thus not to stake out clear-cut definitions for 
each of these dynamics, but to incorporate a meticulous awareness of their slippage – 
and the implications of such slippages – into the analysis of how personal narratives 
engage the reader. The subtle empathically unsettled connection with the true victim 
contemplated by LaCapra provides one suggestion as to what an ethical relationship 
with the subaltern may entail. Even if the corpus for classical trauma theory is entirely 
different from the personal narratives that dominate human rights culture, the type of 
sustained attention trauma theory provides to the intricate textual dynamics that foster 
egalitarian relationships between victims and addressees can thus be crucial to 
disentangling the productive and counterproductive interpersonal aspects of personal 
narratives’ engagement with human rights discourse. 
This textual awareness contributes to and should be integrated with the broader 
social, cultural, and political dynamic between the subaltern and the privileged as it is 
studied by postcolonial and human rights scholars. Even though these fields are not 
aligned in their interpretation of the dynamic between privileged readerships and 
disempowered narrators, they share a focus on narratives testifying to past and on-
going violence, using a conventional definition of narrative that is treated dismissively 
in classical trauma theory. The central question in these fields is not whether 
disempowered subjects can verbalize their trauma, but whether or not their speech can 
find a large enough audience to protest their exclusion from the hegemony and make a 
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difference.6 This shift in focus has a clear impact on the type of text that is studied and, 
indeed, emulated by activist authors. It is noteworthy, for instance, that Eggers’s works 
become less experimental as they move into the realm of testifying to the traumas of 
Deng or Zeitoun, not more so. The relatively straightforward plots and confident 
narrative style of What Is the What and Zeitoun stand in stark contrast to the postmodern 
and self-deprecating style of the author’s breakthrough memoir, A Heartbreaking Work of 
Staggering Genius, which testifies to Eggers’s own traumatic childhood.7 This results from 
the basic premise upon which human rights narratives are based. Concisely, that 
premise is that clear and coherent testimony to human rights abuses provides salience 
for unacknowledged or forgotten crises as well as recognition for the injustices that 
befell their victims. As Brown and Wilson argue, the discourse of human rights thus 
demands from subjects that they display a degree of individual self-assertiveness by 
claiming those rights with which the framework endows them (8). However, rather than 
simply reflecting an existing norm, Levy and Sznaider argue in Human Rights and 
Memory, frequent attention to the violation of rights in the public sphere is part of a 
mutually constitutive practice that is an integral part of the proliferation of human 
rights as a discourse (4). Restating the identificatory practice that underlies human 
rights culture, they write that it utilizes our “capacity to identify with others” as 
derived from the “ontological equality” promoted by the discourse of human rights (31). 
Personal narratives thus bring into play a rights claim on the part of the narrator, who 
thereby implicitly agrees to claim rights according to an existing discourse and thus also 
helps to legitimize it as a means of doing so. In order for a personal narrative to fulfil 
 
                                                     
6 The impetus for this consideration in postcolonial studies is largely derived from Spivak’s famous essay “Can 
the Subaltern Speak,” which asks whether there is a way for the subaltern’s voice to survive mediation into 
the hegemony without it being purloined by Western intellectuals or activists who inadvertently appropriate 
that voice for their own causes.  
7 Even A Heartbreaking Work of Straggering Genius differs from the trauma paradigm, though, in that the memoir 
is not exactly a reflection of the author’s unprocessed trauma, especially given that its central purpose seems 
to be to amuse rather than traumatize the reader. Indeed, as Timothy Dow Adams writes, it confidently and 
consistently attempts to “keep readers off balance” (69). As such, the book is less concerned with wallowing in 
the protagonist’s trauma as much as it seeks to entertain the reader with regard to the presentation of 
traumatic events. 
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this function, Schaffer and Smith explain, affectively charged and sensationalized 
stories are typically chosen for circulation that “target privileged readers in 
anticipation that they will identify with, contribute to, and become advocates for the 
cause” (27). The audience for these narratives is mostly made up of rights-bearing 
individuals whose engagement with the text helps the subjects of these narratives to 
claim their place as similarly rights-bearing human beings in the global community. The 
ability of a personal narrative to cultivate cross-cultural identification thereby becomes 
paramount to its transformative capacity as a rights-tool in its engagement of privileged 
audiences. 
Whereas human rights scholars such as Schaffer and Smith or Levy and Sznaider 
have paid attention to how the discourse of human rights is produced within rights-
cultures, postcolonial critics have sought to illuminate how access to that culture can be 
restricted or denied to those whose rights are yet to be recognized and protected. 
Modes of thinking thus come into play that perpetuate inequality in a global community 
that purports to have accepted universal equality. These insights are important to any 
analysis of personal narratives in a rights context precisely because they impact upon 
the text’s function in global human rights culture. In Postcolonial Melancholia, Paul Gilroy 
makes the point that continued emphasis on racial difference “obstructs empathy and 
make[s] ethnocentrism inescapable. It becomes impossible even to imagine what it is 
like to be somebody else” (63). The point being not so much that race should not be a 
consideration in cross-cultural engagement, indeed it proved central to chapter two’s 
discussion of black rights, but that a radical emphasis on racial difference places 
interlocutors in a category of “others” for whom empathic interaction is placed beyond 
the remit of Western readers. This observation is particularly relevant given its impact 
on the identificatory practices around which human rights culture is so clearly centred. 
It fundamentally questions the ability of a universalist discourse based on equality such 
as human rights to speak in a cultural sense through empathetic identificatory practices 
without dealing first with the glaring inequalities that can make such practices fall on 
deaf ears. By this, I mean that by enforcing equality for all through a discourse of an 
abstract, shared human endowed with rights but stripped of those racial, social, or 
cultural particularities, human rights may be ill-equipped to consider why less 
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benevolent conceptualizations of those particularities may obstruct its egalitarian 
aspirations.  
Anticipating this discussion, Gayatri Spivak’s famous question concerning the 
possibility of subaltern speech demands that one take into account not only why a 
privileged audience may not be open to hearing disempowered subjects, but whether a 
privileged author such as Eggers’s involvement in ventriloquizing their speech may 
perpetuate their silencing as subjects even in the voicing of their experiences. 
Commenting on her landmark essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Spivak explains that 
an ethical relationship with the other must involve “a transaction between the speaker 
and the listener” (Spivak, “Subaltern Talk: Interview with the Editors,” 289), something 
which is potentially rendered more difficult if someone other than the subaltern has 
stepped in to take on the role of speaker. This transaction would challenge the audience 
to unlearn their privilege and reform their understanding of who qualifies as the human 
in human rights. Thus, it would expand the epistemological frames that govern whose 
life is recognizable and grievable, as discussed by Butler in Frames of War. Spivak notes 
further that one of the problems with the assumption that the subaltern will assert 
themselves and claim a voice on our terms is that it conveniently allows audiences to 
remain passive, never requiring them to question their own position in the dialogue: 
“The effort required for the subaltern to enter into organic intellectuality is ignored by 
our desire to have our cake and eat it too: that we can continue to be as we are, and yet 
be in touch with the speaking subaltern” (Spivak, “Subaltern Talk: Interview with the 
Editors,” 292). For Spivak, there can be no true dialogue between the subaltern and the 
privileged without a more substantial process taking place in which barriers of privilege 
and power that prevent an ethical engagement with the other are broken down. As 
Butler explains, once the frames that determine whose life is recognized in full start to 
come apart, it becomes possible to come into contact with those lives that have hitherto 
been excluded (12). This movement, as Rosalind Morris notes, challenges the slippage 
between the normative equality upon which human rights are based and the rather 
reductive insistence on fundamental sameness that stands in for that universalist 
aspiration in human rights culture. Instead, Morris affirms Spivak’s idea that an ethical 
dialogue with the other asks us to acknowledge their rights on the basis of a shared 
humanity as well as their alterity (Morris 97)—an alterity that, for Spivak, is 
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fundamental to the very identity of the other (“Can the Subaltern Speak?” 27).8 In order 
for such a dialogue to be successful, the privileged audience must be willing to 
acknowledge the equality of the other precisely by understanding them as both 
different from Western rights-bearers yet in possession of the same common humanity 
in whose name human rights speaks.  
This leaves us with the seemingly paradoxical impetus to overcome inequalities, such 
as those based on race to which Gilroy draws attention, as well as the need to respect 
the alterity of others as a means of establishing equality on egalitarian terms, as 
convincingly argued by Spivak. What is required, in other words, is for personal 
narratives read in the context of human rights culture to foster recognition and 
understanding without collapsing interpersonal or cultural differences into simplistic 
sameness through reductive forms of identification. The personal narrative is key to 
unravelling this paradox. Personal narratives have become prevalent precisely because 
of their ability to engage the reader imaginatively across the differences that separate 
them from the victim. A productive means of understanding how human rights culture 
ignores, sidesteps, or deals with the social, political, and cultural issues raised by 
postcolonial theorists is through a study of how this key cultural medium, the personal 
narrative, functions in this respect. My approach thus expands on the previous 
chapter’s point that personal narratives, both fictional and non-fictional, construct a 
discursive space in which the relations between rights-bearers and disempowered 
subjects are played out against the backdrop of the global discourse of human rights. 
 
                                                     
8 It is important to distinguish this alterity, the particular identity of each individual subject, from the process 
of othering that lies at the heart of neo-colonial modes of thinking, which erases the particularity of the 
subaltern in favour of what Spivak discusses as catachreses in “Practical Politics of the Open End.” There, she 
uses catachresis to refer to master words that transform particular subjects through sweeping definitions for 
which there are no literal referents, such as “true worker” or “true woman” (104). In this chapter, alterity is 
used as a counterweight to appropriative identification in which the particularity of the other is erased. I will, 
for instance, distinguish between the necessary respect for Zeitoun’s alterity and the negative implications of 
radical “othering” through catachresis by focusing on how the latter is bound up with Zeitoun’s mixed roots 
and the abuse he suffers as a result of racial profiling. 
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The dialogue that takes place in such texts is largely imaginative, as it is conjured up 
by readers as they make their way through the text. The imaginative charge of the 
textual experience is inevitably expended on the relationship the reader builds up with 
a story, its characters, and – particularly in the case of personal narratives – its 
protagonist. In The Singularity of Literature, Derek Attridge emphasizes the importance of 
breaking down absolute alterity as a road towards comprehension: “Absolute alterity, as 
long as it remains absolute, cannot be apprehended at all” (3).9 He goes on to stress that 
literature can be instrumental in breaking down such absolute alterity in a productive 
way that preserves the particularity of the other, whilst allowing the reader to insert 
them into their frame of reference. This idea centres on Attridge’s argument that the 
imaginative process of constructing story-worlds with fictional others is cognitively 
related to the alterity of the subaltern and the reader’s engagement with them (32-33). 
The latter is also the subject with which human rights culture seeks to facilitate 
engagement. Both processes, according to Attridge, present readers with an other and 
ask the reader to make them real and knowable, making the cultural force of literature 
dependent upon the efforts of “responsible readers” (131). In the former case, the other 
is other until they have been imaginatively created by the reader, whereas in the latter 
the other is recovered from their position of having been made foreign by the 
hegemonic discourse.  
Attridge argues that the reader is able to actualize the other through an 
identificatory process in which “otherness” is introduced “into the field of the same” in 
a way that “reshapes cultural norms and habits” (136). This field of the same differs 
from the type of flattening sameness that obscures inequalities in that the otherness of 
the other is meant to be preserved by the identificatory process set out by Attridge. 
Sameness in his sense is only extended on the basis of a shared humanity that 
acknowledges the distinct particularity of the other:  
 
                                                     
9 This insight is echoed by Ulrich Beck and Patrick Camiller when they write in “The Truth of Others: A 
Cosmopolitan Approach” that the preservation of absolute alterity “amounts to irremediable mutual 
ignorance” as it effectively places an embargo on interpersonal understanding (431). They also warn, however, 
against overidentification derived from a notion of universal sameness: “universalism sacrifices the specificity 
of others to a global equality that denies the historical context of its own emergence and interests” (431).  
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To respond fully to the singular otherness of the other person (and thus render 
that otherness apprehensible) is creatively to refashion the existing norms 
whereby we understand persons as a category, and in that refashioning – 
necessarily inaugural and singular – to find a way of responding to his or her 
singularity. (33) 
Even though this textual theory of identification provides an alternative to the 
flattening identificatory sameness that denies the alterity of the other, it has come 
under fire for its reductive conception of the reader. In “‘Above and Beneath 
Classification’: Bartleby, Life and Times of Michael K, and Syntagmatic Participation,” Gert 
Buelens and Dominiek Hoens aim to offer an alternative view on the singularity facing 
readers in a literary text that goes beyond notions of identification. While they share 
the view that literature is more than a simple conduit for meaning waiting to be 
recovered by readers, they argue that the force of a literary text lies in its ability to 
disrupt the reader’s interpretative frames rather than, as Attridge would have it, 
rendering those existing beyond those frames visible to them through a process of 
identification (159). This is an important qualification of Attridge’s theory, in that it 
opens up space for the literary text to carve out a more multidimensional reading 
experience in which the reader is inflected more heavily and more directly by their 
encounter with the other whose story they engage with. To render this insight in 
Spivak’s terms, one can see in Buelens and Hoen’s critique the possibility of overcoming 
the problem of passivity that pervades less productive engagements with the subaltern, 
where Western audiences are allowed to maintain their privilege.  
Despite this critique of Attridge’s theory, the productive link between the 
imaginative process initiated by a literary text and the need to respect the alterity of 
the other brings the concerns of postcolonial critics down to the discursive-
narratological level at which important aspects of human rights culture operate. Indeed, 
Buelens and Hoens’s critique of it shows how this analytical approach to texts begins to 
address important questions regarding the ethical dialogue that human rights 
narratives seek to establish. In doing so, they bring into focus the discursive processes 
by which human rights are negotiated and contested when disempowered subjects find 
ways to speak to rights-bearing audiences. In “Introduction: The Future of Testimony,” 
Anne Cubilie and Carl Good have more fundamental reservations about the premise that 
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the other encountered in literature is cognitively and productively similar to the other 
in postcolonial theory. They assert that, in the process of imagining the disempowered 
other through fiction, the reader is encouraged to recognize them in a way that actually 
makes them less embodied and, therefore, less likely to be seen as a viable interlocutor 
(590). Once again, though, and regardless of its success, the kinship between the 
imaginative aspect of narratives and the imaginative requirements of cross-cultural 
rights-work makes the study of personal narratives a particularly fruitful place to bring 
together various fields of study that have separately considered the articulation of 
trauma, global power relations and inequality, and the cultural discourse of human 
rights. 
If one accepts that personal narratives thus emerge as a prime object of study 
because of their role as a key cultural tool in human rights discourses, the subsequent 
analytical point must be to determine how best to examine them as texts. These textual 
outlets for human rights, as a complex discursive space in which rights-bearers and 
disempowered subjects negotiate their relationship, bring the broader debate 
concerning the accessibility and universality of those rights into focus. They can only do 
so, however, if one allows the analysis to reflect the complexity of the processes at work 
in the text rather than forcing upon them schemata of interpretation that yield the 
types of uplifting but simplistic identification that readers find comforting. To pay 
attention to the intricacies of a personal narrative is to uncover how it presents the 
reader with numerous interpretative cues, not all of which are conducive to 
straightforward identification with the protagonist. Even the Bildungsroman, which, as 
Slaughter has argued, lies at the heart of human rights culture as a genre, extends a 
dubious identificatory invitation to its reader. As Franco Moretti writes in The Way of the 
World, a classical Bildungsroman asks readers to identify with the perspective of the 
protagonist only for the initial section of the narrative process (56). As the protagonist 
becomes more integrated into society, he goes on to argue, the reader is led to desire 
“the disappearance of those attributes of the protagonist that hinder a clear perception 
of the text” (62). In other words, the perspective of the protagonist is only a temporary 
guide for the reader towards allowing that reader to develop their own holistic view of 
the protagonist and the society with which the character interacts. This insight is 
valuable with regard to the identificatory process within human rights’ narrative 
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culture, especially given the tie between Moretti’s object of study, the Bildungsroman, 
and its connection to the developmental history of human rights, as established by 
Slaughter. In this light, Moretti’s argument can be taken more broadly as a basis for 
suggesting that even though the protagonist’s perspective is at the heart of the story, 
the text drives the reader to take on their own distinctive perspective on the events in a 
narrative the longer it progresses. This view of the reader’s engagement with the text 
ties in with Attridge’s theory of textual identification. After all, in Attridge’s view, the 
alterity of the other is incorporated into the reader’s interpretative framework. Buelens 
and Hoens expand his theory to accommodate the complexity of the reading experience 
and, therefore, the reader as a whole. It is therefore worthwhile to study personal 
narratives in the context of human rights as a collection of interpretative paths that 
include the recognition of the other, but are not reduced to a singular identificatory 
relationship. Rather, identification is part of the broader interpretative work the reader 
undertakes in engaging with the text. 
This has two implications for my analysis of Eggers’s testimonial works as texts that 
fill the rights-spaces they open up through their engagement with the reader. Taken 
together, these two analytical imperatives would go some way to deepening the now 
commonplace view of the affective role played by personal narratives in human rights 
discourse. This view is perhaps most memorably expressed by Richard Rorty in his essay 
on “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” as the ability of “sad and 
sentimental stories” to move us to recognize and defend the rights of others (185). The 
first analytical drive is to broaden the analysis to include more than the central 
relationship between the narrating or narrated subject and the reader, taking into 
account the full complexity of the discursive space staged by the text. This discursive 
space needs to be understood in relation to the socio-cultural space that these texts 
operate within and seek to reform, as was shown in the previous chapter. This not only 
makes for a more nuanced understanding of the rights-work performed by testimonial 
texts, but also allows the analysis to come to terms with Elaine Scarry’s critique of the 
sentimental thesis as being overly optimistic about the imaginative engagement with a 
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disempowered subject contributing to the understanding and advancement of their 
cause.10  
Second, it is important to unpack the myriad possibilities for identification and 
recognition between the reader and the protagonist instigated by the text. This not only 
prevents personal narratives from being forced into narrow and reductive forms of 
identificatory interpretation, but also reveals textual efforts to diversify audience 
engagement with the disempowered subject that actually actively seek to counteract a 
discourse of absolute sameness through simplistic identification. Slaughter already 
examines one such alternate form of identification in “Humanitarian Reading,” where 
he suggests that readers should seek to identify with the humanitarian agent’s 
perspective in narratives of human rights violations rather than with the victims’ (103). 
Such a perspective would avoid what he rightly sees as the hierarchy-reinforcing style 
of sympathy with the victim often cultivated by theories of affective engagement that 
reaffirm “the liberal reader as the primary and privileged subject of human rights and 
the benefactor of humanitarianism” (104).11 But in shutting down our engagement with 
the subaltern altogether for the risk of cultivating such an unethical relationship, 
valuable opportunities are also lost to engage them on more egalitarian terms. Would it 
not be more valuable, in other words, if our understanding of the textual dialogue in 
human rights contexts were able to include both the humanitarian agent’s and the 
 
                                                     
10 In “The Difficulty of Imagining Other People,” Scarry argues that notions of empathic engagement through 
identification have led to “an overly optimistic account” of what imagining other people can achieve, to the 
extent that it is seen as a legitimate means of bypassing “legal provisions and constitutional procedures” (99). 
She admits that fictional texts “bring other persons to press on our minds,” but further insists that one must 
“recognize the severe limits of imaginative accomplishment” (104). In Contemporary Literature and the End of the 
Novel, Pieter Vermeulen recognizes a similarly unfounded optimism in the tenets of cultural cosmopolitanism, 
a mode of thinking that I will deal with more extensively in the next chapter. He goes on to conclude that “it is 
far from self-evident that artistic and literary engagements with human rights abuses have more purchase on 
international power relations than other cosmopolitan practices” (88).  
11 Slaughter makes a related point in Human Rights Inc. when he suggests that the sentimental model of 
reading, as defended by Rorty, instigates what he calls an “instrumental humanitarianism” in which a 
powerful rights-bearer, the incorporated citizen-subject of human rights, assists a disempowered subject who 
cannot enact their rights (325-26).  
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subaltern’s perspective, with the text creating a discursive space in which the reader is 
able to engage with both perspectives? If one is to accept, as Slaughter suggests, that 
narratives of suffering make a “metonymical claim of belonging to a common 
community, of membership in the universal class of humanity from which their [the 
subaltern] suffering has effectively excluded them” (“Humanitarian Reading” 105), then 
preserving the absolute alterity of the other by disavowing the metaphorical leap of 
imagining them as equal interlocutors cannot be taken out of the audience’s 
interpretative repertoire. Instead, it would be worthwhile to consider how, for example, 
Eggers manipulates the reader’s identificatory engagement with What Is the What so as to 
counteract the hierarchy-reinforcing and reassuring types of identification condemned 
by Slaughter. This would also resonate with more recent reformulations of the 
sentimental thesis by, for instance, Thomas Laqueur, that are less optimistic about the 
ability of affect to move audiences to action, but still accept the affective force of 
literary texts as a means of expanding “the universe about whom such moving stories 
might be told” (54).12 Such a study of Eggers’s testimonial work would resonate with the 
author’s own assertion that reading testimonies makes the political context within 
which individuals’ rights are violated legible to audiences (qtd. in Bex and Craps 562). 
One fruitful means of understanding how narrating or narrated subjects and readers 
cultivate such productive relationships can be taken from models developed by trauma 
theory for the analysis of a narrow set of trauma narratives adhering to a modernist 
aesthetic. Even though the coherent and self-assertive narratives of human rights 
culture differ markedly from the original corpus of these theorists, their insights as to 
the type of relationship that is to be pursued brings certain aspects of the textual 
dynamics of Eggers’s collaborative works to the fore. 
My analysis of Eggers’s testimonial works brings the disparate theoretical blind spots 
and contributions discussed into focus by considering how the author’s narratives 
address many of the issues and questions outlined above. In my analysis of What Is the 
What, I will use LaCapra’s theory of empathic unsettlement as a starting point to 
 
                                                     
12 This reconceptualization of the sentimental thesis takes into account the critique, as phrased by Laqueuer, 
that “it is, and was, far easier to be moved than to be moved to action” (33).  
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consider the type of guarded identification cultivated by Deng and Eggers in relation to 
the reader. This will then be thrown into relief by considering how those relations 
challenge the neo-colonial assumptions that usually dominate tales of African victims 
being “rescued” and brought to the United States. Critical in this respect are not only 
Deng’s and Egger’s perspectives, as they uncomfortably mix in the narrative voice of the 
story, but also the myriad of other cross-cultural voices with which the reader comes 
into contact as What Is the What progresses. As far as Zeitoun is concerned, my analysis 
will consider the first half of the story as cultivating an all-too-easy identification 
between the protagonist and the North-American audience, before drawing on Kelly 
Oliver’s critique of the identificatory paradigm in Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (2001) as 
a means of understanding the shock effect caused by the radical break with empathetic 
identification in the second half. The resulting contradictory reading cues, I argue, 
provoke a number of incisive questions regarding the balance that needs to be struck 
between making the other recognizable and not reducing them to sameness. Particular 
attention will be paid in this respect to the dynamics of recognizability that permeate 
the narrative. Zeitoun oscillates between the well-worn role of the American hero and 
the radically othered other. His wife, Kathy, plays a recognizable American woman and 
housewife actively seeking to become part of a social category, the American Muslim, 
that, as she finds out, the rest of society has significantly more trouble recognizing. 
Finally, the Voice of Witness series’ Out of Exile and Voices from the Storm shed interesting 
light on the necessity for personal narratives to bring the audience into contact with 
more than just the protagonist. In these collected oral histories, the emphasis shifts 
from identifying with a single disempowered subject to identifying with a diffuse range 
of subjects and situations. The resulting narrative cues invite the reader to find that 
which connects these various voices, all of which are embedded in their own specific 
social, cultural, and political contexts.  
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3.2 Guarded Empathy in What Is the What 
Perhaps the best starting point for the application of trauma-theoretical approaches to 
the ethical dialogue that personal human rights narratives seek to establish is Eggers 
and Deng’s collaborative testimony What Is the What. The novel’s plot is compelling and 
coherent, but its narrative voice and structure are significantly complex and open up 
the types of imaginative spaces in which readers are challenged to engage with the 
author and autobiographical subject’s ambiguous voicing of trauma and human rights 
abuse in a way that resonates with the precepts of trauma studies. The story comprises 
an enthralling account of Deng’s harrowing experiences during the Second Sudanese 
Civil War and his life following resettlement in the United States. Eggers’s 
ventriloquizing of Deng’s speaking voice in narrating this story opened him up to 
criticism for straightforward neo-colonial appropriation of the subaltern’s voice. A 
similar argument can be made from the audience’s perspective, because the novel 
renders the incomprehensible experiences of Deng legible and entertaining in a way 
that allows readers to walk vicariously in the disempowered subject’s shoes as they 
empathize with his horrendous journey across Central Africa and his helpless 
wandering around Atlanta.13 My analysis of the novel rejects both these claims on the 
basis that the novel’s peculiar interplay of genres and narrative voice prohibits such 
offhand dismissals. This is not to place the novel beyond criticism. I go on to argue that 
there are significant issues with Deng and Eggers’s undertaking, but they are located on 
a different analytical level. The issue at stake is not solely one of narrative voice, but one 
of perspective. For all the care that is taken in crafting a non-appropriating narrative 
 
                                                     
13 Lee Siegel’s scathing review of the novel makes both points. He argues that “Valentino Achak Deng, the man 
and the human argument, does not really exist in What Is the What” (51), before lamenting the book’s neo-
colonial appropriation of the victim’s voice as representing a reading culture that increasingly desires to live 
vicariously through the protagonists of rights violations (53). In “Referring to the Human in Contemporary 
Human Rights Literature,” Mitchum Huehls makes the point by claiming that What Is the What is unable to 
refer adequately to Deng’s experiences because it embeds his story in a universalist discourse (7). In this 
reading, the reader can only engage with him as a vacuous representation of an abstract humanity, easily 
recognizable but stripped of particularity. 
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voice, What Is the What’s textual cues still lead the reader into inhabiting a specifically 
Western perspective from which they can comfortably look at Deng’s distant African 
suffering. Before this issue can be dealt with, however, a close reading of the text’s 
central narrative feature, its ambiguous narrative voice, is needed. 
An analysis of What Is the What must deal with its complex interplay of genres, 
through which most of its narrative work is performed. The book hovers between the 
three genres of the novel, biography/autobiography, and testimony. Each of these 
genres must be taken into account in order to understand fully how Eggers’s narrative 
works. In the previous chapter, I homed in on What Is the What’s intertextual links to the 
genre of testimonio and, even more clearly, to the nineteenth-century slave narrative. 
There is a clear similarity with both of these traditions of collaborative testimony, even 
though, as I have shown, the narrative and its paratexts work hard to invert some of the 
more troublesome conventions of the slave narrative in particular in order to divert 
control away from the privileged author towards the disempowered subject. In this 
chapter, I will focus on the novel’s links with two other genres, biography and 
autobiography, because Eggers uses these particular links to create narrative effects 
relating to identification. This blurring of biography and autobiography is already 
encouraged by the title page, where the novel’s full title—What is the What: The 
Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng, a Novel—contrasts with the fact that Dave Eggers is 
credited as the sole author and even introduces a third ambiguity, that the book is also a 
novel and hence at least partly fictional. The subtitle explicitly links it to the genre of 
autobiography, whereas Eggers’s role as the writer of Deng’s life story invokes that of 
biography. Given that the text brands itself as an autobiography rather than a 
biography, the otherwise strictly divided roles of the subject (Deng) and the biographer 
(Eggers) are intentionally blurred. Hence, the reader is unable to pin down the authorial 
voice as being strictly Eggers or entirely Deng, forcing him or her to hear instead the in-
between voice of Valentino. 
Further deepening the generic ambiguity is the fact that What Is the What is also 
fiction, by its own admission on the title page as well as in the (revised) preface: “It 
should be known to the readers that I was very young when some of the events in the 
book took place, and as a result we simply had to pronounce What Is the What a novel” 
(What Is the What 2008 xiv). The admission that part of the protagonist’s life is fictional 
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breaks what Philippe Lejeune in On Autobiography calls the “autobiographical pact,” the 
unspoken contract between an author and a reader that guarantees the actuality of an 
autobiography’s subject. Yet it also exemplifies an unresolvable tension between fiction 
and autobiography that is explored in Paul de Man’s “Autobiography as De-facement,” 
an essay written in response to Lejeune’s ideas. De Man posits that the pact between the 
reader and the text’s subject is in fact one of “mutually reflexive substitution” which 
serves to corroborate subjectivity without collapsing the reader into the 
autobiographical subject (921). In other words, de Man suggests that the 
autobiographical subject is neither strictly real, as Lejeune’s contract suggests, nor 
entirely fictional, but is instead the product of a collaborative process between the text 
and the reader. Accordingly, by embracing the ambiguous space between fact and 
fiction, Eggers encourages readers to become part of a mutually defining relationship 
with Deng based on their entering into a dialogue with the fictionalized voice of 
Valentino. As de Man writes, this conceptualization of the reader’s relationship with the 
text “implies differentiation as well as similarity, since both depend on a substitutive 
exchange that constitutes the subject” (921). This rings true with postcolonial theory’s 
insistence that the alterity of the other must be preserved as well as the emphasis on 
the privileged reader needing to be challenged to unlearn their privilege as part of their 
questioning of why the subaltern was excluded from the hegemony in the first place. 
Following de Man’s understanding of autobiography, this process is partially simulated 
textually by bringing Deng into the realm of the same so that he may be recognized 
while maintaining his difference so that he may function as a fully-fledged interlocutor 
for the privileged reader.  
As a novel, What Is the What is able to appeal specifically to the reader’s imagination 
when engaging with the text. Indeed, Valentino, the in-between voice defined by 
Twitchell referred to in the previous chapter, stresses the importance of readers 
imaginatively engaging with his testimony in order to further the humanitarian aims of 
the text as a whole in a reflection on his interior monologues. These monologues are 
addressed to uninterested interlocutors who, as I argued in chapter one, can be 
considered stand-ins for the North-American audience reading the novel:  
You [the uninterested interlocutor] would not add to my suffering if you knew what I 
have seen. And until that person left my sight, I would tell them about Deng [a 
  171 
friend of Valentino’s], who died after eating elephant meat . . . or about Ahok and 
Awach Ugieth, twin sisters who were carried off by Arab horsemen. . . . Do you have 
any idea? . . . Can you imagine this? (29)  
Consider also the choice of words when Valentino silently addresses Michael, the boy 
left to guard him as he is gagged and bound in his own apartment, telling him of 
Sudanese experiences: “Be grateful TV Boy. Have respect. Have you seen the beginning 
of a war? Picture your neighbourhood, and now see the women screaming, the babies 
tossed into wells. Watch your brothers explode. I want you there with me” (73, my 
emphasis). A further significance of the fictional aspect of What Is the What is that in 
openly and expressly drawing together all of these genres, Eggers’s text foregrounds 
and simultaneously internalizes the constructed nature of collaborative testimony, and 
particularly an account that exists in the grey area between biography, autobiography, 
and novel. The fact, then, that these genres, most notably the novel and autobiography, 
can only coexist uneasily in this text and are “never comfortably integrated” (Siegel 51) 
stresses the unsettled relationship between genres, truth, fiction, and indeed authorial 
voices in the narrative itself. 
The myriad of implications as well as uncertainties that derive from What Is the What’s 
unique blending of genres impacts upon the voice and, by extension, the person with 
whom the reader enters into dialogue. One productive way of conceptualizing the vocal 
dilemma posed by the fictional voice of Valentino, who is neither Eggers nor Deng, 
would be to hear in What Is the What the elusive middle voice that LaCapra puts forward 
in Writing History, Writing Trauma as an appropriate way of representing historical 
traumas. The discussion of the middle voice—a linguistic category between the active 
and passive voices that exists in some languages such as Ancient Greek—has its roots in 
Roland Barthes’s essay “To Write: An Intransitive Verb?” In that essay, Barthes discusses 
the middle voice of the verb to write as allowing the subject to both actively write and be 
affected by that which he or she has written (142). LaCapra’s definition, however, comes 
out of his specific engagement with Hayden White’s reconceptualization of Barthes’s 
notion of the middle voice in “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of the Truth,” 
which posits that the middle voice holds the means to represent the Holocaust in a way 
that eschews absolute certainty and ties reader and writer together in a process of 
understanding and meaning-making on the level of the text. In a similar vein, Rick 
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Crownshaw has suggested in The Future of Memory that memory studies, a field closely 
related to trauma studies, would be wise to focus on the middle voice as a means of 
maintaining the distinctive nature of various subject positions in relation to trauma 
such as primary and secondary witness, while encouraging empathy between them (12-
13). LaCapra himself describes it as being an “‘in-between’ voice of undecidability and 
the unavailability or radical ambivalence of clear-cut positions” (20).  
This description of the middle voice has two key implications for my analysis of 
Eggers and Deng’s collaborative testimony. First, while the contents of the narrative in 
What Is the What are clear, its voice remains necessarily ambivalent to the reader 
(“undecidability”). Second, and consequently, as the victim’s voice meshes with that of 
the Western activist, the reader’s imaginative efforts are directed towards inhabiting 
the space of the narrative’s traumatic events without their being able to overidentify 
with the victim (“unavailability”). In this sense, the narrative voice testifies to both 
Deng’s lived experience and Eggers’s careful listening (Twitchell 639) by finding the 
middle ground between primary and secondary witness. Returning to the question of 
genre, one might say that What Is the What invokes the type of contract Lejeune defines 
in order to secure the factual existence of its subject, while it also undermines that 
contract’s very premise by openly exploring the tension between fiction and 
autobiography alluded to by de Man as a means of drawing the reader into the act of 
recognizing and co-defining Deng. 
It is precisely through this stylistic distortion that What Is the What creates for its 
readers the “empathic unsettlement” described by LaCapra, which guards against the 
reader’s appropriating the victim’s voice or victimhood. Empathic unsettlement, 
LaCapra posits, takes account of the necessarily transferential connection between the 
witness or victim and the reader (36), while warning against gratuitous identification 
(38) as well as against the integration of trauma into a “spiritually uplifting account of 
extreme events from which we attempt to derive reassurance” (41–42). In other words, 
it entails empathy where the reader as an “attentive secondary witness [is put] in the 
other’s position while recognizing the difference of that position and hence not taking 
the other’s place” (LaCapra 78). This form of empathy, which encourages identification 
while acknowledging distance, can be found symbolically in What Is the What as “the 
collapsible space between us” (535) to which Valentino refers in his closing address to 
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the imagined reader. The novel neither appropriates nor erases Deng’s voice or identity 
precisely because of that intersubjectivity. That is, it evokes a type of readerly empathy 
with the victim that centres on a relationship between two independent human beings. 
This dialogue is established in a middle voice distinctive enough to be heard but so 
ambiguous that it cannot be purloined by Western readers or organizations. In this 
sense, the ambiguous authorial middle voice – Valentino’s – with which the reader can 
empathize but not over-identify provides a possible answer to Gayatri Spivak’s famous 
question: how can the subaltern speak without privileged individuals’ humanitarian 
desire to represent the silenced subaltern effectively appropriating the subaltern’s voice 
and thereby re-silencing them? 
The answer lies, as I have shown, in how What Is the What preserves Valentino’s 
alterity, even as it invites the reader to identify with his suffering. This is also partially 
achieved through the narrative’s offering of a different perspective on the protagonist, 
one that does not rely on guarded empathy but on the flattening logic of sameness. As 
Valentino’s home in Atlanta is invaded by two African-Americans, Tonya and Powder, a 
particularly revealing dialogue ensues that seeks to inflect the reader’s interpretative 
framework. This inflection is twofold. First, it undermines the homogenization of the 
subaltern into a universal category of disempowered others. Second, it causes a rift 
between Valentino’s relatable experiences in the familiar setting of Atlanta, on the one 
hand, and his radically different and thus far less relatable experiences in Sudan, on the 
other. In both cases, this is achieved by the narrative in its offering of a perspective, 
Powder’s, that uncomfortably makes both these errors of homogenizing the subaltern 
and subsequently implying that Deng’s experiences as a refugee in Atlanta can be 
equated to a universal understanding of what it means to be black in a society. Powder 
is one of the two African-Americans that robs Deng’s Atlanta apartment. Consider the 
following scene, in which Valentino is violently restrained by Powder: 
“You’re from Africa, right?” 
I nod. 
“All right then. That means we’re brothers.” 
I am unwilling to agree. (5) 
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Cynically referring to Valentino as “Africa” throughout the robbery, even as the reader 
is intermittently informed of his specific traumatic childhood in civil war-torn Sudan, 
explicitly denies the particularity of Deng’s story; his unwillingness to agree with 
Powder’s sarcastic suggestion that he is his brother constitutes a rejection of a simplistic 
pan-Africanism which denies the obvious differences between Powder’s life, however 
troubled, as a black United States citizen and Deng’s life as a Sudanese refugee relocated 
to Atlanta. The problem with Powder’s reasoning, to render it in Du Bois’s terms, is to 
universalize the nature of double consciousness and thereby deny the diffuse 
experience of it. In this scene, the reader has to recognize the alterity of the 
protagonist’s Sudanese trauma in order to keep identifying with the character of 
Valentino in the Atlanta section of the narrative. The alternative would be to equate the 
two social and political contexts, which would leave the reader in the uncomfortable 
position of aligning their perspective with that of Powder. As a result, recognizing 
Deng’s alterity becomes part of the identificatory process with the protagonist in the 
frame narrative. There are others examples of the reader’s interpretative framework 
being inflected by similarly troubling perspectives. One such perspective, highlighted by 
Varvogli, involves the scene in which Valentino fruitlessly appeals to his Christian 
neighbours to rescue him (22). Like the “telescopic philanthropist,” Mrs. Jellyby, in 
Charles Dickens’s proto-humanitarian tome Bleak House, the evangelical Christians next 
door are too fixated on gazing at abstracted and distant issues in Africa to notice 
problems closer to home. Once again, the alterity of Deng’s Sudanese experiences as 
well as the relatability of his situation in Atlanta are underscored by the novel’s offering 
of a perspective of characters who simplistically appropriate the former and fail to 
comprehend the latter. 
The individual alterity of victims is further highlighted ex negativo when What Is the 
What once again self-consciously reflects on the problematic nature of the presumed 
similarity and universality of human suffering. The testimonial accounts of the so-called 
Lost Boys of Sudan – a unifying term imposed upon heterogeneous victims of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War by the West – are repeatedly shown as unnaturally uniform 
narratives deliberately made to suit the demands of Western readers. Children are 
especially vulnerable to this type of logic, as Suski explains in “Children, Suffering, and 
the Humanitarian Appeal.” She explains how the privileged tend to portray child-
  175 
victims in the Global South as “deprived versions of children of the North” (206). The 
follow example is illustrative: 
Along our walk from southern Sudan to Ethiopia, there were a handful of boys 
who drank their own urine, a few more who ate mud to keep their throats wet, but 
our experiences were very different, depending on when we crossed Sudan. . . . 
Even so, the tales of the Lost Boys have become remarkably similar over the years. 
. . . But we did not all see the same things. . . . Survivors tell the stories the 
sympathetic want, and that means making them as shocking as possible. (21) 
Deepening the tension between reality and fiction foregrounded by What Is the What, 
Valentino admits that his “own story includes enough small embellishments that [he] 
cannot criticize the accounts of others” (21). By exposing the pressure exerted by a 
Western audience on the subaltern to sensationalize and harmonize their testimonies, 
What Is the What addresses the broader Sudanese issue in a way which honours the 
complexity of the individual victim’s experience of that particular human rights crisis. 
Given that What Is the What, at least in a textual and paratextual sense, so 
meticulously cultivates the reader’s engagement with the fictional voice of Valentino, it 
is worth considering the extent to which this effort reaches beyond the text to the 
extra-textual level. What my analysis of the range of textual contortions of the 
narrative reveals is how much mediation is required for even the most interested 
audience – that is, readers sufficiently interested in Deng’s story to buy the book – to be 
coaxed into engaging the disempowered subject on more equal terms. This is partly due 
to the discourse in which a personal narrative such as What Is the What is embedded, 
which demands from the narrator that they inform, educate, and entertain in order to 
solicit support from the rights-bearing public. One finds adherence to these narrative 
imperatives in the deployment of Eggers’s compelling sense of storytelling – such as the 
clever use of a frame narrative – or Deng’s sincere belief in the power of the novel to 
“reach out to others to help them understand Sudan’s place in our global community” 
(xiv). Most importantly, one finds this in the ambiguous narrative voice of Valentino, 
which cultivates the guarded form of empathy through which the novel performs the 
majority of its rights-work and which diverges from more straightforward 
identificatory reading practices. To the extent that these textual features are a result of 
the demands placed upon the likes of Deng by Western audiences’ conceptions of 
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human rights discourse and how they wish to consume it, the novel clearly seeks to 
deploy narrative devices in such a way that they also challenge readers to reform their 
reading habits and, by extension, the cross-cultural dialogue established with 
disempowered subjects. In this sense, What Is the What allows itself to be shaped by the 
tenets of human rights culture, but only in a way that puts it in a position to address 
certain flaws it perceives in that culture. 
Nevertheless, intricate textual and paratextual negotiations do not entirely save What 
Is the What from falling prey to some of the Western bias with which human rights 
culture contends. Much attention is paid to complicating the reader’s interpretative 
frameworks as a means of preserving the alterity of the other throughout the process of 
recognition. This is achieved, however, through the novel’s strong grounding of Deng’s 
experiences in the United States, both narratively and imaginatively. The scene with the 
two African-American robbers provides a useful illustration of this. Even though it is 
instrumental in providing the reader with the incentive to recognize the alterity of 
Deng’s past Sudanese experiences, it only does so by having the reader identify with 
him in the narrative present in Atlanta. This means that Deng’s otherness can be 
accepted, but only once the subject has been recovered as available for identification 
within a recognizable Western context. One could even go so far as to suggest that this 
implies that Deng’s humanity is only acknowledged through a story played out in the 
U.S. context. Valentino’s appeal, while poignant for the other characters’ (lack of) 
engagement with his personal narrative and suffering, thus seems to avert attention 
away from the Sudanese context in the process of guiding the reader into engaging with 
him as he suffers in Atlanta. This is not to take away from the fact that the character-
narrator Valentino ensures a productive engagement with Deng’s traumatic past in 
Sudan that does not flatten his alterity nor allow the reader to straightforwardly 
identify with a victim and context whose difference is part of its identity. Instead, the 
issue at hand is whether or not the process of recovering, recognizing, and respecting 
the particularity of Deng comes at the cost of grounding the reader even more firmly in 
the North-American perspective, gazing at the Sudanese social and political context 
from the admittedly unsettling but overall reassuringly familiar position of Deng’s 
Atlanta apartment. 
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3.3 Diffuse Identification in Voice of Witness: Voices from the 
Storm and Out of Exile 
Different forms of personal narratives engage the issue of identification in varying ways, 
however, and with that in mind it is worth looking at some of Eggers’s other testimonial 
work to gauge the extent to which they are as successful as What Is the What in 
negotiating the reader’s engagement or indeed ultimately as vulnerable to reaffirming 
the Western perspective. Part of the money raised by collaborative testimonial works 
such as What Is the What or indeed Zeitoun goes into funding Eggers’s more formalized 
commitment to keep printing personal narratives in a human rights context through a 
book series titled Voice of Witness. Voice of Witness is a non-profit organization that 
seeks to illuminate human rights crises across the globe through edited collections of 
testimonies. The stated aim of this book series, which makes it particularly relevant to 
this chapter, is to foster “empathy-based understanding” of those crises by “amplifying 
the voices of individuals most closely affected by injustice” (“About”). In many ways, the 
series is typical of anthologies about rights violations, by Schaffer and Smith’s definition 
of the genre. They write that “such anthologies gain their ethical force by gathering 
multiple narratives of shared victimization into one volume whose purpose is to 
challenge and rewrite history, call the reader to recognition, and spur action” (45). 
There is a clear similarity between this description and the self-description in Voice of 
Witness’s educational guide book, The Power of the Story, which explains that oral history 
is about combining facts with people’s interpretations of facts in order to come to a 
deeper understanding of a historical moment and its memory (6). The guide book, which 
helps teachers use Voice of Witness books in the classroom, distinguishes itself from 
traditional history precisely on the basis of the identificatory practices at the heart of 
the human rights culture revealed by a study of personal narratives:  
The creators of the Voice of Witness series, and the approaches offered in this guide, 
conceive of students as oral historians able to reject the dispassionate stance of 
traditional social science, and adopt instead a capacity for empathy and identification, 
for greater joy and immense indignation and, above all, a willingness to be changed in 
the process. (7) 
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This ties in with the genre characteristics set out by Schaffer and Smith, who write that 
these thematically structured collections of rights violations tend to make use of modes 
of address “that make an emotive appeal” (45). One of the interesting ways in which this 
identificatory logic is reinforced in the exercises suggested in The Power of the Story is 
by leaving an open space in a “critical reading log.” In this log, students are free to 
reflect in whatever way they choose on the extent to which they feel connected to the 
testifying subjects in the Voice of Witness books.  
The texts of these books lend themselves to empathic engagement in part because 
they have been moulded into a narrative form that suits such an affective relationship. 
Eggers, co-founder of the series, explains this as being one of the hallmarks of the 
project:  
We decided that the Voice of Witness books would edit everyone’s story . . . into a 
linear narrative, without changing words. That would be what the reader could 
rely on –that we would tell a compelling linear narrative with the narrator’s 
original words and phrasings and idiosyncrasies of speech, which takes some 
editing. (qtd. in Bex and Craps 563) 
Writing about one of the first books in the series, Surviving Justice: America’s Wrongfully 
Convicted and Exonerated, Barbara Eckstein points out how this narrative effect is created 
by the volume’s complete effacement of the mediator, since the questions of the original 
interviews are sacrificed to create a linear narrative (109). She wonders whether this 
process does not “obscure the authority of the interviewing/editing/narrating voice” 
that necessarily shapes the reality presented by the narratives (110). As with the 
collaborative testimonial works in which Eggers plays a more involved part as an 
author, he is quick to explain his role as editor as part of the necessary mediation 
required for these personal narratives to be made amenable to a Western audience. He 
expresses his belief that editors of the series “serve the narrators well only when the 
book itself is compelling and can be read by a broad audience” (qtd. in Bex and Craps 
563). With this narrative focus in mind, it is fruitful to determine how the textual cues of 
Voice of Witness books inspire empathic engagement and how that affective 
relationship relates to or differs from the one cultivated by individual personal 
narratives. As I will demonstrate, these cues are largely similar across both Voices from 
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the Storm and Out of Exile. However, the compositional structure of each volume is 
slightly different, and this has some effect on the terms on which the reader is engaged. 
To take this into account, I will provide additional discussion of the different volumes 
where necessary. Overall, my analysis will also take into account the collateral impact of 
the extensive involvement of Eggers and other editors in fashioning these stories for the 
Western market. Voices from the Storm provides an especially crucial point of contrast, in 
this respect, in that one of its victim-narrators’ stories was turned into a stand-alone 
narrative by Eggers.  
Voices from the Storm is an oral history collection that brings together thirteen 
different testimonies of people affected in some way by Hurricane Katrina, which hit 
New Orleans in 2005 and left a humanitarian crisis in its wake. It is organized 
chronologically, detailing particular days or events in the lives of victims as the storm 
progresses, and structured according to major moments before, during, and after the 
storm. Abdulrahman Zeitoun, whose story Eggers later adapted for his non-fiction 
narrative Zeitoun, is one of the thirteen narrators. Before going on to scrutinize the 
textual cues that invite the reader of Zeitoun’s contribution to engage affectively with 
its contents, it is useful to consider the anthology as a whole first to see how it functions 
as a tool within human rights culture. There are two main structuring devices at work in 
this volume that have a direct impact on the rights-work it performs. The text is first 
divided into four sections that relate to the life-changing impact of Hurricane Katrina, 
entitled “Life before the Storm,” “The Storm,” “The Week After,” and “Looking Back.” 
Instead of providing full testimonies from start to finish, Voices from the Storm breaks 
them up in order to fit them into a chronological day-by-day narrative. In a very basic 
sense, this imposes a narrative structure onto the whole – the anthology becomes a 
story of Hurricane Katrina narrated by several survivors rather than a collection of 
disparate survivor testimonies that happen to deal with the same event. The focus is 
shifted away from individual narrators, in other words, and towards the way in which 
certain sections of their experiences contribute to a larger picture of key moments 
before, during, and after the storm. Apart from this distinctive chapter division, the first 
device also works through the insertion of a two-page list of “Narrators” with two-line 
biographies for each at the start of the anthology (40-41). Instead of focusing on each 
biography as narrators tell their story, all of the biographical information is thus 
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grouped so as to allow the individual narratives to be split up according to the 
anthology’s overall narrative of Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the various fragments of 
each testimony are able to inform the stories of the other narrators as the reader makes 
their way through the collection’s story. The focus thus lies on creating a broader 
picture of the crisis at each stage across the spectrum of subjects by weaving together 
their accounts. The volume’s introduction suggests as much when it presents the book 
as “a rich tapestry of oral histories” (Voices from the Storm 1).  
The second structuring device, a list of appendices at the back, works towards the 
same goal of focusing attention on the broader crisis and the inadequacy of the 
government’s response, once again leading the reader away from individual narratives. 
In the appendices, a picture is created of the flooded city that demonstrates that 
disenfranchised African-Americans (lower wealth, lower educations, fewer means) were 
disproportionately affected by Hurricane Katrina because they were the ones left 
stranded in the city of New Orleans. These appendices make it clear that in having 
thirteen narrators from this particular background narrating their hardships, Voices 
from the Storm has not skewed its representation towards a select group of victims, but 
touches on the very essence of the broader issue at hand. It actively promotes, 
therefore, a metonymical reading of these testimonies as being representative of the 
broader experience of the survivor community which largely, disproportionately, and 
unfairly consisted of non-white disempowered Americans. 
Within this collection of oral testimonies, Zeitoun narrates his story in eleven 
episodes. Both before and during the storm, Zeitoun’s testimony feels out of place in the 
volume: he neither struggles to survive before or during the storm, and even has 
enough food to feed abandoned dogs as he roams the now post-apocalyptic landscape of 
New Orleans. Yet his interruptions are given ever more prominence as the volume’s 
story of Hurricane Katrina develops, becoming the first narrative fragment on 31 August 
and 1 September in the build-up to his eventual arrest and detention without charge on 
5 September. The volume narrates the steady progression in government 
mismanagement of the crisis, noting particularly the refocusing of attention on 
combating looters and terrorists instead of search-and-rescue by Mayor Nagin on 31 
August (precisely when Zeitoun’s testimonial fragments are given prominence). The 
image created is one of a gradual creep in government mismanagement, neglect, and 
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abuse in the wake of Katrina, affecting first those at the very bottom before eventually 
even reaching well-to-do but racially othered Syrian-American Muslim Abdulrahman 
Zeitoun. In other words, while the mismanagement of the natural disaster by the U.S. 
government caused the disenfranchised African-American community to be affected 
disproportionately, as shown by the appendices, the homeland security intervention 
that followed in its wake exacerbated this crisis by rebranding survivors from different 
(and not just African-American) ethnic minorities as potential terrorists based on their 
ethnicity and/or religion.  
Zeitoun goes on to comment on the authorities’ decision to arrest him, linking his 
arrest to the post-9/11 context of religious and racial tension in the U.S.: “First, I think 
he [the arresting officer] saw my name, and when he see us together, he overreact. . . . I 
think he thought he catch a group of terrorists” (239). This is precisely the type of 
interaction between fact, the appendices, and personal narratives the volume hopes 
readers will pick up on. Statistics tell the story of which people were most affected by 
the storm, but personal narratives can illustrate just how they were affected and why 
the government’s response exacerbated an already dreadful situation. What this brief 
discussion shows is that Voices from the Storm works towards presenting its testimonies 
metonymically, with each fragment becoming a synecdoche that builds a larger picture 
of government crisis mismanagement deteriorating into rights violations in the context 
of post-9/11 racial and religious tensions. Both the narrative structure of a 
chronological story of the storm and the appendices with their focus on the 
demographic picture of New Orleans contribute to our understanding of Zeitoun’s 
experiences as part of the wider racially motivated rights violations in the storm’s 
aftermath and the socio-ethnic tensions in the country more broadly. 
With this in mind, it is worth considering how this impacts upon the empathy-based 
identificatory relationship the Voice of Witness series seeks to cultivate, which is also 
central to human rights culture more broadly. It is clear from the structural analysis 
that the focus of Voices from the Storm leads towards a greater understanding of the 
overall picture of life in New Orleans before and after Katrina, with individual narrators 
serving as conduits to facilitate that process. This fits with the overall conception of the 
role of personal narratives in the series as noted by both Eggers himself and Mimi Lok, 
the series’ executive director and editor. The latter conceives of the stories as pieces of a 
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puzzle that contribute to an overall picture created in the minds of the reader after they 
have read through the various perspectives: “I think you get at the universal through 
the particular. We make it so that each voice in a collection – there are usually around 
thirteen or fifteen voices per collection – highlights something different, a different side 
of the situation” (qtd. in Bex and Craps 562). Eggers concurs with this view, adding that 
“you almost always have a better understanding of a situation through a first-person 
narrative – seeing what one person says and then seeing a broader view of it” (qtd. in 
Bex and Craps 562). The stated aims and structural devices thus balance individual 
narrators’ experiences with the overall experience of the crisis. Whereas the structure 
draws attention away from the individual narrators towards the situation surrounding 
Katrina, the editors and founders build that picture by focusing on a set of individual 
narrators so as to get the readers to understand the situation in New Orleans around the 
time of the storm.  
This balancing act contributes to the text’s nuanced approach to identification. With 
its tapestry of narrators and fragmented storylines, Voices from the Storm is actively 
checking the reader’s identification every few pages. These checks guide the reader into 
channelling their brief spats of empathic engagement into a metonymical impression of 
the crisis. Lok’s description of individual narrators feeds this metonymical logic, as she 
seems to understand their experiences as being representative of a “type” of person, 
which allows the volume to speak to more than just the individual stories of these 
particular narrators: “Some stories can be taken as emblematic for a crisis, some are 
surprising in that this could have happened to this kind of person” (qtd. in Bex and 
Craps 562). Such a metonymical interpretative framework would be detrimental to the 
preservation of the alterity of the victim in a singular narrative, as it amounts to 
equating a single victim with all victims. It would be particularly problematic in the case 
of Voices from the Storm, which takes place in the United States, in that its primary 
readership may feel that this vicarious victimhood covered every inhabitant of the 
United States, including themselves. As such, it would provide a worrying example of 
what LaCapra warns is the process of becoming a “surrogate victim” who feels they 
have a claim on the real victim’s subject position and think they are entitled to speak for 
them (78). One could even note that the text’s emotive appeal, its call to action, 
stimulates the reader to take up the cause in this way, thus speaking for the subaltern 
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and providing a negative answer to Spivak’s question as to whether subaltern subjects 
can speak for themselves. 
In this case, however, because the volume brings together different perspectives, all 
of which are representative only to a limited extent, the reader’s metonymical reading 
experience is consistently curbed. As a result, while identification is encouraged by each 
personal narrative, overall equation of victims through a logic of simplistic sameness is 
forestalled. The particular experiences of Zeitoun, a reasonably well-to-do Syrian 
migrant living in Uptown, are radically, irreconcilably different from those of other 
narrators such as Dan Bright, a native to New Orleans who grew up in the deeply 
impoverished area of the Florida Housing Project. With straightforward single-
perspective identification thus ruled out, the textual cue for the reader seems to be one 
of diffuse identification. This type of affective engagement, as encouraged by the text, 
allows the reader to gain greater understanding of the human rights crisis at hand as a 
result of their dispersed recognition of and engagement with the humanity of individual 
victims. The construction of that broader picture of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath 
is thus predicated on a process by which the alterity of each victim’s experiences must 
be acknowledged as the volume cycles through different emblematic victim-narrators. 
Out of Exile cultivates a similar form of diffuse identification through its sixteen 
different narrators, but it is less clearly structured around telling an overall story of the 
particular aspect of Sudanese history it seeks to address. The human rights crisis that 
prompted this collection is that of the abducted and displaced people of Sudan during 
the Second Sudanese Civil War. As Eggers and Deng explain in a joint preface to the 
volume, this project grew out of their visiting of the latter’s home region, where they 
were confronted with numerous harrowing stories of victims from across the southern 
part of the country (1-2). The preface explicitly comments on the decision to present 
each victim-narrator’s story separately from start to finish rather than integrating them 
into a larger story in fragmented form, as was the case in Voices from the Storm. The 
reason given is that full narratives overcome the situation where victims offer “brief 
sound bites” commenting on larger issues (2). Full narratives, they argue, allow “the full 
scope of their humanity” to be recognized, thus giving the reader “a far better chance at 
empathy” (2). Unlike Voices from the Storm, which does fragment its narratives so that 
they may shed light on a broader crisis introduced at a structural level, Out of Exile 
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makes a seemingly different choice. However, given the diffuse identificatory practice 
stimulated by the series’ textual build-up, the volume’s ability to speak to the broader 
crisis, now only implicitly available to the reader, is retained. 
The different narratives maintain their metonymical ability to represent a broad 
category of people, as noted in the preface where Eggers and Deng explain to the reader 
what type of knowledge and understanding they will gain from reading the collection: 
“We feel that the narratives in Out of Exile are essential reading for anyone interested in 
contemporary rights issues in Sudan, and in the lives of refugees throughout Africa and 
indeed the world” (3). Finally, though, the preface is also quick to stress the alterity of 
each narrator, emphasizing in its final lines that “[t]here are as many stories, indelible 
and startling and tragic and inspiring, as there are Sudanese. As there are people. Let us 
keep our ears open to them” (3). The victim-narrators in Voice of Witness books are 
thus both the same and different, that is, they are representative of other victims and 
yet entirely individual and specific. Similarly, readers are meant to open themselves up 
to victims by empathizing with them, thus erasing their own particularity so as to relate 
to people living in vastly different rights-situations, yet are also asked to understand 
that each testifying and reading subject is unique, making their stories irreconcilably 
different.  
What one observes here is the double-bind created by human rights culture’s 
tendency towards empathic, identificatory practices as a means of expanding the circle 
of those able to have their rights universally recognized. In order for human rights to 
become universal, victims need to claim an abstracted humanity and rights-bearers 
need to recognize their doing so on the basis of their own similarly conceptual 
humanity. Additionally, though, this process needs to take place in a way that respects 
the alterity of victims and rights-bearers alike if it is not to cover over the inequalities 
and violence that cause and perpetuate rights abuses in the first place. This 
contradictory process is a result of human rights’ status as a theoretical truth 
universally acknowledged and their reality as unequally distributed and protected. As 
far as the theory is concerned, identification helps confirm the basic premise of the 
innate equality of all human beings. In practice, however, various forms of identification 
risk flattening the reader’s own particularity, and thus their position of privilege as 
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rights-bearers, to the extent that disempowered subjects are simply rendered deeply 
unfortunate individuals rather than the victims of systemic inequality and abuse.  
The issue for the personal narratives in the Voice of Witness series as well as their 
audience is how they negotiate this double-bind and to what effect. The diffuse 
identificatory processes stimulated by Voices from the Storm and Out of Exile achieve three 
associated things with regard to the victims, readers, and overall crisis. First, the 
complexity of victims is established through the provision of multiple perspectives. All 
of these perspectives are grounded in the same rights crisis, but simultaneously show 
how a wide range of victims were affected differently. Second, the straightforward 
identificatory practice that sees equality as sameness is forestalled in the text by 
moving the reader out of the interpretative comfort zone that underpins human rights 
culture’s emphasis on a stable sense of humanity. This is achieved by qualifying the 
identificatory drive with each new perspective that is introduced. Third, the testimonial 
narratives and extensive appendices collude to create a larger picture that transcends 
the victims and that highlights some of the broader social, legal, cultural, and political 
dynamics that lead to rights abuses. As such, the volume can claim to provoke cross-
cultural understanding for rights crises in a way that avoids some of the pitfalls that 
plague the rights work usually performed by testimonial narratives in human rights 
culture. 
What they do not achieve, however, is the complication of the reader that is 
instrumental in addressing the reason human rights crises remain beyond the purview 
of the global discourse that guarantees them. In other words, in “amplifying unheard 
voices,” as its slogan would have it, Voice of Witness never gets around to dealing with 
why these voices fall on deaf ears until the series mediates their narratives in such a 
way that privileged readers are coaxed into engaging with them productively. As such, 
it remains couched within the biases of the culture that it seeks to redress. Similarly, 
even as readers are led to bemoan the rights violations, they are equally allowed to 
maintain their uncomplicated position as rights-bearers as they gaze at the suffering of 
others. Even if, for instance, Out of Exile can be said to provoke a more diverse view of 
the violence of war in South Sudan, it does not involve the reader in a similarly 
complicating process when it comes to their position as privileged rights-bearers in the 
cross-cultural dialogue fostered by the collection as What Is the What attempts to do.  
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3.4 Disidentification in Zeitoun 
I have argued in the previous chapter that Zeitoun’s two-part structure has a profound 
impact on the audience’s engagement with the protagonist. The story is made up of a 
section that takes place before Zeitoun’s arrest in which the protagonist functions as a 
typical hero character, and a section following his arrest in which he is subjected to 
gross human rights violations. In this second half, he becomes trapped in a truly 
Kafkaesque situation in which he is accused of terrorist activities and simultaneously 
categorized as an “enemy combatant,” an extra-legal category that places him beyond 
the proper judicial framework. As a result of the latter he is unable to challenge the 
accusations in question. The contrast with the active hero in part one is substantial, and 
this has its most significant impact on the affective level of the text. Whereas the 
character saving others from the storm is irresistibly likeable and recognizable as an 
ideal citizen and compassionate human being, the reader is forced to watch that same 
character become radically “othered,” reduced to his essential foreignness, following 
his arrest. This is reinforced by the narrative when the period covering his detention is 
narrated more extensively from the perspective of his wife, Kathy, who, almost 
certainly coinciding with the reader’s own perspective, struggles to come to terms with 
what has happened to Zeitoun. 
Even if the protagonist is typical of the kind of self-assertive rights-claiming 
individual that human rights culture prefers according to Brown and Wilson, Zeitoun is 
something of an outsider in that the first half of the narrative only marginally affirms 
the protagonist’s claim to victimhood. As the analysis of the Voices from the Storm 
collection already emphasized, Zeitoun is not overly affected by the storm, does not 
struggle to survive, and engages in numerous makeshift rescue operations. This is 
interesting in the light of David Kennedy’s description of human rights culture in The 
Dark Sides of Virtue as a theatre of roles in which victims are passive and innocent, 
violators are abnormal, and human rights professionals are heroic (14). Part one of 
Zeitoun aligns the protagonist with the role of the heroic activist rather than the 
helpless victim. He thereby coincides with the type of person with whom the reader 
should identify, as Slaughter argues in “Humanitarian Reading” (103). A. G. Keeble 
makes the further observation that this version of the Zeitoun character resembles the 
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“American heroes” in the official emergency services who helped deal with the 
aftermath of 9/11 (183). This is particularly significant because this section of the 
narrative works hard to allow Zeitoun’s Syrian-Muslim identity to coincide with his role 
as the quintessential incorporated American citizen-hero. When the storm hits, the 
images used by the text are initially derived from myth and legend, before homing in on 
Zeitoun’s particular character and experiences. The images used to describe the 
protagonist’s feelings about the flooded city are not directly taken from the Qur’an, 
quotes from which periodically intersect the narrative, but from a cross-religious 
mythical hero recognizable to a Judeo-Christian audience. As the water floods the city, 
Zeitoun “could only think of Judgment Day, of Noah and forty days of rain” (94). In 
effect, the protagonist himself becomes a Noah-like figure in the following section, 
concerned only with salvaging people and animals from the flood in his canoe. He is an 
American Noah figure, though, because the image also echoes the American mythology 
of explorers and settlers conquering an exotic new land. These images are yoked 
together as he sets off in his canoe:  
He imagined floating, alone, through the streets of his city. In a way, this was a 
new world, uncharted. He could be an explorer. . . . He thought of the animals. The 
squirrels, the mice, rats, frogs, possums, lizards. All gone. Millions of animals 
drowned. . . . He was conflicted about what he was seeing. . . . The novelty of the 
new world brought forth the adventurer in him – he wanted to see it all, the whole 
city, what had become of it. But the builder in him thought of the damage, how 
long it would take to rebuild (95-96).  
The supposedly to-be-avoided subject position of the subaltern – Slaughter explains 
how it reinforces a “patronizing sense of moral superiority” (104) – is thus rendered in 
such a way that it is not only available as an identificatory perspective, but desirable in 
its coinciding with a subject position deeply ingrained in the privileged readers’ 
interpretative frameworks. By re-writing the “other” as an American hero, the 
narrative’s first half makes the character imminently open to almost boundary-less 
levels of identification. As the reader takes on the perspective of this version of the 
character, they are simultaneously led into understanding Zeitoun’s Syrian roots as well 
as his migrant experiences. Throughout the narrative, references are made to the 
protagonist’s home country, his past as an adventurous merchant sailor, and his 
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eventual settling in the United States. The flooding brings these different identities to 
the fore, quite literally washing up old photographs, shown in the book, of his childhood 
in Syria and life at sea. The American settler-explorer myth and Zeitoun’s particular 
past as Syrian migrant and sailor thus end up coinciding in the hero-role taken up by 
the protagonist in the flooded city. 
This co-mingling of vastly different identities would be highly problematic in its 
erasure of Zeitoun’s distinctive cultural background, were it not for the sudden 
narrative break in the second half following his arrest. The fact that American heroes 
are meant to be representative of the nation as a whole, ideal citizens so to speak, makes 
it especially striking that this dramatic narrative shift is caused by a state-sanctioned 
intervention in New Orleans. The official rescue operation, bungled by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is shown to fail utterly to the extent that the 
situation following the calamitous effect of the storm is allowed to render the city into a 
post-civilizational setting in which the normal social and legal order is suspended. 
Subsequently, the authorities’ heavy-handed response to the perceived threat of 
terrorism in this extra-legal space marks the end of the Zeitoun character’s heroic 
antics in the flooded city. At this point, the reality of the Syrian migrant is severed from 
the mythical image of the American hero. Zeitoun explains that, until he was arrested, 
he “had no experience with profiling,” and had, therefore, been able to lead a 
hyphenated existence in New Orleans as a Syrian-American (213). The process of his 
arrest and detention radically breaks this dual identity, with the extra-legal space of the 
flooded city giving rise to practices associated with socio-cultural contexts existing 
beyond the purview of human rights discourses. As if to reinforce the similarity 
between the rights violations taking place in this chaotic setting on U.S. soil and the 
neo-colonial stereotype of pre-civilizational third world countries rife with barbaric 
legal systems, the protagonist perceives the former in terms of the latter:  
Zeitoun was in disbelief. . . . arrested at gunpoint in a home he owned, brought to 
an impromptu military base built inside a bus station, accused of terrorism, and 
locked in an outdoor cage. It surpassed the most surreal accounts he’d heard of 
third-world law enforcement. (218) 
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Further emphasizing the exotic neo-colonial wilderness of this extra-legal landscape, 
the protagonist experiences his incarceration in animalistic terms, describing himself as 
“an exotic beast, a hunter’s prize” (213). In this way, Zeitoun calls into question the 
supposedly universal availability of rights within the United States by exposing the 
extent to which his hyphenated identity can be reduced to its essential “otherness.” The 
text does so by comparing what befalls the protagonist to the “surreal” neo-colonial 
imaginary of “third-world” countries, which is by definition fantastical, unreal, and 
disorienting in its reliance on stereotypical visions of distant, uncivilized, and 
dangerous lands of “others.” This renders the process of “othering” beyond the affective 
accessibility of the reader to the extent that while the character holds the reader’s 
interest, he is no longer recognizably similar enough to be easily relatable.  
A brief comparison between Zeitoun’s Kafkaesque experiences and Franz Kafka’s The 
Trial can illuminate what is so particular about these shifting affective cues in Zeitoun, 
which oscillate between identification and alienation. The central difference between 
the way in which these two narratives drop affective cues for the reader with regard to 
their respective protagonists lies in the fact that Zeitoun is eminently recognizable in 
the first half of the narrative, while the protagonist of The Trial remains abstract 
throughout the story. Kafka’s famous novel tells the odd story of a man fighting an 
impossibly frustrating bureaucratic system, running from his seemingly arbitrary arrest 
in the novel’s opening line – “Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., he 
knew he had done nothing wrong but, one morning, he was arrested” (1) – to his 
eventual execution by two “officials.” The final pages, describing the moments before 
his execution, echo not only the character’s confusion but the many unanswered 
questions with which the novel’s seemingly definitive ending leaves the reader: “Was he 
alone? . . . Would anyone help? Were there objections that had been forgotten? . . . 
Where was the judge he’d never seen? Where was the high court he had never 
reached?” (164-65). The Trial’s obscure protagonist, simply known as “Joseph K.,” 
engages the reader only in an alienating way. Much as the character’s experiences are 
relatable on a more universal level, since he is a human being trapped in an absurd trial 
backed up by an impenetrable bureaucratic machine, K.’s particularity remains 
symbolically abstracted by the omission of that most basic of human identifiers, a 
complete name. This reflects the general lack of information that pervades the novel, in 
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which the reader’s knowledge of the protagonist’s person is almost entirely reduced to 
his struggle against an obscure law court and its executive branch. As a result, the 
reader’s identification with the protagonist’s perspective only goes so far as to provide a 
window into an otherwise estranging and absurd narrative universe. To this extent, The 
Trial provides a useful point of comparison for the post-arrest section of Zeitoun, in 
which the latter’s protagonist is faced precisely with a Kafkaesque situation.  
Zeitoun is different, however, in that it covers an extensive period before the 
protagonist’s confrontation with bureaucratic absurdity and human rights abuse. This is 
what distinguishes it from The Trial’s narrating of an immutable setting in which a 
protagonist, stripped of agency, undergoes an absurd trial and punishment. Eggers’s 
narrative portrays its protagonist and the story’s setting before the storm. In this 
section of the story, as I showed, both New Orleans and Zeitoun are presented to the 
reader respectively as being identifiably a typical U.S. city and an upstanding Syrian-
American citizen. Once the storm hits, the novel’s setting changes and the protagonist 
becomes an enticing object of identification, claiming the heroic status of an 
adventurous character in a dangerous setting. As such, the reader does not settle into 
the alienating experience of the Kafkaesque post-arrest situation because Zeitoun’s 
narrative structure is fundamentally disruptive. Affect is manipulated to go from 
identification with Zeitoun to alienation from the hero in the second half. In the second 
half, and much like Joseph K., the protagonist is only recognizable as an abstract human 
being suffering at the hands of a simultaneously devastating and absurd anti-terror 
operation. As if to match the way he is reductively “othered” by the authorities, the 
narrative strips the character of the depth that stimulates the reader’s identification 
with him in the first half. The post-arrest section, when told from the perspective of 
Zeitoun, contains no photographic material reinforcing his image as a loving father, 
proud brother, and adventurous traveller. As such, he becomes unavailable as a 
particular individual with which the reader can continue to identify. The text thus deals 
at a textual level with a crucial aspect of identification underlined by Butler, namely the 
need to reintroduce the alterity of the other. As she explains, identification is as much 
grounded in alterity as it is in sameness, given that the identificatory process “relies 
upon a difference that it seeks to overcome” (145). Following Zeitoun’s arrest, the text 
maintains two versions of the protagonist that recreate this coalescence of relatability 
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and difference. With increasing force, the reader is continually confronted by the 
contrasting images of a man inhumanly detained, on the one hand, and the likeable and 
particular character of Zeitoun that lingers on in his wife Kathy’s storyline as well as the 
reader’s memory of the first half of the narrative, on the other.  
As the reader is ejected from Zeitoun’s perspective, Kathy becomes increasingly 
enticing as an identificatory perspective as she seeks to find out what happened to her 
husband after they lose contact following his arrest. Kathy is a sympathetic character, 
introduced to the reader before the storm hits as managing the family business and as a 
caring mother. She is an American who converted to Islam just before meeting her 
husband. As such, she too claims a precarious hyphenated identity as an American and a 
Muslim. As Zeitoun roams the estranging space of post-Katrina New Orleans, Kathy flees 
the city with their children, staying initially with her brother in Baton Rouge, eighty 
miles outside the flooded city, and eventually with a friend, Yuko. As her husband is 
“othered” in the setting of New Orleans following his arrest, Kathy experiences related 
forms of othering within a more ostensibly North-American setting. Once she reaches 
her family, the narrator explains, she could expect to be told to take off her hijab by 
siblings unwilling to recognize her conversion to Islam as genuine and seeing it instead 
as an obligation imposed on her by her husband (57). These asides, focalized through 
Kathy, underscore the socio-cultural attitudes underlying the extreme racial profiling 
experienced by Zeitoun. As Oliver explains in Witnessing, the way “we conceive of 
others” corresponds strongly with “how we treat them” (3). Kathy’s perspective matters 
further, however, because it remains available to the reader as a point of identification 
within the narrative from which to perceive Zeitoun’s victimization. No matter how 
many times Kathy recalls prejudiced behaviour towards her, she does so from an 
American perspective in a recognizably American setting. A scene early on in the book 
in which Kathy confronts an instance of islamophobia serves as a useful example. After 
a young girl throws insults at her and tries to remove her hijab, Kathy returns in kind: 
“They assumed, no doubt, that a Muslim woman, presumably submissive and shy with 
her English, would allow her hijab to be ripped from her head without retaliation. But 
Kathy let loose a fusillade of pungent suggestions, leaving them dumbfounded and 
momentarily speechless” (46). Despite her hyphenated identity, scenes such as these 
serve to distance the reader from their potential prejudices and make Kathy’s 
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perspective more attractive. Through Kathy, the reader is led into seeing the individual 
prejudice she successfully confronts turned into a systemic violation of rights less easily 
combated at an individual level. 
A final comparison with Kafka’s novel, specifically the parable contained within it, 
can illustrate the effect these various perspectives have on the human rights-work 
Zeitoun performs with regard to the reader. In The Trial, as the reader becomes more 
familiar with K.’s particular struggle, however absurd, against his seemingly arbitrary 
conviction and eventual death sentence, the story begins to frame its already ethereal 
protagonist in more abstract terms. As K.’s situation becomes increasingly dire, the 
story leads him to a cathedral where he was meant to meet up with an important 
“Italian business contact of the bank” (143). The contact never materializes, and so K. 
decides to explore the cathedral alone. There he meets a priest working for the court 
who informs him that his case is going badly and his guilt is unquestionable. In 
desperation, K. makes an appeal to a common humanity to counteract his being 
devoured by an absurd legal system that churns out guilty verdicts without considering 
the person involved: “‘But I’m not guilty,’ said K., ‘there’s been a mistake. How is it even 
possible for someone to be guilty. We’re all human beings here, one like the other’” 
(152). Seemingly aware that his particular story and person have not proven his 
innocence, K. turns to pointing out the unfairness of an inexplicably abstract system 
finding any human being guilty more generally. The priest’s answer is intriguing: “‘That 
is true,’ said the priest, ‘but that is how the guilty speak’” (152). This brief exchange, in 
which K. pleads from the position of an Everyman and the priest responds in kind as a 
representative of the system, forms the prelude to the priest’s telling K. a parable called 
“Before the Law,” in which both the characters and the law itself appear in ethereal and 
abstracted forms.  
The famous parable inflects K.’s story by generalizing his experiences with regard to 
the strange world of the text, thus leading the reader away from the particularity of the 
protagonist’s predicament just before he is executed. It tells the story of a “man from 
the countryside” who is stranded in front of a door to “the Law,” guarded by a 
“doorkeeper” who refuses him entry and provides vague answers to the man’s 
questions. Years later, when the man has grown old and senile, he asks the doorkeeper a 
final question: “‘Everyone wants access to the law,’ says the man, ‘how come, over all 
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these years, no-one but me has asked to be let in?’” (155). The doorkeeper’s response, 
which he shouts at the man just before he dies, is baffling: “Nobody else could have got 
in this way, as this entrance was meant only for you. Now I’ll go and close it” (155). It 
would be almost impossible to argue that the reader is provided with any specific 
identificatory cues for the man from the countryside. It is equally clear that the parable 
does not make K. or his situation any more recognizable or real. Instead, the parable 
raises more general issues and questions. The law is presented as being universally 
accessible, even if, paradoxically, not accessible to the man from the countryside. In the 
story, this translates into the question of why he has a door to the law reserved for him 
if he is specifically prevented from entering through it. Much like K., the man from the 
countryside is made to suffer the effects of the law without ever knowing its workings 
or understanding his relationship to it. K. is accused, tried, and found guilty without 
ever reaching the high court or finding out what he is alleged to have done. This is the 
key similarity between K. and the man from the countryside, and the subsequent 
discussion between the priest and K. with regard to the parable bears this out in the way 
K. objects to the man’s unfair treatment (155-60). In this respect, the parable presents an 
abstracted version of K.’s predicament, which, in turn, hands the reader much-needed 
interpretative tools to decode K.’s strange relationship to the absurd legal system in the 
novel. It allows the reader to understand K.’s invocation of the Everyman trope, in that 
his struggle takes on a profound universal resonance of a human being demanding equal 
access to a legal discourse, socially and culturally embedded and accepted, that 
ostracizes and ultimately condemns him without his ever having understood or engaged 
with it. If K. or the man from the countryside invite identification, therefore, they do so 
as abstract human beings confronted with an absurd reality. 
The second half of Zeitoun gains additional meaning as a human rights text through 
this comparison to The Trial, as such a comparison throws its intrinsically Kafkaesque 
features into relief. Neither the setting of Zeitoun’s makeshift prison nor the character 
of Zeitoun stimulate any form of identification informed by ideas of sameness or 
relatability for an audience of privileged Western readers. As much as the first half 
invites precisely such identification, the second half disavows it entirely. In the extra-
legal space of the makeshift prison, Zeitoun is confronted with his own version of K.’s 
predicament, as he realizes the cells there are purpose-built for those flagged up by a 
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system of racial profiling from which he cannot escape and against which he cannot 
protest his innocence: “It was as if the entire operation, this bus-station-turned-military 
base, had been arranged for them” (211). In a twisted echo of the parable about the man 
from the countryside, Zeitoun is incarcerated in a purpose-built prison to which he is 
given “access” once he has been relabelled a terrorist by the guards who will not let him 
leave and will not reasonably answer any questions. The comfortable perspective of 
Kathy, into which the reader can more easily settle, further encourages the reader to 
recognize the irreconcilable difference of Zeitoun’s situation. Upon his release, and 
underscoring the extent to which her husband had been “othered” throughout his 
detention, she demands Zeitoun’s wallet be returned to him with his ID card, so she has 
“proof that her country recognized her husband as a citizen” (317). Despite this 
interlude in which the protagonist is stripped of his status as the incorporated citizen 
upon which human rights is based, to use Slaughter’s terms in Human Rights Inc., the 
reader remains invested in the protagonist throughout the entirety of the story. This is, 
as I argued, a result of the pre-arrest section of the narrative and the sympathetic 
perspective of Kathy, which provides them with a strong cue to maintain some form of 
relationship to him. As is the case in The Trial, however, the type of relationship 
becomes an abstract one. Once the narrative explains how Zeitoun is dehumanized by a 
discourse that collectively labels people like him “terrorists” and erases the relatable 
person described in the first half, the text invites the reader to re-establish that 
humanity.14 In its emphasis on the strangeness of both the setting and the person 
wrongfully imprisoned, however, the only way for that re-humanizing process to take 
place is for the reader to identify with Zeitoun as a human being. In effect, the text asks 
the reader to construct the “human” in human rights in order to find a means of 
maintaining a connection with the now otherwise unavailable character whose rights 
are being violated.  
 
                                                     
14 In “On Making Dehumanization Possible,” Samera Esmeir points out that the rise of human rights as a legal 
framework intricately links the struggle for rights and recognition to the notion of being human and claiming 
humanity: “the transformation of humanity into a status conferred by the protective work of the law enables 
the renaming of human rights violations as practices of dehumanization” (1544). The type of cultural work 
being conducted by Zeitoun in this respect is a reflection of that legal status and issue. 
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In order to achieve this, Zeitoun first has to modify a narrative culture surrounding 
human rights that stimulates direct and straightforward identification with the victim 
rather than this mediated identification through the abstracted “human” in human 
rights. It does so, as I have shown, by facilitating a move towards disidentification on 
the part of the reader in their negotiation of the two halves of the protagonist’s story. 
This is important because it not only counteracts the process by which difference is 
allowed to elide into sameness, but it also undermines readings of Zeitoun in which his 
ethnically diverse roots are essentialized and subsequently perceived as a threat. Oliver 
explains the latter when she writes:  
If we conceive of ourselves as self-identical, and we conceive of identity as 
opposed to difference, and we conceive of anything or anyone outside of the 
boundaries of ourselves as different, then we will conceive of anything different 
or outside of ourselves as a threat to our own identity. (2-3) 
In Zeitoun, the protagonist is drawn from within recognizable and relatable 
circumstances into a position of being “outside” and “different,” which prevents him 
from being constructed as a radical “other” unrelated to the reader. Instead, the reader 
is confronted with various complex versions of the protagonist, which include the 
straightforwardly identifiable, the radically other, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
abstractly human. As such, the traditional pattern, in which privileged readers 
recognize disempowered subjects and in doing so recreate a “subject-other/object 
hierarchy” (Oliver 9), is broken.15 Instead, the recognizer-recognizee relationship is 
deferred to a higher level, in which Zeitoun’s particularity is respected and 
simultaneously seen as a specific incarnation of the “human” covered by the discourse 
of human rights. 
 
                                                     
15 Oliver explains that the condition of disempowered subjects in a culture centred on recognition through 
sameness feeds this negative hierarchy: “Dehumanization creates the desire and need for recognition from 
the dominant culture. By so doing, however, the desire for recognition reinforces the dominance of the 
oppressor and the subordination of the oppressed. For it is the dominant culture and its representatives who 
have the power to confer or withhold recognition” (26). 
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 Zeitoun only partially overcomes the central identificatory issue at the heart of 
human rights culture, though, even if it seems to find a middle ground between the 
practical issue of overidentification with victims and the overly abstracted human 
theorized by human rights discourses. It is important to stress at this stage that the 
reader is only able to form a productive relationship with Zeitoun, one in which his 
rights-claim is recognized in a non-appropriative way, once he has been arrested and 
his rights have been violated. As such, the rights claim in the narrative is only 
introduced once the protocols of identification have been destabilized and the reader’s 
affective engagement has been channelled to a subject who is American first, and only 
then Syrian and Muslim. While this is certainly productive as a mean of recovering 
Zeitoun as a human being worth caring about, it problematically erases his specifically 
Syrian-Muslim background that lies at the heart of the rights violations he endures. The 
“Syrian” aspect of his “Syrian-American” citizenship never appears in anything more 
than a reductively assimilated form in the hero-section of the narrative, where the 
protagonist’s migrant background is incorporated into the far more amenable prototype 
of the American hero.  
Similarly, the racial profiling that allows the protagonist’s rights to be violated in the 
extra-legal space of post-Katrina New Orleans is only addressed when the narrative 
makes Zeitoun’s abstract humanity available as an affective perspective to the reader. 
Whilst this is productive, it problematically erases his specifically Syrian-Muslim 
background. Consequently, when the character is reintroduced into U.S. society upon 
his release, he emerges, in the eyes of the reader, simply as a human being able to be 
incorporated into American society. The latter is underscored by his wife, who 
forcefully asserts Zeitoun’s place in that society by insisting that state officials return 
documents proving her husband’s American citizenship rights (317). His diverse cultural 
affiliations, central to the rights violations he endured, thus fade into the background. 
In the final pages, Zeitoun only exists as a model citizen contributing to the re-building 
of New Orleans. As in the mythical model of the city on the hill, he vows that New 
Orleans should be “better,” that the storm “removed the rot,” and that the foundations 
are being strengthened (325). As such, his incarceration has thus not only distances the 
protagonist from the Syrian-Muslim part of his identity, but the storm that made his 
detention possible is presented as having magically cleansed the country of the 
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prejudices that caused his rights to be violated. In this sense, the rights-claim in the 
narrative is never brought to bear on the particularity of Zeitoun as a character, with all 
its attendant hostility, and only on his abstracted humanity. This is a marked difference 
from the slave narratives discussed in the previous chapter, where the emphasis was on 
the ways in which society needed to change. In the contemporary example, the purview 
of Western human rights culture is thus not extended through the narrative’s careful 
negotiation of the reader’s affective engagement with it. Instead, Zeitoun carefully 
presents and guides Zeitoun’s character in such a way that they can be accommodated 
by the existing rights culture without disturbing that culture’s fundamental limitations 
and problems.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have examined at a textual level how Eggers’s collaborative testimonial 
projects, both with individuals and with collectives, cultivate affective engagement with 
their readership in order to perform their role within human rights culture. As a means 
of achieving this, I suggested an approach that brings together the psychological and 
textual sensitivity of trauma studies and the cross-cultural awareness of postcolonial 
studies. This approach is fruitful because it lays bare some of the affordances and 
constraints of the personal narrative, and of the ways in which this genre is used in 
human rights culture, that are often overlooked. This oversight occurs when personal 
narratives are reduced to a means of enforcing straightforward identification through a 
crushing notion of human sameness that denies those differences that are typically at 
the heart of rights crises. My analytical approach exposes these blind spots and 
complicates our understanding of the personal narrative. Trauma studies has developed 
a meticulous awareness of the dangers posed by (over)identification, and theorists such 
as LaCapra have provided possible answers in the form of guarded empathy. As such, 
expanding the scope of their corpus to examine narratives circulating within human 
rights culture can help to throw into relief the different affective relationships these 
texts cultivate. Similarly, postcolonial studies’ insistence on taking into account the 
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hierarchical power dynamics perpetuated in global discourses of human rights sheds 
additional light on the connections established between privileged audiences and 
disempowered subjects through personal narratives. Following on from the previous 
chapter’s investigation of how Eggers’s collaborative testimonies both produce and 
reproduce the contemporary discourse of human rights, this chapter has thus further 
investigated how these narratives, embedded in human rights culture, engage a rights-
bearing audience. 
What Is the What provided an intriguing case study of how literary ventriloquism, 
through the narrative middle voice of Valentino, destabilizes the relationship between 
Eggers, Deng, and the reader. This particular novel’s distorted narrative voice, I showed, 
cultivates a form of guarded empathy between the reader and the disempowered 
subject that closely resembles the empathically unsettled relationship thought out by 
LaCapra. In doing so, it is able to counteract appropriative readings of the subaltern’s 
testimony that are grounded in neo-colonial conceptions of a rights-bearing West 
gazing at and aiding a wild and lawless Global South. The two volumes discussed from 
the Voice of Witness series, Voices from the Storm and Out of Exile, took a broader 
approach in their affective offer to readers, stimulating a more diffuse type of 
identification. This diffuseness attempts to negotiate the particularity of the victims 
with the metonymical expectations cultivated by oral history collections that their 
subjects provide a comprehensive overview of a rights crisis. Overall, the reader of these 
volumes is provided with a number of cues that aim to unsettle straightforward 
identificatory practices by embedding the particularity of victims in the broader social, 
legal, cultural, and political dynamics that cause large groups of people to be similarly 
affected and abused. Finally, Zeitoun’s two-part structure enthusiastically adopts a 
straightforward identificatory paradigm in the first half, but only as a means of 
stressing radical difference in the second and making the protagonist’s experiences of 
rights abuses unavailable. This has the added effect of unsettling the reader’s 
interpretative comfort in the first section, which reimagines Zeitoun as a prototypical 
American hero, through a process of fundamental human sameness and reductive 
ethnocentricity. When the first and second half are taken together, however, the novel 
provides a strong cue for Zeitoun’s basic humanity to be recognized while preserving 
the alterity of his experiences in the extra-legal space of post-Katrina New Orleans. 
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Fundamentally, all three forms of affective engagement cultivated by Eggers’s 
various adaptations of the personal narrative seek to render the disempowered subject 
as being covered by the “human” in human rights without eliding their alterity in the 
process. As such, they both use and reshape the affordances attached to the personal 
narrative within human rights culture and seek to address the problematic discourse of 
sameness that accompanies its more straightforward applications. This type of 
sustained attention to the textual function performed by personal narratives 
complicates some of the commonplace assumptions held about the nature of those 
narratives’ contributions to human understanding and empathy. For instance, Hayden 
White, an advocate of the so-called linguistic or narrative turn in historiography, begins 
The Content of the Form by stating that “narrative is a meta-code, a human universal on 
the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be 
transmitted” (1). This type of observation is welcome as an affirmation of the centrality 
of narrative to the way in which reality is shaped and understood, one that remains 
crucial to understanding a contemporary context of human rights culture that 
supplements facts of human rights crises with testimonies of real experience. Building 
on this, it has been my argument in this chapter that sustained attention to the textual 
negotiation of affective relationships between the subaltern and the privileged can 
provide additional depth to our understanding of the role played by personal narratives 
in human rights culture. My analyses highlight how Eggers’s personal narratives 
manipulate the opportunities afforded by the personal narrative to conduct the human 
rights-work of establishing the disempowered subject as recognizable and equal in a 
way that does not reinforce a neo-colonial dynamic of rights-bearers patronizingly 
granting that recognition or equality. 
Additionally, however, parts of Eggers’s textual strategies and manoeuvring are, as I 
showed, severely undermined by the constraints of the personal narrative as a genre 
within human rights culture. The previous chapter already brought some of these to 
light, such as the mediation through white authors and the Western book market as well 
as the extra-textual requirements of human rights culture for disempowered subjects to 
occupy the position of the victim with a flattening lack of complexity. This chapter has 
uncovered additional contradictions and counterproductive aspects on the level of the 
text itself. The intricate textual and paratextual negotiation of both the disempowered 
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subject’s voice and the reader’s privileged position in What Is the What ultimately fails to 
factor Deng’s original Sudanese context into the equation. Even as the novel carefully 
guides the reader into a guarded form of empathy with its protagonist, it only does so by 
meticulously navigating the existing boundaries of human rights discourse so as to 
include Deng. As I argued, this leads to the uncomfortable situation of Deng, now 
recovered for a Western discourse, providing a more ethical lens from which to peruse 
distant abuses in Sudan. Even though Out of Exile, adopting the Voice of Witness style, is 
better able to convey the diversity of experience of the Sudanese crisis, it too fails to 
complicate the essentially biased perspective of privileged readers by upholding their 
position as rights-bearers gazing at the suffering of others. Zeitoun overcomes this 
limitation by focusing explicitly on disrupting the reader’s interpretative framework in 
such a way that they are forced to recognize the protagonist’s humanity when he is 
forcefully abused as a result of racial profiling. However, the narrative struggles to bring 
its rights-claiming efforts to bear on the particularity of the protagonist’s cultural 
affiliations, despite their centrality to his incarceration. What Is the What attempts to 
stress difference too through Deng’s encounters with African-Americans, but only to the 
extent that he is a different kind of “other” to whom empathy can be extended once his 
narrative is grounded in an North-American context. Zeitoun struggles in a similar way 
when it fails to reintegrate the protagonist’s alterity back into the North-American 
context, thus cordoning off his experiences of racial profiling and related rights abuses 
in the extra-legal setting of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
Sustained attention to these affective textual negotiations thus turned up a number of 
significant obstacles, challenges, and outright contradictory discourses and processes 
that coexist with the productive aspects of Eggers’s collaborative testimonial work. The 
next chapter will further illuminate these constraints placed on the rights-work 
performed by personal narratives and consider their impact on the rights-space-
creating and -filling affordances of the genre examined in this and the previous chapter. 
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 4 Closing Rights-Spaces: Eggers and Human 
Rights in the Global Public Sphere 
Up to this point, this dissertation has focused on the ways in which personal narratives 
function within human rights culture. When the subaltern finds a means of speaking, it 
not only accepts – and thereby legitimizes – the global rights discourse, but also tries to 
reshape it so as to confront some of the myriad structures and processes by which they 
are rendered invisible by or in spite of it. In doing so, they confront the cosmopolitan 
faith in cross-cultural encounters with the lingering neo-colonialism that still plagues 
the human rights project’s global ambitions. As a genre, the personal narrative thus 
takes up a central place within human rights culture as a rights-space creating tool able 
to expand the circle of people to whom that projects feels rights should extend. In doing 
so, disempowered victim-narrators typically push back against countervailing 
discourses that prevent such an expansion. In this respect, one could recall the rights-
space creating efforts of black authors in the nineteenth century who sought to 
establish themselves as human beings to whom freedom and citizenship should extend, 
and who were acutely aware of the need to challenge widespread racial prejudice and 
inequality. Eggers’s collaborative testimonial works, such as Zeitoun and What Is the 
What, maintain a similar awareness of the need to not only claim rights on behalf of 
disempowered subjects, but also to undermine readings of the narratives of those 
disempowered subjects that reinforce rather than break down the epistemological 
boundaries of who qualifies as the “human” in human rights. The close textual analysis 
in the previous chapter of the type of relationship these narratives cultivate with their 
readership brought out just how the textual cues in these texts aim to ensure non-
appropriative and less hierarchical forms of engagement. 
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Eggers’s meticulous attention to claiming rights, taking on prejudice, and guiding the 
reader matters because there is a perpetual risk that the subaltern’s voice is drowned 
out or re-marginalized. At each stage of my analyses, competing discourses and 
practices crop up that undermine the rights-work being performed by personal 
narratives. In Eggers’s case, for instance, the only way for his disempowered 
collaborators to gain recognition is through a white author who mediates access to a 
book market catering to the expectations of a privileged audience. These expectations, 
governed in part by the tenets of human rights culture, mostly centre on the desire to 
consume sentimental stories whose call to action can easily be answered in the form of 
patronizing charity and sympathy. When combined, the author and the disempowered 
subject’s intricate textual, paratextual, and extra-textual efforts seem to accrue enough 
socio-cultural capital to purchase a place for the victim-narrator within the existing 
hegemony. As I have shown, however, Eggers’s works fall short when it comes to doing 
more than simply recovering the single subject whose story they tell. Fundamentally, 
the discourses that cement the subaltern’s exclusion within hierarchical global power 
dynamics go unchallenged at a structural level, despite the fact that the particular 
subjects of What Is the What and Zeitoun are victims of those dynamics. On this level, in 
short, the overall effort of Eggers’s collaborative testimonial projects is successfully 
counteracted by competing discourses. 
Over the course of this dissertation, at least three crucial systemic issues have 
surfaced that compete with and undermine the rights-work Eggers’s personal narratives 
set out to complete. The first, borne out in the diachronic comparison to slave 
narratives, centres on the collaborative process itself. In the case of the abolitionist-
(former) slave collaboration, the latter continually resists the former’s efforts to allocate 
them a purely illustrative function within an intellectual debate and campaign 
organized, regulated, and played out amongst white folk. Contemporary collaborations, 
such as Eggers’s collaborations with Deng or Zeitoun, acknowledge and seek to reverse 
or downplay this detrimental hierarchy, but in the end the disempowered collaborators 
are necessarily engaged in an unequal struggle for the required socio-cultural capital 
with an established authorial brand name preferred by the cultural marketplace. The 
second structural problem lies in human rights culture’s fixed understanding of the 
different actors in rights crises and reparations. This understanding is enshrined in the 
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form of strictly defined roles from which any deviation risks disqualifying the affected 
victims from being heard and the issue they bring forward from being recognized. 
These roles, set out for example by David Kennedy in The Dark Sides of Virtue, comprise 
the passive and innocent victim, the uncomplicatedly evil villain, and the heroic human 
rights activist (14). In the case of the personal narrative, the audience is often cast as the 
latter as they are invited to take up the cause and act on behalf of the disempowered 
subject.  
The extra-textual case of Zeitoun provides an important example of what happens 
when complexity is introduced into this performance of roles, be it through the 
protagonist’s fall from grace or the supposed state-guarantor of rights par excellence, the 
United States, being cast as the villain rather than the hero. In the case of What Is the 
What, the tension between the recovery of particular subaltern subjects and the need to 
address this second structural problem is laid bare in an especially poignant way. In 
order for Deng to narrate his way into the circle of rights-bearers in an effective way, 
the novel is forced to emphasize his resolute innocence as it carefully treads around the 
ambiguity of the child-soldier issue. As such, Deng’s recovery comes at the cost of an 
implicit admission that some of his fellow Lost Boys, those drafted into being child-
soldiers, are beyond the narrative salvation offered to Deng by What Is the What. 
The final obstacle comes from the widespread intrusion of neo-colonial discourses 
into the rights-claiming process. These countervailing discourses, practices, and 
mindsets are perpetuated culturally in the form of neo-colonial stereotypes that fix the 
subaltern as a passive and helpless collective that exists in the lawless borderlands of 
the global rights-community. What makes this mode of thinking so pernicious is how it 
effectively counteracts some of the core aims of human rights by stressing fundamental 
differences between human beings and entrenching hierarchical conceptions of 
Enlightened and primitive cultures, or indeed between the civilized West and the 
uncivilized rest. Ultimately, all of these three systemic issues are deeply implicated in 
one another. It will be the central focus of this chapter to draw out these implications by 
combining a textual analysis of different works in Eggers’s oeuvre that can speak to one 
another in this respect.  
Initially, I will explore the various strands of neo-colonial discourses more closely in 
order to uncover how they unhelpfully inflect those of human rights culture. This will 
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then form the basis for two separate analyses. The first will deal with the resonances of 
colonialism as they interfere with the cosmopolitan notion of a free and open global 
public sphere in which universal rights are negotiated and distributed. This first section 
will focus on two fictional works by Eggers, the novel You Shall Know Our Velocity and the 
short story “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly.” My aim is to show how the 
discursive spaces in these works play out the tenets of neo-colonialism against the often 
naïve cosmopolitan faith in cross-cultural dialogue as a means of extending the 
discourse of human rights. By exposing the problems with an almost blind faith in cross-
cultural dialogue, these fictional narratives form an effective critique of the type of 
projects Eggers engages in through his collaborative testimonial works and for which 
his careful textual work only provides a limited answer. Interestingly, then, even as 
interdisciplinary research on literature and human rights has begun to etch out the 
coalescence of the two, Eggers provides an important example of how literary texts can 
also critique human rights discourses and explore questions pertaining to their 
universalist rhetoric.  
The second analytical section reprises two critical aspects of human rights discussed 
in the previous analyses that Eggers’s personal narratives rely on for their rights-work. 
The first is the perceived benefit of a rights discourse that transcends the nation state 
and is thereby less marred by the tension between the nation state as guarantor and 
violator of rights. The second is the ability for the personal narrative to provide a 
cultural entry point into the imagined transnational community of rights-bearers. This 
section will discuss Eggers’s novel A Hologram For the King, demonstrating that it exposes 
the relative lack of a strong, formalized socio-political framework beyond the existing 
nation state-based order. This analysis is important because it significantly qualifies the 
faith placed by Zeitoun and What Is the What in the availability of a viable transnational 
alternative to the power dynamics between states and cultures that spawn rights crises. 
The section goes on to consider the ways in which the existing, weak transnational 
framework of human rights risks re-enacting those power dynamics by rendering itself 
unavailable to those who most need it. Returning to several important scenes in the 
run-up to Valentino’s airlift to the United States, I use What Is the What to reflect on the 
legalistic focus of human rights discourse that enshrines the subaltern’s dependency on 
expert, privileged mediators. Ultimately, the chapter uses consecutive analyses as a 
  205 
means of questioning whether Eggers’s personal narratives can overcome the 
competing discourses that seek to undermine his efforts and that he so poignantly 
exposes elsewhere in his oeuvre. 
4.1 Neo-Colonial Inflections 
Given their patently opposing aims, it may seem strange to discuss the 
interconnectedness of human rights and the contemporary incarnations of colonialism. 
One seeks to guarantee basic needs, equality, and fairness for all, while the other harks 
back to a divisive discourse of racial and cultural inequality that justifies mass 
exploitation and suffering. One way of understanding their interaction has been to 
conceive of human rights as a kind of neo-colonialism in disguise. Indeed, as I explained 
in the first chapter, it has been suggested that human rights itself is simply the latest 
Western discourse that allows the old and new imperial powers to maintain their hold 
over the Global South or at least maintain the idea of an Enlightened West setting terms 
to the rest of the world.1 A second view is that human rights was conceived by colonial 
powers who simply did not take subaltern suffering caused by colonial rule into 
consideration for fear of giving imperial subjects a means of protesting their suffering. 
Moyn’s work brings both views together in its comprehensive attempt at explaining the 
fraught relationship between human rights and the history of (de)colonization. In The 
Last Utopia, he argues that when the touchstone for human rights, the UDHR, was 
finalized in 1948, its revolutionary humanist character meant it was so indebted to 
colonial discourse that it became suspect to anti-colonialists, who initially declined to 
use it (60-86). Discussing the central claims from The Last Utopia in an interview, he goes 
on to assert that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself was still fully 
 
                                                     
1 One should recall in this respect not just those academic critiques by, for instance, Gilroy or Slaughter, but 
also the accusation levelled at the ICC by the African Union that human rights law is being used by the West to 
castigate Africa. 
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compatible with a colonial world (Kaul and Kim, Imagining Human Rights 11). In Human 
Rights and the Uses of History, Moyn makes a similar claim and explains that this 
compatibility only changed following a series of United Nations Resolutions in the 
sixties and seventies (93).2 The difficulty in determining human rights’ relationship to 
(neo-)colonialism is thus not so much historical as it is conceptual, depending largely on 
how one understands the human rights project and how it is conceived of by those who 
latch onto it. 
This raises two important issues with regard to the interconnectedness of neo-
colonialism and human rights. First, it points to the fact that human rights was not 
designed as a means of addressing the unequal power dynamics created by colonialism 
and which are perpetuated by neo-colonial discourses. Second, it shows that even 
though human rights seemingly coincides with the period of decolonization, it is not 
clear that the former directly contributed to the latter, at least initially. Much like the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century declarations discussed in chapter two, therefore, it 
had to be reappropriated by disempowered subjects and activists in order for it to serve 
the drive towards ending colonial rule. It is not unreasonable to suggest that in doing so, 
these subjects too were confronted by the restrictions and limitations placed on their 
use of a newly established human rights framework not originally designed to serve 
their needs. In other words, the fact that human rights does not directly address many 
of the attendant ills of colonialism inhibited its ability to facilitate the demise of colonial 
rule and continues to inhibit its ability to deal with the histories and remnants of the 
colonial project, not only geo-politically but also culturally, that prevent rights from 
making good on their universal promise of equality. Accordingly, my analysis of Eggers’s 
fictional works, and particularly “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly,” explores the 
continued struggle of asserting subaltern subjectivity through a discourse that does not 
explicitly speak to the neo-colonial thinking that counteracts it. This suggests that the 
anti-colonial legal and political action that took place in the sixties and seventies 
 
                                                     
2 These are: “1514 (1960) condemning colonialism, 2131 (1965) on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, and finally 2625 (1970) 
on friendly relations” (Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History 93). 
  207 
described by Moyn has not necessarily translated into the cultural sphere, where neo-
colonial thinking remains pernicious and is less easily “outlawed.”  
The mediation of personal narratives provides a significant case in point, as it is 
framed by human rights culture’s weakness in addressing, exposing, and challenging 
the neo-colonial power dynamics that are often the root cause of the crises being raised. 
Fundamentally, it relates to human rights’ otherwise laudable commitment to universal 
rights to which all individuals are entitled. David Rieff sees this universalism as being 
derived from human rights’ foundational origins as an absolutist, maximalist, and 
inflexible law-based movement (286). A worrying consequence of this is that the space 
where rights are officially debated and defined has been rendered so legalistic and 
abstract that it risks being too vague to deal with the deeply entrenched inequalities 
that govern the realities of victims. As Kennedy points out, feeding the legalistic 
bureaucracy of human rights has often become an end in itself for the human rights 
movement, which causes its institutions to “believe and insist that they have addressed 
the problem of violations with an elaborate, internationally respected and ‘state of the 
art’ response” (12). More broadly, there is also no guarantee that declarations and laws 
constructed on the basis of long-standing philosophical concerns for the well-being of 
an abstracted “mankind” brings any of the real and particular suffering of victims into 
focus. One need only look again at the juxtaposed struggles of the black authors 
discussed in chapter two and the declarations lauded by scholars such as Hunt to see 
this glaring issue in action. Unsurprisingly, this blindness to the suffering of black 
people was and is in large part due to the entrenched forms of racial inequality and 
cultural stereotyping of racial others as inferior that form the core tenets of colonialism. 
More recently, the new discourse of human rights is no better equipped to deal with 
neo-colonial discourses because it is both too individualist and too universal. Or, to put 
it differently, human rights consistently deploys its universalist values in aid of 
individual subjects but not explicitly against the forces and structures that 
disenfranchise them. Personal narratives in human rights culture, such as Eggers’s What 
Is the What, Zeitoun, or the Voice of Witness series, can carefully negotiate disempowered 
subjects’ acceptance into the circle of rights-bearers by conjuring up and relying on a 
feeling of common humanity. What they struggle to do, however, is find ways of doing 
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so that do not inscribe that process along the trajectories of persistent neo-colonial 
power dynamics. 
This calls into question the required mediation by well-meaning actors such as 
Eggers. In the absence of a robust global human rights framework capable of 
guaranteeing its universal values absolutely in the face of countervailing discourses, the 
process of representing and righting wrongs cannot be elided and deserves additional 
scrutiny. Kennedy writes that the “production of authentic victims” happens through a 
process whereby they take up “a language of victimization” that admits their voice into 
the global public sphere (29). Even as they speak in that accepted victim-voice, however, 
the dialogue can be monitored and mediated to such an extent that the victim is 
patronized or re-silenced. For instance, one of the central conclusions of Guglielmo 
Verdirame and Barbara Harrell-Bond’s legal-political study Rights in Exile (2005) of 
refugee rights is that many were “unaware of how to present their testimonies in order 
to meet the burden of proof necessary to be found credible as someone fleeing from 
persecution” (19). The legalistic discourse of human rights thus creates the need for 
expert, privileged mediators to stand between the disempowered subject and their 
entrance into the circle of rights-bearers. Those who have not yet been authenticated in 
this sense, remain speechless through their exclusion from this representational 
framework, which similarly reinforces global divisions and inequality (Kennedy 29). 
Disempowered subjects awaiting this form of mediation remain stuck in the passive 
bystander role and are usually, as Ilan Kapoor illustrates, often unilaterally represented 
by celebrities speaking for the subaltern as “victims” stripped of the political contexts 
that caused their rights to be violated (3). The overall problem laid at the feet of human 
rights is that its lack of clout in dealing with neo-colonial dynamics may cause it to 
reflect them, even play them out anew in its cultural efforts to generalize rights. 
4.2 The Cosmopolitan Project 
This poses a direct challenge to those arguing in favour of art’s role in addressing the 
root causes of rights violations by expanding the circle of rights-bearers or of putting 
  209 
the legalistic discourse of human rights back in touch with the reality of subaltern 
speech and suffering (Huyssen; Levy and Sznaider). Contemporary theories of 
cosmopolitanism that have been imbued with new life following the rise of human 
rights are major proponents of this idea. Indeed, it is proposed most forcefully by 
scholars such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, Jürgen Habermas, and Seyla Benhabib. In 
“Cosmopolitan Patriots,” Appiah argues that universalist claims are insufficiently 
attentive to cultural difference and do not guarantee the protection of those living 
outside of the hegemony:  
Liberals take it to be self-evident that we are all “created equal” and that we each 
bear certain “inalienable rights,” and then seem almost immediately to become 
preoccupied with looking after the rights of the local branch of the species, 
forgetting – this is a cosmopolitan critique – that their rights matter as human 
rights, and thus matter only if the rights of foreign humans matter too. (93)3 
In order to overcome the infamously problematic discrepancy between the belief in 
universal rights on the one hand and empathic parochialism on the other, Appiah posits 
conversations between peoples as an intuitive “engagement with the experience and 
the ideas of others” (Cosmopolitanism 85). He suggests that this would make “real and 
present” the otherwise imaginary stranger to whom we are meant to feel connected 
(Cosmopolitanism 99). Furthermore, he argues, this would lead to an engaged global 
conversation that would help create an understanding of how shared “thin” universal 
values (e.g. “good parenting”) can find “thick” particular but diverging cultural 
applications (e.g. “how to be a good parent”) (Cosmopolitanism 45-50). Appiah and other 
cosmopolitan thinkers may offer differing versions of cosmopolitanism, but they do 
tend to agree on the importance of relinquishing entrenched national identities in 
cross-cultural dialogues of mutual understanding so as to expand the global reach of 
human rights. 
 
                                                     
3 Huyssen similarly critiques universalism based on the observation that “[a]ll individuality is inherently 
social” (618). He argues that the liberal belief that understands an individual’s autonomy as being innate 
denies the fact that it actually emerges “in reciprocal recognition of citizens embedded in a culture and 
engaged in social and political relations” (618). 
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Instead of Appiah’s intermittent cross-cultural encounters, Habermas proposes a 
rational-critical debate in a more structured global public sphere in which everyone 
ideally participates as equals. Comparing these two cosmopolitan thinkers, Michael 
Scrivener explains that they share a belief in the cosmopolitan urgency to combat 
global disenfranchisement, but differ once Habermas elaborates on the need for a 
rational persuasive critical debate (24).4 Habermas describes the terms for his public 
forum as fourfold: First, “nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be 
excluded”; Second, “all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make 
contributions”; Third, “participants must mean what they say”; Fourth, 
“communication must be freed from external and internal coercion” (Habermas, The 
Inclusion of the Other 44). In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, he explains that 
it is only when norms and values are debated within such a public forum that they can 
achieve universal validity and recognition (65-67). The emphasis is on the presumed 
rapprochement between diverging cultures that could be achieved through a cross-
cultural dialogue. This distinguishes Habermas’s thinking from monological conceptions 
of universal rights as articulated by contemporary theorists such as John Rawls or the 
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, to which Habermas and Rawls are both 
indebted.5 To come back to an earlier point then, Habermasian cosmopolitanism is also 
determined to define universal rights as debated and agreed rather than innately 
human, as the “natural rights” of old were seen. This is an important distinction, as 
Habermas himself explains in The Postcolonial Constellation, because clinging to “the 
metaphysical assumption of an individual who exists prior to all socialization” 
undermines the necessary communitarian effort required to recognize intersubjective 
 
                                                     
4 Appiah, Scrivener argues, has “a Humean distrust of reason and a Rousseauvian trust in intuition, but his 
narrative of social change omits rational moments” (24). 
5 In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas criticizes Rawls’s argument in A Theory of Justice for 
excluding citizens from the debate on the norms which govern their society, placing it entirely in the hands of 
philosophers. For Kant, one could think primarily of his essays “Idea for a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Perspective” and “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” which posit the general 
rules which would govern relationships within, between, and beyond states with a view to ensuring universal 
peace and prosperity. 
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rights (125). What makes this particularly relevant to a discussion of Eggers’s narratives 
is that, as Levy and Sznaider point out in Human Rights and Memory, extending rights on 
the basis of the universality principle may even preclude participation in a meaningful 
and mutually instructive cross-cultural dialogue (6) in that it glosses over existing 
inequalities and therefore, one might add, never fulfils the four requirements set out by 
Habermas for an open and persuasive debate in a cosmopolitan public sphere.6 The 
failed cross-cultural dialogues imagined by Eggers as I read them, moreover, would 
seem to reflect more fundamentally on the attainability of these requirements in the 
first place given the entrenchment of its protagonists in various other global practices. 
This entrenchment is made explicit in the stories by restricting the characters’ 
relationships with the disempowered as a result of hierarchy reinforcing humanitarian 
impulses and an insurmountable rootedness in colonial discourses. Indeed, colonialism 
and imperialism are both practices that rely on obscuring the particularity of others, 
making them mutually exclusive with a cosmopolitan dialogue and anathema to the 
generalization of rights. 
This question of a limited participation in a global debate on universal human rights 
invites comments from a third cosmopolitan theorist. In Another Cosmopolitanism: 
Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Democratic Iterations, Seyla Benhabib posits that cosmopolitan 
norms could circumvent restricted access to the global public sphere by endowing 
“individuals rather than states and their agents with certain rights and claims” (15). 
Earlier, in The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, she posits that only through 
ongoing negotiations between individuals from different backgrounds is it possible to 
“render distinctions between ‘citizens’ and ‘aliens’ . . . fluid and negotiable” and allow 
“cosmopolitan solidarity” to take hold (21). This is not, however, a move towards 
 
                                                     
6 This glossing over is subtly found in the imagery of You Shall Know Our Velocity when Will suggests that his 
newfound wealth leaves him feeling uncomfortable. His statement that he prefers “living on the equator just 
above and below a zero balance” (15) invites comparison with people in the Global South and ignores the 
fundamental fact that the North/South divide is about more than discrepancies in material wealth. This 
misunderstanding leaves Will thinking that money would “bridge” the distance between him and those 
existing outside of the hegemony, whereas his agonizing over potential interactions with those people reveals 
to the reader the importance of overcoming what he describes as a “limitless and deadly” distance (15). 
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abstract universalism at a transnational level. She starts from what Habermas calls the 
“Janus face of the modern nation,” meaning that “modern democracies act in the name 
of universal principles, which are then circumscribed within a particular civic 
community” (Another Cosmopolitanism 32). In other words, universal norms and values 
work by negotiating legitimacy within a particular group of individuals. The 
cosmopolitan move is once again to imagine this group as crossing cultural boundaries – 
not necessarily along the lines of existing states – in its understanding of how they wish 
to particularize a certain universal norm.7 In discussing this process, she echoes 
Habermas’s insistence on equal access to a global debate when she insists on 
cosmopolitan justice as a vision which incorporates “just membership” rather than 
simply “just distribution” (Benhabib, The Rights of Others 3). This way of thinking about the 
universality of rights is also quite strongly reminiscent of the relationship between 
“thin” and “thick” rights described earlier by Appiah.  
Nevertheless, even though Appiah, Habermas, or Benhabib never suggest that their 
envisioned cross-cultural dialogues and cosmopolitan outlook are easily achievable, 
they spend more time explaining what a cosmopolitan public debate might look like and 
how it would work than discussing the obstacles and problems cosmopolitanism faces 
when engaging with the practical application of universalizing rights. How do these 
processes play out against the backdrop of the legacy of imperialism? What impact do 
the remnants of colonialism and colonial ideology have on cross-cultural encounters? 
How do these questions affect the position of rights-bearers and disempowered others 
in the conversation? And how can advocates for the universalization of human rights 
respond adequately to those who criticize its distinctly Western origins? Answering 
these questions would show sensitivity to Butler’s pertinent claim in Frames of War that 
“we must be wary of invocations of ‘global responsibility’ which assume that one 
country has a distinctive responsibility to bring democracy to other countries” (37). It 
 
                                                     
7 Benhabib stresses this need to balance the universal reach of rights with the particularity of cultures: “It is 
important to respect the claims of diverse democratic communities, including their distinctive cultural, legal, 
and constitutional self-understanding, while strengthening their commitments to emerging norms of 
cosmopolitan justice” (The Rights of Others 3).  
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would also take into account the issues she takes up in Precarious Lives concerning the 
precariousness of those lives existing outside of the hegemony. Both of these issues 
come to the fore in an analysis of Eggers’s narratives, who plays out relationships with 
the disenfranchised both inside and outside of the fictional world. Indeed, this is where 
literary texts can contribute to our understanding of this issue, in that they can imagine 
different forms of cross-cultural encounters and throw the debate on universalism, 
particularity, and cosmopolitan responses into sharp relief. It is in this light that the 
missed or failed encounters which run through Eggers’s You Shall Know Our Velocity and 
“Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” become particularly illuminating. 
4.3 Discursive Spaces and Competing Discourses: You Shall 
Know Our Velocity and “Up the Mountain Coming Down 
Slowly” 
In “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly,” a young American woman, Rita, rushes 
down from the top of Mount Kilimanjaro in a dismayed and shocked state after being 
confronted with the death of several Tanzanian porters employed by a tourist company 
to carry her hiking gear: “She makes it down to the high camp, where the porters made 
her dinner and went to sleep and did not wake up. This cannot be her fault. . . . How 
could she be responsible for this kind of thing?” (198-199). Rita’s question about her own 
responsibility is both a rhetorical rejection of responsibility and an open-ended 
question, asking whether she should take responsibility for the porters’ deaths. Her 
response is a reflection of her thoughts, rendered in free indirect speech and steeped in 
a newfound yet reluctant responsibility for disempowered others whom she had been 
unwittingly exploiting. However, it is also emblematic of the unresolved tension within 
human rights culture concerning the generalization of its core values. How can rights 
which are distributed unequally in some places or not at all in others be made to live up 
to their proclaimed universality? Indeed, as Moyn explains in The Last Utopia, rights 
refer to a set of “indispensable liberal freedoms” supposedly already possessed by all, as 
well as to “the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political 
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entities” (1). In light of this, one can understand Rita’s epiphany firstly as a 
cosmopolitan recognition of her own status as a rights-bearer within a world of 
disenfranchised others and secondly as a stark realization of the consequences of 
rampant inequality. Her difficulty in coming to terms with the responsibility this entails 
– to recognize the disenfranchised and act upon their suffering – reveals the fact that, 
even though she hails from a North-American rights culture that proclaims those rights 
on the basis of a shared humanity, she was unable to confront the tension between the 
unequal distribution of rights and their proclaimed universality up until this point in 
the story.  
This scene and the broader issue it raises is symptomatic of how You Shall Know Our 
Velocity and “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” explore issues of cross-cultural 
interpersonal empathy through an engagement with the particularity of the 
disempowered. I discuss these particular narratives in the context of universalism and 
cosmopolitanism because they both confront the issue of rights-bearing Americans 
venturing beyond their Western rights culture to encounter the disempowered who live 
in parts of the world rife with rights violations. The specific issue to consider in You Shall 
Know Our Velocity is the chequered experiences of its protagonists in establishing 
meaningful cross-cultural relationships while engaging in charitable activities. In my 
analysis of “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly,” I develop these stunted 
relationships against the background of neo-colonial power relations and restricted 
empathy. Thematically, Eggers’s stories test the limits of promoting rights on the basis 
of an innate shared humanity by exposing how such a basis easily slides into other 
universalist practices such as those of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. At the 
character level, these narratives consider the possibilities for meaningful cross-cultural 
relationships within the context of these discourses, revealing the ease with which they 
in turn can slip into hierarchical relations that reaffirm existing divisions. The troubled 
relationships that Eggers describes tend to fail – despite the best intentions of his 
protagonists – because the tremendous socio-economic difference between characters is 
implicitly glossed over in favour of a putative bond grounded in a common humanity, 
and is made explicit through the theme of charity. The recurrent evocation of these 
faltering interpersonal connections dovetails with the conclusion drawn by 
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cosmopolitan scholars who believe that a shared humanity in and of itself is not an 
adequate basis for global solidarity.8  
Eggers’s narratives thus make use of fiction to conduct a worthwhile thought 
experiment. You Shall Know Our Velocity and “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” put 
rights discourses based on an innate humanity to the test by imagining a form of cross-
cultural cosmopolitanism that engages with the particularity of the disenfranchised. In 
terms of human rights, the texts criticize the idea of promoting human rights as an 
extension of Western rights discourses and as incorporating the disempowered into 
Western society, arguing instead for a more open cosmopolitan outlook that would 
accommodate their particular histories. This cosmopolitan outlook would seem akin to 
what Jürgen Habermas theorizes in The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory in 
that it acknowledges how “the equal respect for everyone else demanded by a moral 
universalism sensitive to difference thus takes the form of a nonleveling and 
nonappropriating inclusion of the other in his [sic] otherness” (40). Rather than simply 
acknowledge and reiterate the cosmopolitan need for a cross-cultural dialogue, 
however, Eggers’s imaginative work also raises questions with regard to the feasibility 
of the cosmopolitan project and explores some altogether less promising engagements 
with others in his works. Thus, he stresses the need for generalizing rights while also 
interrogating those solutions that propose to sensitize universalism to cultural 
differences. 
In You Shall Know Our Velocity, one of the protagonists, Will, narrates a travel-quest he 
undertakes together with his friend Hand in the wake of their mutual friend Jack’s 
death. The stated aim of their trip is to dispense with a large sum of money through 
charitable giving in the Global South. As I show, the novel tells the story of two 
characters who are both unwilling and unable to confront others in a cross-cultural 
dialogue and are therefore incapable of answering the call of others to recognize their 
 
                                                     
8 See also Rorty in “Solidarity or Objectivity” regarding the inadequacy of bare humanity to generate solidarity 
and Cheah’s argument in Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights that “the solidarity of world 
citizens grounded solely in the moral universalism of human rights is too weak to generate the cohesion 
required for the implementation of global policies” (57). 
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particular suffering and pain. Even though the call of others’ suffering sounds louder 
and louder as their travels continue, the narrative nevertheless increasingly folds in on 
itself to question its own fictionality and uneasily directs both the reader and the 
protagonists’ attention away from a meaningful cross-cultural dialogue with the 
disenfranchised. The novel effectively invites the reader to question the validity of the 
central assumption of universalist rights, which acknowledges sameness and then 
suggests that these rights can and should be rolled out across the globe through cross-
cultural encounters. Eggers’s stories make this point by exploring the defects of such 
superficial relationships, a point made even more strongly in “Up the Mountain Coming 
Down Slowly.” In this story, the suffering of others – the Tanzanian porters – is initially 
screened from both reader and protagonist when the protagonist’s altitude sickness 
causes her to hallucinate and therefore remain blind to the dying porters. This allows 
her to continue to the top of the mountain in ignorance and abscond from any 
responsibility for the porters, just as the other paying hikers choose to do. The 
concluding epiphany at the mountaintop is the moment when she recognizes her 
responsibility towards the porters as individuals and breaks through the discourse of 
sameness to feel personally accountable for the porters’ deaths. At this point, the 
protagonist’s outlook shares one of the characteristics of the cosmopolitan perspective 
described by Appiah as one in which “we take seriously the value not just of human life 
but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and 
beliefs that lend them significance” (Cosmopolitanism xv). It is, however, the imagining of 
the journeys Eggers’s characters undergo and the obstacles they face in negotiating 
cross-cultural encounters against the backdrop of neo-colonialism that underlines the 
importance of considering literary texts in critical debates on human rights and their 
calibration of universalism and particularity.  
4.3.1 Imagined Encounters, Missed Opportunities: You Shall Know Our 
Velocity  
In You Shall Know Our Velocity, the motif of missed encounters and failed cross-cultural 
dialogues hinges in part on how the novel is structured as well as how the two main 
characters relate to one another. The novel follows childhood friends Will and Hand in 
  217 
their ambitious travels across Africa and parts of Europe in a single week with the aim of 
giving away $32,000 to the disenfranchised. Along the way, the novel provides a window 
into the minds of its protagonists as they struggle to cope with the death of their friend 
Jack, who dies shortly before the novel’s inception. The scene-setting cover of the first 
edition published by McSweeney’s in 2002 (reprinted as the opening page in later 
editions) reads: “Everything within takes place after Jack died and before my mom and I 
drowned in a burning ferry in the cool tannin-tinted Guaviare river . . . It was a clear and 
eyeblue day, that day, as was the first day of this story . . . .” (Eggers, You Shall Know Our 
Velocity 1; all caps in the original). Because of the paradoxical nature of this initial 
statement, in which Will, the narrator, proclaims his own death at the end of the events 
he is narrating to the reader, any positive outcome for this restorative tale is pre-
emptively quashed.9 The downbeat tone on the first page contrasts rather sharply with 
the energetic and vibrant spirit of the protagonists throughout the novel. It also sours 
the upbeat final scene that reintroduces the initial depressing state of affairs far more 
positively as Will and Hand enthusiastically leap into a pool in the Mexican city of 
Cuernevaca.10 In the Vintage edition of You Shall Know Our Velocity, Eggers inserted a 
chapter titled “An Interruption” (not included in the original McSweeney’s edition) in 
which Hand bursts into the novel at the half way point as a competing intradiegetic 
narrator. Hand’s interruptive chapter comments on their failed attempt at ameliorating 
in any way the poverty they encounter while still stressing the need for our empathic, 
economic, and political engagement to extend beyond the parochial: 
[t]here’s nothing to be gained from passive observance, the simple documenting 
of conditions, because, at its core, it sets a bad example. Every time something is 
observed and not fixed . . . there is a lie being told. Friends, I urge you to find us 
 
                                                     
9 In the added separate chapter narrated by Hand, this paradox is explained: “Though the text as printed 
before and after my interlude is as Will wrote it, there’s no way, of course, he could have written that first 
page, being no longer with us, and therefore not close to a word processor. His manuscript was sent to the 
publisher before his second departure, for South America . . .” (136). 
10 The final lines read: “I jumped with my mouth so open, taking it all in . . . and my heart froze. . . . It stopped 
for a minute I swear, but then the sound and pictures came back on and for two more interminable months we 
lived!” (350). 
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[Will and Hand] hopeful. I urge you to find that we tried something, knowing 
nothing of the results. (134) 
Crucially, however, he also aims to correct what he claims are errors in Will’s story. In 
his chapter, Hand denies the very existence of Jack – whom, he claims, Will invented as 
an “amalgam of a bunch of people we know” (52) – and focuses on the restorative nature 
of the story by explaining that the charity-travel plot is also a way for Will to come to 
terms with himself (67). Indeed, he adds that “Jack is there so Will could write about 
pain” and work through his anger at the death of his mother (131). In both versions, 
therefore, the journey is understood as a means for Will to work through his traumatic 
loss and reach emotional stability, with the humanitarian impulse made subservient to 
the emotional needs of the Western protagonist. Additionally, because the characters 
end up fighting and overcoming practical rather than emotional obstacles, the 
restorative nature of the quest narrative is confounded. 
Their onerous travels, despite their stated intent, never truly provide any 
opportunity for the protagonists to reflect on their emotional turmoil or to make a 
lasting impact on anyone’s life. The narrative initially has the characters getting caught 
up in overcoming practical complications such as which countries require visas or 
which travel path will allow them to traverse the world in one week (4-8). As such, the 
novel immediately disrupts the reader’s expectations: whereas the cover (or first page 
in later editions) informs readers of Jack’s tragic death and introduces Will as the 
narrator testifying to his processing of this event, the opening section of the novel is 
entirely – notably exaggeratedly – devoted to considering and reconsidering the travel 
route for Will and Hand’s trip instead of expanding on the facts surrounding Jack’s 
death or the protagonists’ emotional state. These pages are filled with potential travel 
routes such as the following: 
So first: 
Chicago to Saskatchewan to Mongolia  
Mongolia to Qatar . . . 
The next one, with adjustments: 
Chicago to San Francisco to Mongolia 
Mongolia to Yemen 
Madagascar to Greenland . . . . (5) 
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As characters, Will and Hand consistently avoid talking about the impact of Jack’s death 
on their lives throughout their journey. Projecting his grief for Jack onto his advertising 
money, Will experiences his newfound wealth as an encumbrance and decides that his 
earnings “[have] to be disseminated” (2) amongst the disenfranchised in order to shed 
the burden. The cross-cultural move in undertaking this global quest is not motivated 
by a cosmopolitan desire to engage with the subaltern, but rather by the protagonist’s 
assumption that giving away money abroad bypasses the need for precisely such an 
engagement. Will’s explicit explanation to this effect goes as follows: 
Since I got a little money, this was a constant struggle, the frustration with people 
and their coupons, people and their dirty clothes, families from El Salvador living 
in the basement of the church around the corner . . . and my urge to buy things for 
them, even just their food, and my inability, due to the imagined and impossible 
barrier between myself and these strangers with fumbling hands, to engage them 
and fix things. (15) 
As the story progresses, the reader becomes acutely aware that Will sees his travels as a 
symbolic journey (Eggers’s draft title for the novel was in fact Sacrament) both to cleanse 
himself of the trauma as well as the soured relationships he leaves behind in order to 
forge new meaningful ones outside of the U.S.  
However, the internally focused symbolism of overcoming trauma is soon 
externalized in the form of a charity quest plot. This allows the traumatic opening of the 
novel to be replaced by touristic enthusiasm for the upcoming charitable stint and also 
embeds that charity within a self-serving logic of personal healing. As they reflect 
extensively on possible travel routes, Will comments on a particular route with 
particular relish: “That one had everything. Political intrigue, a climactical buffet” (6). 
As such, they divert attention away from Jack’s death, but also trivialize the dire plight 
of those countries and people they intend to visit and help (“intrigue” and “buffet”) so 
as not to dampen this newfound positive spirit. In other words, Will decides that he will 
break the negative spiral he has been in since Jack’s death solely by sharing his money 
rather than his story, frustrating the restorative potential of the narrative by 
transforming a spiritual crisis into a material quest. The reader is later made to feel the 
futility of this faux humanitarian impulse when their charity ends up reinforcing socio-
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economic privilege rather than bridging the North-South divide in terms of wealth and 
power felt by the protagonists. 
For Will, his trauma becomes a guarded secret throughout the trip, and he avoids 
anyone who might have a story of their own to tell and therefore prompt him to divulge 
his own. The trip thus essentially becomes a series of missed and avoided encounters, as 
neither protagonist is either willing or able to engage in a mutually beneficial 
cosmopolitan cross-cultural dialogue. Imagining and stressing these failed encounters, 
however, necessarily forces the reader to consider their potential significance compared 
to the chaotic and ineffective monetary charity pursued by Will and Hand. The two 
protagonists consistently try to find a means of giving away money without actually 
having to meet the people to whom they are giving it. Perhaps the most absurd example 
of this is their idea of taping several thousand dollars’ worth of traveller’s checks to a 
donkey: 
As we drove, hair still wet, we looked for donkeys standing alone so we could tape 
money to their sides for their owners to find. We wondered what the donkey-
owners would think. What would they think? We had no idea. Money taped to a 
donkey? It was a great idea, we knew this. (You Shall Know Our Velocity 94) 
Note how they are reduced to wondering what the finder will think, what their story 
might be, whether they have truly helped them or not, what an encounter with this 
person may be like. Imagining the encounters their donation schemes are designed to 
avoid becomes an increasingly important motif in the novel. As the narrative 
progresses, Will reveals that he conducts silent internal dialogues with people whom he 
feels have traumatic pasts to share.11 These are notable in two respects. First, Will 
explains that he has imagined such dialogues since Jack’s death, thus linking them to his 
 
                                                     
11 Whereas these silent dialogues are eventually imbued with additional meaning by both Will’s own trauma 
and the disempowered position of the interlocutors he encounters during his travels, the reader is explicitly 
made aware of the protagonist’s tendency of having unproductive dialogues with strangers from the very 
beginning of the novel: “I argued with strangers constantly . . . The silent though decisive discussions were a 
hobby of my mind . . . It helped me work through problems, solving things, reaching conclusions final, 
edifying and even, occasionally, mutually agreeable” (26-27). 
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own traumatic state of mind as well as exposing an underlying need to talk about his 
trauma in order to work it through. The fact that these dialogues are silent once again 
frustrates that ambition, however, in that they become an unproductive circular 
repetition of his trauma. Second, during these dialogues the charitable relationship 
between the protagonists and the disempowered is shown to be problematic. Indeed, as 
the silent dialogues provide more and more information about Will’s own state of mind 
without a similarly informative response from the disempowered, the emptiness of 
their monetary charity is further laid bare. Early on, Will comments on how he hopes to 
replace these silent interactions – already a surrogate for actual engagement – with 
something which would render cosmopolitan engagement less complicated: “I wanted 
agreement now, I wanted synthesis and the plain truth – without the formalities of 
debate. I wanted only truth, as simple as you could serve it, straight down the middle, 
not the product of dialectic but sui generis: Truth!” (27). As a result, readers are left to fill 
in this space themselves by imagining the potentially productive nature of these missed 
encounters or are forced to witness Will’s reluctant imagining of such a response. Both 
these options merely serve to stress the ways in which the fear of engagement 
combined with a purely material exchange undermines the cosmopolitan project hinted 
at by the silent dialogues.  
Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the following silent conversation between 
Will and Dennis, an impoverished Dakarian man who helps the protagonists find their 
way back to their hotel. Having seen Hand give money to his brother Pierre, Dennis 
expects – almost demands – a similar donation in return for his help. The following 
silent exchange is noteworthy in this regard: 
– You throw me, Dennis’s brother. You make us sad. 
– My job is not to make you happy. . . . You [Will and Hand] do more harm than 
good by choosing recipients this way. It cannot be fair. 
– How ever is it fair? 
– You want the control money provides. 
– We want the opposite. We are giving up our control. 
– While giving it up you are exercising power. The money is not yours. 
– I know this. 
– You want its power. However exercised, you want its power. (117-18) 
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Commenting on the charitable scheme more generally, Hand notes in the added chapter 
“An Interruption” that they naively thought it “all would be somehow rectified” if they 
blindly gave away money to strangers (71). What exactly the confused protagonists are 
hoping to rectify – be it the resolution of their own traumas or the gaping inequality 
which their trip highlights – remains ambiguous because nothing is actually achieved.  
As more of these types of encounters take place, the protagonists find that their 
charity has made it almost impossible for them to develop meaningful relationships 
with anyone they encounter. As such, the strictly material nature of the charity quest is 
emphasized and evacuated of its cosmopolitan potential to facilitate meaningful 
encounters with disempowered others as well as lead the protagonists to come to terms 
with their trauma. The following observation by Will is significant in this respect: 
“Every act of charity has choice at its core” (242). That choice lies with the protagonists 
who are in the socio-economically more powerful position of giving, thus consistently 
causing them both to highlight and to fix the recipients’ state of disempowerment. Both 
the rights-bearing protagonists and the disempowered others’ position within the 
cosmopolitan dialogue – made central by the motif of silent dialogues – is therefore 
compromised. Moreover, because Hand denies the fundamental fact of Jack’s death 
entirely, the spiritual crisis at the heart of the novel is passed on to the reader, as it is 
impossible to ascertain whose version of events is true. You Shall Know Our Velocity thus 
subverts what is initially set to be a restorative narrative (later reiterated by Hand in his 
chapter) by emphasizing and prolonging the spiritual crisis at its core rather than 
narrating Will and Hand’s resolution of it into emotional stability and forging of 
meaningful cross-cultural ties based on mutual recognition and understanding. 
From this compromised position, the characters fall into increasingly outlandish 
situations and interact with a whole host of individuals – each disempowered in some 
particular way. The novel has at this point already exposed, however, that neither Will 
nor Hand is ready to engage in a productive cross-cultural dialogue in which they could 
share Jack’s death, partly because of their charitable mission and partly because Will 
especially is not yet able to talk about Jack. Instead, in a key scene in which the 
protagonists become involved in a seemingly innocent basketball match with a group of 
young Dakarian boys, a potential encounter turns into a nasty competition, a form of 
sports diplomacy gone wrong, because Will and Hand project their own trauma onto the 
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scene. Indeed, given that Jack is described as a gifted basketball player – “Jack was the 
best pure player our school had ever seen” (113) – and that the basketball court with its 
unhinged backboard and uneven rocky terrain typifies the poverty of the local village, 
the court becomes the stage for a competition of traumatic pasts and presents. Will 
explicitly comments on how the game gradually becomes an unfriendly and 
embarrassing contest:  
I got the hang of the court, its concavities and dust, and soon it was a game, us 
against them. . . . Hand knocked the ball from the younger kid’s hand and scored 
over him without apology. It was not cool . . . The game got closer. I tried to switch 
teams, to relieve the nationalistic tension, but the boys refused. . . . It went dark. 
We called the game. (112-13) 
Hand’s interruptive chapter in the later edition of the novel makes a strong correction 
in this respect when it emphasizes that, contrary to Will’s apprehension in the main 
narrative, they actually “wiped that dusty court with eight of them at a time” (78). This 
would only serve to heighten what Will describes as the “nationalistic” tension between 
the two parties as well as sour the idea of these wealthy Westerners giving away money 
to these token poor people.  
As the narrative progresses, Will and Hand are increasingly perceived by those they 
encounter as abstract representatives of the powerful West, despite their own 
misgivings about the Western society they leave behind. Consider the following 
reflection on the nature of their charitable scheme, which reveals how giving money 
only ends up underscoring the difference between the moneyed West and the 
impoverished rest: “These guys [the disenfranchised] know they need it [money] and 
that we can afford it. They’re not taking it from a neighbor, they’re taking it from 
people who it means, you know, next to nothing to” (99). The underlying idea is that 
Will and Hand – despite the accidental and temporary nature of their wealth – still live 
within a different socio-economic reality to those they encounter. By insisting on giving 
money to anyone they problematically deem “worthy,” they undermine the potential 
for a positive relationship based on equal participation before it gets a chance to 
develop by introducing a socio-economic hierarchy. One of the more poignant examples 
of this comes at the start of their journey in Senegal when an old man helps Will and 
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Hand repair their car at the beginning of their journey: “When the job was done the old 
man turned and looked at my face and smiled and walked away. He still hadn’t said 
anything” (96). Rather than allowing this to be a case of one person selflessly helping 
another, the pair decide to pay the man for his services: “I ran after the man. . . . I smiled 
and handed him a stack of bills. . . . He waved the money off. I took his hand and put the 
bills in his palm and closed his fingers, dry and ringed like birch twigs, around them. He 
said nothing. He took the bills and walked off” (97). As such, their relationship to this 
man is moved closer to that of client-contractor than one of mutual acknowledgment 
and cosmopolitan solidarity. The lack of meaningful engagements throughout the novel 
causes both the protagonists and those they encounter to remain fixed in a state of 
sustained crisis. Neither contributes to the formation of a cosmopolitan community that 
could debate and secure each other’s rights. Indeed, whereas this narrative is formally a 
travelogue and quest narrative, it constantly problematizes the protagonists’ 
relationship to disempowered others as well as their subsequent inability to imagine 
themselves as connected to those others as part of an inclusive cosmopolitan rights 
community. What Will in particular imagines instead is an unsatisfactory silent dialogue 
that re-traumatizes him and further alienates the disempowered.  
As this analysis of Eggers’s first novel shows, the lack of engagement with the 
particular histories of the characters prevents them from beginning the narrative arc of 
bare human individual turned rights-bearing citizen-subject because it reveals the 
potential problems inherent to the assumption that any form of dialogue with others 
draws individuals into a global rights society. Whether it be the repetition of his 
traumatic loss for Will (and Hand to a lesser extent) or the more general disconnect 
from Western rights discourses through lack of meaningful cross-cultural engagement 
for the disempowered, their particular histories remain disengaged as a result of the 
charitable hierarchy imposed by the quest plot. What You Shall Know Our Velocity thus 
shows is that charity, combined with an unwillingness to recognize or share one’s own 
story effectively, is not a sufficient basis for a meaningful encounter with the other, that 
it risks promoting competitive exchanges of traumatic pasts, and counteracts the 
benefits of cross-cultural exchanges in promoting human rights by trapping the 
protagonists in hierarchy-enforcing charitable relationships rather than 
“cosmopolitan” ones. In this sense, Will and Hand’s failure to relate to disempowered 
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others reveals the limitations of the cosmopolitan ideal that travel and cross-cultural 
encounters in and of themselves further the universal enjoyment of rights. The reason 
for this lies in large part in their inability to overcome the neo-colonial hierarchy that 
imposes itself between themselves and those they encounter. 
4.3.2 Cosmopolitan Dialogues versus Neo-Colonialism: “Up the 
Mountain Coming Down Slowly” 
Whereas You Shall Know Our Velocity indirectly bears out the necessity to engage 
disenfranchised subjects on their own terms and on an equal footing, the short story 
“Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” explores the barriers posed by an existing 
transnational practice – (neo-)colonialism – to achieving that goal. It follows the climb 
to the top of Mount Kilimanjaro of a group of paying American hikers and the local men 
hired to carry their gear. In focusing on the group dynamics both within the tourist 
group and between the Americans and the Tanzanians, the narrative shows the 
detrimental effects of adhering to a neo-colonial logic by revealing how it restricts the 
circle of individuals who are recognized as worthy of empathic engagement. This issue 
is essentially the starting point for Butler’s discussion in Frames of War, in which she 
argues that thinking in terms of race and hierarchy does not yield the “analytic 
vocabularies” needed to think about “global interdependency” in a way which would 
allow everyone to count as a grievable subject (31). These colonial resonances manifest 
themselves in two specific ways in the narrative, the first being in the mind of the 
protagonist, Rita, at the beginning of the story, the second in the interactions between 
the paying hikers and the Tanzanians. Both of these are underscored by the extensive 
use of internal focalization in the narrative, which grants the reader access to Rita’s 
particular impressions throughout the journey.  
In one of these many passages of the narrative that are internally focalized, she 
reflects upon the (for her, unexpected) poverty in Tanzania upon her arrival there and 
compares it to her thoughts about Jamaica, another formerly colonized country she 
once visited:  
This country is so poor. Poorer than any place she’s been. Is it poorer than 
Jamaica? She is not sure. Jamaica she expected to be like Florida, a healthy place 
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benefiting from generations of heavy tourism and the constant and irrational flow 
of American money. But Jamaica was desperately poor almost everywhere and she 
understood nothing. (Eggers, “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” 146) 
In this excerpt, one finds clear traces of the colonial civilizing mission as well as 
contemporary U.S. interventionist policy as Rita is shocked to find American 
involvement in these poor countries has not brought peace and prosperity. Moreover, 
in the preliminary stages of the trip, she explicitly allows her imagination to conjure up 
an image of Tanzania as a colony, with the porters taking on the role of colonial subjects 
in an exotic place of beauty: “It was midnight and she was very awake as they drove and 
they had driven, on the British side of the road, in silence through rural Tanzania” (141-
42) and “[s]he has a sudden vision of servants carrying kings aboard gilt thrones, 
elephants following, trumpets announcing their progress” (152). The latter image turns 
into a motif throughout the initial climb: “Frank [the guide] is walking very slowly. Rita 
is behind him, his pace is elephantine” (157). In a similar way to Will and Hand, this 
initially establishes a hierarchical relationship of wealth and power versus poverty and 
powerlessness which prevents any meaningful engagement with the Tanzanians in the 
group. 
As the paying hikers bond over their various aches and pains as the climb progresses 
– “they are all sharing food and needed articles of clothing and medical aid” (174) –, 
their relationship with the porters becomes one of silent charity that leaves the hikers 
unaware of the hardships suffered by the porters or the reason they are undertaking 
what is for them a dangerous climb. Indeed, the porters – who outnumber the paying 
hikers six to one – take precisely those risks in climbing the mountain that the guide is 
at pains to avoid any of the paying hikers taking. While one hiker, Grant, is scolded for 
bringing a simple army tent unable to keep out the cold (171-72), several porters freeze 
to death on the penultimate day precisely because their equipment is lacking. Similarly, 
unlike Rita, the porters wear simple sneakers rather than climbing boots, prompting 
Rita to enter into the same silent charity with the porters: “Rita decides that Kassim is 
her favourite porter and that she’ll give him her lunch. When they reach the bottom, 
she’ll give him her boots” (182). Nevertheless, Rita briefly manages to develop a more 
personal connection with Kassim in addition to the charitable one to which the other 
hikers restrict themselves. In this brief moment, when she thinks about giving him her 
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boots, they also engage in a short conversation in which she asks for his name, turning 
him into an individual rather than a part of the collective of servants carrying their bags 
(182-83). In this short passage, she moves beyond simple donations and enters into a 
brief dialogue while they drink from a mountain stream, which triggers an emotional 
response akin to Will’s silent conversations in You Shall Know Our Velocity:  
Maybe he has kids. He can give the shoes to the kids. It occurs to Rita then that 
he’s at work. That his family is at home while he is on the mountain. This is what 
she misses so much, coming home to those kids. The noise! They would just start 
in, a million things they had to talk about. She was interrupted all night until they 
fell asleep. They had no respect for her privacy and she loved them for their 
insouciance. . . . Kassim finishes, his vessels full, and so he stands, waves goodbye, 
and jogs back to the camp” (182). 
By at least imagining Kassim’s personal story during this brief exchange of words rather 
than silently sympathizing with him from a distance as an impoverished human being, 
Rita takes the first step towards becoming aware of the reality of the porters’ situation: 
being forced into undertaking this dangerous journey in order to ensure the survival of 
their families and missing their families in a way not too different from the way Rita 
misses hers.  
Nevertheless, a clear “us” versus “them” distinction still dominates the relationship 
between the groups in the narrative as a whole and therefore precludes the cross-
cultural dialogue and empathy that is a crucial prerequisite to the global extension of 
human rights. While during their first encounter Rita purports to understand that 
Kassim is working as a porter whereas she is climbing the mountain as a tourist, at this 
stage she at no point reflects on the position of the disempowered Tanzanians she 
meets. This manifests itself in the text through the motif of parenting. As the above 
quote shows, her interactions with Kassim are framed by the narrative in terms of her 
own desire to adopt two children to whom she had been a foster parent. This adds to the 
reader’s pity for the Western protagonist as the story explains earlier on that this 
adoption was thwarted by her parents who had “beaten her to it” and adopted them 
instead (147). The reader’s affective engagement is even more clearly misdirected when 
the motif is used to build up a contrast between the porters and Michael, a young 
American hiker who suffers from altitude sickness and is eventually forced to return 
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before reaching the summit.12 Michael’s slow deterioration severely impacts upon the 
group of paying hikers, particularly his father, and as a result he is a constant subject of 
monitoring, care, and empathy. His eventual decision to give up the climb affects 
everyone and ruins the experience for his father. By contrast, when some of the 
unnamed porters freeze to death during the penultimate night of the climb, the hike 
carries on regardless the next day, with most of the paying hikers barely noticing the 
missing porters. The son’s ordeal manipulates the reader’s expectations in that it directs 
their attention towards the severity of Michael’s condition – and the relationship 
between the Western characters more broadly – and away from the precarious position 
of the porters. The reason for this almost dismissive attitude to the porters’ deaths is 
that while their loss is pitiable on a general level as a loss of human life, their 
individuality has consistently remained obscure to the group – and to the reader – and 
therefore remains unavailable for empathetic engagement. As African individuals, their 
exclusion from the hegemony makes their lives non-griavable, to use Butler’s terms.13 In 
other words, while their humanity is recognized on an abstract level, actual solidarity 
based on an engagement with their particular disempowered reality and suffering is 
forestalled at the level of narrative and in terms of the reader’s expectations.  
Rita only vaguely notes the death of the porters – having suffered from altitude 
sickness herself on the night they died – and joins the hikers in reflecting triumphantly 
on the achievements of the group once they reach the summit: “Now, she thinks, seeing 
these views in every direction, and knowing the communion with the others who have 
made it here, she would not have let anything stop her ascent” (197). Crucially, 
however, Rita breaks free from the restricted framework created by the neo-colonial 
relationship between the porters and the paying hikers at the very end of the narrative. 
When a fellow hiker, Shelley, informs Rita of the porters’ deaths once they have reached 
 
                                                     
12 This is another example of a risk taken by the porters that the guide, Frank, tries to prevent the hikers from 
taking. The hikers are told not to go up the mountain too quickly in order to avoid getting ill (163), whereas 
the porters have to rush up and down between camps in order to transport all of the hikers’ equipment (173). 
13 See Butler’s explanation in Frames of War: “If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not 
conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full 
sense” (1). 
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the top, Rita becomes disgusted by the idea that the hike continued regardless. When 
Shelley, enjoying the view, remarks “I’m glad everyone decided to push through, 
because this is worth it, don’t you think?” (198), Rita rushes down, dismayed and angry, 
only to find that there is nothing left for her to do but sign the book of international 
tourists who made it to the top. Her panicked response to the porters’ deaths gains 
further meaning when contrasted with the short story’s title “Up the Mountain Coming 
Down Slowly.” Rita’s frantic sprint down the mountain stands in stark contrast to the 
decision of another paying hiker, Grant, to turn back after the porters’ deaths, 
presumably to help with the slow decent back down with the bodies. While she initially 
condemns Grant for choosing to go down even though “he was strong enough to make 
it” (197), she later finds that his decision to go down accentuates her own guilt over 
continuing to the top (199). More broadly, therefore, this narrative shows how the neo-
colonial assumptions of the paying hikers form an insurmountable barrier to a 
productive cross-cultural dialogue in that they make it impossible for them to 
empathize with or even recognize anyone outside of the Western hegemony. These 
assumptions prove so powerful that they effectively cancel out the relevance of Rita’s 
epiphany at the end, which ultimately comes too late for it to make any difference to 
the porters. The contrast between ineffective charity and cosmopolitan engagement 
becomes especially salient when the protagonist ends up giving the boots she intended 
to give to Kassim to another young boy (199), presumably because Kassim is amongst 
the porters who died on the mountain. 
An analysis of Rita’s narrative development within this story reveals that she actually 
completes a journey towards an increased sensibility to the predicament of 
disempowered others: Rita begins the journey in a self-absorbed state of distress as part 
of a group of similarly self-involved American tourists, but the climb subsequently 
allows her to wrench herself free from her limited empathetic framework to include 
those excluded by the hegemony. Rita’s development here thus seemingly serves to 
extricate the protagonist from the restrictive Western discourse that extends rights 
only to those who are “incorporated,” as Slaughter would have it. Nevertheless, the 
narrative also shows that development as taking place after the fact, once the porters 
have already died, thus cancelling out any uplifting readings of Rita’s evolving empathy. 
To render this in the previous chapter’s terms, the reader is provided with a cue to 
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revise their engagement with the characters as Rita develops her own affective 
engagement with them. Even if that new awareness comes too late for Rita, the 
narrative’s cycling through various identificatory cues and practices provides a possible 
empathic learning curve for the reader, who is able to retrospectively adjust their 
interpretation of the narrative’s events and characters in a way that Rita cannot.  
Additionally, the development of the protagonist has been adapted by Eggers in this 
case to criticize the universalist underpinnings of rights discourses in that it shows how 
simply acknowledging the porters’ humanity in the way the paying hikers do in no way 
guarantees actual solidarity with their suffering or a deeper understanding of the 
inequality which denies them their human rights in the first place. As such, stressing 
competing and more detrimental global practices such as neo-colonialism that preclude 
meaningful cross-cultural encounters allows this narrative to shift the focus away from 
the disempowered towards studying the stance of the rights-bearing Westerner in the 
rights dialogue. While You Shall Know Our Velocity exposes the difficulty of giving the 
disenfranchised an equal role in the conversation, “Up the Mountain Coming Down 
Slowly” explores the formative arc Rita herself must undergo in order to even become 
receptive to a meaningful cross-cultural conversation. Rita’s outrage at the end of the 
story is presented as a belated first step towards breaking through that restrictive 
narrative of sameness which forestalls solidarity or understanding. The recognition Rita 
offers the porters in this final moment is nevertheless significant in light of Judith 
Butler’s argument in Precarious Lives: “To ask for recognition, or to offer it, is precisely 
not to ask for recognition for what one already is. It is to solicit a becoming, to instigate 
a transformation, to petition the future always in relation to the Other” (44). In 
cosmopolitan terms, therefore, it is a step towards engaging the disempowered in an 
open dialogue of mutual recognition that can transcend entrenched and restrictive 
positions of cultural and national identities. Within the context of the narrative – and 
therefore within the reader’s understanding of the suffering of the porters – the 
epiphany is a stark reminder of the type of suffering that goes unrecognized. It also 
serves to shine a light on those who remain disengaged from the global conversation 
about universal rights. 
Even though my reading of Eggers’s texts both engages with and critiques a central 
assumption of contemporary rights discourses, it does not do away with the normative 
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idea of generalizing rights. Indeed, both stories actively encourage the reader to feel 
that human rights should be extended to the porters in “Up the Mountain Coming Down 
Slowly” or the disempowered characters in You Shall Know Our Velocity.14 They make the 
point that doing so on the basis of a shared humanity is problematic for those to whom 
we as readers feel they should be extended, while also showing that a cosmopolitan 
stance of openness and dialogue towards others is likely to compete with far less 
productive transnational practices that undermine the envisioned generalization of 
rights in a global public sphere. The main obstacles are relationships grounded in 
charity for Will and Hand, and neo-colonialism for Rita. You Shall Know Our Velocity 
touches on ways in which establishing a charitable association with the disempowered 
can entrench both parties in an insurmountable hierarchical relationship that 
undermines solidarity and engagement with one another’s particularity. What “Up the 
Mountain Coming Down Slowly” shows is how easily the universal discourse of 
sameness elides into neo-colonial ideologies which not only forestall solidarity, but 
allow rights abuses to go unchecked and effectively counteract the extension of rights 
to those beyond Western society. Nevertheless, Eggers’s imagined encounters lay bare 
these issues while simultaneously and resolutely bringing to light the necessity of 
incorporating both rights-bearers and the disempowered into a more open 
cosmopolitan outlook and dialogue. 
 
                                                     
14 As the previous chapter showed, the principle goal of these personal narratives is thus to negotiate the 
reader’s affective engagement with the characters within rather than provide direct insight in and of itself 
through reasoned argument. This makes them particularly effective in recovering the disempowered victim-
narrator of such narratives, but may also lead away from framing that recovery with broader concerns over 
why they were excluded in the first place. 
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4.4 The Transnational Insecurity of Human Rights: A Hologram 
for the King 
Culture can thus play an important part in the cosmopolitan project even if, as my 
critical analysis of Eggers’s fictional works show, it also lays it open to further scrutiny. 
The major criticism of the cosmopolitan faith in culture is succinctly summed up by 
Pieter Vermeulen, who remarks: “Conceived as goals in themselves, the intercultural 
encounters that literature affords can easily be dismissed as forms of intellectual 
tourism” (88). His work draws on that of Cheah, who notes that contemporary 
incarnations of cosmopolitanism risk reproducing or reaffirming existing power 
dynamics:  
It is not enough to fold the pluralistic ethos of older cosmopolitanisms into the 
institutionalized tolerance of diversity in multicultural societies. . . . The 
inscription of new cosmopolitanisms (and theories about them) within the force 
field of uneven globalization must be broached at every turn. (Cheah, 
“Cosmopolitanism” 495) 
An overly optimistic understanding of the role of culture makes cross-cultural 
encounters in fiction a seemingly satisfying replacement for the actual encounters made 
impossible by neo-colonial hierarchies and barriers. A similar problem affects the 
suggestion by Andreas Huyssen in “International Human Rights and the Politics of 
Memory: Limits and Challenges.” He argues that abstract, legalistic human rights 
discourses can be nurtured by memories of rights violations so as to provide them with 
historical grounding (608). In other words, Huyssen believes that bringing narratives 
and histories of suffering into contact with institutionalized rights discourses may bring 
their theoretical concerns into contact with the lived experiences of those whose rights 
they seek to protect. If the personal narrative, the role of which in human rights culture 
was discussed in the previous chapters, provides such succour, it may only do so in a 
very limited way.  
This scepticism over the role of culture resonates with broader developments in 
twenty-first century fiction and should, therefore, not be seen as a dismissal of the 
important role it plays in human rights culture. It does, however, point to the need of 
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taking into account the manifold ways in which rights-claiming efforts are inflected by 
competing discourses that have historically weighed heavily on the relationships 
between the West and the rest of the globe by disempowering those subjects now vying 
for inclusion in the hegemony. Once again, it is my analytical aim to bring these 
concerns down to the level of the discursive space created by Eggers’s texts, as this is 
where they can be most tangibly studied and understood. Eggers’s stories, in providing a 
means of critiquing the cosmopolitan ideal, may be seen as part of a broader trend in 
twenty-first century fiction identified by Boxall that displays a marked scepticism 
towards the “blend of postcolonial identities” easily slotting into a new cosmopolitan 
global order (168). Similarly, Irr notes the rise of a new kind of political novel that aims 
to force the United States to engage with “the pragmatics of global mobility and 
inequality” (194). In terms of my analysis, I take this trend in twenty-first century 
American fiction and bring it to bear on a different aspect of culture seemingly less 
encumbered by the issues raised by these new novels, such as A Hologram for the King. 
Whereas You Shall Know Our Velocity and “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” 
were released before the publication of Eggers’s collaborative testimonial work, his 
novel A Hologram for the King appeared in 2012, respectively six and three years after the 
publication of What Is the What and Zeitoun. As opposed to those works, A Hologram for the 
King does not directly feature a cross-cultural encounter that directly aims to expand 
the hegemonic reach of human rights. Nevertheless, it can be read as an imagining of a 
postnational – the decline of the United States as a global power is its core theme – or 
transnational space stripped of its familiar hierarchies and power dynamics. As such, A 
Hologram For the King offers a somewhat different perspective, that of economic 
globalization and the United States’ dwindling influence, and, therefore, provides a 
complementary context to the socio-economic superiority and neo-colonial ideologies 
that cause the previously discussed protagonists’ failure to engage in cross-cultural 
human rights-work.  
A close reading of the desperate struggle for salience and equality in the cross-
cultural dialogues imagined in Eggers’s fictional works has already shed additional light 
on the problems created by his well-intentioned use of the collaborative testimonial 
form in other places. If, as Eakin claims in How Our Lives Become Stories, the authorial 
brand name on the title page of a collaborative work “reflects the necessarily unequal 
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distribution of power” (176), then this inequality must have an impact on the discursive 
space of the text as well as its reception by a privileged audience. Much as the 
identificatory practices discussed in the previous chapter work hard to destabilize the 
interpretative frameworks of privileged readers, the dynamic of personal narratives in 
human rights culture inevitably runs into trouble at the narrative’s close. At this point, 
both the reader and the victim-narrator are cast back into their respective positions as 
rights-bearer and disempowered subject, without any guarantee that the productive 
textual engagement engendered by the text will survive.  
At worst, the positive affect generated by the text is translated into the unhelpful 
relationship described by Slaughter in “Humanitarian Reading.” He describes this 
phenomenon by explaining how it reinserts the goodwill of the text into the power 
trajectories of global inequality: 
These unequal divisions of the world into the rich and powerful, who have 
security and sympathetic understanding on their side, and the poor and 
powerless, who are in need of both security and sympathy, have a tendency to 
recenter the traditional subjects of history as the subjects of sentimentality and 
goodwill. (104-105) 
In A Hologram for the King, these strictly divided roles, and their geographical 
associations, are dealt with in two important ways. First, the relative stability of the 
United States as a salutary actor on the global stage is shown to be waning through its 
insecure and tragic protagonist, Alan Clay, as he hopelessly competes for a business 
contract with actors that are traditionally cast in an inferior role in the neo-colonial 
hierarchy, such as China and the Middle East. Second, the resulting public sphere, 
stripped of its familiar power dynamics, more closely resembles a chaotic free-for-all 
than a new egalitarian world order. The novel thus imagines an alienating global public 
sphere in the story world in which the traditional narrative roads to salience for the 
disempowered and powerful alike are no longer staked out on a map drawn out along 
neo-colonial lines. Far from offering succour to its characters, the protagonist and those 
he encounters are wracked by insecurity as neo-colonial modes of thinking continue to 
govern their interactions but no longer have the power to regulate them. 
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In the novel, the protagonist is an impotent bankrupt consultant estranged from his 
daughter and wife who embarks upon a hopeless journey to meet the ever-absent King 
Abdullah of Saudia Arabia – the epigraph from Samuel Beckett’s “Waiting for Godot” is 
no coincidence – in order to sell him a global holographic communications device that 
can be used to link up “King Abdullah Economic City” (KAEC) to the rest of the world. 
Initially, Alan seems to take up the same privileged position, distanced from other 
cultures, as Rita or Will. He stays at the Hilton hotel – “built . . . to bear no evidence of its 
existence within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (21) – and keeps his distance from 
anyone but the members of the team of American consultants he is leading. However, as 
a representative of America as a declining superpower, Alan is partially “freed” from the 
social, political, and economic feelings of superiority that barred Will, Hand, and Rita 
from developing meaningful transnational exchanges. Rather than facilitate encounters 
with others though, this socio-economic weakness strips him of his confidence and 
causes him to feel consistently out of place. He openly wonders “[h]ow he could have 
predicted the world losing interest in people like him” (135). Indeed, he comes to reside 
in a type of in-between position, belonging neither with the influential and wealthy 
King of Saudi Arabia, the Chinese businessmen who represent the new economic 
hegemony, the local residents of Saudi Arabia, nor even the members of his own 
“Western” team, who perceive him as inadequate and past his prime. His (self-
)perception is summed up in this reflection on how he must look to Brad, a team 
member: “a human who was more burden than boon, more harm than good, irrelevant, 
superfluous to the forward progress of the world” (75). 
Perhaps more than any other character discussed above, therefore, Alan is entirely 
isolated, lacking the reassuring but detrimental national and neo-colonial frameworks 
afforded to Eggers’s other protagonists. From this weakened, insecure, and lonely 
position, Alan tries and fails to develop two relationship: one with Hanne, a woman 
working for the Danish embassy who is attracted to his status as a U.S. businessman, and 
another with Yousef, an insouciant local taxi driver who invites him to join him for a 
visit to his father’s house in the country. His encounters with Hanne fail because he 
lacks confidence, suffers from impotence, and does not know how to interact with 
others now that he no longer holds a position of power. His encounters with Yousef are 
ineffective because Alan accidentally shoots at a young Saudi boy when he is invited to 
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go hunting with Yousef, reminding his new acquaintances of America’s traumatic 
military interventions in the Middle East. The obstacles to dialogue here are Alan’s 
reluctance to show or inability to cope with weakness, as well as the difficulty he 
experiences in transcending the negative connotation of his nationality and past 
instances of neo-colonial actions. This indicates that a simple removal of neo-colonial 
thinking underpinned by the decline of imperial powers does not guarantee more 
productive engagements in the global public sphere.  
In fact, the imagined encounters in A Hologram for the King play out the distinct lack of 
a coherent framework able to facilitate such engagements that is not worryingly 
indebted to detrimental discourses. Hanging over the imagined encounters like a 
nostalgic spectre, neo-colonial stereotypes appear throughout the novel as a comfort 
zone from which individual participants have emerged but for which they have no 
viable alternative. Praising the confidence of the Europeans who colonized the 
Americas, a businessman treats Alan to a lament of the “nation of doubters, worriers, 
overthinkers” that the United States has become (12). Alan seeks to distance himself 
from this newfound failure and decline, wishing instead for “the simplicity of being who 
he was: no one” (252). As a result of his disavowing of a strong U.S. identity, Yousef and 
his friends are happy to embrace Alan until the first sign of trouble, at which point his 
misstep is integrated into a long-held mistrust of the West and the United States in 
particular. Atif, one of Yousef’s friends, even maintains “the possibility that Alan was 
CIA” (252). Despite his inability to perform the associated role, Alan is thus continually 
re-embedded into the dynamics of power that mark the history of the West’s 
interventions in the rest of the world. After the shooting, Yousef distances himself from 
Alan and says: “Give me some time. I have to remember what I like about you” (262).  
In the narrative, the protagonist’s identity crisis is further exacerbated and 
externalized in the form of a lump in his neck that becomes intricately linked to his lack 
of self-confidence, weighing him down in his endeavours. Fantasizing about its removal, 
he imagines once more taking up the confident role of the American businessman 
trading in a distant land: “He was a new man, a vital man. They knew he had gotten the 
job done. He’d fixed what needed to be fixed, he’d paved the way for their success, he 
was again captain of the ship” (199). It is unclear, however, whether the ship will map 
out uncharted territory by allowing Alan to develop more productive relationships with 
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those around him, or whether it will set course along the familiar and detrimental neo-
colonial flows of power. The novel’s close may seem to suggest the latter, in that the 
protagonist decides to keep waiting in KAEC for the king to visit and provide him with 
the opportunity to prove himself as the influential American businessman of old, even if 
the original contract for communications technology goes to a Chinese IT firm: “So he 
would stay. He had to. Otherwise who would be here when the King came again?” (312). 
However, because the story’s ending continues the waiting rather than concluding it, 
the course Alan’s trajectory will take remains undecided. 
The endless waiting that pervades the novel and that is perpetuated by its ending 
resonates strongly with the story’s epigraph, taken from Samuel Beckett’s play Waiting 
for Godot, which reads “It is not every day that we are needed” (1). This quotation sheds 
light on the burden placed upon Alan by his waiting to fulfil some kind of new role 
following the decline of the United States on the global stage. In this scene of Beckett’s 
play, the two main characters, Vladimir and Estragon, are prompted to make their time 
spent waiting worthwhile by responding to Pozzo’s cry for help after he falls to the 
ground:  
Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! Let us do something while we have the 
chance. It is not every day that we are needed. Not indeed that we personally are 
needed. Others would meet the case equally well, if not better. To all mankind 
they were addressed, those cries for help still ringing in our ears. But at this place, 
at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not. Let us make 
the most of it, before it is too late! Let us represent worthily for once the foul 
brood to which a cruel fate consigned us! (71-72) 
This additional context throws up a less obvious interpretation of the epigraph in A 
Hologram for the King: the emphasis is not so much on Alan’s being superfluous as this 
being a moment of opportunity waiting to be grasped. In Beckett’s play, Vladimir 
recognizes this, at least in theory, as a moment when, after all their waiting, they have a 
chance to do something meaningful, to help another and, in the character’s lofty terms, 
thereby demonstrate the bond that ties together all of mankind. In Alan’s case, the 
opportunity afforded is one of reinventing the neo-colonial theatre of roles that governs 
his relationship to others. For most of the novel, much like in Beckett’s play, this 
opportunity is squandered because the protagonist’s insecurity allows him to be defined 
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by others, a process that relies heavily on reinstating neo-colonial dynamics even after 
they have been dismantled by undermining the United States’ position of power.  
At first sight, Alan manages to glean some hope in the final chapters when he meets 
Zahra Hakem, a surgeon of mixed roots working in the Kingdom, with whom he 
connects on a more intimate level after she has removed the symbolic lump on his neck. 
His relationship with Zahra is not burdened by the national or individual flaws that have 
made their lives difficult. They explain how they both came to be in Saudi Arabia, tell 
one another about their children, discuss their fears and insecurities, and share a 
necessarily imperfect but significant moment of intimacy (285-301). At the same time, 
this seemingly positive encounter is only made possible because both characters have 
relinquished any aspiration to being something greater than their individual flawed 
selves. Stripped of the bluster of neo-colonial power dynamics, the chaotic 
transnational space within which Alan and Zahra circulate is filled with disillusioned 
individuals. Their relationship brings together the protagonist’s general disillusionment 
as well as his eventual acceptance of his physical and metaphorical impotence: “They 
were so in love with the world, and disappointed in every aspect of it” (303). The fact 
that Alan decides to keep waiting for the king, even after King Abdullah came and went 
once without making a deal, provides another resonance between A Hologram for the King 
and Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. Curtis Brooks’ conclusion concerning’s Beckett’s piece is 
equally valid with regard to Eggers’s novel: the central event that would give meaning 
to the narrative never occurs (297). Moreover, Alan’s choice to remain in waiting is not a 
hopeful anticipation of opportunity, but a decision made in desperation despite the king 
having visited once, the protagonist not having made a deal, and the prospect of a 
future deal evaporating as the king strikes deals with Alan’s competitors. As in his 
relationship with Zahra, therefore, Alan decides that he will similarly accept the failure 
to get anything more out of his relationship with the king other than endless waiting 
and disappointment. In “The Solution as Problem: Beckett’s Waiting for Godot,” Rolf 
Breuer explains how the waiting itself becomes an insurmountable problem in Waiting 
for Godot (230). Alan’s choice to wait for the king despite the clear indication that it is in 
vain is no less problematic. It is a refusal to move on and an acceptance of forever being 
stuck in limbo, unwilling and unable to think beyond the role he is no longer able to 
perform. 
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The implications of this analysis of A Hologram for the King for my re-reading of 
Eggers’s testimonial projects is twofold. First, the novel explores a type of cross-cultural 
encounter that is stripped of its explicit neo-colonial inflections. Its imagining of these 
encounters is no less pessimistic than those in You Shall Know Our Velocity or “Up the 
Mountain Coming Down Slowly.” Their failure is different though, in that what is shown 
is the lack of available discursive tools to transcend those exclusionary and divisive 
global frameworks into which current efforts to engage across cultural boundaries so 
easily slot. Stripped of its familiar but detrimental neo-colonial inflections, the 
transnational public sphere is not so much brimming with cross-cultural possibilities as 
it is paralysed by disillusionment and inertia. Second, with the grand narratives thus 
removed from the equation, the singularly positive relationship to emerge from Alan’s 
trip to Saudi Arabia instils disappointment rather than inspiring hope. Alan and Zahra’s 
positive encounter is no lofty example of cosmopolitan human connection, as it is one in 
which they find in each other the comfort to no longer aspire to be more than their 
failed selves, to have to “represent” mankind, to use Beckett’s words. The suggestion is 
thus that combatting negative discourses may not be enough in and of itself to cultivate 
the types of radically productive energy which human rights culture imagines as 
deriving from cross-cultural encounters. This resonates quite clearly with the 
limitations of the rights-work that can be performed by personal narratives, which have 
been shown to be equally ill-equipped as a means of dealing with such discourses. What 
if, in other words, the human rights narrative does not have the cultural clout to 
engender the type of generalization human rights aspires to in a global public sphere 
that is no longer governed by the neo-colonial dynamics that instigated it?  
4.5 Re-reading What Is the What and Zeitoun 
The questions raised by this analysis of Eggers’s You Shall Know Our Velocity, “Up the 
Mountain Coming Down Slowly”and A Hologram for the King, gain further resonance 
when confronted with the collaborative testimonial projects undertaken by the same 
author. To what extent do the testimonies of Deng and Zeitoun survive their mediation 
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into the global public sphere of human rights culture? How do they fare against the 
competing discourses whose pernicious impact is exposed in Eggers’s fictional works? 
Can the individualism at the heart of human rights-work undertaken by What Is the What 
and Zeitoun do enough to combat the collective stereotyping that has long been the 
stock-in-trade of global power dynamics? How do personal narratives cope with the 
unstable transnational arena explored in A Hologram for the King once their careful 
textual, paratextual, and extra-textual negotiations have broken down some of the neo-
colonial thinking that structures cross-cultural encounters? Finally, how do the tenets 
of human rights culture mesh with the legalistic nature of its legislative and 
institutional sides? These questions have asserted themselves in many of the preceding 
analyses in this dissertation, and the sustained textual attention to the cross-cultural 
encounters imagined in Eggers’s fictional work provides the tools to throw them into 
sharp relief. 
What Is the What offers an interesting case in point to start answering a number of 
these pertinent questions. In the run-up to his airlift to the United States, Valentino 
spends a considerable amount of time in a refugee camp called Kakuma. The refugee 
camp is presented as a type of transnational limbo that is no-longer-African-but-not-
yet-America: “Kakuma was nowhere. Kakuma was, we were first told, the Kenyan word 
for nowhere. No matter the meaning of the word, the place was not a place. It was a kind 
of purgatory. . . there was nothing for miles, it seemed, so we became dependent on the 
UN for everything” (373-74). From this place of transition, Valentino begins the process 
of finding his way into the West. Part of the application process to Western aid agencies 
organizing the transferral of people from Kakuma to the United States involves 
Valentino providing a written version of his life story. It is worth quoting the 
protagonist’s reflections on the application process in full, as it is, in a way, a meta-
analysis of the role of personal narratives in human rights culture: 
The first step in leaving Kakuma was the writing of our autobiographies. The 
UNHCR and the United States wanted to know where we had come from, what we 
had endured. We were to write our stories in English, or if we could not write 
adequately in English, we could have someone write it for us. We were asked to 
write about the civil war, about losing our families, about our lives in the camps. 
Why do you want to leave Kakuma? They asked. Are you afraid to return to Sudan, 
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even if there is peace? We knew that those who felt persecuted in Kakuma or 
Sudan would be given special consideration. . . . Whichever strategy we applied, 
we knew that our stories had to be well told, that we needed to remember all that 
we had seen and done; no deprivation was insignificant (485). 
Valentino makes at least four noteworthy observations in this paragraph, all of which 
deserve further scrutiny. The first is that his narrative must be in English. The second is 
that the focus of his statement needs to be on what and how much he has suffered. The 
third is that it must demonstrate a continued threat of persecution or danger. The 
fourth and final observation is his understanding of the need to present a well-crafted 
and seemingly complete record of himself as a victim in order for the process to be 
successful. 
The language requirement may seem trivial, but it goes to the heart of the issue of 
mediation that has plagued the rights-work undertaken by personal narratives since the 
slave narratives of Douglass and Jacobs analysed in the second chapter. If one accepts 
that South Sudan has some of the worst educational records in the world, it seems likely 
that many of the young refugees who would be dubbed the “Lost Boys of Sudan” 
required some level of help in turning their stories into a fluent and compelling English 
text.15 Some, like Deng, further develop their autobiographies into activism by soliciting 
additional mediation from author-activists such as Eggers. A double process is thereby 
instated whereby traumatic pasts are rendered in the correct language and format 
required for the disempowered subject to be recognized within the discourse of human 
rights and then later mediated further so as to be made amenable to a Western audience 
as a broader rights-space creating tool. The first gains relevance in light of the practice, 
illustrated by Verdirame and Harrell-Bond’s Rights in Exile, of victims’ personal 
narratives not meeting the legalistic discourse-requirements of human rights processes 
(19). Initial mediation is required, therefore, by aid workers and other experts able to 
 
                                                     
15 On its website, UNICEF reports on the dire educational situation in the region: “The adult literacy rate stands 
at a mere 27 per cent, and 70 per cent of children aged 6–17 years have never set foot in a classroom. The 
completion rate in primary schools is less than 10 per cent, one of the lowest in the world. Gender equality is 
another challenge, with only 33 per cent of girls in schools” (“South Sudan: Issue”). 
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translate the bare experiences of abuse suffered by victims into the sophisticated 
narrative that grants such experiences salience as human rights issues. The second 
mediation, the one for which Deng collaborated with Eggers, continues this process in a 
cultural sense, carefully negotiating the wider Western public’s affective engagement 
with his story so as to render him as a human being entitled to human rights. 
Part of this process involves cleansing the disempowered subject of potential 
complexity, even if only hypothetically, by emphasizing that the victim has 
unambiguously suffered. Talk of child soldiers in What Is the What broaches a notoriously 
problematic issue in this respect, but the protagonist is spared the complicated 
association with this problem when Valentino, entirely unprompted by his silent 
interlocutor, reassures readers at the start of chapter ten: “I was almost a soldier, Julian. 
I was saved by a massacre” (318). This passage essentially disentangles the protagonist 
from one of the more complicated issues What Is the What raises, while reaffirming the 
protagonist’s suffering as entirely legitimate according to the precepts of human rights. 
The risk is that victims end up being slotted into a mould constructed according to the 
tenets of neo-colonial stereotypes, even if their affective engagement with the 
disempowered subject is subsequently mediated in an altogether different way within 
human rights culture. As such, readers may be cast in the type of role taken up by Rita 
in “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly,” where their intentions are good but their 
modes of thinking are detrimental to their humanitarian intentions. The central 
difference between this short story and What Is the What is that the latter is told from the 
perspective of the disempowered subject, which does not allow for the kind of explicit 
exploration of the privileged’s perspective taken up in “Up the Mountain Coming Down 
Slowly.” On the one hand, as I have argued, the collaborative project makes use of the 
opportunities afforded by the novel form to break down many of the neo-colonial 
assumptions that frame Western engagements with the subaltern. What remains 
unaddressed, on the other hand, is Valentino’s observation that the purpose of victim-
narratives is to demonstrate and perpetuate their victimhood, as is illustrated by his 
reflections on the autobiography he must produce for aid agencies.  
This reductive process, whereby complex lives and situations are channelled into 
singular narratives of victim-subjects, means disempowered subjects can never fully 
narrate their claims to the incorporated citizenship enjoyed by their readers. Consider 
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in this respect how What Is the What destabilizes stock images of victims in a wild and 
dangerous Africa finding salvation on the rights-protecting shores of Western havens. 
Much as this move is necessary and important in cultivating the reader’s guarded 
empathy with Valentino, it is achieved by juxtaposing the protagonist’s continued 
victimhood in the United States and his horrible experiences during the Second 
Sudanese Civil War. If Deng’s rights-claim is made through the novel, therefore, it is 
only granted on the basis of his having properly performed the victim-role he is 
expected to play. In this respect, the evaluation of his performance is symbolically 
represented in the novel by his writing of his autobiography on “an examination 
booklet” (485). Valentino soon realizes that his story will be cross-examined and 
evaluated by UN aid workers and, following Eggers’s narrativization of it, North-
American readers, whose opinions will be swayed by how many traumatic memories he 
is able to incorporate and how convincingly he presents them. Despite this need to be 
exhaustive, he concludes that the focus on the violent or miserable parts of his past 
means it would only ever be a “sliver version of the life I’d known” (485). One could 
suggest, therefore, that the more the disempowered subject’s story is made illustrative 
and compelling for privileged readers through its focus on danger and deprivation, the 
less it is able to address the fully-fledged personhood to which victim-narrators are 
universally entitled as human beings according to the discourse of human rights. This is 
an important parallel to the abolitionist-(former) slave dynamic discussed in the second 
chapter, which centred on black writers’ efforts to narrate more than simple victimhood 
in order to push the rights-space creating efforts of their narratives beyond claims to a 
bare humanity and into the realm of citizenship.  
This is not to suggest that Eggers’s involvement in writing What Is the What is not 
concerned with fully recognizing Deng by including him in the circle of rights-bearers 
rather than simply having him acknowledged by it. The issue is rather that human 
rights may be too rigid or underdeveloped as a discourse to make this possible. By this, I 
mean that human rights can recover victims as rights-bearing subjects only by 
appealing to idealized notions of what it means to be human, and has instituted highly 
stylized and regulated means of achieving that goal. Kennedy illustrates this point when 
he writes that human rights activists working on behalf of victims speak “in the 
language of universal commitments and interests” in order to convince the powerful 
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that they “must respect human rights not to protect the interests of these victims, but 
to respect the universal significance of rights themselves” (xvi).16 In the case of What Is 
the What, this means that the novel carefully negotiates the reader’s acceptance of Deng 
as a fully-fledged human being, but neither finds nor offers any means of allowing that 
recognition to take place at anything other than a theoretical level. The analysis of A 
Hologram for the King can illuminate this further with its pessimistic imagining of the 
transnational public sphere stripped of yet haunted by its familiar dynamics. Once he 
has been recovered from the stereotypical role of the silent African victim, Valentino 
starts resembling Alan in the sense that the lack of a neo-colonial determinant turns the 
characters into floating signifiers. Boxall suggests as much when he notes that What Is 
the What is a “testing of the capacity of global culture to provide new forms in which to 
express postnational identity, after African decolonisation” (174). The cultural system of 
meaning-creation available at this stage is that of human rights discourse, which 
sketches the characters along the broad lines of a universal humanity but does little to 
colour that sketch with anything but predictable elements. In this sense, there may be 
little difference between victims collectively determined by neo-colonial thinking and 
individual subjects recovered as idealized humans stripped of their complexity by 
human rights discourse. 
At this point, it is worth bringing Zeitoun into the discussion, as its rights-work relies 
heavily on the framework of basic humanity drawn up by human rights in its pursuit of 
a different kind of affective engagement with its readers. As I have argued, this process 
is deeply invested in its ability to force the reader to construct the abstract “human” in 
human rights as a means of maintaining their relationship with the protagonist once 
 
                                                     
16 Kennedy’s further observations also resonate with my analysis of What Is the What: 
The vocabulary and institutional practice of human rights promotion propagates an unduly 
abstract idea about people, politics, and society. A one-size-fits-all emancipatory practice 
underrecognizes particularity and reduces the possibility for variation. This claim is not that 
human rights are too “individualistic.” Rather, the claim is that the “person,” as well as the 
“group,” imagined and brought to life by human rights agitation is both abstract and general 
in ways which have bad consequences (13). 
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the narrative’s events and tone radically shift in the second half. The question then 
becomes whether such an approach can ever fully integrate the protagonist into the 
hegemony, or whether the process of increasing abstraction in the narrative’s affective 
appeal leads away from the complexity of the character’s experiences. Indeed, it was 
precisely my point in the third chapter that the recovery of Zeitoun as a person involves 
a real risk of cleansing him from that which makes him a target for rights abuses in the 
first place. In such a case, readers only relate to and recognize the disempowered 
subject on an abstract level without either side coming to terms with their 
incommensurable alterity. As such, it becomes enough to read the narrative and 
conclude that what happened to Zeitoun in the extra-legal space of post-Katrina New 
Orleans was wrong and that human beings in general should be spared such horrendous 
treatment.  
The protagonist is thus recovered in the eyes of the reader on universalist grounds, 
but their gaze is simultaneously averted from the racial profiling that led to his arrest 
and abuse. This process is dangerously close to the type of hierarchy-reinforcing charity 
in which Will and Hand engage in You Shall Know Our Velocity, by which disempowered 
subjects are stripped of their complexity in order to become abstract human receptacles 
for Western charity. This is not to suggest that Zeitoun actively promotes such a process, 
but rather that by pursuing rights-work along the lines set out by human rights culture 
it risks inscribing the recognition of the protagonist into the same type of imaginative 
dynamic that pervades the detrimental discourse of neo-colonialism. The point is thus 
not that Zeitoun actively pursues neo-colonial charity, but that the reliance on 
constructing an ideal human for the reader to engage with in the discursive space of the 
novel may not be altogether that much different from the catachresis deployed to 
“other” the subaltern. I use “catachresis” here in the sense that Spivak elaborates on in 
“Practical Politics of the Open End.” There, she uses catachresis to refer to master words 
that transform particular subjects through sweeping definitions for which there are no 
literal referents, such as “true worker” or “true woman” (104).17 In this context, it is 
 
                                                     
17 Writing about Spivak’s use of the term, Stephen Morton notes that such catachresis are abusive in that the 
particularity of entire groups of people is thus plastered over by a singular definition (35). In the case of 
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illuminating to juxtapose the idealized human that emerges from the affective process 
in Zeitoun and the deprived collective that Will and Hand fail to engage with but to 
which they give liberally. It suggests that simply recognizing Zeitoun as a human being 
to whom rights should be extended may not get him started on the long road to 
inclusion in the hegemony, but may constitute yet another deferral of such an entry.  
In order to dig into this issue, it is worth recalling the place of the nation state in 
Zeitoun as a means of understanding just how feeble the alternative offered by human 
rights discourse is in its attempt at humanizing and incorporating, to use Slaughter’s 
term, the protagonist. In the narrative, the United States’ traditional hero-role is slowly 
deconstructed as its inept and misguided response to Hurricane Katrina gives rise to 
rights violations. As such, the nation state that Slaughter establishes as being at the core 
of granting full rights and personhood to individuals by making them incorporated 
citizens emerges in a crippled state from the text. This means that as Zeitoun’s idealized 
humanity is secured through his enrolment in the transnational narrative of human 
rights, the avenue towards further integration and rights-bearing citizenship has been 
cut off. This is not so much a flaw of the collaborative testimonial work in which Eggers 
and Zeitoun are engaged, but a detrimental result of the tension between theory and 
practice that exists at the level of human rights as a discourse. Whereas the 
transnational narrative of human rights is still firmly anchored in the nation state when 
it comes to securing individual rights, personal narratives circulating within human 
rights culture often testify to the violation of their rights by nation states by invoking a 
discourse that supposedly transcends the national context within which their rights 
were violated. This leaves Zeitoun in the narratively impossible position of having to 
recast the United States as the villain rather than the hero at the cost of removing the 
protagonist’s natural route towards protecting himself from villains, namely the one 
towards incorporated citizenship.  
Like the postnational relationships imagined in A Hologram for the King, therefore, this 
shows how cross-cultural encounters facilitated by literary texts can be haunted by neo-
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
human rights, the question is thus whether the “human” in human rights constitutes such a singular 
definition and whether such a conception tolerates the complexity of victims such as Zeitoun. 
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colonial thinking, even after it has supposedly been dispelled. In Zeitoun, this manifests 
itself as human rights culture not having the discursive tools available to challenge and 
overcome the hierarchical, racialized thinking that strands its protagonist in the 
position of recognized-human-but-not-yet-citizen status. Consider in this respect the 
way in which the familiar, comforting framing of the character and his life that 
dominated the first half of the narrative, nationalism, reattaches itself to the character’s 
identity following his release:  
More than anything else, Zeitoun is simply happy to be free and in his city. . . . 
Every person is stronger now. Every person who was forgotten by God or country 
is now louder, more defiant, and more determined. They existed before, and they 
exist again, in the city of New Orleans and the United States of America. And 
Abdulrahman Zeitoun existed before, and exists again, in the city of New Orleans 
and the United States of America. He can only have faith that [sic] will never again 
be forgotten, denied, called by a name other than his own. He must trust, and he 
must have faith. (324)  
This passage is problematically cyclical in its suggestion that everything is slowly 
returning to normal, given that the racialized modes of thinking at the heart of the 
abuses described, which had been normalized and internalized, are no closer to being 
altered. The narrative can only express hope at its close that the process of recognition, 
grounded in a bare and idealized humanity, that has taken place throughout its 
bifurcated plot holds sufficient sway with its readers to redress the detrimental divisive 
thinking that led to its protagonist’s rights being abused. It places this hope, however, 
precisely in the nation state that it has shown to be at the heart of its protagonist’s 
suffering. This is largely because it cannot help reintegrating the bare transnational 
imagining of Zeitoun as a human being in the second half into the discourse of the 
nation state, intersected by racialized thinking, that was used in the first half to ground 
him.  
As such, Zeitoun echoes Eggers’s fictional work in its rendering of a global public 
sphere unable to think beyond the nation state as a means of granting and protecting 
rights. However, whereas the author is able to critique this notion in the discursive 
spaces of You Shall Know Our Velocity, A Hologram for the King, and “Up the Mountain 
Coming Down Slowly,” his collaborative testimonial work must seek to circumvent or 
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simply accept this restriction for the sake of the type of rights-work it performs. The 
obvious difference between the fictional and collaborative testimonial projects is that 
the latter’s primary goal is to highlight the case of a particular disempowered subject, 
preferably in such a way that privileged readers are engaged in a non-appropriative way 
while they come to terms with a broader rights crisis. Even as What Is the What or Zeitoun 
seek to reshape the discourse of human rights in the ways outlined in chapter two, their 
acceptance of its established cultural channels and precepts embeds them in its 
strengths as well as its weaknesses. These weaknesses, as explored in Eggers’s fictional 
work, largely revolve around the competing, neo-colonial discourses with which it 
struggles to cope and that consistently bind the equalizing transnational aspirations of 
human rights to age-old hierarchical international power relationships. The 
protagonists of You Shall Know Our Velocity and A Hologram for the King are noteworthy in 
this respect, whose cross-cultural encounters are marred because they are continuously 
re-shackled to the United States’ neo-colonial position of power with all its attendant 
connotations in the global public sphere. The point here is not so much that the 
characters deliberately take on this role, indeed they are often unfairly forced into it, 
but that there is no alternative narrative available through which they can redefine 
their engagement with others. When it comes to the personal narratives of Zeitoun and 
Deng, this becomes especially acute. Human rights culture is largely pre-occupied with 
gaining recognition for disempowered subjects, while Eggers is focused on doing so in a 
way that emphasizes his collaborative partner’s alterity and that challenges the reader 
to engage them in a less hierarchical way. These ambitions coalesce in terms of the 
shared humanity of the protagonist and privileged reader, around which basic rights are 
structured and at which level neo-colonial divisions are less prevalent. Once this shared 
humanity has been established through the affective relationship cultivated by the text, 
however, it must be integrated into the real global society, with its attendant flows of 
power, prejudice, and inequality, in order for textual engagement to translate into 
socio-political activism and change.  
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have brought to the fore the obstacles and issues with which personal 
narratives circulating in human rights culture are faced, and which undermine the 
rights-work they seek to perform at various stages. The insertion of the textual process 
into the extra-textual matrices that govern their reception and impact can be illustrated 
most decisively through the collaborative dimension of What Is the What and Zeitoun. As I 
noted in the second chapter, the disempowered subject in whose name the personal 
narrative undertakes its rights-work is forced to compete for the socio-cultural capital 
required to effect change with the privileged author whose name alone appears on the 
title page. This is particularly damaging given that, as I have shown, these personal 
narratives so carefully negotiate and disavow the potentially hierarchical relationship 
between author and disempowered subject in the text and paratext. The fact that these 
narratives manage successfully to overcome baleful modes of thinking at a textual level, 
however, suggests that Eakin may be wrong to equate the nature of textual 
collaboration to its correlated appropriative erasure upon publication. He writes that a 
collaborative autobiography involves two “I” speakers whose distinctive character is 
absorbed by the author whose name appears on the title page, thus reflecting the 
unequal relationship that exists between the two (176). As I have argued, this is 
expressly not the case in the careful collaborative texts produced by Eggers. What Is the 
What’s unique narrative voice pre-empts such a collapse at the textual level by making 
itself unidentifiable as either Eggers or Deng, thus preserving the alterity of both. 
Zeitoun also preserves the alterity of its protagonist through its shifting presentation of 
the protagonist, emphasized through the distance engendered by the narrative’s third 
person narration. The Voice of Witness series similarly preserves the identity of its 
victim-narrators at a textual level through its use of the diffuse identificatory model.  
If appropriation occurs, it does so once the collaborative texts produced by Eggers 
and his disempowered collaborators circulate within human rights culture. At this 
point, the carefully crafted discursive space of the text is intersected by the various 
competing discourses with which the cross-cultural encounters portrayed in Eggers’s 
non-testimonial fictional works are confronted. Like the fate of the ideals of an open, 
egalitarian public sphere imagined by cosmopolitan theorists in these narratives, the 
 250 
transition from the careful and considered affective engagement cultivated by the 
author’s collaborative testimonial work into the extra-textual instability of the global 
public sphere does not inspire confidence. Taken out of the safe space created by the 
text and paratext, Eggers’s relationship with disempowered others must struggle not to 
be defined by a culture that is liable to treat them fundamentally differently, despite the 
common humanity upon which the personal narrative’s endeavour is based.  
The extra-textual life of Zeitoun makes for a good case in point. The artistic success of 
the text in rendering its abused protagonist as a compelling, relatable human being to 
whom the text seeks to extend rights earned the author plaudits, some of which spread 
to the charity set up in Zeitoun’s name as a means of resolving the lack of intercultural 
understanding that lay at the heart of his ordeal. Once the protagonist was revealed to 
be a more complex and less likeable character, however, as I discussed in the second 
chapter, the rights-work being performed by the narrative’s success fell down. The 
Zeitoun Foundation was closed down as a result of mounting criticism and the author 
now refuses to speak about Zeitoun or to answer any questions about the issues 
concerning its protagonist and its charity.18 John Simerman of the Times-Picayune, a New 
Orleans-based newspaper, picked up the story and wrote that the entire situation leaves 
Eggers in what he calls a “literary pickle” over his “tender depiction” of Zeitoun’s story. 
The author recovered from this ordeal, however, and continues to publish successful 
novels and, through his popularity and success, fund further human rights-work, such 
as the Voice of Witness series. The energy and activism relating directly to Zeitoun’s 
story, however, ran out of steam as a result of the scandal surrounding its protagonist, 
even if racial profiling is no less of an issue because of it. This shows that while the 
 
                                                     
18 The previous discussion of Victoria Patterson’s article for Salon.com is an example of how the abuse of the 
victim’s rights can be disqualified because they are unable to live up to the strictly defined role of absolute 
innocence allotted to disempowered subjects in human rights culture. Edward Champion writes about Eggers’s 
refusal to comment on the situation in an article for Edrants.com, which also has a video of the author avoiding 
the question at a book award ceremony (“Dave Eggers, National Book Award Finalist, Refuses to Asnwer About 
Abdulrahman Zeitoun’s Violent Assaults”). The website also ran an investigation by the same author into the 
Zeitoun Foundation’s lack of transparency with regard to how it spent its donations (“The Zeitoun 
Foundation’s Finances: An Investigation”). 
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privileged Western author claims credit for and builds on the success of Zeitoun, the risk 
lies entirely with its disempowered protagonist. Much as the crimes Zeitoun actually 
committed make him less likeable as a character, that does not make the crimes for 
which he was wrongfully detained and for which his rights were abused any less wrong. 
Nevertheless, Zeitoun’s rights claim and recognition, both for himself and others 
affected by similar racial discrimination, hinge on his ability to perform the role of 
absolute innocence imposed by human rights culture. At the same time, however, the 
author’s ability to fund future rights-work or indeed advance his own literary career are 
seemingly bound by no such restrictions. 
Finally, it is worth considering the fate of the rights-work performed by What Is the 
What, as its protagonist has not been affected by a similar scandal but has nonetheless 
run into the limitations of the energy and momentum generated by personal narratives 
within human rights culture. In this case too, the author’s accumulated socio-cultural 
capital, facilitated by his sole authorship on the book’s cover, ensures his continued 
support for worthy human rights causes as well as the success of his future output. The 
Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, however, must fight a perpetual battle for salience, 
made harder now that the initial burst of interest following the publication of What Is 
the What a decade ago has somewhat faded. The website for the foundation speaks of 
“[f]inancial strains and subsequent austerity measures” (“Foundation History”), and this 
at a time when South Sudan is faced with renewed political turmoil impacting on the 
foundation’s work: “political turmoil in South Sudan directly affects market supply and 
demand, which raises price [sic] of local commodities. The political unrest has made it 
more expensive to access and transport goods during the school year” (“Foundation 
History”). The issue here is once again that the privileged author’s work is not affected 
by the human rights crisis to which he helps testify, whereas the disempowered 
subject’s ability to address that crisis is undermined by its being perpetuated. Even if 
Deng’s position in South Sudan has markedly improved for the better, as he is now the 
minister for education in the Northern region of Bahr el-Ghazal, his effectiveness is still 
largely determined by the extent to which he can maintain his salience and success in 
the West. Eggers’s What Is the What and Zeitoun thus are undoubtedly successful in 
gaining recognition for their respective protagonists’ rights-claims at an inter-personal 
level through the deft deployment of the text’s discursive space. However, once this 
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collaborative commitment enters the global public sphere, it becomes clear that author 
and subject follow markedly different trajectories and that the latter’s benefit remains 
both temporary and marginal.  
An analysis of Eggers’s fictional works helped bring this into focus, as those works 
tend to foreground the fraught nature of cross-cultural encounters. They do so by 
creating discursive spaces in which those well-intentioned encounters are played out 
within a global public sphere intersected by unequal power dynamics and neo-colonial 
prejudices. In You Shall Know Our Velocity, the protagonist’s humanitarian impulses are 
consistently recast as hierarchy-reinforcing charity that close down any opportunity for 
cross-cultural engagement. As a result, Will and Hand remain oblivious to the 
particularity of the disempowered subjects they encounter, who in turn cast the 
protagonists in the role of the typical American humanitarian and activist rather than 
seeing them for the troubled individuals they are. In “Up the Mountain Coming Down 
Slowly,” Rita’s cross-cultural dialogue with Kassim is even more explicitly inflected by 
neo-colonial thinking to such an extent that she is made blind for most of the story to 
the forces of inequality that disenfranchise him. Once she recovers some of her 
humanitarian intentions from these detrimental inflections, moreover, she finds herself 
powerless to address what she now understands as being the major challenges facing 
the disempowered subjects she encounters during her hike. Finally, my analysis of A 
Hologram for the King brings into focus how the global public sphere remains haunted by 
its neo-colonial foundations so long as it does not have a strong narrative able to 
challenge and supplant it. The protagonist embodies this point. Alan’s weakness as a 
character in this respect is what causes him to be consistently recast as the powerful, 
interventionist, and malignant force he no longer feels he is, leaving him impotent with 
regard to how he should engage with others.  
Chief amongst the subversive complications brought into focus by these analyses, 
therefore, is the persistence of neo-colonial modes of thinking that reinforce or 
reinstate at every turn those barriers that the rights-claiming process seeks to break 
down. Closely related to this are the strictly defined roles of the innocent victim, heroic 
activist, and evil villain that actors in human rights culture must take up 
unambiguously. These roles easily slot into the familiar hierarchical thinking in which 
the subaltern is deprived of agency and becomes a speechless vessel for the privileged’s 
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charitable impulses. By throwing these points into relief, it became possible to trace the 
extent to which his collaborative testimonial work is affected by the same problems. 
What Is the What, for all its careful management of the type of empathy it engenders, 
channels its narrative efforts through two intersecting storylines in which Valentino 
takes up the role of the unheard victim. This is not to deny that Eggers’s well-crafted 
narrative presents the victim in such a way that Valentino is made to represent more 
than the sum of the victimization he describes. However, as the protagonist himself 
explains, he understands that the function of his personal narrative is to emphasize his 
victimhood by phrasing his suffering in a predetermined code. The danger is, as I have 
argued, that once this code is taken out of its textual context, it will be deciphered 
differently by a global rights culture that is not designed to counteract modes of 
interpretation that read Deng’s narrative in terms of far less fruitful discourses. Indeed, 
while detaching Valentino from the stock image of the African-in-need may be 
productive as part of the textual process to imagine a postnational and affectively 
valuable identity for the character, it may subsequently leave the protagonist unable to 
claim his full humanity outside the text given that, as Slaughter argues, nation states 
are still at the heart of the rights-claiming process. Zeitoun is particularly affected by 
this, as it relies heavily on human rights’ conception of a shared humanity entitled to 
certain universal rights. As such, my discussion reveals the broader extent to which the 
carefully crafted textual space in which privileged readers and disempowered subjects 
meet clashes with the less accommodating extra-textual reality into which personal 
narratives inevitably must reach if they are to effect real change. 
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Conclusion 
It has become abundantly clear that Eggers’s oeuvre and activism are deeply bound up 
with the prominent discourse of human rights. Whether it be the Amnesty International 
Chair with which I began this dissertation or the explicit labelling of the Voice of 
Witness series as a human rights project, Eggers’s (extra-)textual activism confirms the 
notion that human rights, as a prominent legal-political framework, shapes author-
activism in the contemporary American cultural field. It is tempting to focus exclusively 
on the ways in which his activism is shaped by the human rights project. In this sense, 
recent scholarship in the field of human rights and literature provides a cue for a 
reconceptualization of human rights as comprising a significant cultural dimension. 
This culture includes the field within which personal narratives such as Eggers’s 
circulate in service of the human rights movement, as well as the opportunities and 
restrictions placed upon those narratives by the tenets of that movement. 
However, if recent scholarship has focused on the ways in which such activism is 
shaped by the culture of human rights, this study has uncovered a more multifarious 
and mutually inflecting relationship. It demonstrated that he also positions himself and 
his works within that culture in a way that allows him to serve better those 
disempowered others whose voices and rights he seeks to amplify. My analyses have 
highlighted how Eggers engineers the narrative voice, focalization, motifs, and dramatic 
tension in his collaborative testimonial works as a means of directing the reader’s 
engagement with the text’s affective charge. Often, these interventions are geared 
towards preventing appropriative or hierarchy-reinforcing readings that would reinsert 
the eminently inter-personal aspect of such narratives into abstracted neo-colonial 
stereotypes. At the same time, Eggers’s efforts to preserve and facilitate the capacity of 
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the individual human being’s story to effect real change coincides with the core 
principles of human rights culture. The complexity of this relationship between Eggers 
and human rights, the nexus of which is the connection between narrative form and the 
politics of rights, explains how it is that he can be said to contribute to the human rights 
project. 
In doing so, Eggers shows a marked preference for the personal narrative form, 
through which he believes broader crises can be illuminated and individual rights can 
be (re)claimed. He contends that “[y]ou have to focus on the day-to-day work as 
opposed to the theoretical and more frustrating work, where you know what needs to 
change but cannot effect that change” (qtd. in Bex and Craps 567). The historical 
comparison to previous uses of the personal narrative as a rights-claiming tool in the 
nineteenth century by (former) slaves threw up intriguing parallels and differences in 
this respect. Contemporary victim-subjects are engaged in a struggle for salience and 
recognition both rendered possible and at times more difficult by the central tenets of 
human rights culture. Eggers’s role in this process is critical as a means of making the 
narrative amenable to a Western audience, but also risks obfuscating the very reasons 
his intervention is necessary. Whereas Douglasss’, Jacobs’s, Washington’s, and – perhaps 
most of all – Du Bois’s adaptation of narrative form for political ends proved remarkably 
similar, it was also clear that they saw the personal narrative as a means of addressing 
precisely those “theoretical” and systemic concerns that Eggers claims to treat 
peripherally. If narrative is thus an essential part of the politics of rights, the form of 
that narrative betrays the treacherous road towards social, cultural, and political 
change treaded by individual subjects and their testimonies 
The rest of the author’s oeuvre, such as You Shall Know Our Velocity or A Hologram for 
the King, exposed the risks of operating under the radar of such theoretical or systemic 
concerns. This constituted a significant qualification to the positive story of the 
mutually beneficial engagement between human rights and Eggers. It became apparent 
that the flaws, problems, and obstacles of the human rights project necessarily weigh on 
the type of cross-cultural engagement upon which the author’s activism relies. This 
tempers the enthusiasm expressed by Eggers about the extent to which his highly 
personalized activism, in the form of personal narratives, can bypass the seemingly 
immutable systemic problems that spawn human rights crises, by focusing attention on 
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individual victims and their right to rights. Fundamentally, this dissertation has focused 
on this discrepancy between the success Eggers can achieve at that day-to-day level by 
harnessing, as Voice of Witness would have it, the power of the story and the limits of 
that success in the face of extra-textual forces that threaten to overpower the text’s role 
within a global public sphere of which human rights culture is only a part. 
Chapter one sought carefully to embed Eggers within a broad conception of human 
rights that included the cultural dimension against which the author’s texts are clearly 
positioned. If Eggers’s collaborative testimonial work for Zeitoun, What Is the What, or the 
Voice of Witness series earned him Ghent University’s Amnesty International Chair in 
2015, this chapter explained why that work warranted the label of human rights 
activism in the first place. In order to do so, it proved useful to consider the differences 
between legal-political iterations of human rights and cultural engagement with the 
ideas of the human rights project. Despite sharing the basic premise of universal rights, 
it became clear that there is a distinctive human rights culture whose practices differ 
from more formalized legal structures that govern international human rights law. By 
writing the individual traumas of victims as violations of a person’s basic rights, Eggers 
clearly subscribes to human rights culture’s core practice of using the testimonies of 
disempowered subjects to affectively engage readers and recruit them in the push to 
effect change on their behalf. At the same time, Eggers’s embedding in human rights 
culture raised questions as to what the impact is of such privileged mediation on the 
relationship between rights-bearers and disempowered others. 
The second chapter took up these questions by considering Eggers’s use of the 
personal narrative in a historical sense, comparing it to canonical slave narratives by 
Douglass and Jacobs as well as instances of black authorship and activism after 
Emancipation by Washington and Du Bois. On a textual and paratextual level, this 
chapter mapped a number of critical formal continuities in “deep time” that mark the 
personal narrative’s use as a rights-space creating tool. As far as the personal narrative 
is concerned, the adaptation of these formal continuities, such as latching on to popular 
narrative patterns in the Bildungsroman or the familiar affective dimension of the 
sentimental novel, is intricately linked to the social and political struggle for rights. In 
the contemporary context, however, Eggers engages in particular with the formal 
affordances of human rights culture, which stipulates, validates, and seeks to guarantee 
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a specific narrative path to salience for testifying victims in order for them to advocate 
their own and similar victims’ rights. On an extra-textual level, the limits of the 
personal narrative’s narrative force came up against the silencing dynamics of the 
rights-bearing community whose affect and engagement it seeks to broker. In their own 
ways, the well-intentioned and necessary interventions by abolitionists and Eggers alike 
adversely impacted on the disempowered subject’s ability to articulate fully their rights-
claim, even as it provided them with the necessary platform and salience to be heard.  
Chapter three homed in on the mechanics of affect in Eggers’s personal narratives in 
order to see how they confronted these extra-textual concerns at a textual level. I 
concluded that his personal narratives cultivate forms of identification that lead away 
from appropriation or hierarchy-reinforcing sympathy. In What Is the What, the 
relationship between the text and paratext as well as the intriguing narrative middle 
voice of Valentino made up a series of compelling identificatory cues that encouraged 
the reader to inhabit the space of Valentino’s trauma without appropriating his voice or 
victimhood. The Voice of Witness series, in turn, consistently checked the reader’s 
identificatory impulses by weaving a complex tapestry of voices testifying to their lived 
experiences of a single human rights crisis. As a result of this, the diffuse identification 
stimulated by collections such as Out of Exile or Voices from the Storm invites readers to 
create a diverse and intricate picture of recent crises in South Sudan and New Orleans 
respectively. Zeitoun goes furthest when it comes to directing the reader’s affective 
engagement with the testimonial subject, providing multiple narrative perspectives on 
his story as well as two versions of the protagonist that are difficult to reconcile 
affectively. In this case, the disidentification caused by the bifurcated plot navigates the 
reader towards identifying with Zeitoun as the “human” in human rights, whose rights 
deserve protecting, while emphasizing the unavailability of his victim-experiences for 
straightforward identification. In each of these cases, however, problems persisted with 
regard to allowing the reader to deny their complicity in the crises to which the 
narratives testify. Similarly, the extra-textual issues by which a narrative such as Zeitoun 
is beset negatively inflect the careful textual work conducted by the story. These issues 
expose the precariousness of relying on texts and stories as cornerstones of human 
rights culture. If Eggers’s oeuvre shows the power of narrative form in relation to the 
politics of rights, it also exposes its vulnerability to countervailing extra-textual forces. 
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The final chapter is devoted precisely to mapping some of the countervailing 
discourses with which human rights culture contends in the global public sphere, and 
which are poignantly played out in Eggers’s fictional works. These works confront the 
type of cross-cultural engagement imagined in Eggers’s collaborative testimonial work 
with the impact countervailing discourses have on each party in such a cosmopolitan 
dialogue. You Shall Know Our Velocity stages cross-cultural encounters in which Western 
charity comes to inflect negatively the broader rapprochement sought after by a human 
rights project intent on equalising the relationship between the West and the rest. It is 
especially significant that the two protagonists, Will and Hand, find that they are unable 
to overcome the existing roles that are stock-in-trade of neo-colonialism in approaching 
disempowered others. Rita’s experiences in “Up the Mountain Coming Down Slowly” are 
marred by these same neo-colonial resonances, even as she confronts them after the 
fact and thereby prompts the reader to reflect on how blind she had been to the nature 
of the inequality she encountered on her hike. This is all the more poignant because, 
throughout the story, Rita is shown to be kind-hearted and actively seeks to engage 
with others, much like the protagonists in You Shall Know Our Velocity. As such, blindness 
to the realities of inequality in these works stems not from a lack of individual 
compassion on the part of their protagonists, but from the way in which their cultural 
background and perceptions obfuscate inequality by supplanting egalitarian forms of 
engagement with self-satisfying acts of charity. Relatedly, the discursive space of A 
Hologram for the King imagines a global public sphere in which characters are seemingly 
unmoored from their national cultures with their attendant hierarchies. Even in this 
setting, however, the stock characters and roles of neo-colonialism continue to 
reimpose themselves. The novel exposes the lack of discursive tools available to the 
characters that would allow them to transcend those exclusionary and divisive global 
frameworks into which current efforts to engage across cultural boundaries so easily 
slot. The question thereby emerged as to whether or not facilitating cross-cultural 
encounters is sufficient as a means of moving towards a more egalitarian public sphere, 
which can rise above the divisions that have defined it in the past. 
This contrast between the affective engagement suggested by the discursive spaces 
so meticulously crafted by the author and the more recalcitrant extra-textual global 
public sphere threw Eggers’s penchant for collaborative work into sharp relief. 
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Throughout chapters two and three, the collaborative process emerged as providing 
hindrances and opportunities as a result of its complex layering of agency, authorship, 
and subjectivity. At the same time, a diachronic understanding of collaborative 
testimonial work raised questions about the extent to which the disempowered subject 
is also competing with the privileged author when it comes to accumulating the 
necessary and sustained socio-cultural capital to effect change. This is where the clash 
between the cosmopolitan faith in an open, egalitarian global public sphere and the 
failed cross-cultural encounters imagined in Eggers’s fictional works come into play. 
Often, the favourable aspects of cross-cultural engagement in his work remain silent, as 
if to symbolize the extent to which verbalizing them within the global public sphere 
threatens their productivity and positive impact. This is the case both for Will’s silent 
monologues in You Shall Know Our Velocity, Rita’s revelatory insight at the end of “Up the 
Mountain Coming Down Slowly,” and Valentino’s silent stories throughout What Is the 
What.  
As soon as these characters try to move their positive insights and intentions beyond 
the realms of their imaginations, they turn sour. Will’s suffering becomes externalized 
in a hierarchy-reinforcing charity plot, Rita’s understanding of Kassim’s plight remains 
firmly grounded in a neo-colonial mode of thinking until the final scenes, and 
Valentino’s actual, non-silent conversations with Powder and Tonya debase the 
transnational sentiment cultivated elsewhere in the narrative. The way in which the 
reader is engaged by What Is the What and Zeitoun could be seen in a similar light, 
whereby the affective rights-work undertaken during the reading process is 
painstakingly managed, but the aftermath of that reading process is less certain and 
more precarious. This was brought out quite specifically when it became clear that both 
the author and disempowered subject play for different stakes following the publication 
of their collaborative work. Readers are happy to accept Eggers’s efforts in telling 
Deng’s or Zeitoun’s story as evidence of his literary brilliance and kind-heartedness, 
upon which basis his continued success and future activism is assured. The 
disempowered subject, however, must continue to struggle for salience against the 
forces that continuously seek to re-silence them.  
In this respect, the privileged reader’s insight and recognition of that subject may not 
prove to be enough to overcome the countervailing discourses that render the suffering 
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of others invisible or denies their importance. It remains unclear, in short, whether or 
not the affective momentum generated by successful cross-cultural collaborations at a 
textual level with privileged readers survives the transition into a book market and, 
more broadly, a human rights culture mediated by privileged actors. This conclusion 
suggests, therefore, that the relationship between human rights culture and literature 
that has risen to prominence deserves additional scrutiny to take into account the way 
in which it is inflected by other social, cultural, and political forces. As I have argued, 
this leads in part to considering human rights culture’s lacking ability to confront and 
subvert the detrimental modes of thinking that undermine it at every turn. If in recent 
years the understanding of human rights has broadened to include the cultural 
dimensions of the human rights project, as Eggers’s oeuvre illustrates, this dissertation 
shows that it is imperative for that broader conception of human rights and its 
attendant textual activism to be studied in conjunction with the rest of the global public 
sphere. 
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